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A Continual Evolution: The Reform of France’s “Politique de la Ville” as an Urban Peace-Building Mechanism in the Suburbs of Paris

Pauline Day
pday@wellesley.edu

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A Continual Evolution: The Reform of France’s “Politique de la Ville” as an Urban Peace-Building Mechanism in the Suburbs of Paris

Pauline Odile Day
Advisor: Lawrence Rosenwald

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Prerequisite for Honors in Peace and Justice Studies

Wellesley College
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# Table of Contents

Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................. 3

Glossary .................................................................................................................................. 4

The Lived Experience .............................................................................................................. 5

Comments on the Translation Experience ............................................................................. 13

**Introduction** ...................................................................................................................... 14

A. Presentation of the Thesis Plan ......................................................................................... 14

B. La Politique de la Ville ....................................................................................................... 15

C. The February 21st Call for Reform ................................................................................. 25
   i. The July 2012 Cour des Comptes Report ................................................................. 25
   ii. « Le Pouvoir D’Agir » 2014 .................................................................................... 28
   iii. The Law of February 21st, 2014 ............................................................................ 33
   iv. A new context of budgetary restrictions .................................................................. 35

I. Part I: The Key Actors/Stakeholders of Politique de la Ville .............................................. 36
   i. The Ladder of Power ................................................................................................. 36
   ii. New and Emerging Partnerships ............................................................................ 42

II. Part II: Towards a Simplification ...................................................................................... 45
   i. A New Priority Geography ...................................................................................... 45
   ii. Taking into consideration the Lived Neighborhood ................................................. 55
   iii. The Question of Shifting Responsibilities .............................................................. 56
   iv. The ambition of the New Projects .......................................................................... 59

III. The Stakes of Participative Democracy in the Politique de la Ville ................................. 60
   i. The procedure of elaboration of the New Contract .................................................. 60
   ii. The Creation of Citizen Councils ............................................................................ 65
   iii. A new mechanism of consultation and Co-Construction ...................................... 74
   iv. “Parlons Quartiers” ............................................................................................... 76

Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 79

Works Cited ............................................................................................................................ 83

Appendix ................................................................................................................................. 85
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• To Pamela Daniels for acknowledging the potential of, and actively supporting, non-traditional student projects like this one.

• And lastly- to Claudia Yau, a good friend, whose simple words of encouragement nudged me to pursue this senior thesis project in the first place.

This thesis would not have been possible without all of you. Thank you.
Glossary:

ACSE : Agence National pour la Cohésion Sociale Egalite des Chances (National Agency for Social Cohesion and Equal Opportunity)

CLS : Contrat Local de Sécurité (Local Contract of Security)

CUCS : Contrat Urbain de Cohésion Sociale (Urban Contract of Social Cohesion)

IRIS : Unit of measurement referring to the 200m by 200m squared area used for statistical analyses.

HLM : Habitation a Loyer Modéré (Affordable Housing)

NPNRU: Nouveau Projets de Rénovation Urbaine (New Projects of Urban Renovation)

PRE : Programme de Réussite Educative (Program for Educational Success)

QP: Quartiers Prioritaires (Priority Neighborhoods)

ZSP : Zone Sécurité Prioritaire (Zone of Priority Security)

ZUS : Zones Urbaines Sensibles (Sensitive Urban Zones)
The Lived Experience:

This thesis is largely based on academic and personal experiences while I was interning and researching in Pantin, France my junior year abroad, which have molded my unique point of view. Pantin is a suburb of Paris, directly bordering it to the northeast. The 18th and 19th districts of Paris run straight into Pantin, with little or no break in neighborhood continuity. Pantin has 54,124 residents, 74.4% of which are considered “actifs,” active contributors to the economy. The remaining 25.6% are “inactifs:” retired residents, students, and unemployed residents. In comparison to neighboring suburbs, Pantin is relatively small and dense, with a population density of 10,673 inhabitants per kilometer squared.

Figures 13 and 24: Figure 1 situates Pantin within the Department of Seine Saint-Denis, the dark green territory that spans the northeast Parisian border- infamously referred to as the 93. Pantin directly borders the 18th and 19th

---

3 “Carte de Pantin, en Seine-Saint-Denis.” / Image Source: IDE
districts of Paris. The figure also makes clear how large the area of the banlieues surrounding Paris is. Figure 2, on the right, is a neighborhood breakdown of Pantin- taken directly from the Mairie’s website. The canal de l’Ourcq, marked by a light blue line on the map, runs through the middle of Pantin, as do the RER train tracks- the grey lines right above the canal. The small blue dots (two of them) on the outermost west edge of Pantin indicate the Metro stops connecting Pantin to Paris.

Pantin is connected to Paris both by the RER (commuter rail) and by the Métro Line 7. The Canal de l’Ourcq runs through the center of Pantin, and with it, a highly developed and funded bike path. There are public art installations and landscaping along this path, funded jointly by Paris and Pantin. The Canal also runs through the Pantin neighborhood (Mairie-Hoche) with the most ongoing investment, private and public. There are notable private housing developments being constructed along the Canal, with advertised rental rates that rival those of the neighboring Parisian districts.

Figure 3 and 4: Figures 3 and 4 are photos taken in January 2016 of the Canal de l’Ourcq in Pantin. Figure 3 on the left shows an example of the modern housing developments that have become popular along the canal. These types of mixed-use development, with restaurants or small businesses on the first floor, are also typical of the Mairie-Hoche neighborhood. Figure 4 on the right shows the bike and walking path that follows along the canal, with regularly up kept landscaping. The Mairie of Pantin is the building barely visible in the left hand corner of the photo. It is located directly on the canal.

4 “Carte des Quartiers,” Image Source: Ville de Pantin, Conseils Quartiers
5 “Canal de l’Ourcq 1,” “Canal de l’Ourcq 2” / Image Source: Pauline Day
Pantin’s proximity to Paris has made it an attractive area for private and public investment. BNP Paribas, Hermès, and Chanel are headquartered in Pantin- a response to the unaffordable Parisian rental rates. All of these companies are significant contributors to Pantin’s economy, and have poured considerable funding into public development projects in the neighborhoods in which they find themselves. They are also large and profitable companies with significant numbers of employees- bringing in thousands of commuters into Pantin everyday, and with them, their spending power, and considerable tax revenue. It is worth noting that the large majority of those employed by the companies are not Pantin residents. However, during the project development phases, contracts were signed between the companies and the city of Pantin mandating a certain percentage of local hires (not an uncommon practice in France.) These investments are highly concentrated along the RER and Canal that runs straight through the middle of Pantin. This area of the City is also where the Mairie and the Centre National de Dance (CND), major public institutions, are located. These ongoing investments feed into a Pantin that is continually developing, and rapidly gentrifying. This is part of a larger project of a ‘Grand Paris,’ in which the city of Paris would expand to include the neighboring suburbs. This project has been in talks for over ten years, with an ebb and flow of support and critique, though it seems to have been put on hold of late. The hesitation is in fact, around the additional strain, financial and perceptual, that adding surrounding suburbs, most of which include many low-income communities would put on Paris.
Figures 5 and 6: Figures 5 and 6 show examples of recent private sector investments in Pantin. On the left is the new BNP Paribas headquarters, located directly off of the Canal. BNP reconfigured and expanded the old Pantin Mills (Grand Moulins), creating headquarters that span over several buildings. This was a billion Euro construction project, that received additional funding from State sources, both due to its ‘historical site’ considerations, and as an urban renewal project in Pantin. Figure 6 is an example of the businesses that emerge out of this private sector investment. This modern bakery, located directly to the right of the Hermès workshops, caters almost exclusively to the commuter workers, closing at the end of the workday. The prices at the bakery are exorbitant- pricing out even workers from the nearby Mairie. On this square, there is a farmer’s market in the American Style with very specialized and expensive goods such as jams, cider, and baked goods. This is very different from the European/French market style, which is required in every neighborhood in France, and caters to all residents, keeping prices below supermarket value. The modern apartments above it are also typical of emerging housing developments that cater to the modern “bobo” (hipster) that is looking to live in refurbished apartments, located within the historical parts of cities.

This neighborhood, Mairie-Hoche, is the only Pantin neighborhood that does not qualify for Politique de la Ville, and there is stark inequality between this neighborhood, and those that border it. When I was first accompanied to Pantin to meet my Mairie supervisor, I was told Pantin was the new Williamsburg, NYC. If this comparison is deserved- and I believe the case can certainly be made that it is- the Pantin I am describing now in 2016 will look nothing like the Pantin in ten, or even only five, years.

6 “BNP,” “Boulangerie Bobo,” / Image Source: Pauline Day
Pantin has historically been, and continues to be, strongly anchored on the political left. Much like many of the Parisian suburbs, traditionally populated by the working classes, Pantin was led by the French Communist Party for a period of almost fifty years. It was only in 2001, when current mayor Bertrand Kern was elected, that the city switched over to being socialist.

My junior year abroad, I completed two internships around the policy mechanisms catered to low-income communities in the Paris region. The first internship I completed was in the (loosely translated) Department of Democracy and Development of Youth and Neighborhood Life (DDJQ), which had among its responsibilities what is called: ‘Politique de la Ville.’ The department is intended to “propose and construct” services for the populations that are most at risk. These services are co-designed and constructed with partners (public, private, non-profit) and the inhabitants of the neighborhoods served.

