Cultural Vibrations:
Measuring the Dominant Creative Class in Times of Conflict:
West Jerusalem 2014 to 2016, A Case Study

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Chapter One

Introduction

“The opposite of art is not ugliness, it is indifference.”1 – Elie Wiesel

1.0 Introduction:

When walking in Jerusalem one cannot help but notice the presence of political and religious street art. Slogans, portraits of political and religious figures, ironic political statements, and religious symbols are spray painted, hung, or plastered in public view. For instance, one artist is infamous for painting mural portraits of important public figures such as Albert Einstein (Image One) and Maimonides (Image Two), as well as less known minority leaders of the ultra-orthodox or Palestinian sects (Image Three). Other artists paint verses from the Hebrew Bible, or spray stencils of Israeli heroes such as Moshe Dayan (Image Four) and Theodore Herzl. A well-known graffiti tag, ‘Na Nach’ (Image Five), is used as a rally cry by a sub group of Breslover Hasidim2, meant to recruit Jewish people back to their traditional ways. Still another artist has sprayed elementary Arab words, and beneath it the Hebrew translation and phonetic spelling (Image Six).3

At first glance the city seems to be peppered with political expression originating from authentic roots of civil society- the artisan social commentators. However, upon reflection, one comes to notice that much of the paint is chipped, and the political commentary is no longer relevant to contemporary issues. According to Ron, a city-planning official in Jerusalem, the

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2 See Daniel Treiman, 2007 for more information regarding the Na Nach graffiti.
3 See images in Appendix D
decline in street art (and in individually commissioned cultural pieces) can be traced back to around the time of the 2014 Operation Protective Edge (Gaza Conflict).  

It is puzzling that a population having just achieved renewed dominant status, simultaneously experiences a decline in private political-cultural participation, specifically through street art. The following question arises: does the presence of a people’s own military induce or reduce those same peoples’ political-cultural participation. Specifically, how did the increased activity of the IDF during the summer of 2014 Operation Protective Edge influence political-cultural street art in West Jerusalem?

2.0 Literature Review:

This study is grounded in two schools of academic literature: 1) the social and political importance of artistic expression in the public sphere, and 2) artistic expression in times of conflict. In the following literature review we shall first consider the social and political importance of artistic expression in an effort to determine under what circumstances is street art an authentic expression of civil discourse and an accurate measure of public opinion. Next, we shall consider what happens to civil expression and public discourse through street art, in times of conflict.

2.1 Artistic Expression in the Public Sphere:

In order to understand street art as public dialogue through artistic means, we must first gain a better understanding of: the public sphere, those who contribute art to the public sphere-the creative class, art as public dialogue, and street art as a unique form of social and political commentary.

2.11 The Public Sphere

4 Ron, in-person formal interview, 2017.
In his innovative work, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (1962), Jürgen Habermas lays necessary foundations that define the public sphere in modern terms. Habermas coins the term *public sphere* as the realm in which ‘something approaching public opinion is formed’ - a place of cohabitation accessible to all members of civil society.

Habermas anchors the birth of the modern (individual based) public sphere in the salons and coffee shops of seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe. The concept of a public sphere dates back to ancient western civilizations and can be found in the words of Aristotle. Habermas’ key contribution is his act of disengaging the public sphere from the representative authority. Throughout the middle ages the public sphere, though inhabited by the masses, belonged to the ruling class, causing the masses to define themselves and their actions in terms of the ruling class. Thus, prior to the reformation the public sphere was “directly linked to the concrete existence of a ruler.”

‘Private’ versus ‘public’ spheres only became relevant with the disintegration of feudal authority (triggered by the seventeenth century Protestant Reformation). Religion became a private matter, and the Church became just one authority among many public institutions. The re-public (representative public, or authoritative sphere) that previously represented the masses

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8 *Politics*, Book II

9 Peter Weibel, Global Activism: Art and Conflict in the 21st Century (Karlsruhe, Germany: ZKM, Center for Art and Media, 2015).48-49

10 Jürgen Habermas, Sara Lennox, and Frank Lennox. "The Public Sphere: An Encyclopedia Article (1964)." (New German Critique, no. 3:1974). 51
became obsolete to large segments of the population. And so the liberal (modern) public sphere formed as “an all inclusive site of un-coerced discussion and opinion formation, a place that transcends politics, commerce, private interests, and even state control”\textsuperscript{11}

2.12 Inhabiting the Public Sphere

As defined above, the body of the public sphere is understood as comprising of a collective of individual members of civil society- a public grouping of private citizens, actions, expressions, etc. For the purposes of this study we will consider those members of civil society who practice artistic expression within the confines of the public sphere as artisan social commentators (loosely related to members of the creative class).

Author Richard Florida, in his book, \textit{The Rise of the Creative Class} (2006), introduces the notion of a \textit{creative-class}. The creative-class is considered to be those groups of individuals who contribute innovation, creativity, and technological advancement, correlating with rapid economic growth, which in turn adds momentum to cultural development.\textsuperscript{12} This concept of a creative-class is not directly applicable to the study at hand seeing as not all members of the creative class are artists, and not all artists are members of the creative class. Indeed Florida applies his concept of the creative class to members of the professional sphere in post-industrialized societies and is more concerned with the creative class’s influential role in the social distribution of economic resources. Still, Florida’s argument is useful in highlighting some of the characteristics of the modern urban artists: their motivations, habitat, and behavioral patterns. Of particular relevance is Florida’s attempt to consider and define those members of society who foster and contribute culture, through innovation, artistic creation, and public

\textsuperscript{11} W. J. T. Mitchell, Art and the Public Sphere (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.).3
expression. This study will apply the concept of the creative class to define those artisan social commentators fostering culture through public artistic expression in Jerusalem.

As mentioned above, the public sphere is a space that transcends political, economic, and private interests. It is important therefore to discuss what it means if an artist’s public expression is practiced in collaboration with political, religious, or commercial institutions. For instance, if an artist either applies for a government grant, or is nominated through committee selection, to contribute works of art to the public sphere- is that work of art an authentic voice of the artists in a public sphere? On the one hand, the involvement of the governing authority in producing the artistic expression, calls into questions the authenticity of the public expression as the artist’s individual contribution. On the other hand, the artist’s compliance, and in some cases desire, to collaborate with the governing authority is arguably an authentic aspect of the artist’s expression.

Penny Bach reconciles this dilemma by constructing the concept of the artist-citizen. According to Bach the artist-citizen works with the various social institutions (be they governmental, religious, commercial, or private) to bring art into public space. The following excerpt best represents Bach’s argument that artist-citizens work can be regarded as authentic public expressions so long as they spark individual reflection and productive public discourse:

The integrity of the artist is brought by a wholeness brought by the artist [sic.] to the public art project; it is not determined by it. Creative inquiry, supported by the artist’s rich sense of exploration and experience over time, informs the public art process. It cannot be protected; it is intrinsic. The integrity of the process is reflected by a soundness of method, one that articulates and interprets the goals of the project is open to change and variation, creates a sense of agreement between the goals of the artist and those of the community, and empowers the public by identifying opportunities for discourse and discovery.¹³

Bach argues that by infusing public spaces with meaningful artistic content, the artist-citizen creates opportunity for individual spectators to engage in meaningful public discourse.

Ultimately, it is at the discretion of the artist to preserve the authenticity of their voice and the wholesome nature of their work, while working with communities and institutions. In conclusion, Bach argues, “we ought to place the highest value on the integrity of the artist who helps us see, think, respond, and react to the elements of our time and space.” By trusting the integrity of each individual artist, we might understand artists-institutional collaborations (such as with government organizations) as authentic expressions of the artist’s perceptions of society.

2.13 Art and Politics:

“The opinion that art should have nothing to do with politics is itself a political attitude.”
- (G. Orwell, 1946)

Murray Edelman presents a comprehensive theoretical argument defining the scope of what he believes is the complex causal relationship between art and politics; all art is relevant (and in one way or another, influences) the political sphere. According to Edelman, “art is the fountainhead from which political discourse, beliefs about politics, and consequent actions ultimately spring.” Edelman argues that the social sciences, and political science in particular, must consider artistic expression as a real influence on a society’s political and cultural opinions and ideology. The following section will consider several links between art and politics: art as iconographic propaganda, composing collective narratives, preserving collective memory, and critical social-political reflection through art and humor.

One circumstance in which art and politics interact is in cases of propaganda, iconography, and religious, political, or cultural symbolism. In the following passage, Read considers art as a tool for reinforcing ethnic, cultural, and political ideology. According to

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14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
17 It is important here to distinguish between propaganda in general, and government sponsored propaganda.
Herbert Read, “it is characteristic of such works of art [religious, political iconography or idolatry] that they are not disinterested creations…”\(^{18}\) In fact, these religious and political iconographies utilize visual expression and symbolism to communicate, thereby reinforcing an idea or set of beliefs.\(^{19}\) Mia Gröndahl demonstrates this argument in her piece, ‘Gaza Graffiti’, in which she explores the role of religious calligraphy-based street art in Gaza as a means of propagating political affiliation.\(^{20}\) In this instance the art serves as a form of idolatry or symbolic propaganda; the substantive content of the iconography is therefore the coercive factor, whereas the medium of expression is simply the material form of relation.

While public (and private) art play a role in inspiring nationalism, composing narrative, and preserving collective memory, artistic expression can also serve the purpose of critiquing the establishment. “The explicitly critical, disruptive, or satiric work may, at certain moments, open up a site of public experience that approximates universal inclusiveness and collective emotion.”\(^{21}\) In this passage Mitchell describes how public art can, through satire and humor, break down social barriers and prompt interactions in the public space. The satirical and disruptive nature of the social commentary invites spectators to the discussion, while the political or social content reinforces social ties, and strengthens collective emotion.

American comedian, Will Ferrell, in his 2017 commencement address to the graduates of the University of Southern California, considers just how his art acts as this form, “my role on this show, Saturday Night Live, is to hold up a mirror to our political leaders and engage in

\(^{19}\) Ibid.
\(^{20}\) Mia Gröndahl, Gaza Graffiti: Messages of Love and Politics (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2009).
\(^{21}\) W. J. T. Mitchell, Art and the Public Sphere (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.). 19
satirical reflection.\textsuperscript{22} The public sphere allows the artist to play an integral role in providing satirical reflection of political realities.

2.14 Street Art: Definitions and Scholarly Contributions:

“Street art, in essence, connotes a decentralized, democratic form in which there is universal access, and the real control of messages comes from the social producers. It is a barometer that measures the spectrum of thinking.” - (Chaffee, 1993: 4)

This study will use the terms ‘street art’ and ‘graffiti’ interchangeably. The main reason to distinguish between street art and graffiti is to ensure that no ‘non-art’ will mistakenly be considered in the analysis. But the line between graffiti that is art and graffiti that is not art is widely contested in both social science and art history disciplines seeing as an empirical distinction would require an accepted definition of the term art in and of itself.\textsuperscript{23} In the interest of not falling down the rabbit hole of a centuries old debate\textsuperscript{24}, this study will consider all public scratchings\textsuperscript{25} contributed by members of the creative class as viable data points for analysis.

Since the rise of urban graffiti in the 1960s an increasing number of social science studies have considered street art as a measure of public [often times political] opinion.\textsuperscript{26} The argument for urban street art as a legitimate vehicle of political, social, or personal expression is rooted in a body of literature that considers art a social commentary and/or propagation of a certain ideology or opinion.\textsuperscript{27} According to one study, “[graffiti] provide[s] accurate indicators of local attitudes

\textsuperscript{22} Will Ferrell, 2017
\textsuperscript{24} For more information on the history of the scholarly debate concerning the definition of art please refer to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “The Definition of Art”
\textsuperscript{25} The term graffiti originates from the Italian ‘graffito’- an ancient term used to characterize the scratchings on the city walls (arguably to first forms of graffiti).
\textsuperscript{27} Murray Jacob Edelman, From Art to Politics: How Artistic Creations Shape Political Conceptions (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2003).
and social process in areas where more direct measurement is difficult.”  

In other words, through graffiti and street art spectators may gain an authentic understanding of the social and political realities of any given society.

Lyman Chaffee’s analysis of street art in Latin America, echoes this sentiment and highlights the importance of democratic contexts in which street art should be created, in order to ensure an authentic representation of civil society’s true opinions. As quoted from Chaffee, “Street art, in essence, connotes a decentralized, democratic form in which there is universal access, and the real control of messages comes from the social producers. It is a barometer that measures the spectrum of thinking.” Chaffee highlights the relationship between democratic contexts and free, public expression. Notably, in democratic contexts, control of the content of the messages is in the hands of the ‘social producers’, or civil society. Therefore, street art, when interpreted in democratic contexts, is an authentic measure of public opinion.

Building on this literature, international scholars have analyzed urban street art in ethnically or nationally contested areas in order to gain insight into a certain conflict, territorial, or social dominance. These scholars, and others, highlight the use of religious, cultural, historical, and ethnic symbols, relevant to the region, in deciphering political affiliation. The use of symbolism and iconography in street art builds on the previous discussion (see section

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2.13) that considers the role of art in cultivating, enforcing, or influencing a dominant collective narrative.

2.2 Arts and Culture in Times of Conflict:

In the previous section we defined civil societies’ self-determined public street art as instances of authentic social or political dialogue. In the following section we will consider literature discussing the nature of this dialogue when those members of the civil society and/or the public sphere in which they inhabit, experiences conflict.

2.2.1 Artistic Expression as Resistance

“Because it can be ahead of general opinion, art becomes controversial at such times, and in some measure becomes symbolic of rebellion and dissent.”

- (Edelman, 1995: 20)

Public art produced during times of oppression and/or revolution has become a popular theme in modern art history, psychology, sociology, and political science literatures. Some case studies focus on social revolution, or activism, including the posters, museum exhibitions, poetry etc. associated with the feminist movement that took place in the United States in the late twentieth century, and still continues today. For instance, the Guerrilla Girls movement founded in New York City, in 1985, or the mass reproductions of “Rosie the Riveter” poster are classic examples of culture jamming (a tactic meant to subvert mainstream media and foster progressive social change). More recent works include graffiti by Russian artist, Mikaela, who applies a stencil graffiti technique to spray portraits of revolutionary female figures.

Within this broad literature is a series of studies that focus exclusively on the politically (culturally, ethnically, or nationally) oppressed and their efforts to subvert dominance through

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32 guerrillagirls.com
artistic expression. In this case, art serves multiple purposes: a communicative purpose (similar to the culture jamming cited above), a therapeutic purpose, heritage preservation, and in many cases, represents acts of revolt.

In his seminal works, *Domination and the Art of Resistance*, and *Weapons of the Weak*, James C. Scott discusses his theories of subaltern forms of resistance in which he describes everyday attempts to deter colonialism and extreme oppression. According to Scott, colonized and oppressed segments of society subvert the dominant power through composing a ‘hidden transcript.’ The ‘hidden transcript’ is comprised of different elements of culture, from distinct garb, to cultural stories, theatrical productions, and material works of art.

A robust literature considers street art a unique form of resistance, often employed by oppressed peoples for the purpose of resistance and/or revolution. Some of these studies interpret graffiti as an example of what James Scott describes as a ‘hidden transcript.’ Other studies go so far as to consider the street art of revolutions to be distinctly public (as opposed to

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40 Lisa K. Waldner, and Betty A Dobratz.. "Graffiti as a Form of Contentious Political Participation." (Sociology Compass 7.5, 2013: 377-89).
In either case, the conflict is directly linked to the increased production of street art. Two such examples include: Lyman Chaffee’s study of political protest through street art in Hispanic countries, and Lewis Sanders IV (among many other scholars) analysis of the surge in street art in-and-around Tahrir Square during the Egyptian Revolution, in 2011. In both of these cases the authors define the production of street art as a response to conflict. The authors go so far as to argue that the commandeering of public space through art can be considered an act of resistance.

