Is there something morally wrong with cultural appropriation in the arts? I argue that the little philosophical work on this topic has been overly dismissive of moral objections to cultural appropriation. Nevertheless, I argue that philosophers working on epistemic injustice have developed powerful conceptual tools that can aid in our understanding of objections that have been levied by other scholars and artists. I then consider the relationship between these objections and the harms of cultural essentialism. I argue that focusing on the systematic nature of appropriative harms may allow us to sidestep the problem of essentialism, but not without cost. —Keywords: culture, appropriation, epistemic injustice, harmful speech, social marginalization, essentialism, misrepresentation, art —Citation: Matthes, Erich Hatala. "Cultural Appropriation Without Cultural Essentialism?" Social Theory and Practice, Vol 42, No.2 (April 2016): 343-366.