This branch of local government has three primary missions:

1. Create and promote the path to participatory democracy.
2. Support the social transformation, and development of the person and the citizen.
3. Adapt the services provided by the city to the diversity of the city, thus assuring that each neighborhood has access to services adapted to its specific, different, needs.

---

7 The left and right political divides as they exist in France are very different from the Democrat/Republican divide in the United States. The best way to explain this is to image the American political scale shifted significantly to the left, so that a center-democrat in the United States would roughly line up with someone on the right in France. Socialism, and to some degree Communism, are not considered radical or extremist parties in France.


9 Participatory Democracy in France is founded on the general principle (de la République) of increasing citizen participation within the democratic process as a means of creating a better French Republic. Participatory Democracy also refers to the specific political will and projects to actively engage citizens in the political process, and increase the weight this participation carries in the decision making process. It does not refer to voting specifically, but rather additional efforts sustained by local governments such as neighborhood councils, mock elections for teenagers, and community meetings. The manifestations of this will are varied, and range from projects that follow through with this principle in name only, to efforts that sincerely give inhabitants a vote on RFP demands of government projects.
Although this branch serves the entire city of Pantin, it is principally concerned with the neighborhoods that are identified by the State (in coordination and negotiation with City representatives) as “Quartiers Prioritaires,” (QPs) or translated to Priority Neighborhoods. It ought be noted that QPs replace the “Zones Urbaines Sensibles” (ZUS) or Sensitive Urban Zones that were initially identified with the introduction of the ‘Politique de la Ville’ in the late 1970s.

I want to acknowledge that my experience was atypical, and happened to fall at the right time, in the right place, under the best conditions. Small, administrative coincidences shaped my experience. First, it so happened that my supervisor was on maternity leave. This meant that I was mentored directly by the head of the department, and his adjoint (next in command.) Both of these mentors held responsibilities of greater scope within the DDJQ. Shadowing back and forth between these two supervisors allowed me a much wider view into the workings of the Politique de la Ville, and also gave me access to more important meetings, conversations, and internal department memos. Second, my arrival at the DDJQ coincided almost perfectly, within a week or so, with the first diagnostic presentation on the reform procedure. Along the same lines, my final week at the DDJQ coincided with the final presentation on the reform procedure to the elected officials of each of the cities. This timing allowed me to observe the reform procedure almost from start to finish, consequently allowing me greater confidence in evaluating it as a whole. It fell at a time in which I was able to witness the chaos, pressure, and brainstorming that arises after a law drops down from the national government, mandates a reform, and the local governments have a short amount of time to enforce it. In short- I witnessed how a new law, one that aims to transform a formerly existing one, is put into place.
I want to be clear and acknowledge that my internship was overwhelmingly observational. I held very little responsibility within the department, and directly contributed very little to the brainstorming conversations. For my 10 weeks at the DDJQ, I was a fly on the wall. Throughout the internship, I participated in meetings with the different important actors in each neighborhood served, both local and governmental, and in inter-departmental meetings on the progress of the reform. These meetings happened almost every day, often twice a day.

Although this was initially very frustrating, I was informed that this was/is very common for French internships, particularly ones in government, and I was encouraged to embrace being an observer, and take extensive notes. This encouragement marked a shift in how I understood my role within the department, and I began to take notes not only on the content of the many meetings I was sitting in on, but on how they were unfolding, who was there and who was not, on the tensions that became increasingly noticeable, on the conversations that were encouraged, and on those that were held in whispers and suppressed. All of these notes serve as the anchor to the research that followed—and provide, I believe, a unique perspective on this process of reform. As an insider with an observational role, I was given access to information that is unavailable to the public and the press, or that simply is not in any way recorded to be found using traditional research methods. I learned more from watching elected officials shift uncomfortably in their seats, noticing actors choosing which meetings to attend and not to attend, and listening in on conversations between functionaries in hushed tones, than I did from any other source I encountered in my research. I consider this to be both the strength and the weakness of my thesis. On one hand, this non-traditional research can give us an insight into how laws are drafted, brainstormed and carried out in real time, which is, I believe, in stark contrast to how we believe they will be when we celebrate the passing of a law. However, this also makes the bulk
of my research highly subjective, and largely unverifiable. I want to acknowledge this tension, as it will become increasingly evident as this thesis progresses. While understanding the subjectivity of this research- I have chosen to embrace it for what it is, a modified version of field research, and a case study example of the reform procedure as I witnessed it in Pantin. I have done my best to include some of the important pages of notes taken during my time at the DDJQ, which can be found in the Appendix.

It should be noted that in addition to my internship at the DDJQ, I also completed a short complementary internship at the Association de la Fondation Etudiante pour la Ville (AFEV) or the Student Organization for the City. Practically, this was done to shorten my internship at the DDJQ so that it could remain unpaid. However, it was also done so that I could work with both governmental and non-governmental actors. The question of actors is fundamental to my research and this thesis, and it was important to me that I work with both types of actors. The AFEV is also a recipient of funding from Politique de la Ville, which gave me additional insight into the day to day functioning of the mechanism, and the process for receiving and retaining this funding.

At the AFEV, I was assigned to be a Junior Researcher for their think tank (Observatoire) on the social responsibility of Universities (ORSU), which operates in partnership with UNICEF France. I both continued to observe and take notes on meetings I was a part of, and was responsible for completing a research report that focused on social responsibility initiatives by Universities throughout Europe.

All of these experiences allowed me to develop a greater understanding of the actions and services that are continually being developed in order to assist inhabitants in disadvantaged neighborhoods.
Comments on the Translation Experience:

In many ways, this thesis is a work of translation. First, the large majority of my sources, notes, and experiences are in French, and embedded within the French bureaucracy- which carries a vocabulary of its own. For this thesis, I grappled with translating words and concepts of which there is no easy equivalent in the English language. This is both because in works of translation we often times find lacunae, but also because the government structure, principles, and mechanisms of France and the United States do not mirror each other. Additionally, words carry with them historical and cultural baggage, and the connotations this implies can be lost in translation. The chosen word in translation can conversely do likewise. Where appropriate, I have included a comment or footnote explaining the particular context of a concept or word, or have left the word in its original language.

Second, this thesis is based on my own writing and notes in French. I am, therefore, strangely translating my own thoughts. This has been a particularly interesting part of my thesis experience, as I have been confronted with my own language and cultural biases as I parse through notes and government documents.

Finally, throughout the research process for this thesis, I have attempted to focus primarily on secondary sources that are in French. This means that for most, if not all, of my citations, I am translating the original words of the authors.
Presentation of the Thesis Plan:

It is clear that this new context of reform has for its goal the complete upheaval and evolution of the Politique de la Ville. Central to this reform is the reintroduction of the citizen as a key actor in his or her own neighborhood. This question of emerging/re-emerging actors is at the heart of the reform, and is therefore an essential question for the conclusions of this thesis. In three parts, I will analyze the following central question: “How are the actors of Politique de la Ville evolving?”

I choose to ask this question in the present tense because it presents the reform as one that will be continually evolving, and will continue to evolve, in a considerable way, in the years to follow. This analysis and question will be done primarily in three parts. First, I will present the different actors of the Politique de la Ville, then I will look at the move towards a simplification of this mechanism, and finally I will analyze the new promotion of Participatory Democracy and citizen inclusion in the new attempts at reform and diagnostics.
Introduction

La Politique de la Ville:

In parallel with its economic benefits and its cultural advantages and access, the Urban Metropolis, and its neighboring suburbs has become a new location for the concentration of poverty and insecurity. We often find in and around cities the most acute indicators of poverty, and the most telling indicators of social dysfunction. This acute poverty is in stark contrast to private enterprise capital, highly concentrated in certain areas in the city. As a consequence, financial and social inequalities have developed between neighborhoods in the city, perpetually reinforced by private and state actors, entrenching urban (economic, social, racial) segregation.

Worth noting here is the distinction between American suburbs, and the French banlieues. The case can certainly be made that the French model follows the European one, but there are French particularities that have made the evocation of banlieues in European government contexts bring about a collective groan of apprehension. As a starting point, I would grossly simplify, and say that French banlieues are the French equivalent of the American inner city- highly economically and racially segregated, ‘socially dysfunctional’, disenfranchised, and stigmatized ten times over.

There are many instant connotations that the word banlieue carries. First, there are in fact some very wealthy suburbs, particularly on the West side of Paris. But when French people say banlieues, they mean a particular type of suburb located in the north and east of Paris, primarily. Second, there are, of course, banlieues all over France. However, when banlieues are evoked in popular dialogue, be it media based or government based, it is generally a safe assumption to say that those being referred to surround Paris. (Increasingly, Marseille is also entering the national conversation.) Lastly, banlieues carry the cultural and historical weight of the 2005 émeutes
(riots) and we can all still remember the newspaper front-pages of burning cars, and armored riot police.

Although there are certainly regimes which historically have explicitly promoted, or continue to promote, segregationist policies- the most significant contributions to urban segregation as we understand it now, has been done by implicitly segregationist policies, promoted by local government actions, but often carried out by private sector actors. For Parisian segregation, the most culpable actor is undoubtedly the housing industry.