2.22 Artistic Expression Originating from Members of the Dominant Society

While there is a plethora of scholarship concerning artistic expression (specifically street art) as a form resistance, there is a dearth of literature considering what happens to the dominant creative class’s artistic expressions in times of conflict. Even the concept of ‘dominant artistic expression’ (artistic expressions that originate from the dominant, or sovereign segment of society) is grossly understudied in academic literatures. For instance, Sanders does recognize the ‘dominant’ narrative expressed through public artistic means, in the opening statements of his journal article. However he goes on to focus his piece solely on the street art originating from the marginalized and oppressed segment of society in terms of acts of resistance (against the dominant narrative). This is not to say that studying the artistic expressions of the subaltern class during times of conflict is in any way irrelevant. Indeed, at first glance it would seem that the street art of successful revolutions must be combed in an effort to identify which strengths led to the subaltern’s successful resilience and revolt. This is to say though that there is a blatant lack of

44 Ibid. 143
scholarly attention paid to modern day civil allegiance through artistic expression (in our case street art) with a dominant narrative, specifically when that dominant society is participating in conflict. This study seeks to fill this gap by surveying the nature of dominant artistic expression in times of conflict.

Though there is insufficient literature surveying dominant artistic expression in times of conflict, one may intuit based on the aforementioned literature, that a healthy dominant, democratic society would experience an increase in public artistic expression, especially in times of conflict. This artistic expression may either align, or reject the dominant narrative; in either case one, would think public expression, as a whole would increase. For instance, (as discussed above) public artistic expression plays an important role in enforcing a society’s collective memory. One might expect that as a dominant society grows stronger in a conflict, members of that society seek to define their collective narrative through increasing public expression in allegiance with the establishment. Alternatively, one may expect that as a dominant side grows stronger, members of the dominant society who do not agree with the establishment’s actions are more likely to publicly voice their opinions, especially in a democratic setting.45 For instance, Mark Twain considers acts of patriotism to be act out of loyalty to one’s country, not allegiance with one’s government, or ruling party.46 “You see my kind of loyalty was loyalty to ones country, not to its institutions or its officeholders.”47 With this definition of national loyalty in mind then even critical political commentary can be understood as originating from the

45 Ibid.
dominants’ patriotic ideology. Harris and Sherman’s Narratives of Dissent is one example in which Israeli society increase opposition rhetoric through public artistic expression as a direct response to the increasing IDF presence in Lebanon (post 1978). In this case, increased conflict correlates with increasing grassroots public artistic participation on behalf of the ‘dominant’ Israeli society.

*When Societies Go Silent- A Cultural Lull*

Indeed, one may expect a dominant society would increase public artistic participation at the grassroots level, during times of conflict. It is curious then that an official from the Jerusalem municipality would make the observation that grassroots public artistic participation declined around Operation Protective Edge during summer, 2014. Furthermore, explains the same Municipality official, the Jerusalem Municipality, in response to the decline in grassroots public artistic expression, has launched multiple campaigns and programs geared towards catalyzing artistic expression (regardless of content).

The following section shall consider why artisan creative class social commentators from the dominant society may go silent during times of conflict. First we shall consider instances of a-political state sponsorship of public artistic participation as an indicator that the artisan social commentators of that society have gone silent. Next, we shall consider two arguments that

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49 City Planning Official 1, personal communication
50 Here it is important to note that these state-sponsorships of the arts differ from government sponsored-propaganda both in their purpose and terms of cooperation. Government-sponsored propaganda serves a particular purpose- to reinforce a dominant narrative. The terms of the government commissioned artwork are clear: the artists will receive compensation in exchange for creating artwork that pledges allegiance (or reinforces) the dominant national, or ideological narrative. Scholars and private citizens alike consider this sort of government behavior to be a method of coercion, corrupt in nature and illegitimate in practice. But separate from political propaganda, government organizations may sponsor artworks in order to catalyze economic productivity, or social participation. These commissions are offered under more broad terms compared to propaganda commissions and serve a clear purpose other than to influence a particular social narrative. More importantly, these initiatives may indicate that the targeted society has gone silent.
highlight the relationship between silent artisan social commentators and conflict in a dominant society.

One way to identify a society lacking an adequate grassroots public expression is to evaluate how much government organizations provide (with the clear intent to catalyze public artistic expression) a-political incentives to private artists to increase artistic expression in that society. Two such cases include: The Federal Project Number One under the Work Progress Administration (WPA) relief effort during the Great Depression, and present day efforts on behalf of Iraqi security forces to incentivize creative endeavors, are two examples of government commissioned arts in response to their silent societies.

The Federal Project Number One under the Work Progress Administration (WPA) funding for the arts is an example of a government attempting to catalyze a dormant creative class. United State’s sponsorship of the arts specifically did not curate the content of the sponsored art. President Roosevelt wrestled with the implication of ideologically unconstrained state-sponsorship of the arts. “Roosevelt replied that he was interested in government sponsorship of the arts but didn’t want “a lot of young enthusiasts painting Lenin’s head on the Justice Building.”51 In the end, Roosevelt decided in favor of state-sponsored art. Roosevelt’s decision in favor or state-sponsored art, despite his hesitations concerning the potential anti-American sentiments that might ensue, is evidence that his motives were not political, nor ideational in nature.

A close examination of recent efforts on behalf of a joint initiative between the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Culture indicate that the Iraqi public has gone silent.

Kendall Bianchi discusses this in her article, ‘Why Iraqi Forces Are Promoting the Arts.’\textsuperscript{52} Bianchi argues that the Iraqi forces are investing in this initiative in effort to boost the general moral of civil society, in the hopes that this will boost moral in Iraqi troops. Grassroots public artistic participation had sustained healthy levels since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003. The Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Culture noticed a decrease in free artistic expression around the same time that ISIS swept through Mosul, in 2014. In this case, the joint government-ministry initiative may be an indication that Iraqi society has gone silent.

Societies may go silent for several reasons. Jutta Vinzent argues that in times of conflict each party in the conflict perceives itself as an oppressed collective:

“… something might have been dominant, but has, for whatever reason, become precarious; likewise, the dominant can be actor and brands something as precarious, probably something that is considered dangerous; thus it becomes unsecured, unstable, perilous and fragile.”\textsuperscript{53}

A spectator may perceive a society to be dominant based on past realities. However, any society (dominant or oppressed) experiencing conflict perceives itself in a precarious (fragile) state. This concept may be applied to Israeli society in Jerusalem during Operation Protective Edge. In this case, Israeli society in Jerusalem is perceived by the world to have achieved dominant status both prior to and throughout the operation. Once Israeli society enters into conflict (Operation Protective Edge) the collective perception of Israeli society’s perception of itself relative to Hamas and Fatah changes from status from dominant to fragile.

Vinzent’s theories of a society perceiving itself as precarious during times of conflict explain the perceived silence of Israeli artisan’s during Operation Protective Edge. For the sake


of argument we shall assume the Jerusalem Municipality official is correct in his observation that Israeli artisan social commentators went silent during the summer 2014 conflict. Then applying Vinzent’s logic, one would expect Israeli artisan society to resume public expression once the tide of the conflict turned clearly in their favor.

Another reason societies may go silent is that an authoritative figure is coercing civil society away from expressing their opinions in public. For instance, Lisa Wedeen, in her work *Ambiguities of Domination*, observes the ‘coercive apparatus.’ According to Wedeen dominant (in Wedeen’s case, authoritarian) regimes will use art as a coercive tool to reinforce political ideology. Similarly, art history and political science literature on early to mid-twentieth century Soviet Art is quick to attribute the dominant-narrative based artistic expressions to coercion by state means. Wedeen continues to argue that the state propaganda coerces society into silence, due either to fear, intimidation, or lack of spirit.

More relevant to this study is Eva Bellin’s theory of authoritarian coercion on behalf of a military apparatus. According to Bellin the extent of authoritarian coercion can be measured through a military’s capacity for violence, as well as their will to enforce policy through physical force (such as shooting or beating). The Israeli military and security apparatus coopts public space during times of violent conflict. In coopting public space the Israeli military and security apparatus coerces the creative class out of producing public art. This is a fear-based model of coercion.

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57 At this point it is imperative the reader understand I am not suggesting Israel is an authoritarian state. I am drawing on Bellin’s study, as I believe she presents a useful approach to measuring military
3.0 Hypothesis:

1. Increase in military presence in Jerusalem correlates with a decrease in dominants’ public artistic expression. In effect, I expect that the creative class will go silent.

2. The relationship between the increase in military and security dominance and decrease in creative class street art can be explained using the fear-based coercion model.

Based on the results of the first test this study shall consider the following:

a. If street arts trends increase during times of conflict this study shall reject Hypothesis 1.

b. If street art trends decrease during times of conflict we shall move on to testing the fear-based model in Hypothesis 2.

4.0 Outline:

The second chapter of my thesis presents a comprehensive background on the Israeli military and security apparatus. First this chapter expands on the theoretical foundations of dominance in terms of military and security capacity and will. Next this chapter discusses the history of Israel’s military and security apparatuses, from the time of the British Mandate, through the War of 1967. The final section of this chapter focuses on the Operation Protective Edge in summer 2014 and the Knifing Intifada in Jerusalem, 2014 to 2016. This section analyzes the increase in Israeli security and military apparatus dominance during this period.

In the third chapter of my thesis I shall test to see if the increase in military tension and presence during Operation Protective Edge (summer 2014), as described in chapter two, correlates with a significant increase or decrease in street art creation. I am measuring street art creation based on an image archive I am building (see section 5.0 Research Methodology for dominance (in terms of capacity and will). This study is centered on a puzzle of why would Israeli artists go silent during a time of conflict, given that they have freedom of expression. This assumes Israel is a democratic nation. This study, in its entirety, recognizes the State of Israel as a democratic nation.
further explanation). After testing this correlation I move on to discussing the accuracy of a fear-based model of coercion in explaining a cultural lull and creative class silence during 2014-2016. I test the accuracy of the fear-based model against qualitative evidence in the form of interviews that I conducted within the context of this study.

The fourth chapter of my thesis presents a background on culture in West Jerusalem. This chapter shall draw on archival, anecdotal, and scholarly sources to describe public art and culture in West Jerusalem from the end of the second intifada (February 2005) until the beginning of Operation Protective Edge (summer 2014). I hope to understand the causal connection between the correlations I have discovered. I shall reference a series of interviews with a selection of Jerusalem street artists, private cultural non-for-profit organizations, and Jerusalem Municipality officials. Through this qualitative analysis I seek to gain a better understanding of the street artists’ experiences prior to, during, and post Operation Protective Edge and the Knifing Intifada.

The final chapter will discuss the extendibility of my findings to other society’s post conflict relations between military forces and artistic classes.

5.0 Research Methodology:

5.1 Image Archive:

In order to test my Hypothesis 1 I am building an image archive of West Jerusalem street art; catalogued according to the (approximate) time period the street art was created (‘approximate date created’). In order to build this archive I spent four weeks at the end of summer 2017 in West Jerusalem photographing street art and tracking down various artists’ private image libraries of street art in Jerusalem. The image archive will be used in chapter three in order to determine if there was a cultural lull, if the creative class did indeed go silent, between 2014 and 2016.
I have chosen to follow a method developed at the Digital Gallatin laboratory at NYU both to collect new data, and aggregate the private image archive libraries, onto a digital map. This method was developed specifically in order to investigate the relationship between street art and politics. The process uses Fulcrum software to capture and store the geo-location and picture of each data point. To date I have knowledge of over 2,000 images from four different sources (including my own collection); 261 of which (the data points I photographed during my stay in Jerusalem). Please refer to Appendix A for a detailed discussion on the graffiti data collection; the methods used in this study as associated limitations.

5.2 Interviews:

While in Jerusalem I also conducted five interviews with West Jerusalem-based street artists, two interviews with staff members working for Mekudeshet (a cultural non-for-profit working to increase grass roots culture in Jerusalem), one interview with a staff member at the Jerusalem Foundation, and one interview with a Cultural Officer from the Eden initiative, an arm of the Jerusalem Development Authority. In addition to these formal interviews I also gathered qualitative, anecdotal data, through informal conversation with Jerusalem residents and members of the Jerusalem street art community.

My interview method included snowball sampling and open-ended interviews. Where there were a few people who I initially wanted to contact, those people introduced me to more interview subjects. Here is a sample of questions I asked all interview subjects.

*Interview Questions:*

- How long have you considered yourself a street artist?
- Do you have a specific message, or a general observation?
- Where and when do you choose to do your street art?
- Why is street art your chosen form of expression?

- Are you consistent in your work, or do you take breaks from your practice?
Chapter Two

The Contested Space of Jerusalem and Israeli Military and Security Dominance

1.0 Introduction:

The following chapter argues that the Israeli military and security apparatuses are dominant in the physical space of West Jerusalem and surrounding territories. There are many ways to evaluate Israeli dominance in Jerusalem. Some scholars revert to the traditional method and consider Israeli dominance through the political development of the conflict (Dumper, 2014, Gilbert, 1998, Tessler, 2009). These works often start with the Balfour Declaration (1917), and describe the UN Partition Plan in 1947, the Knesset passing the Jerusalem Bill in 1980, to the Oslo Accords signed in 1993.

This study is particularly concerned with evaluating Israeli dominance over the physical public space in Jerusalem, through military and security presence. Therefore this section focuses on those military conflicts involving Jewish Israelis that directly concern the fight to shift and subsequently maintain the status of Israeli territorial dominance over Jerusalem, primarily West Jerusalem. This chapter refrains from providing broader context for the conflict at large (meaning beyond the scope of the fight for Jerusalem) except in cases where absolutely necessary.

Michael Dumper presents a creative argument to consider Jerusalem a many-bordered city. Over the past century the borders of Jerusalem have shifted no less than three times. The following section shall detail how conflict and conquest, perpetrated by both Palestinian and Israeli military apparatuses, have physically divided the city. Furthermore this section shall consider how this division has enabled each side to claim dominance over particular geographic

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areas and reinforce dominance at their will. Specifically, this section shall focus more on Jewish-Israeli military dominance in West Jerusalem, as this is the space that is relevant to the study.

The first section of this chapter explains how the borders of Jerusalem evolved due to both Palestinian and Israeli military victories during the British Mandate, the 1948 War, and the 1967 War. Next this section shall shift to focus on present day Israeli dominated West Jerusalem. This section considers 1967 as a turning point for Israeli military and security policy. It details how the presence of Israeli defense apparatus’s robust security apparatus in Jerusalem, and West Jerusalem in particular, reinforces Israeli territorial dominance over the area. Finally this section considers the 2014 Gaza War, and the ‘Knifing Intifada’ in Jerusalem (2014 – 2016), as a period of time in which Israeli defense apparatuses used military and security measures to enforce territorial dominance.

This chapter refers to major wars in Israel’s history by the year, instead of by any accepted name. One aspect of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the dual narrative associated with each respective side. For instance what the Palestinian narrative refers to as ‘Al Nakba,’ or the Palestinian Exodus, the Jewish-Israeli narrative refers to as ‘The War of Independence’ and is often referred to in jubilee. In an effort to remain as politically neutral as possible, this study refers to select events as the 1948 War or the 1967 War. For readers who are unfamiliar with the exact chronology of the history, please see Appendix E in the index for an event key that describes each war in both Palestinian and Jewish-Israeli narrative terms.

2.0 Theoretical Foundations of Military and Security Dominance in Public Space:

One way to measure military and security dominance over a space is to consider the coercive effect of that military or security presence on their civilian surroundings. In discussing

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the robustness of authoritarian regimes, Bellin (2004) develops the concept of degrees of coercion employed by a military, or security apparatus. Bellin notes that the coercive apparatus includes all levels of public security (military, police, intelligence agencies, etc.). The coercive apparatus theory is comprised of two components: capacity and will. The legitimacy of the coercive apparatus is defined and measured according to two components: capacity, and will. The capacity of the apparatus is measures in terms of the resources, international support, and amount of potential impact, which the apparatus has at their disposal. The will of the coercive apparatus refers to the perceived probability that the military or security forces will act in violence against a civilian.

We can measure the Israeli military and security apparatus’ dominance in terms of Bellin’s coercive apparatus theory by defining the extent of the Israeli apparatus’ capacity, and will. At the start of the British Mandate, Jewish (not yet Israeli) militias had hardly begun to develop- the Jewish people had low military and security capacity. The Jewish militia’s low capacity means they could not have been dominant in the space. Over the course of the British Mandate, Jewish militias gained military capacity. In addition, the increasing number of Jewish militia perpetuated violence, in particular bombing the King David Hotel (1946), demonstrated their willingness to disrupt civilian life. This demonstrates the Jewish militia’s increasing dominance over the physical space in West Jerusalem. During the War of 1948 and War of 1967 the Israeli army and security apparatus solidified their capacity for violence and demonstrate their willingness to shoot. By the end of the War of 1967 the Israeli military and security apparatus had claimed dominance over West Jerusalem and the surrounding territory. In contemporary times, the Israeli military and security apparatus maintains dominance through demonstrating their sustained capacity and will.