With each ‘urban renewal’ policy, there has been a pushing out of low-income neighborhoods and inhabitants further from the center of Paris, onto the margins. This can be traced back to the initial ‘urban renewal’ carried out by the baron Haussmann in the late 18th century, celebrated for his upheaval of the city of Paris. (The classical Paris architecture of the 5 story housing units is accredited to Haussmann.) His policy under the Second Empire of Napoleon III was done in an attempt to “ease the congestion” caused by the “dense network of medieval streets.” 10 Haussmann was given carte blanche to make Paris his blank canvas- entire neighborhoods were torn down, and very little of modern Paris remained untouched by Haussmann. The boulevards of Paris were opened up, and there was not a 1 to 1 replacement of all the housing units destroyed. This both displaced communities, and re-shifted the ‘social profile’ of the communities. This massive reconstruction of neighborhoods invited in the housing and construction industry, which swept in, pricing out former inhabitants of neighborhoods, in favor of businesses and middle to high income housing units.

A second major shift occured in the urban renewal efforts that spanned from the 1950s to the 1970s. The political will at this time was in favor of ‘modernizing’ the city center,

exclusively reserving its use for “[tertiary function’]” of commerce. The political policy contributed to the focus on building new social housing units on the peripheries of cities, in zones that were in urgent need of urban renewal. Although this political effort was initially popular, it quickly began to be seen as a “politic of renovation-deportation,” forcing low-income communities out of the 13th, 14th, and 15th neighborhoods, which had historically been neighborhoods of high welcome for newly arrived immigrants.

In order to compensate for these displaced populations, the national government developed and financed urban policies that focused on the creation of low-income housing projects. This was done in during the era of the expansion of the French welfare state. The housing took on the classic, and often lauded, 1960s shape-tall, dense, simple housing structures. Here France is not the exception, and its housing projects closely mirror those constructed in the same time periods in major American cities such as Baltimore and Chicago. These are referred to as HLMs or Habitats a Logement Modéré. Directly translated, HLM means Affordable Housing, and there are, practically, many different kinds of HLM housing units. However, just as with the American consciousness around public housing, the HLM that is most discussed, relevant, and thought of, is the multi-story public housing units. At the time of their construction, these were used for populations that fell under the poverty line, and were not meant as affordable housing for mixed-income use. The structures are often turned inwards, and composed of several different units that share common spaces such as a cement basketball court, a small bodega, and in some instances, preschools or after-school centers.

I want to explain this HLM phenomenon clearly as it has become the symbol of the public debate around urban segregation in France. When taking the RER train into the suburbs, you leave Paris, and know you are entering the suburbs when you begin to see these large
housing units, so different from Parisian architecture, standing out like sore thumbs on the architectural landscape. This difference is worth noting—because that is the word most commonly used to describe the suburbs: “They are different.” Even the architecture reinforces the felt difference and separation between the cities and the suburbs of French cities. The HLMs are the physical manifestation of the prison that has become the modern French banlieues, turned inwards, falling apart, and bleak. Images of the HLMs are dispersed throughout the French media, and even though many of these public housing units are being phased out, community activists and conservative pundits alike point to HLMs as a symbol of all that is wrong with the French welfare state. While the argument is perhaps still made that at the time HLMs were useful and necessarily, it is largely accepted as a failed project.

**Figure 7:** The image to the left is the Ilot 27, an HLM park in Pantin, under constant renovation, that has been often cited for code violations. Although it is slightly shorter than the average HLM in France, it is a typical example of the HLM bleak architecture.

Image Source: B. Pouvreau for the Department de Seine Saint Denis
The conversation around segregation in France re-enters the public debate at the end of the 1970s, and again in 2005, with the increase of riots in the quartiers populaires within banlieues, characterized as neighborhoods that are marked by poverty, insecurity, unemployment, and a strong demographic presence of immigrants.\textsuperscript{11} This public reaction and quick focus on the ‘urban question’ is often compared by the media to the impact of the race riots on large American cities. The comparison is only to some degree, I think, justified, and is highly, and intentionally, sensationalist.

In order to respond to these growing inequalities in cities, the State and its collective local governments have developed a contractual partnership that takes the shape of the ‘Contrat de Cohesion Social’ (CUCS) or the Contract on Social Cohesion, intended to lead and develop actions against the exclusion of inhabitants, and social inequality. This contract, and the politics which define and develop it, are considered globally to be the ‘Politique de la Ville.’

Largely in reaction the riots in low-income neighborhoods, a new government focus has developed on programming to address these communities. This was progressively put into place until the 1990s, when it was formalized, and Politique de la Ville, as a formal and national policy, was created. At the heart of this policy is the targeting and labeling of Zones Urbaines Sensibles (ZUS), which become priorities for the national intervention in the sectors of housing, education, urban renewal, and citizenship. While this policy, since its creation, has perhaps allowed for significant urban improvement, it has also led to significant unintended consequences such as severe stigmatization. It has never succeeded in “developing the social and economic profiles of these communities that would favor mixed-income housing, multi-use

\textsuperscript{11} Marco Oberti and Edmond Preteceille, \textit{Collection Repères: La Ségrégation Urbaine} (Paris: La Découverte, 2016), 5.
building, etc, (mixité sociale)” a major intent of the original project. Additionally, there is an increasing gap between these communities themselves, with some steadily improving, and others steadily degrading.

Brief Timeline of Major Politique de la Ville Shifts:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Shift Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>HVS: Habitat et Vie Sociale (Housing and Social Life)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>After criticisms begin to come in, the first formal mechanism of rehabilitation and evaluation of HMLs is created, called HVS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982-1988</td>
<td>DSQ: Development Social des Quartiers (Social Development of Neighborhoods)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>After criticism of HVS by several reports (Schwartz, Bonnemaison, Debedout) DSQ is created to aid in the improvement of all aspects of daily life in the neighborhoods in which inhabitants incur “social, cultural, and urban handicaps.” Efforts under DSQ are led and financed by the State in partnership with the Region. The financing is guaranteed within the larger contract signed between the Regions and the State.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>‘Ministere de la Ville’ (Ministry for the City) formalized and appointed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Loi d’Orientation pour la Ville</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Law passed by the Ministry of the City to attempt to fight against urban segregation, particularly with regards to housing. Additionally, the ‘dotation urbaine’ is formalized, which requires affluent communities to financially contribute to less affluent cities that contain significant HLM parks. The most significant measure passed (which continues, though it has been slightly amended) is the requirement that Agglomerations of over 200,000 inhabitants have</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12 Oberti and Preteceille, Ségrégation, 62.
13 Oberti and Preteceille, Ségrégation, 62.
25% of their territory include social/affordable housing, under financial penalty. Some affluent communities choose to (yearly) incur this fine, rather than build affordable housing on its territory.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
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| ~1993-1995 | Creation of the ‘Contrats de Villes’  
Shifts the signatories on the contracts developed with the State in order to allow for projects to be carried out at a smaller, local, city level. |
| 2003   | First Report of the Cour des Comptes  
The Cour des Comptes releases its first, highly critical, report on the management of Politique de la Ville, particularly with regards to housing developments. The responsibility of public housing is reallocated back to the State, and it is determined that in ZUS neighborhoods “200 000 units must be destroyed, 200 000 rebuilt, and 200 000 restructured or significantly rehabilitated.” Additional, the ANRU is created, and tasked with large-scale urban developments in ZUS neighborhoods. Finally, an oversight committee (Observatoire) is created to monitor the progress of this first wave of reforms. |
| 2005   | Post 2005 Riots- National Response  
A new urgency is pushed onto Politique de la Ville, and new funding is delegated to Politique de la Ville: “the ANRU’s funding is increased by about 25%, 100 million from the national budget is re-allocated to non-profit subsidies, and new departments and committees are created within the Ministry of the City.” Additional, increased funding is funneled into employment initiatives for youth, largely seen as a pacification measure post-riots. |

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16 “L’évolution de la Politique de la Ville (La Documentation Française)”  
17 “L’évolution de la Politique de la Ville (La Documentation Française)”
Adil Jazouli, a prominent French sociologist, describes the Politique de la Ville phenomenon as “an ambiguous consensus.”\(^{18}\) He notes that Politique de la Ville falls under this political flou (blurriness) in which it is almost universally criticized and associated with “notable insufficiencies in the best of cases,” and an “inability to control the anger of the banlieues” in the worst.\(^{19}\) And yet- “the policy has survived a couple of political turnovers” (from left to right and vice versa), and for the past 30 years “has only grown in size and responsibility.”\(^{20}\) There is something, therefore, to be noted about its persistence. Where other urban programs have failed and fallen out of vogue, particularly in moments of high national tension, Politique de la Ville, even despite ongoing reform, survives, and is often strengthened in times of urban crises, such as the riots of 2005.

It is not a coincidence that there are shifts of policy, and new energy consecrated to Politique de la Ville after moments of high tension and raised awareness and consciousness through national events such as riots. Riots draw quick national attention to these communities, otherwise ignored within the French government and media, and put pressure on the local and national governments to address the painfully obvious systemic inequalities that momentarily become visible.

Perhaps it might be appropriate to comment here on the current political context in France post 2015 and 2016 terrorist attacks. I want to note that I am not a terrorism expert, nor was terrorism considered a focal point of consideration during my time at the Pantin government. But, it is undeniable that since the terrorist attacks, there has been an increased conversation and concern over the disenfranchisement of the French banlieues, particularly of Paris and Brussells.