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60 Professor Hajj, Pol2 217, Wellesley College, Fall 2017, Personal lecture notes
3.0 Military Dominance in Jerusalem 1917-1967:

3.1 The British Mandate (1917 - 1947):

Prior to the British Mandate (1917-1948) Jewish and Palestinian conflict over the territory of Jerusalem manifested itself primarily in small-scale street riots and non-state brawls. In fact, relations between the first robust community of Jewish settlers in the city (circa late 19th century) and their Arab counterparts were considered to be civil, if not neighborly.\(^{61}\) During the latter half of the 19th century and through the beginning of the 20th century Palestinians and Jews lives in Jerusalem with a mutual understanding that the city was ruled by the Ottoman Empire. The majority of military conflict over the city was fought between the Turks and the allied Britain, France and Russia.\(^{62}\)

Jews began physically fighting for Jerusalem in the beginning of the 20th century. During the final years of the Ottoman Empire (1914-1917) many Jews joined allied forces in the fight against Ottoman Turks over Palestine. Jewish soldiers were instrumental in the British army’s final capture of Jerusalem from the hands of the Turks. In November 1917, after three years of battling the allied German and Turkish army towards Jerusalem, the British army cut through Nabulus. On November 21 a British army infantry headed by General Edmund Allenby, defeated German-Turkish forces on the slopes of Nebi Samwil. This infantry, the first to gain sight of Jerusalem, was comprised of many Jewish soldiers. Jewish soldiers served in two specially recruited battalions in the British army (the 38th battalion recruited Jews from the United Kingdom, while the 39th Battalion recruited from the United States). The Jewish desire for Jerusalem was clear, even from within the confines of the British army. The following passage is quoted from Ronald Storrs (soon to be Military Governor of Jerusalem) memoirs:


“A British General commanding one of the detachments which took Jerusalem told me at the time that the most reckless bravery he had ever seen was shown by a young Jewish lance-corporal of a London Regiment who, mounting over a ridge into sudden sight of Jerusalem, seemed to be transported and transformed, rushed alone against a Turkish machine gun, killed the entire crew, and captured the gun.”

In this quote a British General describes how a young Jewish lance corporal demonstrated the will to conquer Jerusalem. This willingness to use military violence for territorial conquer is the same will Bellin identifies in her coercive apparatus theory. Therefore by charging against the Turkish forces, this Jewish lance corporal begins the process of dominating Jerusalem.

On December 4, 1917 Allenby entered the Old City through Jaffa Gate, on foot. Thus Britain seized Jerusalem from the hands of the falling Ottoman Empire and the start of the British Mandate in Palestine and British rule over Jerusalem.

During the British Mandate (1917-1948) Jewish-Palestinian relations in Jerusalem turned from neighborly to violent and the ethnic conflict over Jerusalem was born into military brawl. Over the course of the British Mandate neither Jews nor Palestinians had any politically or nationally recognized claim to Jerusalem. Indeed Great Britain was the occupying force in the whole of Palestine, including the holy city of Jerusalem.

During these years, Zionist Jews arrived from Eastern Europe to join Jewish military groups and fight for a State of Israel. With the British Mandate offices headquarter in Jerusalem, the new city was a popular destination. Outside the walls of the Old City Jewish immigrants

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64 Sources vary some say Allenby entered Jaffa gate on December 11, 1917. David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East (New York, NY: Holt, 2009), 312-313
were settling new neighborhoods, right beside Arab communities. In addition Jews made the new Jerusalem home to a host of cultural institutions, such as: the Hadassah Medical Center located in Ein Kerem, Hebrew University on Mt. Scopus, and the Bezalel Academy of Art located just near the Jaffa gate. Each new cultural institution and Jewish neighborhood in Jerusalem reinforced the Jewish Zionist ideology that the Jewish people had an ancient (and now modern) right to settle in the holy city.

Over the course of British Mandate period, and based on the increasingly strong Zionist ideology and Jewish presence in Jerusalem, Jewish militias such as Nili, the Haganah, the Palmach, and the Irgun, grew stronger, more desperate for statehood, and less willing to yield to Arab natives. At the same time, Palestinians, native to Jerusalem and shocked by the fall of the Ottoman Empire fought to stay on the land of their fathers.

The 1946 bombing at the King David Hotel can be understood as a turning point in non-state Jewish military organizations fight for Jerusalem, and West Jerusalem in particular. On July 22 1946 the Jewish military organization, the Irgun, put explosives in the basement of the King David Hotel. The King David hotel is situated just outside the Old City. The hotel is also in very close proximity to the center of town in West Jerusalem.

Members of the Irgun, dressed as Arabs, brought explosives, disguised as milk cartons, to the café in the basement of the King David Hotel. Prior to detonating the explosives, the Irgun relayed a message to the switchboard operator at the hotel to evacuate the premises. The warning

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67 Neighborhoods such as Rehavia, Katamon, and Yemin Moshe
71 Martin Gilbert, Jerusalem in the Twentieth Century (New York: Wiley, 1998), 172
was ignored. The incident caused severe civilian casualties is reaffirmed the Jewish militia’s capacity to insight violence.

3.2 Establishing Israeli Dominance (1947 – 1967):

By the end of the 1948 War the Israeli army and security apparatus willfully dominated parts of Jerusalem. During the 1948 Battle of Jerusalem Jewish and Arab militias (subsequently Israeli and Jordanian military forces) fought for control over Jerusalem. Fighting broke out on November 29, 1947 immediately following the United Nations (UN) General Assembly adopting Resolution 181 (II). The fighting consisted of bombings and military operation attacks on both sides, throughout the Old City and surrounding neighborhoods.

The Israeli army demonstrated their capacity and will within minutes of British forces departing Jerusalem. On May 14 1948 High Commissioner General Sir Alan Cunningham resigned his post as High Commissioner of Palestine under the British Mandate, and left for England. As Cunningham’s plane took off the Union Jack flag was lowered from the Government House in Jerusalem. Within ten minutes of this symbolic gesture soldiers from the Hagannah\textsuperscript{72} advanced to conquer the new city of Jerusalem. The newly recognized Israeli militia advanced through Jaffa road, the main road in the new city, and entered the now evacuated British security zones. By nightfall the Israeli military organizations had control over the developed areas in the new city.\textsuperscript{73}

In the early days of the war the Israeli military demonstrated dominant capacity. The Israeli army dominated developed areas in the new city through violent means. The conquest of the new city demonstrates the Israeli army’s capacity to dominate by violent means. The Israeli army’s willingness to conquer through violent means demonstrates their will.

\textsuperscript{72} The Haganah was a Jewish militia group, active during the founding of the State of Israel.

\textsuperscript{73} Martin Gilbert, \textit{Jerusalem in the Twentieth Century} (New York: Wiley, 1998), 211
Over the course of the war this capacity began to wane. By the end of May 1948, the Israeli army began losing its hold on the Jewish quarter in the Old City.\textsuperscript{74}

The rise of Palestinian nationalism between 1940 and 1967 brought with it new Palestinian military organizations.\textsuperscript{75} Fighting in Jerusalem increased as both Jewish-Israelis and Palestinians developed gained access to stronger military companies.

The Israeli military’s will to dominate was evident from its founding, as demonstrated in the War of 1948. In the War of 1967 the Israeli military and security organizations prove their capacity to dominate.

\subsection*{3.22 Policy Shift- From Conquest to Security}

During the British Mandate in Palestine, and through Israel’s victory in the early years after the 1948 War, Jewish and subsequently Israeli military policy was founded, and self-justified, on the belief that the Jewish people had a religious right to the holy city of Jerusalem.\textsuperscript{76} Leading up to the 1967 War, and especially after Israel’s victory, Israeli military policy vis-à-vis Jerusalem shifted, from one of religious or national desire, to one of maintaining security.\textsuperscript{77} As Israeli officials began to consider Jerusalem united under Israeli sovereignty, their goals began to shift from acquiring territory to maintaining security within territory. The following quote from the first commander of the Border Police, Pinhas Kopel, captures the Israeli defense apparatus’s security sentiment:

\begin{flushleft}
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Ibid. 222
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\begin{quote}
Mark A. Tessler, \textit{A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict} (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), 315
\end{quote}
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“We saw two main tasks before us: The first – to establish the units, train the men, and instill in them the importance of their role. The second – to provide the citizens, who had just arrived in the country with a sense of security…”

Understanding Israel’s shift towards a security maintenance policy helps to contextualize much of the Israeli defense organizations’ behavior in and around Jerusalem, and West Jerusalem in particular, over the past 50 years. Specifically, during times of increased conflict (both from Palestinian and Jewish-Israeli non-state actors) the Israeli military and security forces increase their presence in public space. This is done in order to retain dominance over territory through security, not in order to conquer additional territory. This study shall consider the Israeli military and security actions during Operation Protective Edge and the Knifing Intifada with the context of this security policy.

4.0 Israeli Military and Security Dominance in Jerusalem- Case Studies:

Applying theories of military and security dominance to the case of Jerusalem, we can infer that increased military and security presence has arguably contributed to the publics’ perception of Israeli security and military dominance over public space in Jerusalem. The following section shall summarize times of intense conflict in Jerusalem. Specifically this section shall describe the violence associated with the following two events: 1) Operation Protective Edge (summer 2014), and 2) the Knifing Intifada (2014-2016). In each case this section shall detail how Israeli security apparatuses responded to the violence by increasing security measures, mainly physical presence in public space. Lastly, we shall detail for each case how the increase in Israeli security presence in Jerusalem reinforced Israeli dominance both in the minds of the Palestinians, but also in the minds of the Israeli public.

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4.1 Operation Protective Edge:

4.12 Violence:

On June 12, 2014 Naftali Frenkel, Gilad Shaer, and Eyal Yifrah, three Israel teenage boys, were kidnapped from a hitchhiking stop just outside of Jerusalem.\(^79\) Within one day of the kidnapping the details of the capture went viral over social media within the Israeli community. Within days Israeli security agencies determined the boys’ kidnappers were members of Hamas who were residing in the West Bank, just outside of Jerusalem. On June 30, 2014 authorities located the bodies of the deceased boys, buried in recently acquired Palestinian owned land, located out of Jerusalem, just north of the city of Hebron.\(^80\) On July 2, 2014 Israeli settlers kidnapped Mohammed Abu Khdeir, a 16-year-old Palestinian boy from the streets of East Jerusalem. Israeli authorities found Khdeir’s remains hours later in the Jerusalem Forest.\(^81\)

These two incidents escalated into mass violent demonstrations from both Israelis and Palestinians, ultimately culminating in a summer long Operation Protective Edge, also known as the 2014 Gaza War. The primary actors in the military operation were Israeli Defense Forces and Hamas. Based solely on information available to the public, it is believed that during this time Hamas was primarily operating from within the Gaza strip, with satellite contacts in areas in the West Bank. Given that Hamas’ primary organization was based in Gaza, the majority of friction took place on the Gaza boarder and within Gaza between Israeli Defense Forces, Hamas combatants and residents of Gaza.

\(^81\) "Palestinian Mohammad Abu Khdair 'was Burned Alive',' BBC News, July 05, 2014, , accessed April 24, 2018,
Though the majority of violence took place in Gaza, Jerusalem did also see significant friction between the Jewish-Israel and Palestinian civilian populations. The series of civilian violence and Israeli military and security apparatus actions, included in the following section, is based on Live (online) Updates published by Ha’aretz newspaper. The updates were published from the third day of Operation Protective Edge (July 10, 2014) through the fiftieth, and last official day of the operation (August 27, 2014). The majority of violence erupted in areas specific areas of East Jerusalem (most notably Issawiya and Shoafat neighborhoods) and around the Old City.

5.13 Increase in Israeli Security and Dominance In Public Space

The following paragraphs shall detail Israel’s increased security and military measures in and around Jerusalem during Operation Protective Edge. This section shall present a chronological summary of specific security and military operations conducted during this time. Here we demonstrate the Israeli military and security apparatus’s dominance in Jerusalem by demonstrating the capacity for, and willingness to, sustain violence.

In response to the kidnapping of the three boys the IDF initiated Operation Brother’s Keeper. The operation consisted of an 11-day search, in and around Judea Samaria, for the boys. During this time the IDF arrested almost 300 Palestinians, including almost all of the Hamas’ leaders working out of the West Bank. These arrests clearly demonstrate the IDF’s capacity for effecting violence in this territory.

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82 Ha’aretz is a well-known news source amongst Jewish Israelis. Ha’aretz publishes
83 See Appendix B for a detailed description and presentation of data collection and analysis.
84 See Table B.1: Haaretz Live Updates Operation Protective Edge, July 10 - August 27, 2014, Jerusalem Related
86 William Booth and Ruth Eglash, "Israelis Worry about Missing Jewish Teens, but Military Wants to Hit Hamas, Too," The Washington Post, June 18, 2014, , accessed April 24, 2018,
As mentioned previously, the Israeli military’s primary objective during Operation Protective Edge was to combat the Hamas organization. Therefore, the majority of Israeli military forces during the operation were deployed, in offensive measures, on the border of the Gaza strip, or sent in to Gaza for strategic combat.87 The Israeli military presence in and around Jerusalem may have been employed in order to combat the small contingent of Hamas’ leaders in the West Bank. However, given the event immediately preceding Operation Protective Edge, that of Operation Brothers Keeper, it is likely that the Israeli military had a strong hand over Hamas’ presence in the West Bank, and therefore chose to focus their attention on Hamas in the Gaza strip.

With this in mind it is important to distinguish between Israeli military presence for offensive purposes against Hamas, and military presence for defensive purposes of containing a perceived threat. On the third day of the operation, July 11, 2014, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu said, “There cannot be a situation under any agreement, in which we relinquish security control of the territory west of the Jordan River.”88 A large portion of Israel’s military presence and all of its security presence in and around Jerusalem during this time was in order to maintain strategic security. This strategic security is both to ensure the immediate safety of citizens of the State of Israel, as well as in order to secure a military vantage; it is not to conduct offensive warfare.

In the first days of the operation, and controlling for the increased IDF presence from Operation Brothers Keeper, there is little evidence of a significant increase in police patrol in Jerusalem. The primary role of the security apparatuses in the beginning of the operation included responding to riots in East Jerusalem, and arresting rioters who were disturbing the

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87 Steven Erlanger and Isabel Kershner, "Israel and Hamas Trade Attacks as Tension Rises," The New York Times, July 08, 2014, accessed April 24, 2018,
88 Netanyahu, quoted from Ha’aretz 7.11.14
peace. It is reasonable to assume that there was some increase in deployment of security bodies on the streets of West Jerusalem in the early days of the operation, though no such record is available to the public.

On the eleventh day of the operation, July 18, 2014, the Home Front Command announced a prohibition of over 1,000 people in open areas 40-80 kilometers from the Gaza Strip. This perimeter includes areas such as Tel Aviv as well as Jerusalem. The purpose of this regulation is hard to determine. Given the radius is relative to a perimeter surrounding the Gaza Strip, it is likely the regulation was set in place in order to avoid mass casualty due to rocket fire (rocket fire coming out of the Gaza strip).

The Home Front Command regulation was the first large scale Israeli security action that influenced public space the. This type of action results in Israeli security dominance over public space in that it regulates civilian behavior within the space. This form of security regulation, similar to a curfew, is a psychological constraint on the civilian. The civilian knows they must abide by this rule, in so far as they abide, they are yielding to, and by extension affirming, the dominance of the security apparatus.

The following days saw increased violence around Jerusalem, particularly between Palestinian residents in East Jerusalem and Israeli police forces. For instance, on day 15, July 23, 2014, rioters in East Jerusalem erupted, throwing rocks and Molotov cocktails. Israeli police forces responded with riot-control measures, and no injuries were reported. By day 17, July 25, 2014, civilian violence in East Jerusalem had significantly escalated with tens of thousands of Palestinians marching from Ramallah to Jerusalem. In response Israeli security forces deployed thousands of police officers and border police around the capital. In addition, Israeli security
forces put in place a ban for Palestinians under the age of 50 to enter Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, through the end of Friday prayers.

By day 25, August 1, 2014, reports show that “heavy police presence is being felt in Jerusalem.” The increasing security presence was likely due to the end of the Ramadan holiday and the anticipation that riots would potentially increase in momentum. Israeli security forces reinforced their presence along Jerusalem’s seam zones and took strategic position at checkpoints and friction zones on the outskirts to West Jerusalem and within East Jerusalem. Information regarding the exact location of these strategic vantage points is not publicly available.

The primary source of Israeli security apparatus’ physical dominance over the city of Jerusalem became clear on day 17, July 25, 2014, when thousands of officers and patrol were deployed around the city, thus demonstrating their strong capacity for physical control over the space. This mass deployment began a period of time when middle to heavy police presence was felt in both East and West Jerusalem. Police presence was particularly obvious in friction areas such as at the gates to the Old City, and on the seams, between Jewish and Palestinian neighborhoods.

Israeli security presence in and around Jerusalem remained at this level through the remainder of Operation Protective Edge. It is hard to determine when exactly security presence in Jerusalem returned to post operation levels. This is due primarily to the post summer 2014 violence that erupted in Jerusalem, outside the scope of the military Operation Protective Edge. On August 27 the official IDF military operation ended and the IDF withdrew from the Gaza, and areas in the West Bank. Thought he military operation was over, violence in Jerusalem continued. The months after Operation Protective Edge transitioned into what is retroactively
known as ‘The Knifing Intifada.’ A detailed analysis of the Israeli security apparatus in West Jerusalem during The Knifing Intifada shall be presented in following sections.

5.2 Knifing Intifada:

5.2.1 Violence:

Though the Israeli military Operation Protective Edge ended on August 27, violence in and around Jerusalem continued through 2015. The violence that later became known as the ‘Knifing Intifada’ or the ‘Silent Intifada’ was born out of the events in summer 2014. Immediately following the end of the military operation a series of knifings in and around West Jerusalem, in particular the Old City started to occur. Similar to the section above describing violence in Operation Protective Edge in and around Jerusalem, the following section shall detail the violence of the Knifing Intifada.

5.2.2 Increase in Israeli Security and Dominance in Public Space:

In contrast to Protective Edge, the Knifing Intifada was unique to Jerusalem. This means that all security and military escalation was related to the events within the city. In addition, the Knifing Intifada is not recognized by the IDF as a military operation. Intelligence communities and various units in the IDF may collaborate with Jerusalem security forces to ensure safety in West Jerusalem. But all security policy and presence during this period belongs to Jerusalem’s security forces, not Israel’s military forces.

There were likely many points during 2014-2015 during which the Israeli security community increased security presence in Jerusalem due to the Knifing Intifada. Two major security increases stand out: one in October 2014, and another in October 2015. The first was on October 21, 2014, in response to the increasing casualties in and around the Old City, Israeli security forces announced they would be taking extra measures and increasing security. The
comprehensive details of the increase in security are not available to the public at the time this study was conducted.89

The following passage, written in October of 2015, depicts one author’s account of his feelings walking on the military guarded streets of Jerusalem:

“The streets of West Jerusalem are eerie and still. Silence hangs over the city... busses are half empty... heavily armed security forces, joined by army reinforcements, patrol checkpoints, bus stops and deserted sidewalks. Young men in plain clothes carry assault rifles... In the city’s... East [Jerusalem], residents are frightened, too. Massive cement cubes block exits from their neighborhoods. Lengthy lines at new checkpoints keep many from their jobs. Men under 40 who were barred from Al Aqsa Mosque on Friday prayed instead behind police barricades in the surrounding decrepit streets.”90

Thrall’s depiction links the eerie and empty feeling felt in the streets of Jerusalem to the increase in military and security presence. The presence of military and security personnel is ultimately for the benefit of the residents of Jerusalem. And this study is not arguing that the Israeli military and security intends to create an eerie and still feeling in the streets of Jerusalem. This anecdote simply correlates this eeriness with the presence of military and security.

The second significant increase in security presence took place on October 14, 2015. These security measures included erecting roadblocks and checkpoints in and around East Jerusalem, including near the seams of West Jerusalem. The authorities also deployed hundreds of police officers and military personnel to monitor streets and public transportation in both East and West Jerusalem.91

6.0 Habermas as Counterargument:

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Habermas would likely disagree with the notion that a public space can be dominated by any specific culture—particularly when that culture is of national or political origin. According to Habermas’ definition, public space is in fact that place without governance.\textsuperscript{92} Indeed it is a valid argument that given the physical, political, and cultural tensions and perceived dominant status of Israel, Jerusalem, and particularly West Jerusalem, cannot be considered a public space. One way to reconcile this dilemma is to define public space, within the context of Israeli dominated West Jerusalem. In the context of West Jerusalem and the surrounding areas, Habermans’s concept of publicly accessible space applies only to Jewish Israelis.

\textsuperscript{92} See ‘Chapter 1, section 2.11: The Public Sphere,’ for further discussion
Chapter Three
Jerusalem’s Secular Creative Class Cultural Lull

“The aim of art is to represent not the outward appearance of things, but their inward significance.” – Aristotle

1.0 Introduction:

The previous chapter detailed the increase in violence and Israeli military and security presence in Jerusalem during Operation Protective Edge and the Knifing Intifada. As mentioned in that chapter, as violence and military and security presence increased, the “… streets of Jerusalem became eerie and still.” One subset of the population, the secular creative class, lost creative inertia during this time. Let us consider the decrease in street art production, and change in levels of museum attendance. This series of evidence demonstrates the Jerusalem’s secular creative class’s cultural lull during the violence of Operation Protective Edge and the Knifing Intifada.

With this cultural lull in mind we turn to testing the hypothesis that artists in Jerusalem’s creative class were coerced, based on fear, by the Israeli military and security apparatus, out of producing creative culture during times of conflict. I present a fear-based model as my conjecture to explain the relationship between the Israeli security and military apparatus and artists in Jerusalem’s secular creative class.

Contrary to theoretical foundations, evidence gathered in this study argues against accepting this fear-based model. Anecdotal evidence collected from five interviews with street artists suggest something other than fear was at play during this time. Alternative explanations

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93 Attributed to Aristotle
95 See theoretical framework in Chapter One: Introduction.
for the cultural lull include: limited resources available to the artists, as well as imposed time constraints due to military obligations.

2.0 Defining the Secular Creative Class:

This study shall focus on individuals at the intersection of Jerusalem’s creative class and the secular population. The reason this study shall not focus on the Palestinian creative class is simply because of the divide between East and West Jerusalem. Palestinian and Jewish-Israeli populations in Jerusalem operate in separate economic, commercial, and cultural spheres.\(^9\) Therefor we shall distinguish now between the Palestinian creative class and the Jewish-Israeli creative class in West Jerusalem. This study shall focus on the Jewish-Israeli creative class, as this is the creative class associated with the dominant Israeli society. In this study we seek to understand why a creative class associated with a dominant society might go silent in times of conflict.

2.1 Jewish population in West Jerusalem

The Jewish population, in Israel at large, and particularly in Jerusalem, is comprised of factions based on various degrees of religious affiliations. We can divide the Israeli Jewish population into five subgroups (based on religious affiliation): ultra-orthodox, religious-nationalist, traditional-religious, traditional, and secular.

These religious affiliations are significant in that they dictate the foundation for much of the social, economic, political, and cultural realities on municipal and even national level. As is the case in many religious and sectarian societies, religious-social affiliations in Israel can be observed from individual practices, as well as collective allegiance and institutional behavior. In terms of everyday individual practice, religious affiliation can be observed from something as

basic as fashion. On average, individuals with strong secular affiliations dawn more modern garb, while the stronger the religious affiliation, the more modest the individual’s dress. Religious affiliations are also relevant in the political sphere; again both on a national and municipal level.

Table 1, pictured below, provides a statistical description of the Jewish Population in West Jerusalem by religious affiliation:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2002-2009</th>
<th>2010-2016</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ultra-Orthodox</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Nationalist</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional-Religious</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secular</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics)

As shown in Table 1, the ultra-orthodox population, the largest of the five religious groups, has grown over the past twenty years and now comprises 33% of the Jewish population in Jerusalem. The religious-nationalist population has also grown over the past two decades and now makes up 20% of the population. In contrast the less religious groups (traditional religious, traditional, and secular) has either not changed relative to the population as a whole (i.e. traditional religious), or has decreased in relative terms.

It is interesting to note that the ‘traditional’ and ‘secular’ groups averaged 20% and 22% of the Jewish population in Jerusalem, respectively, between 2002 and 2009. However between 2010 and 2016 ‘traditional’ affiliations decreased to 15% of the Jewish population in Jerusalem, and ‘secular’ affiliations decreased to 20% of the population.
2.131 Ultra-Orthodox Population:

Similar to the Palestinian population, the ultra-orthodox (and the bulk of the religious-nationalist) populations shall be considered beyond the scope of this study. Within West Jerusalem there are two main city centers. One is the commercial center maintained by the ultra-orthodox populations; the other is the city center that services the secular and religious-nationalist populations. These two populations function in very different ways and tend to only meet on the political playground, when policy is at stake. One central characteristics that defines the ultra-orthodox populations is that they are ‘closed societies.’ Modern secular (sometimes referred to simply as ‘western’) society operates on principles such as open information ecologies, transparency, and individualism and associated individual rights.

2.132 Secular/Traditional Population:

This study shall consider the creative behavior born out of the secular creative class.

3.0 Cultural Lull:

3.1 Production of Street Art in Jerusalem Overtime:

One measure of public art and creative culture in Jerusalem is the level of street art/graffiti adorning the city walls. The bright colors of the murals, or the catchy slogans splashed across shop walls, are character traits associated with vibrant urban culture. According to one Jerusalem street artist graffiti is “the art of the revolutionary,” it is the sign of change in urban space, or the authentic interaction between artist and crowd.\(^97\) According to a city planning official, graffiti “is dirty enough to be real, and cool enough to attract the masses. To the common residents, graffiti is a sign that ‘here lies culture, this is a cool place.’\(^98\)” A third artist says, “I use graffiti to turn a space into a place. I want my art to invite people to this wall, or this

\(^97\) Omer, in-person formal interview, (Jerusalem: August 2017)
\(^98\) Ron, in-person formal interview, (Jerusalem: August 2017)
corner, to develop, in this place I have created. These anecdotes demonstrate how street artists view their graffiti as contributing to the cultural vibrancy of a place. The anecdote from the city-planning official demonstrates that even Jerusalem’s governing authority considers graffiti as an integral aspect of the cities cultural composition. Based on these understandings, this study shall use production of street art to measure the cultural vibrancy of Jerusalem, across time.

Figure Two: Street Art Production In Jerusalem (2012-2017), pictured below, compares amount of street art produced in different time intervals, to levels of military and security presence in Jerusalem, during those same time intervals. This graph is based on a collection of 261 units of graffiti photographed from the streets of West Jerusalem. Each unit of graffiti refers to one graffiti sketch. In some cases graffiti may be overlapping. In this study we differentiate between the two elements, each sketch of graffiti, though they overlap, is measured as an individual unit.

The time period of creation cannot be determined for 35 of the 261 units of graffiti measured. Of the 261 units, 42 units were created before 2012. The sample measured 20 units of graffiti created in 2011, 17 units from 2010, 7 units from 2009, 2 units from 2008, and 2 units from 2007. In addition, there were several units from the years 2002, 2005, and 2006. These units, though identified during the analysis phase, are undocumented in the sample as the exact time-period of creation are questionable. These units, that pre-date 2012, are not represented in Figure Two, below. It is likely that overtime graffiti fades or is covered up, either by new art, or by law enforcement or municipality intervention. Unfortunately there is no baseline for average graffiti production per year. Therefor we shall consider graffiti production in a comparative perspective. We can determine the productivity of street artists during times of conflict by comparing amount of graffiti created in the years just prior, and post, the periods of conflict. The

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99 Barel, in-person formal interview, (Jerusalem: August 2017)
orange vertical shading in the graph highlights the time periods during which military and security presence increased in Jerusalem.

As shown in Figure 1, the sample contained 42 units of graffiti created in 2012. Graffiti units created, observed in the sample, rose by 16.67 percent, to 49 units, in 2013. In 2014 observed graffiti production decreased by 69.39 percent, to 15 observed units. In 2015 observed graffiti production increased by 66.6 percent, to 25 units.

There are two possible explanations for the rise in graffiti creation, observed between 2012 and 2013. One possibility is that more street art from 2013 is available for observation from 2013, compared to 2012, given that 2013 is more recent. The second explanation is the 2013 Israeli Parliament, as well as the Jerusalem municipality elections, both held in 2013, inspired additional political graffiti in support or against candidates. Indeed graffiti dated to 2013 included many references to Jerusalem’s mayor, Nir Barkat, as well as various national party candidates, primarily the head of the Likud party, Bibi Netanyahu, as well as the head of the Yesh Atid party, Yair Lapid.
For instance one stencil piece (Image Seven), though somewhat faded, still clearly says ברקת (pronounced ‘Barkat,’ is the last name of Jerusalem’s mayor, Nir Barkat). The text underneath the name is already illegible due to the age of the piece. Though illegible, it is clear that the middle line of text is crossed out. This crossing out of the text was most likely done by a second party, in response to the content embedded in the initial graffiti unit. This stencil is one example of graffiti practiced in connection with the municipal election in 2013. In this case the graffiti also prompted a response, additional street art productivity.

In 2014 the amount of street art produced seems to have significantly declined. This finding does not prove a causal relationship between the violence and security in Jerusalem during 2014, and the decline in street art production. This finding simply demonstrates the cultural lull, in at least street art production, during the period under question. Of the 15 units of graffiti observed from 2015, some are clearly related to the violence in the city, while a majority is without connection to the political climate. It is possible 2014 was an anomaly year in terms of street art production. If this were the case we would expect to see graffiti production in subsequent years increase to levels matching 2012 and 2013 (i.e. in the 40-50 observed units, range). This is not the case; indeed graffiti production levels remain in the teens to mid-twenties levels throughout 2016. These observations work to support the hypothesis that the cultural lull in Jerusalem, observed through graffiti production, is correlated with times of high military and security presence.

The rise in observed graffiti production in 2015, relative to that of 2014, can be explained by the 2015 Israeli Parliamentary elections. For example, one stencil, *The Caesar to Caesarea* (Image Eight) garnered particular popularity\(^\text{100}\) during the 2015 Israeli parliamentary season.

Pictured in the center of the stencil is a caricature of Benjamin Netanyahu. The figures gaze is smug and seems to look down upon the viewer. Above the figure, in block letters, is the work קיסרה (pronounced ‘kei-sar,’ translated to mean ‘The Caesar’). Below the figurehead, written in the same block letter font, is written לקיסריה (pronounced ‘La-Kei-Saria,’ translated to mean ‘to Caesarea’). The stencils were sprayed on surfaces around the Prime Minister’s residence in Jerusalem.

Indeed the amount of produced graffiti observed in 2015 increased relative to levels observed in 2014. Still, the levels of productions are low compared to the years prior to Operation Protective Edge. One would expect levels of graffiti in 2015 to match levels of graffiti in 2013, especially considering both were election years. One might argue the comparison between graffiti produced in 2015 to that of 2013 is asymmetric considering both municipal and parliamentary elections took place in 2013, while only parliamentary elections took place in 2015. Let us therefore compare levels of graffiti produced in 2015, to levels of graffiti production in 2012. Neither a municipal nor a parliamentary election took place in Jerusalem in 2012. Therefore we would expect the sample to include less graffiti produced in 2012, relative to 2015. Especially considering 2012 was five years prior the time of collection, whereas 2015 was only two years prior. It is therefore surprising that there were only 25 street samples observed from 2015, whereas there were 42 samples from 2012. This evidence supports the claim that street art production decreased on a global urban scale in Jerusalem during 2015, in addition to 2014.