\(^{19}\) Oberti and Preteceille, *Ségrégation*, 7.
What is regrettable is that the conversation is being almost exclusively framed in terms of the disenfranchisement of the communities in these banlieues. The narrative being spun is that inequality and segregation ought be prevented because it leads to disenfranchisement and radicalization that opens up the space for new actors, such as terrorist organizations and extremist religious groups, to take the place of local government legitimacy. This is not to say that this is not true—simply that it is only one facet of the inequality within these communities, and it securitizes democratic principles. We ought strive to lower disenfranchisement not because we are worried that an internal terrorist threat will bubble up, but because it is the responsibility of local government, particularly under a socialist regime, to include all inhabitants into the democratic process. The community is not blind to this, and increased and pushy moves to include inhabitants are now being seen as disingenuous and suspicious. As always, during times of terrorist threat, civil liberties have been dealt a blow—rightly so or not. This means that there is an aura of suspicion and surveillance all throughout Paris and the surrounding suburbs, and particularly in priority neighborhoods (QP.) My fear is that rather than honestly bring into discussion the questions around segregation (racial, social, and economic), racism, and xenophobia, the increased vigilance on these neighborhoods has driven conversations around participative democracy within these neighborhoods underground. Along with the increased focus on these neighborhoods has come an increase in anti-immigration rhetoric and policy. Jazouli and Rey confirm:

“Nous sommes en pleine conception sécuritaire des politiques en direction des populations immigrés, il faut donner des gages en continu a un électorat de plus en plus sensible aux sirènes de l’extrême droite.”

21 Jazouli and Rey, Pour une histoire, 177.
[“We are smack in the middle of a securitizing conception of the politics intended for immigrant populations, that have to make continual pledges to an electorate that is increasingly sensitive to the alarms of the extreme right.”]

Populism in France, manifested in the Front National party, has taken as its core issue the traditional and wholly unoriginal narrative of anti-immigration policies. There is an increased conversation around immigrants as populations that take employment opportunities from ‘true French’ people (Français ‘de souche’), and that “en plus” are high terrorist risks. The effect is that entire neighborhoods are being criminalized and otherized.

What is likely to happen is that certain sectors (crime, social integration) of the Politique de la Ville will get increased, while others will fall out of the national conversation. The problem is that these sectors may have obvious reactionary policies to, say, drug trafficking, or to an increase in radical mosques being built, but do nothing in terms of peace building for future integration, and tackling the larger questions of why these phenomena are able to take root in the first place. Those questions and conversations take time, and with significant long-term financing unlikely to be given in this current political context in which little money is to be found, people are growing impatient with the banlieues, and most importantly, fear has begun to dictate political policy.
The February 21st 2014 Call for Reform:


In 2012, the Cour de Comptes\textsuperscript{22} released a report on the ineffectiveness of the policy of ‘Politique de la Ville.’ The report asserts that in only ten years, the Cour has already issued two reports on the political mechanism. The first report was in 2002, and led to the reform of 2003. Then, in 2009, the Court made new inquiries after little change was made. At the end of its reports, the Cour issues a list of recommendations, many of which were unaddressed or ignored in the 2003 reform.

The Court defines ‘Politique de la Ville’ within the frame of the contractual partnership of the CUCS, as being “the collectivity of actions intended to fight against the exclusion of inhabitants in these [QPs] and to ameliorate their living conditions.”\textsuperscript{23} The report arrives at the conclusion that living conditions for a majority of citizens living in these neighborhoods have not been improved, and that the principal handicaps of these neighborhoods still exist, and have not been addressed or decreased. What’s more, the report concludes there exists a strong “dysfunction in the coordination of the ministries and local government.”\textsuperscript{24} The report attributes the absence of results primarily to this administrative dysfunction.

\textsuperscript{22} Colloquially, I was told that the Cour des Comptes intervenes when ‘things are really bad, and you’re in trouble.’ More specifically, it is a Court charged with monitoring public funds, and informing the citizens of its usage, abuse, and efficiency. This court is based on the notion, derived from Article 15 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, that the citizen has the right (and responsibility) to demand transparency as regards to the use of public funds. It is publically funded and non-partisan, and any given moment, has numerous ongoing investigations into public policies and projects. All results of investigations are made public, and are given significant weight by local and national governments. Although it is not legally required, it is seen as politically required to adapt and edit policies and projects after particularly scathing reports by the Cour.


\textsuperscript{24} Cour des Comptes, 24.
These results continue even after ten years of reform and heavily subsidized initiatives, and the Cour asserts that gaps in inequality will continue to widen. An example that the Cour offers to explain this gap is the financing for the development of urban neighborhoods. After the 2003 reform, the ‘Agence Nationale pour la Rénovation Urbaine’ (ANRU,) or the National Agency for Urban Renovation, was created to support projects focused on the physical transformation of sensitive neighborhoods. It has equally a responsibility to promote social integration through mixed income housing, and mixed used developments. In ten years of projects, the funds for this urban development reached almost forty-two billion Euros. This demonstrates a willingness, both political and fiscal, to support the ‘Politique de la Ville.’ In the same spirit, the National Observatory on the Politique de la Ville (ONZUS) was created to monitor effective development in the ZUS neighborhoods, and to publish reports on the wider goals, directions, and projects currently funded under this mechanism. Yet another example of the public and political determination is what is called Espoir Banlieue, or Suburban Hope, launched by the Secrétaire D’Etat (roughly equivalent to the Minister of the Interior,) Fadela Amara, in 2008. This project had for objective to diminish the differences in quality of life in the large French suburbs, and closely mirrors the objectives set forth by the Politique de la Ville. It was heralded as a “Marshall Plan” for the suburbs by all major journalistic publications, but was unable to receive full financing, and was significantly diminished in consequence. All this to say that despite a willingness, political, public, and to some extent, fiscal many different actions, led by numerous departments, were unable to produce the intended results.

All of these mechanisms were put in place within the frame of, or in tandem with, the Politique de la Ville. There continues to exist an enormous gap between the ZUSs and the

surrounding cities and neighborhoods. This is a gap that has been relatively stable by every indicator over ten years of reforms. Moreover, the dependence on welfare mechanisms is significantly elevated, a dependence over-elevated even after consideration of the 2008 financial crisis. Finally, with relation to employment, the gaps have grown, and ZUS now find themselves at almost double the national unemployment rate. This number is doubled twice over for employment of ‘youth,’ defined in France as those less than 26 years of age.

One explanation that the Court gives is that the ‘Politique de la Ville,’ and the reform that accompanied it in 2003, was not sufficiently piloted. Right from the introduction, the report reminds the reader of the need to have all action taken under the mechanism of ‘Politique de la Ville’ be coordinated across the numerous actors, several administrative ladders, and to have a flexibility to be able to adapt the policy to the specific needs of each individual neighborhood. These principles of flexibility and coordination were not, however, demonstrated in the management of these policies.

The Court also makes reference to the organization and division of the priority geography that determines the QPs and ZUSs. This geography is more often than not divided over and over again between numerous zones which overlap each other, and contributes significantly to a confusion about project requests, and about service deployment by different actors of the ‘Politique.’ In short, the bureaucracy of the program has become unmanageable for those requesting funding for projects, or for inhabitants requesting services. The report applauds and pulls examples from Germany and Spain, countries with a priority geography much more tightly organized, with results that show significant reductions in the urban inequality gap.
ii. “Le Pouvoir D’Agir” 2014 (The Power to Act)

The second, and arguably more significant, criticism of ‘Politique de la Ville’ rests on the absolute need to include inhabitants of QP neighborhoods in the big decisions taken by the governments on the needs of the various neighborhoods. In July 2013, Marie-Hélène Bacque and Mohamed Machmache published the report “The Power to Act: for a radical reform of the Politique de la Ville” addressed to the Ministre de la Ville (Minister delegated to the City.) Mohamed Machmache is the President of ‘AC Le Feu,’ a national, collective organization with mission to “communicate the voices of inhabitants of neighborhoods,” which was constituted after the 2005 riots. Marie-Hélène Bacque is both a sociologist and urbanist, and a professor at the Université of Paris Ouest Nanterre. The conclusions of the report are the product of considerable effort that united several key players of the non-profit communitarian world, local elected officials, urban professionals, and public opinions determined in two citizen meetings. It reiterates the large propositions by the representatives on the need to reform the Politique de la Ville. It also proposes additional methods possible for this reform, and is accompanied by examples of good practices from across the world. One clear example that is referenced throughout the report was the use of random drawing to determine citizen consultation on the project to draft a new Icelandic Constitution in 2010, right in the middle of the financial crisis. The committee charged with drafting the new Constitution consulted 950 random (within certain limits on area and gender) citizens.28 After this initial brainstorming effort, a citizen committee of 25 was created, who additionally, and systematically, used social media networks to get public feedback on each drafted article. Bacque and Mechmache celebrate this ‘good practice’ example

for its original use of social media to promote a wider participatory democracy, considerable
government transparency, and significant “redistribution in the balance of powers.”

It is important to note that this report itself created a movement of engaged citizens that
retook the slogan “[Not without us]” as its title. Pas Sans Nous is a “citizen coordination of 150
neighborhood organizations that have as their objective to restructure the Politique de la Ville on
a basis of Participative Democracy.” They consider that the actions taken in the new reform
(2014) are only “saupoudrage” (sugar coating) that does not answer the main calls and issues of
the initial report that called for reform. I don’t disagree.