Observed graffiti production moderately declined in 2016, relative to 2015. Compared to production levels in 2014, graffiti production levels in 2016 arguably increased, slightly. In terms of municipal and national electoral politics, 2016 was an insignificant year. This likely explains part of the decline in street art production levels observed between 2015 and 2016. Comparing to
2014, more graffiti was produced in 2016. This trend is in keeping with the theory that cultural vibrancy as measured through graffiti production is correlated with military and security presence. In Chapter Two we discussed the military and security presence in Jerusalem in 2016 as part of the Knifing Intifada. Recall that security presence significantly increased in 2014 and 2015, but not in 2016. Though there was much violence in the city during 2016, the Jerusalem police did not issue any new policy pertaining to citizen behavior. In other words, the intensity with which the presence of the security apparatus was felt in West Jerusalem was arguably lower relative to prior years. This might explain the upward trend in street art production, relative to 2014.

This study recognizes that a decline in publicly displayed street art observed during times of conflict in the city, is not an empirical basis for a causal relationship between increased violence and decreased graffiti production. Indeed, there are many reasons public street art may fluctuate, aside from increase in military and security violence associated with political conflict. One common reason artists stop producing street art, is executive intervention on behalf of law enforcement agencies. Cities across the globe balance the fine line between culturally stimulating street art, and vandalism. Jerusalem is no exception to this urban struggle. All artists consulted in this study recognized the risk embedded in their work. In particular, each of the five streets artists formally interviewed for this study, as well as the dozens of side conversations with Jerusalem’s graffiti community commented on the illegal nature of their activity. Shira, one street artist, previously based in Jerusalem but now works primarily in Tel Aviv, noted how, after her first arrest for vandalism, she abandoned street art. Shira noted how only years later did she return to the art.101

101 Shira, Telephone informal interview, (March 2018)
It is important to note that the risk for arrest on the grounds of vandalism are likely significantly higher during times when extra police officers are deployed around the city, for instance during times of conflict such as between 2014 to 2016. For this reason it is important to distinguish between fear of arrest on the grounds of vandalism, and silence due to coercion. In the case of vandalism the offense is in the very act of graffiti on public property, or private property without the permission of the owner. In the case of fear-based coercion the offense is in the content of the graffiti, not the act of graffiti. In testing the fear-based coercion model we are testing to see if street artists limit street art production during time of conflict out of content-censorship.

Another form of intervention is whitewashing. The Jerusalem Municipality, and in some cases private property owners will deliberately paint over graffiti that is deemed either offensive, politically incorrect, or disruptive in any manner. Ironically, when a wall is whitewashed, it tends to further invite street artists to paint. In the words of one street artist, “the white washing literally provides me with a white canvas.” Still, whitewashing will account for erasing graffiti produced on the streets of Jerusalem. It is possible that more graffiti was produced in 2014 that was deemed deliberately offensive given the potential nature of the work.

In addition to intervention on behalf of law enforcement agencies, we have noted how graffiti production may fluctuate, primarily due to political happenings, such as elections. As noted in the analysis above, in comparison to the previous year, election years tend to yield more graffiti production. These factors are important to consider in analyzing this data.

Still, the data presented in Figure Two do show a cultural lull in so far as the trend for graffiti production in Jerusalem declined during 2014 to 2016. Only in 2017 do we observe graffiti production levels that begin to match those in years prior to 2014. On the basis of this

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102 Omer, in-person formal interview, (Jerusalem: August 2017)
evidence this study shall claim that, in so far as graffiti production measures the cultural vibrancy of Jerusalem’s secular creative class, between 2014 and 2016 there was a cultural lull in Jerusalem.

3.2 Museum Visitation Levels in Jerusalem Overtime:

A second measure of Jerusalem’s cultural appetite is levels of museum visitation over time. This measure differs from the previous data on street art production as it measures the public’s appetite for cultural consumption, not the artists desire, or ability to produce. As we move to consider museum visitation levels, I ask the reader shift their perspective from a locus of cultural production to a locus cultural consumption. This study began with a focus on street art, but has since expanded to consider cultural vibrancy in the city of Jerusalem. Both production and consumption are relevant in measuring cultural vibrancy.

Table 2: Museum Visitation Levels In Jerusalem (2009-2016), pictured on the following page, is one measure of the cultural appetite for consumption in Jerusalem, between 2009 and 2016. The table presents visitation level data for nine prominent museums in Jerusalem: the Israel Museum, Tower of David, Yad Vashem National Holocaust Museum, Old Yishuv Court, Museum of Natural History Museum for Islamic Art, Bloomfield Science Museum, Bible Lands Museum, and the Museum of Underground Prisoners. The data presented in the first five columns of the table are raw visitor numbers per year. Starting with the year 2013 the table adds ‘percent change’ columns every year showing the percent change between the year in question and one year prior. For example, the first instance is this is column six showing the percent change in visitor levels between 2012 and 2013.

Museum visitation levels were mixed in 2013 compared to 2012. The Israel Museum saw a substantial 14.36 percent increase in visitation levels, while the Old Yishuv Court museum saw
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<td>Israel Museum (a)</td>
<td>458373</td>
<td>720608</td>
<td>817000</td>
<td>830254</td>
<td>969502</td>
<td>14.36%</td>
<td>-27.45%</td>
<td>760696</td>
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<td>300000</td>
<td>319630</td>
<td>309602</td>
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<td>284878</td>
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<td>900000</td>
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<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>800000</td>
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<td>800000</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>800000</td>
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<td>Old Yishuv Court</td>
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<td>34129</td>
<td>26429</td>
<td>28645</td>
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<td>-21.30%</td>
<td>22600</td>
<td>-4.49%</td>
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<td>20093</td>
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<tr>
<td>Museum of Natural History (c)</td>
<td>64000</td>
<td>100091</td>
<td>73710</td>
<td>113222</td>
<td>122567</td>
<td>7.62%</td>
<td>-126.08%</td>
<td>54215</td>
<td>6.41%</td>
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<td>Museum for Islamic Art</td>
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<td>55850</td>
<td>50301</td>
<td>42573</td>
<td>41290</td>
<td>-3.11%</td>
<td>-6.78%</td>
<td>38668</td>
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<td>39723</td>
<td>10.62%</td>
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<td>Bloomfield Science Museum</td>
<td>207397</td>
<td>255714</td>
<td>250299</td>
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<td>-18.76%</td>
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<td>Museum of Underground Prisoners</td>
<td>43239</td>
<td>47853</td>
<td>51150</td>
<td>39423</td>
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<td>-15.30%</td>
<td>35143</td>
<td>1.89%</td>
<td>35819</td>
<td>8.48%</td>
<td>39136</td>
<td>8.48%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics)

(a) includes estimated visitors to both the Israel Museum and the Rockefeller Museum
(b) Until 1995 and since 2010 - data based on estimate - no tickets sold
(c) From 2012 data include externally operated activities, courtyard events, festivals, and extracurricular participants
a substantial 21.30 percent decrease in visitation levels. The remaining seven museums in the
table saw mild fluctuations in visitation levels between 2012 and 2013.

In 2014 museum visitation levels plummeted. The Israel Museum, one of Israel’s most
highly regarded museums of fine art, saw a 27.45 percent decline in visitors, relative to 2013. To
put this into context, in 2013 visitation levels to the Israel Museum rose 14.36 percent, relative to
2012. Since 2009 the Israel Museum did not see a decline in visitation levels until 2014. The
Tower of David Museum, located in the Old City of Jerusalem, saw an 8.68 percent decline
during this time period. The Museum of Underground Prisoners located deep in the Old City of
Jerusalem saw a 15.30 percent decline in visitation levels. By far the most substantial decline
was the Museum of Natural History that saw a 126.08 percent decline in museum visitation
levels in 2014 compared to 2013. Visitation levels to the Museum of Natural History increased
compared to the year prior in both 2013 and 2015 (data is not available for 2016). The museum
only saw declining visitation levels in 2014. Only two museums saw an increase in visitation
levels in 2014- the Bloomfield Science Museum, and the Bible Lands Museum. However for
both of these museums, visitation levels increased at modest rates, the former at 2.08 percent and
the latter at 7.61 percent. Museum visitation levels, on average, were better in 2015, compared
with 2014.

Six of the nine museums listed saw increasing museum visitation levels in 2015, relative
to 2014. Still, Jerusalem’s three most well attended museums: The Israel Museum, the Tower of
David Museum, and Yad Vashem Holocaust Memorial Museum all experienced decreasing
visitation levels during this time. These trends in museum visitation levels as presented in Table
2, on the previous page, support the claim that the cultural appetite in Jerusalem decreased from
2014 to 2016.
4.0 Coopting Public Space through a Fear-Based Model:

After recognizing this cultural lull we must consider the relationship between increased military and security presence in public space during times of conflict and decreasing cultural vibrancy. My initial conjecture considered the following, fear-based model that might explain the relationship between increasing military and security presence and cultural lull.

Figure 2: Israeli Security/Military Apparatus and Jerusalem Creative Class, Fear-Based Model:

Figure 2: Israeli Security/Military Apparatus and Jerusalem Creative Class, Fear-Based Model, summarizes my initial conjecture explaining one potential relationship between the military and security apparatus and the secular creative class in Jerusalem. This fear-based model
draws on Eva Bellin’s theory of the military as a coercive apparatus\textsuperscript{103} in order to define fear-based coercion.\textsuperscript{104}

The model depicts three main bodies: the Israeli military and security apparatus (condensed to ‘Security Apparatus’ in the figure, in the interest of visual accessibility), the creative class (in this figure, and henceforth the term ‘creative class’ refers to the secular creative class in Jerusalem), and the public art produced by the creative class. The straight arrows, pointing from the Security Apparatus towards the Creative Class, represent the relationship between the apparatus and the creative class, as perceived by the Creative Class. The wavy arrows originating with the Creative Class and pointing towards the Public Art variable, represents the fluctuation in public street art production.

Under this model I hypothesize this relationship is one on cooptation that leads to fear-based coercion. I posit that from the perspective of the street artist, the increase in Israeli military and security dominance in the physical public space is seen as a cooptation of that space. In coopting the space the military and security apparatus demand the public respect their presence. I expect the Israeli military and security bodies enforce this respect through fear-based coercion. The increase in military and security dominance insights fear in the public and coerces public artists out of producing street art. In turn, the street artist limits graffiti production as a means to censor their public expression.

In order to understand the significance of cooptation it is important to recognize the special relationship between artists and public space. In Chapter One and at the end of Chapter Two we considered the theoretical foundations of public space. One of the central tenants of public space is that it is accessible to all members of a society. In Chapter Two we limited our


\textsuperscript{104} See Chapter One: Introduction
definition of public space in West Jerusalem to Jewish Israeli public space. We concluded that public space in West Jerusalem, post 1967, is accessible to all Jewish-Israelis and is therefore considered to be a, Jewish Israeli, public domain. This model considers how an increase in military and security dominance in public space may interact with street artists accessibility (both physically, as well as psychologically) to enter, and transform that space. In coopting the space the military and security apparatus limit the Creative Class’ accessibility, and their claim to acting and expressing freely in that space.

The trends in street art, discussed above, support the argument that during 2014 to 2016 what was previously public space in West Jerusalem was no longer as accessible to Jerusalem’s Creative Class. This is demonstrated through the decrease in public expression through street art. Something disrupted the Creative Class’ accessibility to public expression. This model considers the role of fear-based coercion in obstructing this access.

5.0 Testing and Rejecting this Model:

Based on interview data there is reason to believe that the fear-based model does not accurately explain the relationship between the secular creative class and the military and security apparatus during times of recent conflict.

Of the five street artists formally interviewed within the context of this study, none seemed to be coerced, through fear or intimidation, to either yes or not produce public art. During none of the interviews were subjects asked to directly define the relationship between the Israeli government and their art. All five street artists did, at one point or another, relate their inspiration for some of their work, back to their relationship with the Land of Israel, the Israeli government, the Zionist movement, and/or their personal experience coming in contact with nationalist activities and/or ideologies. From this we can determine that the work of all five
artists is influenced, in one way or another, by their relationship to their nation-state and/or national identity.

Though all five street artists cite national ideology as an inspiration, none showed evidence of acting out of fear-based coercion. One artist expressed their respect for the military and security apparatus, especially during Operation Protective Edge. This artist noted the irony of, at the same time, respecting an institution whilst practicing illegal activity.

“We all have our roles. Their [the police] role is to maintain order in the streets. My role is to bring life to public space. Do I wish we got along better? Sure! But do I hold their job against them? Not at all. I have it on good authority they actually like what I do.”

In contrast, other artists freely ridiculed the Israeli military and security apparatus, without showing fear. For instance, Rotem, a Jerusalem based street artist and head of a local artist collective, shared with me his deep ridicule of the Israeli military and security organizations. For Rotem this ridicule sometimes drives his creative expression, and at other times does not. “I am focusing less on producing and more on creating a platform for others to produce. Maybe there are other people like me who are just looking for community and that is why there is less art right now.” In recent years Rotem has been less active in creating public art, focusing more on developing his artist collective.

Ami, a Jerusalem based street musician shared a very interesting anecdote about one in which the military and security apparatus disrupted his art during Operation Protective Edge. During Operation Protective Edge any reservists were called to the front lines in order to reinforce the military operation. On July 8, 2014 45,000 IDF reservists were called to the front

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105 Omer, in-person formal interview, (Jerusalem: August 2017)
106 Rotem, in-person formal interview, (Jerusalem: August 2017)
107 Ibid.
On July 16, 2014 8000 more reservists were called. And again, on July 18, 2014, 18000 reservists were called to serve. A young, fit male, living in Jerusalem, Ami was called up for reserve duty during summer 2014.

I asked Ami if any external, political, or environmental factors had ever influenced his desire or lack thereof to perform in public. Ami threw his head back and laughed, “Yeah! There was the time I was called back as a reservist…” Indeed, Ami was one of many artists, businessmen, fathers, uncles, and brothers called back to the IDF during Operation Protective Edge.

Ami continued, “But I don’t think any of my experiences with the IDF hurt my music. There is actually this great image of me in uniform, walking to the car to go to base, a guitar strung over my shoulder.” Ami continued to play music all through his reserve duty in summer 2014. “It was the only way I could cope. I need my music. And I need others to hear my music. And nothing is going to change that. I’ll serve, but I’m sure as hell going to play my music as well.” Though Ami showed frustration with the Israeli military for disrupting his daily life, his anecdote did not show any fear, or coercive influence.

The Israeli military and security apparatus during Operation Protective Edge disrupted Ami’s ability to engage in public expression in that it took Ami out of the public eye by bringing him to serve in the army. Based on my conversation with Ami, the Israeli military did not
intimidate or coerce him out of performing. There were simply other factors that defined Ami’s relationship with the Israeli military and security apparatus. In this case, Ami was a reservist and has a duty to serve. Ami felt free to express his art while he served.

Based on qualitative data collected through the interview process, I am inclined to reject the fear-based model. Each artist gave a different narrative explaining fluctuations in their public artistic expressions. For Rotem, his public artistic expression relied on a community. Rotem is focusing on creating a vibrant community right now, instead of producing his own art. Ami still plays in public spaces. Ami only stopped playing in public when he was called for reserve duty. Each street artist had a different opinion about the Israeli military and security organizations. But none of the artists interviewed for this study showed any evidence of fear of, or coercion by the Israeli military or security apparatus.
Chapter Four

Organizing Jerusalem Creative Class Street Art

“Creativity takes courage.”113 – Henri Mattise

1.0 Introduction:

In the previous chapter we tested my initial hypothesis regarding the relationship between the increase of the Israeli military and security presence and artistic public expressions through street art, in West Jerusalem during times of conflict. This hypothesis assumes a direct link between the military and security apparatus organizations, and the individual street artist that comprise Jerusalem’s creative class. My hypothesis did not anticipate the political intervention or significance of any intervening institution between the Israeli security and military apparatuses and the individuals in Jerusalem’s creative class who produce street art. Contrary to my hypothesis, results from my research suggest that established organization play a significant role mediating between Israeli security apparatuses and Jerusalem’s secular creative class.

In this chapter, the central narrative still posits that an increase in military and security apparatus correlates with a decrease in individuals’ public artistic expression. In order to understand this relationship we must also understand the role of several municipality-linked organizations that serve as catalysts for secular culture in West Jerusalem. These intervening institutions have social and financial ties to the Israeli government apparatus. In addition these institutions, since their founding during the Second Intifada, have nurtured and continue to support a healthy secular cultural development in West Jerusalem, in the form of street art. This chapter shall link the decrease in public artistic participation during operation protective edge

113 Clint Brown, Artist to Artist: Inspiration & Advice from Artists past & Present (Corvallis, OR: Jackson Creek, 1998), 62.
and the knifing intifada to municipal-linked organizations complying with Israeli military and security apparatuses.

Figure 3: Expanded Model- Organizations as Intervening Institutions

Figure 3: Organizations as Intervening Institutions, pictured above, describes the relationship between the Israeli military and security apparatuses, municipal-linked organizations, the Jerusalem secular creative class, and public art in Jerusalem. Let us focus on the relationship between the three social bodies in this diagram: the military and security apparatus, the municipal-linked organizations, and secular creative class. First, we shall consider the relationship between the municipal-linked organizations and Jerusalem’s secular creative class. Several established organizations in Jerusalem are, to a degree, fully responsible to the creation and sustenance of secular culture in Jerusalem. In turn, the secular creative class in Jerusalem is, when considered on a large scale, fully dependent on institutional structure to
maintain their existence. Next we shall consider the relationship between municipality-linked organizations and the Israeli military and security apparatus.

2.0 Relationships Between Social Bodies:

2.1 Relationship Between Municipal-Linked Organizations and Secular Creative Class:

In order to understand the relationship between the secular creative class and municipal-linked organizations, we must first understand the history of these two bodies. This section shall detail the history of the secular creative class in West Jerusalem. In detailing the history of the secular creative class, the history of municipal-linked organizations will become apparent.

2.11 Background of the Secular Creative Class in Jerusalem

In order to understand the relationship between the secular creative class and municipal-linked organizations, we must first understand the history of these two bodies. It is important to understand the history of creative secular culture in West Jerusalem, since its rebirth in the wake of the Second Intifada. The following section shall discuss how this creative class developed out of a larger municipal initiative to rejuvenate daily life in Jerusalem. One central component of this initiative was the refurbishing of the city center (colloquially known as ‘Merkaz Ha’ir’- or ‘The Center of Town’), as the physical home of the secular creative class. In particular, we shall pay special attention to organizations as an intervening institution between the Jerusalem Municipality and the secular creative class.

Israeli secular and religious national creative culture flourished from around the time of the Six Day War until turn of the 21st century. As discussed earlier in Chapter Two, Israel’s 1967 military victory was the start of a new era of Israeli dominance in West Jerusalem. Indeed the second half of the 20th century saw Jewish Israeli’s establish West Jerusalem as their religious, political, and cultural home. Some of the cultural foundation developed during this
period, include: the opening of the Israel Museum in Jerusalem in 1965, as well as the development of Ben Yehuda and Jaffa road in West Jerusalem as the central commercial and cultural districts in the city.114

During this time the neighborhood known as Lev Ha’ir (translated to mean ‘the heart of the city) developed into a commercial and cultural capital of West Jerusalem.115 Unlike many cities, Jerusalem’s metropolitan center and surrounding neighborhoods is home to the majority of the city’s inhabitants. Indeed 71% of Jerusalem residents reside in the metropolitan center. The significance of this number can be understood in contrast to other large cities in Israel, such as Haifa (in which 55% reside near the center) or Tel Aviv (where 11% of the city’s inhabitants reside near the center).116 The physical space of the city center in Jerusalem serves a special purpose in that it is immediately accessible to many of the residents of West Jerusalem.

The first and second intifadas succeeded in diminishing much of what had been developed in Jerusalem117 in the latter half of the 20th century. During this time many of the secular creative abandoned the city in search of a more politically tame horizon. In particular, the violence of the intifadas prompted many secular and traditional Israeli Jewish Jerusalem residents to move out of the city, towards Tel Aviv. For instance, … “After the First and Second Intifadas. “A whole generation left Jerusalem,” she said.118 This left the scene bereft of vitality and stunted the creative development in the city. According to one street artists, “during the

115 Ibid.
116 ישראל סטטיסטי: יישור ת¾ס¹/year, 2016, Jerusalem Institute for Policy Research
117 An interesting study might compare the cultural lull during this time period, to the cultural lull documented during the Second Intifada. This comparison is outside the scope of this particular study. Still, I find it important to note, that at first glance, there seems to be a similarity between these two time periods; both in terms of military and security measures, as well as in terms of levels of secular cultural vibrancy, as observed through anecdotal evidence.
118 Tom Teicholz, "The Culture of Jerusalem Itself," The Huffington Post, December 07, 2017, accessed April 25, 2018
In this quote the artist describes how during the Second Intifada Jerusalem became culturally bare. Those who stayed in Jerusalem remained uncertain as to the cause of the culturally barren state. On the one hand the violence of the Intifada stunted the physical capacity of the city to produce culture. But there was also an increasing sensation that the creatives in the city were abandoning Jerusalem as a culturally vibrant local.

In response to the depleted state of Jerusalem’s economic and cultural scenes the Jerusalem Municipality, together with the Jerusalem Development Authority, established an effort to revitalize Jerusalem’s urban livelihood. The city center renewal plan—unprecedented in Israel—received considerable funding from the Israeli Government. Despite the prevailing sense that Jerusalem was a ‘lost cause’ all parties involved believed the city could return to a healthy urban state. This effort was based on European case studies and embodied the belief that healthy culture leads to economic progress.

A central component of the revitalization plan was refurbishing and planning the physical space in the city center in such a way that would invite secular creatives to the space. In 2011 the Jerusalem Center for Israel Studies published a report examining these efforts to revitalize Jerusalem’s city center. The following quote demonstrates how central the physical space in the city center of Jerusalem was to this revitalization effort:

“Behind the plan is the premise that downtown Jerusalem is the city’s “beating heart,” and that proper functioning of this heart is essential if the city as a whole is to thrive.”

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119 Rotem, in-person formal interview, (Jerusalem: August 2017)
120 Amnon Ramon, Aviel Yelinek, and Asaf Vitman, eds., "Downtown Jerusalem: The Story of Jerusalem's City Center and Its Regeneration," Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies Series, 410th ser. (2011):.
121 Aviel Yelinek. "Culture As A Tool For Urban Regeneration." Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies.
This quote refers to downtown Jerusalem (referred to in this study as the city center, or Merkaz Ha’ir) as the city’s “beating heart.” This nickname is more than just a play on the name of the neighborhood beside the city center, Lev Ha’ir (translated to mean ‘heart of the city’). This nickname recognizes that the space in the city center must be a vibrant commercial and cultural zone in order for Jerusalem at large to be considered a vibrant, and culturally relevant city.

The early years of the rejuvenation effort seemed to take effect and yield positive results. As the violence subsided, and the streets were cleaned, culture began to flow through the streets of Jerusalem. One of the early public, cultural celebrations in the revitalized city was the ‘Arting in Jerusalem’ festival, organized by Israeli artist, Liron Meshulem. The festival brought together works by fifty plus artists, both from within Israel, as well as from around the globe. In an editorial of the festival, Scott Sherry reports the following:

“Arting in Jerusalem’ was conceived an organized by Israeli artist Liron Meshulem, who sought to show work that would have a positive impact upon the political and religious tensions that are a feature of daily like in Jerusalem. Though it was no different in its approach to public art projects in western Europe, what made Arting Jerusalem so extraordinary was the fact that there was no real precedent for a project of that nature in the city, primarily because of the threat of terrorist attacks.”123

Indeed, this editorial recognizes the significance of the ‘Arting in Jerusalem’ festival. The editorial cites the lack of precedent for the culturally vibrant event. At first glance this festival indeed seems unprecedented in the wake of rising terrorism, violence, and security and military policy enforcement.

2.12 Organizations For Development

From the outside the secular cultural scene in Jerusalem seems to function as a grassroots, civil society ecosystem. In the early stages of this study I believed the creative class in Jerusalem was an authentic expression from Jerusalem residents, independent of institutional

intervention. In reality, a series of formal organizations catalyzed (and continue to play an integral role in sustaining) Jerusalem’s secular creative class since the cultural lull during the Second Intifada. The following section shall discuss the Eden Company (henceforth referred to as Eden) and the Mekudeshet initiative as two examples of such organizations. This section shall then provide examples of ways in which these institutions intervene in creating and sustaining the secular creative class in Jerusalem in the years after the Second Intifada.

2.12a Eden:

In 2001, as part of the municipal rejuvenation effort the Jerusalem Municipality founded Eden as an associative branch of the Jerusalem Development Authority. Eden was founded in order to ensure there was a special arm of the municipality devoted to commercial development. Eden engages in several types of projects. For one, the organization is mandated with preserving the physical appearance of the space in the city center. This is to ensure that the space does not become dilapidated as it was in the turn of the 21st century. Another type of project Eden engages in the ensuring there is cultural vibrancy in the secular creative class. This is because cultural vibrancy is on factor that drives commercial and economic activity.

The Jerusalem Development Authority’s website introduces Eden:

“… as a statutory authority under the Jerusalem Development Authority Law (1988). The company’s Board of Directors includes representatives of the Jerusalem Development Authority, the municipality, and the government. The Chairman of the Board of Directors of Eden is the Mayor of Jerusalem. The boundaries of its activities were approved by the City Council.”124

Eden was founded as an arm of the Jerusalem Development Authority. This means the municipality and government have total control over the activities and efforts perused under Eden’s authority. This does not mean that Eden is inherently biased towards government

ideology. Eden’s purpose is to develop economic and commercial vibrancy through cultivating a healthy creative class, not to propagate political views. But this does mean that anything Eden des must comply with government policy, even if at the cost of commercial and cultural vibrancy.

2.12b Mekudeshet

The Mekudeshet initiative is another organization playing an active role in stimulating public art and culture in West Jerusalem. The Mekudeshet initiative, a sub-initiative of the Lynn Schusterman Foundation, hosts a series of elaborate cultural events. The initiative began in 2011 by organizing a festival in the center of the city. The following excerpt is taken from the Mekudeshet initiative’s website, published in 2016:

“For the last five years, we have been exploring Jerusalem, drawing inspiration from the city and turning it into the raw material for our artistic productions. We have sought out ways to present Jerusalem as a place that is both holy and secular. We have tried to create art that expresses the inherent tension between the past, present and future and to turn Jerusalem into a city of contemporary culture.”

The excerpt demonstrates how at the core of Mekudeshet is the desire to bring contemporary culture into Jerusalem. The initiative seeks to preserve the integrity of the city, as well as draw inspiration from Jerusalem’s ethnic complexity.

The link between Mekudeshet and the Jerusalem Municipality is not as strong at the link between Eden and the municipality. While Eden’s link to the municipality is financial, Mekudeshet’s link to the Municipality is primarily social. Many of the staff members working with Mekudeshet have strong professional and social ties to municipal bodies. The Mekudeshet initiative is also a registered non-for-profit foundation. The link between Mekudeshet and the Jerusalem Municipality is strongest in Mekudeshet is recognized by the municipality, and by the

creative community in Jerusalem at large, in an official (professional, financial, and social) capacity.

2.2 Cultural Vibrancy Dependant on Formal Intervening Institutions:

These two institutions, among others, provide a series of initiatives in effort to stimulate culture in Jerusalem. Institutions cultivate and sustain secular culture in Jerusalem by simulating, on a micro-scale, authentic cultural participation in every-day life. They also do things such as organize large festivals and other cultural platforms to bring independent artists together. The Eden organization paying street performers and commissioning graffiti artists, the founding of Hamifal, and the Jerusalem Season of Culture (JSOC), are examples of how intervening institutions simulate (in order to stimulate) culture in West Jerusalem.

In order to maintain cultural vibrancy in West Jerusalem the Eden organization stimulates authentic appearances of a healthy creative class ecosystem. The first example of this is the organization recruiting and paying street performers, such as musicians and acrobats, to stand on public, commercial streets in the center of the city, and perform for the public. According to Ron, a staff member at the Eden initiative:

“This is done from the understanding that also the Jerusalem artists need to learn to get used to this type of art, the type of art that stimulates commercial activity. And also this introduces this type of art to the people of Jerusalem (the spectators) who then begin to digest and absorb and normalize this commercial incentivized art. And if we want that this occurrence will happen by itself, then we need for several years to help it along.”

As explained in this quote, what Eden is seeking to do is ‘teach’ the Jerusalem creative class how to channel their creative activity. Hiring and placing street performers in public space in order to simulate individual creative expression on the city streets, might serve as a catalyst for vibrant creative culture.

126 Ron, in-person formal interview, (Jerusalem: August 2017)
It is possible that this endeavor indeed convinces passers by, Jerusalem creatives and residents alike, that the city actually does breed cultural vibrancy. My conversation with Moshe, a young Jerusalem-born resident, exhibits how people in Jerusalem perceive these initiatives as authentic expressions from individual members of Jerusalem's creative class. Moshe, when told that sometimes street performers are commissioned by Eden, responded with: “I had no idea! You mean they get double? I always drop coins to contribute to their performance. But you’re telling me they get what I give and they get the commission.” Indeed it is not widely known that Eden served this purpose to simulate cultural vibrancy on the streets of Jerusalem. Therefore it is possible Eden’s efforts do inspire individual creatives to participate in public artistic expression.

Another example of Eden’s authentic cultural simulation, in effort to catalyze creative participation, is the commissioning of graffiti on specific walls around the city center. One specific place that has garnered a lot of attention recently is Hamifal (The Factory). In 2016 Eden, in collaboration with other artist collectives, took an abandoned building in the center of the city and repurposed it for creative use. Today the building is open to any artist who wishes to paint on the walls, or use the space for expression. The building is open to the public, and even includes a cooperative café in the abandoned kitchen. The kitchen is open to all who wish to use it. The walls of the building are full of art, and the rooms contain various three-dimensional works (Image Nine).

Jerusalem Season of Culture (JSOC) run by the Mekudeshet initiative, is another example of how institutions stimulate culture in West Jerusalem. At the end of every summer Mekudeshet hosts JSOC- a month long series of artistic, cultural, and educational events, around Jerusalem.

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127 Moshe, in-person informal conversation, (Katamon, Jerusalem: March 23, 2018)
128 Ido, in-person informal conversation (Jerusalem: August 31, 2017)
The organizers work around the calendar year finding talented artists and cultural leaders, who embody and express the plurality and complexity embedded in Jerusalem. The events in JSOC range from gatherings in rooftop bars where guests sip on arak or Israeli wine and listen to middle eastern musicians chant psalms and traditional Mizrachi\textsuperscript{129} poetry. Other events take place in the Old City of Jerusalem in enclaves of Greek and Roman ruins. Acrobats dance around the Tower of David, and performers line the streets in the center of town. JSOC specifically brings together Israeli and Palestinian artists, in an effort to unite communities and breed coexistence. The series of events is a fantastic accomplishment.

JSOC is indeed a vibrant cultural force in Jerusalem. So much so that it can be perceived as an infrastructure within itself that sustains vibrant creative culture in West Jerusalem. The following quote demonstrates the range of JSOC’s impact on the cultural scene in Jerusalem:

“JSOC seized an opportunity to commission original work, including pieces that were site-specific to Jerusalem. In doing so, JSOC created an infrastructure for the arts and artists – all of the festivals under JSOC’s umbrellas have artistic directors as well as producers, creating year-round work and cementing JSOC’s role in sustaining creative life in the city.”\textsuperscript{130}

By holding JSOC every year, Mekudeshet created a framework to house and sustain members of Jerusalem’s creative class. This is helpful in sustaining cultural vibrancy in Jerusalem and motivating creative people to produce more. This also means that if ever anything were to happen to Mekudeshet, or JSOC as an organization, then creative production and expression in Jerusalem would be halted.

The efforts and projects associated with Eden and the Mekudeshet initiatives are indeed impressive. Together these initiatives are responsible for the most exciting and culturally vibrant

\textsuperscript{129} Mizrachi is a term for eastern culture referring to culture and practice originating in Iraq, Iran, Yemen, and other Middle Eastern communities.

\textsuperscript{130} Tom Teicholz, "The Culture of Jerusalem Itself," The Huffington Post, December 07, 2017, accessed April 25, 2018
spaces and happening in West Jerusalem. This study appreciates the actions and efforts taken by the Eden and Mekudeshet initiatives. As mentioned at the start of this chapter, the state of commercial and cultural vibrancy during the Second Intifada was depleted. So much so that a generation of creative fled the city in search of more accommodating creative spaces. This study does not question that these initiatives have reversed this pattern and given Jerusalem a newborn cultural and creative spirit. Having said this, it is important to consider the implications of such a relationship between cultural institutions and creative vitality in an urban setting. Specifically, it this study argues that prior to and during the violence and security increase in summer 2014, the creative class in Jerusalem was dependent on institutions such as Eden and Mekudeshet.