The report begins with one basic principle: that there was once great enthusiasm and
ambition for participative democracy in the neighborhoods classified under the Politique de la
Ville (ZUS), but that this ambition has largely lost momentum and grown tired. This loss of
momentum is felt both by non-profit neighborhood partners, and by residents of the
neighborhoods themselves. Electoral participation is perpetually decreasing. Politique de la
Ville, it is argued, must therefore be rethought entirely, to clarify the “objectives of the debate
surrounding participation” and “modernize the mechanisms of institutional (governmental)
participation.” The report demands first and foremost reflection before new actions of reform
are taken.

Several questions are posed about how this rethinking should take place. The first is on
the importance of considering the role of two types of persons perpetually absent from public
debate, so as to be able to respond to the global needs of the neighborhoods. The second question
concerns the different actors in Politique de la Ville, principally the little neighborhoods

29 Bacqué and Mechmache, Le Pouvoir d’Agir, 26.
31 Bacqué and Mechmache, Le Pouvoir d’Agir, iii.
organizations and their consolidation in neighborhood projects. Often, these organizations are at
the heart of the population, but are composed of small informal groups of informal populations,
and are without funds or institutional support. Yet they are integral to determining the needs of
neighborhoods, which necessitates support to formalize their role. The report rests itself around
this central notion: how to develop a “pouvoir d’agir” for neighborhood inhabitants and
organizations, so that the results and the developments are at the same time their success and
their responsibility. On the issue of neighborhood residents, the question being asked is: How
can we integrate a consultation of inhabitants in tandem with a consultation with elected
officials. The report seeks a new reflection and organization of Politique de la Ville that sees the
work of elected officials and neighborhoods residents in tandem.

This reflection is accompanied by a list of thirty concrete propositions to guide the reform, here
sorted into six more general propositions.

1. Give sufficient funds to pilot a call to citizens independently from the government and other
institutional powers. This would be entirely separate from most of the existing structures of
Participative Democracy, which are often organized, run, and directed by the services of the City
(City Hall.) This is the case for the Councils of Citizens in Pantin, which are directly linked to
the DDJQ.

2. Support and recognize a space for debate and for citizen\textsuperscript{32} communal gathering, with the
“creation of local tables of consultation and a national platform.”\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{32} While language (particularly language from a national policy drafted many times over) is always intentional,
citizen (citoyen) as it is employed here is more akin to neighborhood resident, not legal citizen.
\textsuperscript{33} Baque and Mechmache, \textit{Le Pouvoir d’Agir}, 31.
3. Favor and assist the development of non-profit resources and legitimacy in precarious neighborhoods with a foundation “for social solidarity.”\textsuperscript{34} This is essential to favor a freedom of action, and to unlink the client mentality that often exists between organizations and state actors in the status quo. It is also important to securitize the organizations with funds, so that they will be able to bridge the gap between different grants and subventions, and to insist on transparency in the development of their subventions from state actors.

4. Rethink this moment of reform of the Politique de la Ville as a moment of état des lieux (determining current state of affairs), and pilot co-elaboration, co-decision, and co-construction. In order to do this, there must be an assurance of representation for all key stakeholders and partners, and a citizen representation present in neighborhoods in order to determine the needs of each neighborhood (a diagnostic), and therefore the public services necessary. The report suggests doing this diagnostic at the inter-communal level\textsuperscript{35} to better represent the lived neighborhood, rather than the neighborhood as defined by municipal borders, often dividing neighborhoods over several different municipalities. An archetypal example of this is demonstrated in the neighborhood of Les Courtilières in Pantin. It is divided almost equally between Aubervilliers, Pantin, and Bobigny, without any clear demarcation or separation of this division in the lived experience and day-to-day actions of inhabitants.

5. Shift the perspective on low-income neighborhoods with institutional support of media diffusion on the culture, the life, and important contributions of the neighborhoods for the development of France. This is perhaps increasingly important since the terrorist attacks of

\textsuperscript{34} Baque and Mechmache, \textit{Le Pouvoir d'Agir}, 22.
\textsuperscript{35} This is not an informal recommendation- it refers to the transition of Politique de la Ville to the Agglomeration, a (relatively) new inter-communal government structure, typically regrouping about 5 or 6 cities within a Department.
January 2015, and November 2016, as scrutiny of the low income neighborhoods, heavily populated by immigrant communities, has become more divisive, extreme, and important.

6. Encourage a transparency and co-construction to limit the limitations (freins) of the administrative hierarchy of French institutions, state and otherwise. This ought be accompanied by an important evaluation of public services to create an institutional responsibility and link functionaries in government with the populations they serve. This necessitates a new development and training of functionaries, and a more diversified recruitment, anchored in the communities themselves.

The report was well received, and served as the basis/inspiration for the new national law. We therefore find many of these same propositions in the project for drafting the national law, and the processes it followed. However- it ought be noted- while the spirit of the report was certainly in the national law, many of the processes that followed ignored key tenets of the report, which underlie the propositions.
iii. The Law of February 21st, 2014

The 2014 reform wave is accompanied by a new contract system for Politique de la Ville. The Contrat Unique de Ville (Singular Contract of the City) will replace the Urban Contract of Social Cohesion (CUCS.) Although this was scheduled for January 2015, numerous contract deliberations and extensions continue, and it is unclear when this contract in its entirety will replace the former. The process is detailed in the law number 2014-173, “on the programming for the city and urban cohesion” presented by the Ministry of Equality on territories and housing, and the Ministry delegated to the City. This reform and new law were presented within the context of a seemingly new institutional and political initiative that began with the Council of Ministers on the 22nd of August 2012, and then accompanied by a national consultation that regrouped key stakeholders. This consultation was called “Quartiers, engageons le Changement!” (Neighborhoods, Let us engage change!) Finally, the significant objectives of the law were fixed by an inter-ministry committee of cities (CIV.) The law echoes the calls made by the Court, and insists that inequalities in the territories in fact continue, despite significant financial and organizational developments. Reform is therefore absolutely necessary.

Many of the objectives of the law and the mechanisms that Politique de la Ville will utilize do not change; but there is a transformation that results from concerns about the actors of Politique de la Ville, and their functioning within the existing state-focused structure.

The following are the key reforms demanded by the law:

1. A singular geography- tightened and standardized.
2. A better articulation and collaboration between the urban and social services in the neighborhoods. The actions ought be focused on both the people in the neighborhoods and specific key locations in neighborhoods, for a true transformation of the neighborhoods.

3. The Politique de la Ville must be put into place “by establishing the principle of co-construction” between neighborhood inhabitants, neighborhood organizations, and institutional actors. The development of “Citizen Councils” is anchored in the law. (While many cities previously opted to have these kinds of councils, this law aims to standardize them, and make them mandatory.)

4. A new program for Urban Renewal (NPNRU) will replace and take over the role of the ANRU, endowed with five billion Euros, aimed at the most precarious neighborhoods. This new program will need to take into consideration “lived expertise” of neighborhood inhabitants.

5. A new Observatory (Think Tank) will be put into place to evaluate (linked with the old ONZUS) the progress of these new methods of Politique de la Ville, and will be presented to elected officials every year.

These new priorities for the Politique de la Ville will be written into the Singular Contract, which aims to replace the CUCS in late 2015.

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37 Pantin is an example of a city that has already opted for this kind of citizen consultation, creating and supporting what was previously referred to as Neighborhood Councils. These were small and informal groups of citizens that would somewhat regularly meet, organized and supported by a functionary from the Mairie de Pantin. These Councils, one for each major neighborhood in the city, were sometimes given decision-making power, though it was primarily on superficial questions, and in the final stage of development projects. In Pantin, they are seen as successful, though under attended, and not representative of the entire community. Pantin has additional Youth and Teen Councils, intended to draw the community into participatory democracy measures early on. The Pantin Youth Council is highly celebrated and attended, while the Teen Council has had difficulty with retention. Both are given very small, symbolic, decision-making responsibilities in City projects.

38 Assemblée Nationale, Numéro 296, 15.
iv. A new context of budgetary restrictions

It is important to note that the reform falls right at the moment of significant budgetary constraints. Additional expenses are not politically popular. Globally, the government, at the state, inter-communal, communal, and city level, is looking to lower the budget by about four percent. Furthermore, with consideration of the report released by the Court, it is not recommended to spend without rethinking the base of the functioning of the law and mechanism. The law rests therefore on a substantive change, and a tightening of the geography, rather than the form or expansion of the services provided. The mechanisms and their budgets will not be changed dramatically.
Part I: The Key Actors/ Stakeholders of Politique de la Ville

i. The Ladder of Power

The actors of Politique de la Ville have always been numerous, which has often led to confusion and tensions. A key point of the reform is simplification, and embedding simplification in the organization and management of the different actors. In the status quo, the actors all operate independently on several different levels: geographic and hierarchic- linked to power. The actors are very hierarchic, with most hanging to the bottom rung of the ladder: the neighborhood inhabitants, and the little organizations in financial difficulty.

To better explain, I will present the geographic hierarchy of Pantin:

Europe:
There currently exists a European fund for the development of neighborhoods in insecurity, even if these funds are not traditionally classified as a fund for the Politique de la Ville. Europe therefore permits another mechanism other than ANRU for urban renewal.

France (National):
The state of France is the primary actor in the Politique de la Ville. The drafting and issuance of the new law was done at the national level, and the state finances a large majority of the projects within the context of the contract. Cities and Inter-Communities sign onto the contract with the state to guarantee funding.