Though it seems to the naked eye that Jerusalem has a healthy and independent creative class, in reality there are established organizations at the core of the cultural vibrancy. Outside of the projects (such as Hamifal and JSOC, described above), there is little cultural vibrancy in the city. It is outside the scope of this project, and perhaps premature, to assume institutions are the cause of latent cultural participation. Institutions do not squander vibrancy. Indeed it is in the very interest, and mission statement, of the Eden institution, for Jerusalem to have an independent creative class to help stimulate commercial activity. Such an independent creative class did not exist in Jerusalem in 2014-2016, at least not on a significantly large scale.

Hearat Shulaim- An Independent Artist Collective:

At this point it is important to point out that not all artist collective were fully dependent on municipal-linked organizations in the wake of the Second Intifada. One example of this is the

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131 Discussed near the beginning of section 2.1
work of the artist collective ‘Hearat Shulaim.’\textsuperscript{132} The founding members of the collective write the following:

“We wanted to comment on various aspects of the local reality, art politics, and the relationship between art and Jerusalem in urban space… This project was intentionally produced without any external official, political or economic support, which kept us free of institutional interference, free of political considerations, and free of the need to ally ourselves with local and international organs and institutions whose policies and interests we don’t agree with.”\textsuperscript{133}

Heara’s desire to remain independent of broad institutional effect is indeed at the center of the collective’s ideology. And in fact, Heara’s seclusion from any institutional structure allowed it to act independently. Moreover, their independence allowed them to react in an authentic manner to the social and political realities of that time.

Hearat Shulaim operated in the following manner. The collective produced a series of events, referred to as Heara’s. For instance the first event is referred to as, ‘Heara 1,’ the second event as, ‘Heara 2,’ and so on. The Heara is a curated and showcase of works, all connected by a common theme. The showcases were open for a single event and were open to the public. Along with each public event, the Heara collective published a journal. In fact, the journal was the original intention of the collective’s founders. Only after considering the importance of public space in cultivating culture did the founders decide to host events, or public art showcases, with every journal publication. Each event took place in a precisely chosen public space. Much deliberation went into choosing the location for each Heara. The location of each Heara was intended to carry significance associated with the broad theme, or idea of each event.

Heara 2, the collective’s second exhibition held at the Saydoff Courtyard, is particularly noteworthy. This event demonstrates the how Heara’s independent from any intervening

\textsuperscript{132} Hebrew term for ‘Note in the Margins.’
institution, afforded it authentic freedom of expression. The Saydoff Courtyard, located in the city center, was comprised of artist studios and workshops and stood adjacent to Jewish Ultra-Orthodox neighborhoods. The event was scheduled for 8:00pm on the evening of Friday April 12, 2001. The event organizers recount that the timing of the event was significant as it was “…just after the start of the Sabbath and a controversial time according to the usual Jerusalem schedule.” The artist collective was making a deliberate political claim against the orthodox sect by scheduling the event during the welcoming of the Sabbath.

Hours before the event, and just 100 meters away from the courtyard, there was a suicide bombing. The suicide bombing took place at around 4:00pm, in the Mahane Yehuda market place. The market place, formerly the economic center of West Jerusalem, now serves as a tourist attraction, commercial organ, and home to many Jerusalemites.

With hours to the scheduled event, the Heara collective had to decide if to proceed with Heara 2, or cancel in light of the recent violence, security precautions, and/or out of respect for the tragedy. After much deliberation the collective decided to go forth with the planned Heara. In the context of increased violence and security awareness, the collective decided in favor of pursuing their planned public cultural expression. The collective’s total independence from any larger organizational structure enabled them to pursue creative expression in times of conflict.

Indeed the Heara collective is an example of the type of independent secular creative class culture that is missing from Jerusalem. The presence of such a group potentially discredits the central argument that such independent artistic practice was dormant at this time. The following two points arguably reconcile this contradiction: in 2009 the artist collective partnered

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134 Ibid.
with the Jerusalem Foundation,\textsuperscript{136} an organization with deep financial and social ties to the municipal cultural development network. The fact that Heara ultimately collaborated with the Jerusalem Foundation is evidence of their dependence on this network of foundations and established organizations. Second, many artists who began their careers with the Heara collective moved on to help build Hamifal and other projects, in collaboration with municipal-linked institutions.\textsuperscript{137}

2.2 Relationship between military and security apparatus, and institutions:

The previous section considered the relationship between the creative class and intervening, municipality-linked institutions. The section concluded that in West Jerusalem, during Operation Protective Edge, the secular creative class was dependent on municipality-linked institutions. Let us now consider the relationship between the intervening institutions and the Israeli military and security apparatus.

Institutions that are socially or financially linked to municipal organizations are especially influenced by government policy. The relationship yields compliance on behalf of the organization towards government policy. In this case intervening municipal-linked institutions were significantly influenced, and readily complied with Israeli military and security apparatus policy. The cultural lull, or silence of the creative class in West Jerusalem can be explained as a filtered down effect, through intervening institutions, originating with Israeli military and security policy.

There are a plethora of minor examples that demonstrate this relationship. One major example is the case festival organizers postponing JSOC until after the military operation. JSOC was scheduled to host 31 days of cultural and artistic events in Jerusalem as part of JSOC 2014.

\textsuperscript{136} Ibid. 19-20
\textsuperscript{137} Ibid.
The opening night of the festival was scheduled to take place on Thursday evening, July 10, 2014. Days before the scheduled opening, at the start of the military operation, festival organizers cancelled the first events. According to an article published by The Times of Israel, JSOC organizers are quoted as follows, “As long as the war continues, the Jerusalem Season of Culture’s events will not carry on as planned. We look forward to the quickest possible end to the conflict and will resume our normal activities the moment a ceasefire is announced.” The organizers cancelled the event in light of the increase in violence and military operations taking place in the area of Jerusalem. In place of an in-person event in physical space, the festival organizers organized a several-day-long radio show. The show was broadcast to the public and was meant to embrace in the spirit of the festival. Each day the radio show was broadcast from different stations around the city in order to capture the plurality that thrives in Jerusalem.

Contrary to the Heara collective, JSOC decided to cancel cultural events in the face of increased conflict. I argue that JSOC’s official capacity as an established organization recognized by the Jerusalem Municipality, in other words, their status, influenced the decision to comply with Israeli military and security norms. In the case of Heara 2, the independence of the organization relieved the organizers of any external pressure to react to a changing military or security climate. JSOC did not have the advantage of this independence. JSOC’s status as an established organization, associated with an esteemed foundation, meant their actions carried currency beyond simply representing the artists in the creative class. The following statement made by festival organizers during the operation demonstrates JSOC’s compliance: “We’re not really back to routine, and we don’t think we can celebrate the end of summer or dance like

nothing’s happened.”\textsuperscript{140} The violence and the presence of a military operation coerced JSOC festival organizers out of hosting their planned cultural events. It is possible that if JSOC was not as well established, or well regarded amongst the leaders of Jerusalem, they would not have felt the need to cancel in times of turmoil.

**Independent (Religious) Creativity:**

This study observed that much of the creative class went silent during Operation Protective Edge and the Knifing Intifada. The previous section presents a model suggesting that there are institutions that intervene in the creative class’s independent creative platform. This intervention results in the creative class producing less when intervening institutions are unable to support their creative efforts. Let us consider one example of an independent creative team that did become very active during summer 2014.

The following anecdote is based on a series of interviews with the artists Barel and Souza, as well as members of the Jerusalem street art community, at large. Barel moved to Jerusalem in 2011. He first saw Souza’s artwork on the streets of Jerusalem in 2012. From the first time Barel saw Souza’s work, he knew Souza was a special artist. “Whenever I saw blank walls I would call him” explained Barel, “The thing is the city has painted over murals that he had done voluntarily so he left Jerusalem.”\textsuperscript{141} Between 2012 and 2014 Barel made several minor attempts to collaborate with Souza, but nothing came of it until 2014.

In 2014 Barel was walking through the Mahane Yehuda marketplace (henceforth referred to as the ‘shuk’) on a Saturday afternoon. Barel remarks how the shuk was empty, the shutters closed, and the quiet of the Sabbath was in the air, but the city felt empty. As Barel tells the

\textsuperscript{140} The Times of Israel, August 14, 2014, accessed April 25, 2018, \url{https://www.timesofisrael.com/contact-point-redux-for-the-season/}.

\textsuperscript{141} Barel, in-person formal interview, (Jerusalem: August 2017)
story, “I’m looking at the empty shutters and I’m like ‘what an eye sore.’ But there was one little piece of art that made me happy. It was painted on this shop shutter.” The piece of art to which Barel is referring is a mural done in 2011 by a street artist named Sinai. Barel continues, “As I continued walking up towards Jaffa [street] I saw a mural that Solomon [Souza] produced in 2012. And that’s when I was like, ok this is real and I went dragging his ass back to Jerusalem and we’re doing this.” So Barel brought Souza back to Jerusalem with a vision to revive the space and breath vibrant culture into the area. And once Souza was back in Jerusalem, his work started popping up on walls and corners around the city.

Indeed when Souza came back to Jerussalem he immediately began spraying the walls of the city. One artist, referencing Souza’s work, says the following:

“Souza. He threw up on this city. Now everywhere you look you can’t get away from him. His faces of established figures and these colors and shapes. He took over Jerusalem. It has been three years now of Souza!" 

In this particular quote the artist has a critical tone. This particular artist has been working on the streets of Jerusalem for over twenty years. In talking about Souza he is referencing the time period in between 2014 and 2017 (when this interview was conducted).

Barel and Souza produced a lot of work in their first months working together (the end of 2014) both in the shuk and around Jerusalem. But over time Barel formalized his initial vision. His initial vision, says Barel, was to produce a mural gallery along the shop shutters of the market place.

“The idea is to create like a massive Kiddush. That would showcase the multiplicity of Israeli ethnicity with Shabbat tables from each community within our nation upholding

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142 Ibid.
143 Ibid.
144 Omer, in-person formal interview, (Jerusalem: August 2017)
145 A Kiddush is a traditional gathering that takes place on the Sabbath where someone blesses a glass of wine and the community partakes in a light meal. It is similar to a cocktail hour, where refreshments are served and people mingle.
their own unique fashion, culinary, and singing traditions. And to try and create an all-inclusive standard that would appeal to everyone without excluding anyone. That is what the shuk is, what Nachlaot\textsuperscript{146} represents, what this country represents.”\textsuperscript{147}

There is a term in the Hebrew Bible called \textit{kibbutz galuyot}, or an in gathering of the nations. Barel’s vision was to simulate this in gathering in the form of vibrant cultural participation in the shuk.

In the beginning shop owners were hesitant. One said yes, then another and another. Several shop owners asked for portraits or rabbis as they thought they would bring luck to their business and their household. “Guys originally said no, but then they saw they we could paint some rabbis. These guys, they are indifferent to art, but they think the rabbi will bring good luck. So we ended up with this gallery of rabbis.”\textsuperscript{148}

All of this started in summer 2014 and continued through 2016. At the beginning there was almost no nightlife, only one bar in the shuk, and Barel and Souza painting rabbis for shop owners. Slowly over the course of that summer, as cultural events hosted by organization, around the city closed down, the shuk began to fill up. As the murals gained popularity, Barel and Souza harnessed their social capital with the shop owners to start deciding which figures to paint.

On multiple occasions Barel tried to reach out to organizations for financial support. Each time he reached out he was met with unwelcoming greetings. Barel attributes this to a stigma associated with the project- that the murals are inherently religious. “Because of the rabbis and the biblical scenes we had this stigma of being too Jewish, and the people involved in the cultural renaissance in Jerusalem kind of shunned us.”\textsuperscript{149} Because the artists were considered religious none of the organizations wanted to risk being blamed as bias. It is puzzling that in this instance

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{146} Nachlaot is the neighborhood next to the shuk.
\textsuperscript{147} Barel, in-person formal interview, (Jerusalem: August 2017)
\textsuperscript{148} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{149} Ibid.
\end{footnotesize}
the religious community, often considered to be closed and less culturally stimulating, was producing vibrant culture, while the secular creative class experienced a lull.

Barel and Souza did succeed in bringing life to the shuk. And their work inspired an ingathering of different cultures. This is best highlighted by an anecdote told by Lev, a student in Jerusalem who is familiar with the street artist community. Lev recalls one image of how the murals in the shuk have inspired pluralism:

“You see a young secular kid in ripped jeans and a white t-shirt smoking hookah at a bar. And this kid is leaning his back on a portrait of Maimonides. All while Mizrachi music plays in the background and people take shots around him. The contradiction between secular and religious is playing out right before my eyes. But it works, the worlds are twisting together.”

Indeed, to this day the shuk is the center of nightlife in the city. It is home to the secular creative class, despite its roots originating in religious ventures.
Chapter Five

Conclusion

1.0 Summary of Results:

Eighty odd pages later, let us remind ourselves why we are here. It is to answer the following question:

*How did the increased activity of the IDF during the summer of 2014 Operation Protective Edge influence political-cultural street art in West Jerusalem?*

Answer: Probably not, and to the extent it did it was indirect.

In effort to answer this question, this study has yielded three notable results:

1) **Decline in street art production:**

As detailed in chapter three, this study observed a decline in street art production in 2014 and 2016, and low levels of street art production in 2015. First and foremost this finding is significant in that it allows us to consider what, if any, role increasing security and military presence plays in decreasing public artistic expression. The methodological rigor used to analyze street art production levels in order to arrive at this finding, adds a degree of legitimacy to Hypothesis 2.

After four years as an undergraduate student of social science (primarily political science and economics), I have observed the following. What distinguishes social science research, as a discipline, is its ability to rigorously discern patterns of social behavior. In order to ensure rigor, the social scientist turns to the scientific method. Implicit in scientific methods of inquiry is measurement. It is not immediately apparent which method should the social scientist employ in analyzing broad, and frustratingly vague, phenomena, such as ‘cultural vibrancy.’ Even after
isolating street art/graffiti as a measure of cultural vibrancy associated with the creative class, there remain a series of daunting methodological challenges.

The second point of significance is the methodological labor that led to this finding. Culture, artistic production, creative initiative, these are all cornerstones of collective expression. They are difficult to measure, but that does not mean we should not try. This study joins growing efforts in attempting to rigorously analyze cultural vibrancy through street art. It is the first of its kind to gather street art data in a single point in time and retroactively date the unit of graffiti’s time of production. I hope this study motivates future researchers to overcome these methodological challenges and attempt to rigorously analyze components of social and political material culture.

2) Rejecting the Fear-Based Model:

A second result of this study is rejecting a fear-based model to explain the relationship between an increase in Israeli military and security apparatus presence, and Israeli creative vitality in West Jerusalem. Interviews with Jerusalem based street artists, conducted for the purpose of this study, yielded little evidence to support a fear-based model. This result is significant in that it contributes to the body of knowledge about how artists in West Jerusalem relate to military and security organizations.

3) Municipality-Linked Organizations as Intervening Institutions:

When I asked this question, back in September 2017, I assumed there existed an independent creative class in West Jerusalem. A third result of this study indicates there are intervening institutions supporting the creative class in West Jerusalem. Furthermore, evidence gathered over the course of this study suggests the creative class in Jerusalem is not a function of individual grassroots public expression. As a result, Jerusalem’s creative class is susceptible to
institutional influences. This is observed during Operation Protective Edge wherein cultural vibrancy in Jerusalem decreased in part because municipal-linked institutions complied with Israeli military and security policy.

2.0 Implications:

2.1 Implications for Future Military and Security Policy:

It is difficult to navigate the public-private space. It is true that the primary objective of the military and security apparatus is, and by all means should stay, to take offensive and defensive measures to protect its citizenry. Sometimes these efforts may come at the cost of absolute free individual public creative expression, or may trespass on any other individual freedom. The question becomes, to whom does the responsibility fall to protect the individual freedoms of a society? Is it the responsibility of the military and security apparatus? Or is it the responsibility of the people, independent of the military and security apparatus? The answer to these thought experiments are well beyond the scope of this study. What is clear from this study is that there must be a citizenry that stands independent of the military and security apparatus if free creative expression is to weather the trials of violent conflict.

2.2 Implications for Future Urban Development Policy:

These results have several implications future urban development policy in Jerusalem. First it is important to reiterate that these intervening institutions likely do more good than bad. The cultural lull during the Second Intifada warranted significant intervention. These results indicate that the task at hand now is to transition the institutionally grown creative class into an independently thriving, grassroots public artistic expression. The exact policy path towards an independent creative class is well beyond the scope of this study. But these findings highlight that perhaps the creative class in Jerusalem is ready to function independently.
These findings also highlight the importance of considering the character of a city when adapting development policy. The Jerusalem Development Authority adapted urban development policies that originated in European cities such as Dublin, Berlin, and Paris. One lesson we can take away from this study is that not all cities are the same. In particular, urban development policy suited to European cities may not be fit for Jerusalem. Jerusalem is a conflict prone city and is home to a diverse ethnic base. Urban development policy cannot simply be copied from European cities. Rather, municipal officials must consider the Jerusalem creative class’s specific needs, and tailor policy towards them. This will allow for an easier transition to an independent creative class in Jerusalem, in years to come.

3.0 Remaining Puzzles and Call for Further Research:

There are two ways in which this study can be extended:

1) First is continued research into the relationship between increase in violence and military and security dominance, and individual grassroots creative class public artistic expression. One way in which these findings are extendible is to consider different social cleavages. This study considered only the secular and religious-national segments of West Jerusalem’s Israeli population. It would be interesting to conduct the same study and consider the ultra-orthodox population in West Jerusalem.

2) Second are the collected questions, tangentially related to this study, that are worth further exploration. I have done my best to note in the footnotes when such a question arises. Here are some of these questions, or paths of further inquiry.

- Further research into West Jerusalem’s creative class. Specifically to what extent is the creative class dependent on intervening institutions?
The relationship between West Jerusalem’s creative class and intervening institutions only became clear during the research phase of this study. This finding is itself a basis for further research into the degree to which the creative class is dependent, as well as the implications of such a relationship.

- Comparing levels of cultural vibrancy, both in Jerusalem, as well as within Israel at large, across times of military conflict.

Another interesting question that became clear during the research phase of this study is the question of a cultural lull in West Jerusalem during the Second Intifada. Unlike the cultural lull between 2014 and 2016, the lull during the Second Intifada is well cited. It is even formally recognized as a basis for municipal and national policy, seeking to rejuvenate urban commercial life through stimulating culture, post Second Intifada. It would be interesting to compare cultural vibrancy across different military operations.
Appendix A

Research Methods

1.0 Street Art Data Collection and Analysis:

1.1 Data Collection:

The data presented in Figure 1: Street Art Production in Jerusalem (2012-2017) considers only data points collected by myself during August 2017. In the summer of 2017 I walked the streets of Jerusalem a photographed graffiti and street art. Originally I collected 368 pictures of graffiti/street art. During the initial stages of this study I believe mapping street art would be a significant portion of my research. This did not pan out as I rejected the fear-based model in chapter three. Therefore I did not need to know where graffiti is drawn, as there is no evidence for a correlation between spaces where there is increase in military and security presence and street art production. None-the-less I stored all of my data on the Fulcrum data collection Internet application. My data collection method follows a method developed at NYU. This is discussed in Chapter One under Methodology.

A note on Souza and Barel’s work: I did not photograph any of the murals in the shuk. I did photograph Souza’s other work around Jerusalem. I felt this best represented graffiti production in the city and captured how the shuk is, after all, an isolated place.

1.2 Image Analysis:

After collecting the data I aggregated the images. In some cases I had taken multiple pictures of the same piece in order to isolate the text of the piece. When collecting the data I photographed everything that could potentially be considered graffiti/street art, even those tags that were clearly vandalism. In analyzing the data, I parsed out the images that were clearly reckless vandalism.
Cleaning the data in this manner I was left with 261 isolated units of graffiti. It is likely that there were more units of graffiti in my sample that I did not detect. This is due to the fact that graffiti layers on top of itself. I isolated only graffiti units that I could clearly see.

For each of the 261 units of graffiti I analyzed them in order to determine the time they were produced. In some cases I consulted with street artists, members of Jerusalem’s street art community, and/or private archives of Jerusalem street art, in order to accurately determine the time period or date of creation.

1.3 Possible Biases in Collection and Analysis:

The process of classifying graffiti according to time created differs based on the type of image being analyzed. Some images capture a single mural. In these cases it is easy to classify this data point and determine the time period in which it was created. Other images capture a ‘rolling wall of graffiti.’ These are images of surfaces that have different street art contributions from a variety of street artists, each attaching their work at a different point in time. In these cases it becomes harder to classify each individual piece of graffiti. Many graffiti sketches overlap; it is reasonable to conclude that new additions of art have layered older sketches out of view. This rolling wave of covering the old biases the sample. Given that all images were captured at the same time, we are more likely to observe recent graffiti, rather than old graffiti.

In addition, the accuracy of the time will vary based on my knowledge of the art. In some cases I was able to confirm the exact date the artist painted the street art by contacting the artist. In other cases I was able to determine the time range with street art was created, based on my familiarity with the street art in the area. In other cases the street art references a specific political issue popular during a specific time period. I was then able to determine when the art was created based on when this political issue was relevant.
Appendix B

Operation Protective Edge: Ha’aretz Live Updates Analysis

I created the following table in order to analyze the increase in violence and subsequent increase in Israeli military and security apparatus presence during Operation Protective Edge, summer 2014. He Ha’aretz newspaper publication published live online updates, from the third day of Operation Protective Edge (July 10, 2014) through the fiftieth, and last official day of the operation (August 27, 2014). Table B.1 aggregates those live updates from Ha’aretz that are relevant to either increase in violence or increase or decrease in Israeli military and security presence, in Jerusalem. Table B.1 is comprised of two columns. The first column is the day of the operation. For instance, the first line of the Date column is labeled Day 1, and corresponds to August 25, 2014, the first day of Operation Protective Edge. The date corresponds to the second column, Events. Included in the Event column is are aggregated quotations, taken directly from the text of the online live updates that are relevant to Jerusalem. To clarify, the Events column does not include every live updated published by Ha’aretz during the operation. Rather, the Events column includes only those updates that the author (I) deemed relevant to this study. When the live updates for a particular day could not be found at all the Events column is coded as ‘unavailable.’ If there were live updates for a certain day, however none of the live updates on that day were connected with Jerusalem, then the Events column is coded as ‘none.’
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Day</th>
<th>Events:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Day 1</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 2</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 3</td>
<td>Rockets fired hit Jerusalem area, Siren sounds in Jerusalem (Hamas claims responsibility)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 4</td>
<td>According to Gantz, the security apparatus will continue carrying out offensive operations, and that the IDF is &quot;prepared to widen them when needed, with whatever force required and for as long as it takes.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 5</td>
<td>Riots erupt in East Jerusalem. In Issawiya, youths throw stones and firebombs at police forces. A fire breaks out in the area, not far from Hadassah Hospital, Mount Scopus. Firefighters are unable to arrive at the scene due to the continued clashes. In A- Tur and in Qalandiyah several dozens of youths are clashing with police, and throwing stones and firebombs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 6</td>
<td>A firebomb was thrown at an Egged 962 bus, en route from Tiberias to Jerusalem on Route 6, south of Eyal Junction. One of the bus' windows was shuttered. Medics treated several passengers for shock.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 7</td>
<td>Israel Police arrest 10 Arabs after clashes break out on the Temple Mount in the Old City of Jerusalem. Rioters hurled stones at the officers, wounding two.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 8</td>
<td>A number of Palestinian men attacked and lightly wounded two Jewish men near Jerusalem's Old City, by Herod's Gate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 9</td>
<td>Police arrested 36 people on Sunday on suspicion of disturbing the peace, throwing rocks and hurling firebombs in Jerusalem. 165 people have been arrested so far on similar suspicions, including 44 minors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 10</td>
<td>Clashes in East Jerusalem: Palestinians threw stones at a passing train in the Shoafat neighborhood this morning. No injuries were reported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Two Palestinians arrested overnight in East Jerusalem, suspected of throwing stones. Another three Palestinians suspected of attacking a Jewish man in the Muslim Quarter were also arrested. The victim did not require medical treatment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>An additional 21 Palestinians suspected involvement in Jerusalem riots over the last two weeks were also arrested overnight. 201 Palestinians have been arrested over the past two months, 45 of whom have been formally charged. Police expect to make further arrests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 11</td>
<td>Sirens sound in Jerusalem Hill area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 12</td>
<td>Home Front Command prohibits gatherings of over 1,000 people in open areas 40-80 kilometers from the Gaza Strip, a perimeter which includes Tel Aviv and Jerusalem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 13</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 14</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 15</td>
<td>Clashes in East Jerusalem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 16</td>
<td>Sirens sound in Jerusalem Hill area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 17</td>
<td>Masked Palestinians clash with police in East Jerusalem; rioters throwing rocks, molotov cocktails. Police respond with riot-control measures. No injuries reported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 18</td>
<td>12 Palestinians were arrested for causing disturbances around Jerusalem. Thursday night is Laylat al-Qadr according to Muslim tradition, one of the most important nights in the month of Ramadan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 19</td>
<td>Two Palestinians were killed near the Qalandiyah checkpoint in the West Bank and over 200 were wounded, many of them by live IDF fire, when some 10,000 protesters marched from Ramallah toward Jerusalem late on Thursday night. Israeli authorities say live fire was fired at IDF troops from with the crowd. Four Palestinians have been killed during Friday demonstrations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 20</td>
<td>Police and security officials are concerned that the combination of the holiday and the fighting in Gaza will lead to widespread disturbances in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 21</td>
<td>Thousands of police officers and border police have spread across the capital. The special deployment will last until the end of Friday prayers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 22</td>
<td>Israel to bar Palestinians under 50 from entering Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem during Friday prayers, fearing clashes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 23</td>
<td>According to the Jerusalem Police, during the disturbances in the city yesterday 39 suspects were arrested and 27 police and border police were lightly wounded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 24</td>
<td>This morning thousands of police and border police have been positioned on the Temple Mount, in the Old City and in east Jerusalem. Only men above the age of 50 as well as women of any age will be admitted to prayers at the mosques on the Temple Mount.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 25</td>
<td>Palestinians in East Jerusalem report dozens wounded, including four wounded by gunfire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 26</td>
<td>39 Palestinian rioters arrested by police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 27</td>
<td>Meanwhile, Palestinian protesters and Israeli security forces continued to clash in the West Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 28</td>
<td>Dozens of masked men are throwing stones and firebombs at police forces in Isawiyah, Jerusalem, the police spokesperson reported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 29</td>
<td>unavailable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 30</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 31</td>
<td>IDF is preparing for violent protests in the West Bank today, the first Friday since the ending of the month of Ramadan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 32</td>
<td>Heavy police presence is being felt in Jerusalem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 26</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 27</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 28</td>
<td>Police beefing up presence on Jerusalem's seam zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Contingents of police from outside capital annexed to Jerusalem forces, positioned at friction points between Jewish, Arab portions of city.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 29</td>
<td>Gunman on motorcycle opens fire at bus stop by Jerusalem's Hebrew University in Mt. Scopus. One man seriously wounded. Security forces attempting to apprehend attacker.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A man has rammed a digger into a bus in the Shmuel Hanavi neighborhood in Jerusalem. The digger driver was shot dead by the police.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 30</td>
<td>A security guard was moderately wounded Tuesday afternoon in stabbing attack near the police station at the entrance to Ma'aleh Adumim, near Jerusalem. Police suspect terrorist motive. The guard, in his mid-50s, open fired on the assailant but missed the target. The assailant managed to escape to the village Azaria nearby.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 31</td>
<td>unavailable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 32</td>
<td>unavailable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 33</td>
<td>According to the instructions issued by the IDF's Home Front Command yesterday, gatherings of over 1,000 people in open areas are not permitted anywhere within 40-80 kilometers of the Strip's perimeter. Both Jerusalem and Tel Aviv fall into that category.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In areas within 40 kilometers of the Strip, public gathering of over 500 people are forbidden, both in open areas and within closed spaces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 34</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 35</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 36</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 37</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 38</td>
<td>IDF forces arrest 20 Palestinians overnight in the West Bank and the Jordan Valley. Among them are two suspected Hamas operatives, arrested in Beit Lakia and Qalandia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 39</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 40</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 41</td>
<td>unavailable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 42</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 43</td>
<td>Rocket siren sounds in Jerusalem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rocket siren sounds in Jerusalem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 44</td>
<td>According to the IDF, over 150 rockets and mortar shells were fired at Israel from Gaza, targeting the Tel Aviv and Jerusalem areas as well as the south.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A rocket explodes in an open area in the Jerusalem region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 45</td>
<td>Eleven Palestinians arrested in West Bank overnight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 45</td>
<td>First round of Israel's Premier League soccer games postponed due to security situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 45</td>
<td>The defense minister asked the public for patience and fortitude, saying &quot;the operation will be long and the goal is one: to return quiet and security to the people of Israel in general and the residents of the south in particular. We will not compromise.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 46</td>
<td>A 20-year-old Palestinian is in serious condition after an exchange of fire with Israel Police in Jerusalem on Friday. According to the police, a special police unit spotted gun fire from the Shoafat Refugee Camp toward the Pisgat Ze'ev neighborhood, and returned fire, confirming a hit. The suspected Palestinian youth is currently hospitalized in the Hadassah University Hospital, Ein Karem, in Jerusalem.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 47</td>
<td>According to the police, the incident followed another shooting incident toward Pisgat Ze'ev, after which the special unit was deployed in the area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 48</td>
<td>Three children have been lightly injured by stones thrown at an Israeli car in the East Jerusalem neighborhood of Wadi Joz. They were taken for treatment. Border Police captured one of the masked assailants, who admitted to being involved in the incident, according to police.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 49</td>
<td>There have also been clashes between police and Palestinians youths in Silwan and Shoefat, according to Palestinian sources. Operations of the light railway in Shoefat have been suspended after three incidents, including one in which a molotov cocktail was thrown.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day 50</td>
<td>Firebomb thrown at Jerusalem light rail in Shoafat area of East Jerusalem, damaging the train.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C

List and Description of Interview Subjects, and Informal Conversations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table C.1 Formal and Informal Interview Subjects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pseudo name</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barel and Souza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ami</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lev</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shira</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rotem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moshe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ido</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix D

Images

Chapter One


Image Two: Souza, Solomon and Hahn, Berel, Portrait of Maimonides. 2015, on shop shutter in Mahaneh Yehuda Market Place, (Source: Lital Yeshurtun Photography).

Image Three: Solomon Souza and Berel Hahn, Portrait of Lucy Aharish (February, 2016) on shop shutter in Mahaneh Yehuda Market Place, (Source: Renee Ghert-Zand).
Image Four:  Stencil graffiti of Moshe Dayan (date of origin 2008), (image captured by Ellie Neustein, August 2017).

Image Five:  Image of ‘Na Nach’ tag (date unknown)- a popular reference to a song about the prominent religious figure, Rabbi Nachman from Umman (Source: unknown).

6.a: 6.b: 6.c:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table D.1: Image of Elementary Arabic words with Hebrew Phonetic Spelling, Translation (Arabic/Hebrew)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Image 6.a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Arabic Spelling</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hebrew Spelling</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Arabic phonetic pronunciation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hebrew phonetic pronunciation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Translation</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chapter Two
None.

Chapter Three
Image Seven: Nir Barkat Graffiti on Electrical Box (2013), (image captured by Ellie Neustein, August 2017).

Chapter Four

Image Nine:  Walls at the Miphal, artists unknown (images captured by Ellie Neustein, March 2018)

9.a ‘Map’ on Hamifal wall  9.b Decorated wall of Hamifal  9.c Painting on Hamifal wall
### Appendix E

**Event Key**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Referred to as in the context of this study:</th>
<th>Also known as:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The War of 1967, or The 1967 War</td>
<td>The Six Day War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The War of 1948, or The 1948 War</td>
<td>War of Independence, The Catastrophe, al-nakba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judea Samaria</td>
<td>The West Bank, The Contested Territories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Protective Edge</td>
<td>The Gaza War, The Gaza Conflict, Tzuk Eitan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Knifing Intifada</td>
<td>Wave of Terrorism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bibliography


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Israel Central Bureau of Statistics


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