The Department:
The Department serves as the (former) primary link for the representatives of Pantin in all matters of financing, determining the priority geography, and reform with the state. The Department of Seine-Saint-Denis (93) is the Department in which Pantin is located, and is
considered over-stretched, under-funded, and is recognized nationally as précaire (insecure.) It is by far the Department in France with the most red-level indicators of housing, unemployment, crime, education, and inequality. Additionally, it is highly stigmatized, and gets incessant negative media coverage. Its Department demarcation, 93, is infamous, and often cited in number alone when the Department is covered in the media. Referring to the Le 93 immediately solicits all the traditional images of poverty and crime.

*The Agglomeration:*

The Agglomération d’Est Ensemble (East Together) now finds itself (in place of the Department) as the new primary actor in the reform of the Politique de la Ville. Before this reform, Est Ensemble was not significantly involved in this mechanism, and was primarily involved in the Employment sector. However, like the Department, it has a budgetary ‘envelope’ dedicated to the subsidies within the context of the CUCS.

*The City:*

Prior to and for the duration of the reform, the City holds the most important role in what concerns the management of Politique de la Ville. They are the link with the neighborhood/non-profit organizations and are the first to classify, organize, and review subsidy/grant requests. The reviews of organizations are also done by the services of the City. In certain cases, the services and/or city centers are those that receive funds from CUCS subventions.

*‘Associations’ (Non-Profit Organizations):*

The organizations are often the most common beneficiaries of Politique de la Ville subsidies. They respond to Appels a Projet (RFPs,) and offer actions meant for inhabitants in the priority neighborhoods.
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**Figure 8:** Above is a comparative of the geographical and hierarchic scales for the Politique de la Ville, determined by the level of responsibility in the subsidy and management of Politique de la Ville. We notice that there is a reversal of the important roles of the small levels of government, as compared with the State.

The hierarchic scale of the actors involved in Politique de la Ville reveals an upheaval of the traditional state hierarchy. It is precisely this upheaval and shift that lead to tensions and a lack of coordination between actors, often on questions of competencies and project management. A typical example is seen in the partnership between the State and the City on the Education sector. The middle schools fall under the jurisdiction and management of the City, but high schools are managed both by inter-communities and the Education Nationale, the national government branch tasked with standardizing education across the country. There is therefore a disconnect between the management of these two institutions, and some difficulty in linking the programs of Politique de la Ville, like the Program of Education Success (PRE) between the two. This limits the follow-up for inhabitants being tracked within the context of PRE, and contributes to a higher dropout rate in the transition between middle school and high school. This also limits the actions that the City can take, notably on the questions of teacher training, and on the extra-curricular offerings in the context of the CUCS.
The tension between the two entities follows this familiar pattern: The City is primarily concerned with the day to day management, but has difficulties when it comes to reforms of actions or programs because it is not the City that is responsible for the significant directions of the programs, which are determined by the State. This question of management is also linked to that of financing and budgets. There are significant tensions regarding the question of investment in the domains that are the most costly, particularly upfront, namely Health and Security. This became evident in the brainstorming sessions I attended focused on Health. Concerns were quickly raised over the question of sharing equipment (MRI scanning, for example) and products of Mairie services (translated pamphlets on basic dental health, for example.) One of the intents behind an inter-communal approach is the ability to pool resources, both expanding access for residents, and decreasing expenditure. However, there were notable hesitations when the facilitator asked cities to disclose their investment plans for Health equipment. Cities are hesitant to commit to investing in this equipment- hoping for another city to invest first, and then share access. This hesitation is even more pronounced on the question of resources that are developed by the services of the Mairie. It was shared with me by the Director of Health Services in Pantin, who I accompanied to the Health discussions, that there is a general annoyance at cities who rely exclusively on others to produce materials- particularly ones that are translated or well designed, requiring private and expensive outsourcing by the Mairie. This hesitance is becoming particularly acute as the Agglomeration transitions from giving grants by neighborhood, into one by service provided. In the Health Sector, the city heavily auto-subsidizes itself, since non-profit organizations are often unable to bear the initial entrance cost of health service oriented projects. The intercommunal solidary seems to become strained when it begins to put in competition budgets between cities.
Another typical example is demonstrated in the disconnect between the National Police (PN) and the Municipal Police (PM) in the sector of Security. Legally, drug trafficking is the responsibility of the PN, and so the PM does not have the authorization to intervene in trafficking incidents, even though they have a better knowledge of the neighborhoods. This significantly slows down response time, and accentuates a hierarchy that becomes painfully visible to the inhabitants. Consequently, the PM has difficulty seeming a legitimate actor in certain neighborhoods it patrols. This is reinforced with small, but noticeable, police policies that are largely symbolic in terms of legitimacy. For example, the PM is not permitted to carry firearms while on patrol. Additionally, the PM must contact the PN before deploying the riot police. The PN was noticeably absent from the diagnostic meetings with city representatives, and only attended the final meeting that included the mayors from each of the cities concerned. In contrast, the PM representative for Pantin was on a first name basis with the Pantin Security representative, and spoke openly and candidly at the meeting. He expressed concerns that while the PM had the willingness to embrace a larger role on questions of security, the PN had the legitimacy and resources. Representatives from the cities echoed this concern, though there was a felt passive collective acceptance of the PN as far beyond the local government reach and influence. I expect that this dynamic between the PM and PN will have become even more important and strained since the State of Emergency was first declared after the Paris terrorist attacks of 2015. Certain neighborhoods under Politique de la Ville have become exclusively patrolled by the PN, now jointly with members of the French armed forces, who were ordered by the thousands to be deployed in Paris and the surrounding suburbs, and patrol streets in full armored gear, including large machine guns. These firearms are not permitted to be loaded while
soldiers are on duty, but are intended to deter, and create a sense of securitized comfort for residents.

Figure 9: This graphic demonstrates the hoped-for new hierarchy for the actors involved in Politique de la Ville after the reform is complete. It shows an eventual collaboration between the agglomerations, the Citizen Councils, and the State, with a secondary role for Europe, the Department, and the Cities.

In order to limit the dysfunction of the previous Politique de la Ville, the reforms seek to redraw and reorganize the hierarchy of the actors involved in Politique de la Ville, demonstrated in Figure 2. As early as 2015, the responsibilities of Politique de la Ville will be transferred to the Agglomeration, which will need to co-construct the contract and the new actions in conjunction with new Citizen Councils, and the State. In parallel will remain the actors of Europe, the Department, and the City to subsidize certain actions and projects. However, in reality, during the transitional period, the City will remain the primary link for the Politique de la Ville, though it is envisioned that these services will eventually be transferred to the Agglomeration.
ii. New and Emerging Partnerships

It is not surprising that in a time of financial constraint and budget reductions, the actors of Politique de la Ville are seeking out external partners to replace certain subventions. Two new partners are emerging in the move towards priority neighborhoods: private enterprise, and Universities.

Often, the neighborhood organizations will turn towards partners in the private sector. These are private foundations, organized and run by private companies. However, more recently, governments have also been turning towards these actors for additional financing on projects. A ‘good practice’ example is that of the partnerships involved in the financing and management of the service of urban mediation in Pantin.39 The service is financed by the City, Hermes, and the BNP, which allows for a stable financing and continual service. The partners then participate in meetings that follow up on the progress of the mediators, and reinforce a line of direct communication between the mediators and the businesses. This significantly eases the financial responsibility of the City, and allows it to continue to provide this essential service for the community in priority neighborhoods. The partnership works because the service is seen as

39 The Urban Mediation Program in Pantin has been heralded as innovative and largely respected by the wider community. The Program trains local (not simply from Pantin, but from the specific neighborhood in consideration) community residents in basic conflict resolution, particularly with regards to the shared use of public spaces. Then, these mediators go on ‘maraudes’ (patrols) in high-conflict neighborhoods, in City uniform, and intervene on any non-violent conflicts or concerns they come across, or are called by residents to. This shift is done from 4pm to midnight, at times of high report of non-violent crime. They are intended to be a first resort for small conflicts, in order to limit the presence and intervention of police forces, often untrusted in communities. They are additionally tasked with spreading knowledge on prevention measures, services offered by the city, and simply talking with the residents they encounter. In my time in Pantin, I had the opportunity to join the médiateurs on their maraude, and witnesses first hand the friendly relationship that they have with the inhabitants of the neighborhoods; they are on a first name basis with many they stop and chat with, including young loitering populations, a group intentionally targeted by this program. They are also one of the few Departments of government services that are racially representative of the community they serve, given that neighborhood residence is a condition of the job, while city residence is not for general city services. Promoting Urban Mediation has become more popular across Europe, with high success in communities en décrochage, but that have not yet reached a point in which violent crime is more common than non-violent crime. When thinking about the médiateurs’ job, it is important to keep in mind that crime does not manifest itself in France in the same way that is does in the United States. Possession of firearms is very rare, though growing, and gangs are much more loosely structured.
mutually beneficial for all actors involved, not simply as philanthropy. This reinforces the notion of partnership rather than client service, which is an important evolution so that these actors can be respected and legitimized within the community.

The type of engagement supported by the private sectors is also beginning to be done by universities, often situated in the heart of priority neighborhoods, at the edge of cities. This movement towards a more involved ‘Societal Responsibility of Universities’ (RSU) allows for an ‘aller vers’ (go towards) of universities towards the communities that surround them, but from which they are often completely disconnected, and an active encouragement of student volunteering. But RSU can take very different forms across the spectrum of very different universities. The RSU of universities is followed closely by the Association for the Foundation of Students for the City (AFEV) within the frame of a think take on RSU (ORSU.) The AFEV is an organization created in 1991 to “fight against the inequalities in ‘populaires’ (low-income) neighborhoods.”\textsuperscript{40} The observatory (think-tank) was created within the logic of solidarity between universities and the neighborhoods in which they are implanted, in order to develop policies to develop of sustainable neighborhoods. The observatory offers, in its research, a compilation of good practices to demonstrate the power that universities can have while utilizing their human resources and capital (students) and their fiscal resources to subsidize actions of social responsibility.

This movement of RSU is mentioned in the report “Pouvoir d’Agir” as a “major stakeholder for democracy.”\textsuperscript{41} The document proposes the creation of a new network of voluntary universities to develop collaborations that would mobilize students, researchers, and local actors (associations.) This would allow for an opening on the territory/ neighborhoods of

\textsuperscript{40} Enoncé de Mission : Association de la Fondation étudiante pour la Ville, “ Last modified April 21, 2016, http://afev.org/nos-valeurs/
\textsuperscript{41} Baqué and Mechmache, Pouvoir d’Agir, 34.
the universities, and would introduce universities as key actors in the Politique de la Ville programming.

The universities offer significant resources and are actors that could, within the context of the reform of Politique de la Ville, support larger projects. The volunteer organizations run by students could also become actors of Politique de la Ville, and could respond to Appels a Projects (RFPs.) This would help develop the link between the inhabitants of neighborhoods and the universities in these neighborhoods. There would also be the possibility of opening up university resources to neighborhood inhabitants.
Part II: Towards a Simplification

a. A New Priority Geography

The new reform of Politique de la Ville transforms the priority geography to take into account a single criterion: the income threshold of 12,800 Euros per ‘unit of consumption’. This was done in the spirit of simplification and tightening of services offered by the Politique de la Ville.

Figure 10: The above figure from the Final Est Ensemble Report shows the median fiscal revenue per IRIS. If you refer to Figure 2, you can identify Pantin at the top right of the CAEE. Pantin—on its whole—figured slightly below the CAEE and Department medians (14,491 and 14,924 respectively) with the entire City below the light purple categorization of a median income between 11,000 and 14,500 Euros a year. Certain neighborhoods, particularly les Quatre Chemins to the north, fall within the darker purple categorization, with a median income between 8,000 and

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42 A unit of consumption refers to a particular way in which statistics by the INSEE (National Institute of France on Economics and Statistics) are carried out, particularly for references around income. It refers to the resources consumed in a household, which often share resources and wealth. 1.0 is used for the first adults, 0.5 is added for every additional household member over 14, and 0.3 is added for every additional household member under 14. (INSEE)

11,000 Euros a year. Additionally, almost the entirety of Pantin is identified as a disadvantaged environment with few resources (red lines.)

In the former PV, there were several geographical subdivisions that allowed for access to different financial mechanism of subsidy:

**ZUS:** Sensitive Urban Zone, the primary target of Politique de la Ville

**ZSP:** Priority Security Zone, created in 2012 to target “rooted delinquency.”

**Zone CUCS:** Larger areas which encompass the ZUS, but also include surrounding territories, and have access to subsidies within the context of actions carried out under the contract CUCS.

**ZFU:** Zones Franches Urbaines, an ‘economic’ space, privileged by government actions in order to stimulate the local economy.

The new geographic categorization of Quartiers Prioritaires (Priority Neighborhoods) proposed was determined by the State and proposed to the cities on the 17th of June 2014. It will replace all the categories above, and encompass all into 1300 new Priority Neighborhoods. The Agglomerations, in coordination with the cities, were afterwards able to enter into negotiation with the State, and propose extensions to these proposed QPs. While for the large part of most ZUSs, there is a tightening of the neighborhood borders, there are also certain neighborhoods which are now outside Politique de la Ville, no longer falling under the singular criterion. This eventual exit from PV is the objective of PV subsidies and programming, and demonstrates a development of the neighborhoods- though to what substantiality is up for debate. However, in counter balance, several new neighborhoods now enter into PV qualification.

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Figure 11: The above is taken from the final report on the new law publicly released by the Agglomeration Est Ensemble on January 1st, 2016. The territory delineated by the grey line is the whole Agglomeration. On the top right most corner is the city of Pantin. There are 19 neighborhoods within the Agglomeration that will fall under the new categorization of Quartier Prioritaire. The orange sections are the extensions that were proposed by the cities, and were not accepted by the state, which encompasses about 20,000 additional inhabitants.

Figure 12: The above graphic is also taken from the final reform report (2016.) It emphasized that for Est Ensemble, there has been both an increase in the total area of the territory that will now fall under the new geography, as well as an increase in the population served.

Figure 13: The above graphic shows the tightening of the territory and its borders that will be adopted under the new priority geography (QPs) in Pantin specifically. The dark green areas outline the former ZUSs, the light green is the demarcation for the CUCS zones, and the dark red lines mark the borders for the QPs offered by the State. The dotted red lines are the proposed extensions offered by the city, in negotiation with the state. They were accepted by the State the following year.

In the case of Pantin, there was a significant tightening of the zones, but none of the former ZUS exit the PV qualification. Pantin’s QP areas encompass about a third of the total population of the city, close to 49 000 inhabitants. On average, the unemployment rate is between 18 and 24%, and close to 50% of the population of QPs is categorized as ‘young,’ under 26 years old. Additionally, there is a higher concentration of single parent households, and a higher concentration of immigrant populations. Recently, there has also been found to be a higher concentration of migrant populations, and strong groupings of dense migrant communities. This includes populations du voyage (directly translated as populations that travel, without fixed location, commonly referred to as the ROM, or Romani people, but not exclusively of Romani origin), but also encompasses other types of migrant communities.
Figures 14 and 15: The above figures map out of the population proportions in the CAEE that are immigrant; who currently do not hold French nationality, though can hold permanent residency. As compared with the CAEE average, Pantin has a very significant proportion of residents that are immigrants, except for within Mairie-Hoche, the neighborhood directly in the center of the city. Figure 15 contextualizes Pantin within the CAEE city averages, and it sits squarely above average at around 32%, with a 7% growth since 1999. The orange outline in the south of Pantin delineates an area with neighborhoods that have old, private housing markets, in which are over-represented immigrant populations. It is extremely important to keep into consideration that these are not statistical measures of the ethnic or racial concentration in these neighborhoods. In France, it is illegal to collect statistical data on ethnicity.

as such, in the aftermath of WWII, in which databases were nationally collected noting the religions, which at the time were also considered ethnic categorizations. This means that France has very unreliable data when it comes to estimating the concentration of people of color in these communities, particularly since estimate based off of immigrant numbers do not take into consideration 2nd, 3rd, and 4th generation immigrants, now French citizens, but equally stigmatized and disenfranchised due to systemic racism and xenophobia. This lack of this data is symbolically powerful, in that it literally blinds productive conversations on racial segregation within government contexts. It should be noted that some non-profit organizations, and international watch-dog organizations such as UNICEF France, have begun tentative collection of this kind of data.

**Figures 16 and 17:** The figures above and below map out the unemployment (Figure 16) and educational trends in the CAEE. Pantin has an unemployment rate that, at its worse, reaches to up to 37%. Throughout the entire city, it is still comparatively high. Additionally, Figure 17 demonstrates that Pantin has a significant portion of its population that holds a diploma BEP (high school equivalent) or lower. To the north, in the Courtilières, there is an over representation of this population, outlined in red. Unemployment is also over-represented in HLMs, indicated with a gold cross sign on the figure.
There are three Priority Neighborhoods in Pantin: Les Courtilières, Les Quatre Chemins, and the neighborhood of Sept Arpents/Hoche, all which follow the characteristics outlined above, typical of QPs across France.

*Les Courtilières:*

Even with significant renovation and reinvestment into the territory, the neighborhood has a social profile that does not seem to evolve over time. The renovation includes projects that were carried out under the program for urban renovation subsidized by PV (PRU,) as well as the

“construction of several new social centers.”

We find in this neighborhood a communal neighborhood identity that is very strong, but a tissue associatif (non-profit culture) that is very weak. There are not many businesses, and little liberal economic investment in the neighborhood. A large part of the population is ‘young,’ 11.6% of then being truant. It has been recently observed that there is a significant increasing religious/communitarian withdrawal, principally visible to government officials with the increase of the wear of the integral headscarf (niquab, burqua.)

There is significant drug trafficking (marijuana and heroine) that is very organized, notably in public spaces and parks. Additionally, there has been an emerging arms trafficking network emerging. There are significant public disturbances and noise complaints, and park ‘rodéos’ (or motorcycle racing.) There has recently been a decrease in armed robbery and violent crime, without a conversation of what this may be attributed to.

Les Quatre Chemins:

The unique advantage of this neighborhood is its strong tissu associatif, which is very involved and respected in the neighborhood. It is often noted in research, and when referencing this neighborhood with discussions of good practices, that this neighborhood is the ‘exception,’ a ‘special case.’ There is a ‘Maison de Quartier’ that is vibrant, and an ‘Antenne

50 Wearing the integral headscarf (niquab, burqua) is controversially illegal in France in all public spaces. This law is largely symbolic, and rarely enforced. The debate and conversations around the headscarf has become a tool for elected officials, and government functionaries, to have veiled conversations on race and religion, and the ‘repli communautaire’ in low-income communities. There is massive anxiety that communities will fold inwards on themselves, and begin relying on religious or ethnic communities for support, rather than the government. Conversations in which this repli was mentioned were quickly shut down, as if ignoring these phenomena will make it disappear. The principle of laïcité makes the input of religious actors in these discussions tenuous, though this has only recently seemed to solicit government anxiety when these religious actors are Muslim, and conservative. This is not to say that there are not significant, well intentioned, and highly functioning partnerships between these actors, simply that they are the exception that makes the rule. The Catholic Church has long been a social and non-profit force for low-income communities without the same fear of repli. There was noticeable tension during conversations around the headscarf, and a noticeable absence of any government official wearing a headscarf.
Jeunesse’ with a very elevated participation rate. However, a new mixité sociale (gentrification) is beginning to penetrate the neighborhood and create new tensions between the inhabitants. There has been an increase in violence, foot traffic, and the appropriation of public spaces with loitering. This appropriation is largely masculine and creates a dominantly unsafe space for women in the neighborhood. There has recently been an increase in prostitution as well. The housing is mixed-income, but there is a significant presence of sub-standard, and not up to code housing, some of which corresponds with old public housing units.

_Hoche-Sept-Arpants:_

Similar to Quatre Chemins, the neighborhood of Sept Arpents has housing that is old and in decay, with the additional concern of projects (Ilot) of public housing. Ilot 27 in this neighborhood has been proposed as an extension to the QP, and was accepted by the State in the geography. It has a significant immigrant population, a growing gentrification rate of young professionals, and a strong percentage of young people. This population has been highlighted by real estate experts as one with growing potential, and there has been an increase in housing investment. This neighborhood has an associative tissue that is very weak, and it has seen significant degradation/decline of public spaces and parks. Drug trafficking in this neighborhood is structured, but not as organized as in the Courtilières.
ii. Taking into consideration the Lived Neighborhood

One significant advance of the reform efforts has been to take into consideration the Lived Neighborhood for the inhabitants. Taking into account this concept transforms the hierarchy and traditional functioning of the City governments, and theoretically forces departments of different cities to work together to have inter-communal results, and better services for residents. This notion stems from the analyses of the neighborhoods that demonstrated the futility of borders in the lived experience of citizens. The Courtilières in Pantin, divided between three different cities, is a typical example of the necessity of expanding the actors and developing better actor coordination if cities want to have a tangible impact on the lives of the inhabitants. If the funds of PV are only put into place in the parts of the neighborhood which belong to Pantin, but these inhabitants want to attend a community meeting in Aubervilliers (the neighboring city) because this is geographically closer to them, this is a flexibility that must be taken into consideration by government officials. Inscribed in the law is a true and genuine will for inter-communality and the principle of “travail ensemble” (work together) to better address the needs of the community, and simply the response by the PV actors. It is likely this logic that justified the State’s decision to have the Agglomerations pilot the reform procedure, and the writing of the new contract.
iii. The Question of Shifting Responsibilities

The reform of the PV calls for the shifting of responsibilities (organization and management) from the Cities to the Agglomeration. The new CUCS contract (Singular Contract) will therefore be debated, elaborated, written, and presented by the Agglomeration, and will then be signed into law by the Agglomeration, the State, and each of the cities represented in it. This transfer was done in the logic of simplification and inter-communality, to address the question of the lived neighborhood. The call to Projects, the organization/evaluation of applications, and the final evaluation will be done, theoretically, by the Agglomeration, as well.

However, an initial worry of this shift of responsibilities is that often, in order to supplement the services provided by associations and organizations, cities will subsidize (using CUCS) city services that meet the same objectives as does the call to projects. Therefore, cities are often self-subsidizing, creating an inflated valorization of the City and City Hall itself. The Agglomeration does not want to privilege one city’s services over another, and will consequently no longer subsidize these cases. While this may seem to make a lot of sense in principle, in reality, it will create a significant void for certain cities and communities. This void in money and services will need to be subsidized directly by the Cities themselves, already under financial pressure to decrease annual budgets.

However, if we choose to optimistically evaluate this shift, there is perhaps a possibility that this void will encourage organizations to emerge and develop new foci, so as to be able to answer the PV RFP. This void could also encourage associations in neighboring cities to work more inter-communally, to be able to better respond to the needs of the community. This evolution is still to be determined and demonstrated.
Another more important worry is the difficulty of impartiality in the analysis and evaluation of applications, and the eventual division of PV funding. It is envisioned that in the first year of transition, the funding will be divided among the different cities corresponding to the number of priority neighborhoods (QPs.) In the long run, though, the subsidies will be granted by the Agglomeration, corresponding to the level and quality of the applications submitted for evaluation. This significantly disadvantages the cities with neighborhoods without a strong associative tissue, and furthers deficit of services offered to inhabitants in some of the most crucial neighborhoods.

Yet the worry that is the most pronounced in the brainstorming meetings held by city actors, is the loss of personal contact and connection between the associations, the inhabitants, and the cities. Often the application for subsidies is long and complicated. This means that associations and inhabitants wanting to submit an application will often work in tandem with an employee from the city. This reinforces key communication, developing the link between the institutions (government) and the associations. This link is very important in order to develop a relationship of trust and legitimacy between the neighborhoods and the City governments. But the intent to simplify risks actually complicating the life of inhabitant associations and their application procedure. They will need to shuttle between their communities and the Agglomeration, which can sometimes be very far. This could further reinforce the gap between the functionaries of the State who evaluate the applications, and the associations. With this shift in responsibility, there is a loss of closeness which risks isolating associations and inhabitants.

This shift is already beginning to create considerable tensions between the City and Agglomeration governments, since it is conceivable that PV functionaries for the City will
be eliminated. In the transition, there will not be any concrete changes in the administration, and the current employees/functionaries will continue to evaluate applications, and will continue to keep close contact with the associations. But there is a fear of the long-term transition that would take away responsibilities from the City level. Historically, there are already significant tensions between the Cities and the Agglomerations, because the creation of the Agglomeration began to progressively take away more and more of the responsibilities of the City.
iv. The ambition of the New Projects

As announced in November 2014, after the reform, the projects subsidized with the funding from Politique de la Ville will need to be more significant in scale and budget. This ambition targets an actor evolution that is more organized, larger, and more independent in order to lower the burden of the State. The new ambition also favors projects that are inter-communal, and solicit funding from several actors, rather than entirely from PV funding. It was decided within the context of the reform that the Prefecture would no longer accept applications for subsidies that were under three thousand Euros. This number may seem small, but was determined by the consideration that in order to receive a PV subsidy, the organization must also find the funds for at least half of the project from other funding sources. Therefore, the overall budget for projects proposed by the associations would need to be of at least about seven thousand Euros. Smaller projects will be sent back to the Citizen Councils, and ought be proposed as projects by individual citizens, to be evaluated, coordinated, and voted on by the Council rather than by government functionaries.
Part III: The Promotion of a larger Participation: The Stakes of Participative Democracy in the Politique de la Ville

i. The procedure of elaboration of the New Contract

The procedure of the elaboration of the new contract offers a first insight and analysis as to how the new Politique de la Ville will be received. This reception of the new reform, and the procedure itself, was the primary objective of the internship and field research carried out, and demonstrates the very real and complicated procedure of putting into place and writing a new law and contract, within a very short time frame, with a significant number of actors involved. Condensed notes from these meetings can be found in the Appendix, as well as the official timeline document that was creating outlining the timeline for the reform, although the process ended up surpassing the initial signing date of the new contract. It is also important to note that the elaboration procedure for Pantin, carried out by the Agglomeration of Est Ensemble, was exemplary, and was praised by the Préfet of the Department (93) on numerous occasions. 51 It does not likely represent the general way this procedure for the reform and contract was carried out, but offers an example of good practice. It was also noted at a communal meeting of the prefecture (93) that there had been a significant gap in the mobilization efforts of different cities and communities for the reform of the Politique de la Ville.

The elaboration of the contract intended first and foremost to conduct a diagnostic on the territory to determine the needs of the communities, the existing mechanisms and centers/resources, and the current unfulfilled needs. The procedure and diagnostic for Est Ensemble began the summer of 2014 in partnership with the research consultants of FORS and

51 This was said by the Préfet a L’Egalite des Chances at an Internal Prefecture Meeting with all cities and Departments present on October 10th, 2014.
MENSIA. It is not without significance that this procedure was outsourced by the government, and carried out by an independent private sector actor. The Agglomeration was then able to develop a diagnostic with the statistical analyses of the consultant (unemployment rates, youth population percentages etc.) as well as with tools and information provided and gathered by the individual cities. There were also a few territory workshops held, and an analysis of the region held. An example of this was done in Pantin, when the consultants went to the Maisons de Quartiers (Community Centers) and asked questions to inhabitants there. In addition, certain cities conduct their own independent analyses of the conditions of the communities. In Pantin, there is a yearly ZUS report created which is not mandated by law, but helps the City services better remedy gaps in services.

This diagnostic analysis was done according to four typologies:

1. Accompaniment of Youth
2. Social integration of neighborhoods ‘en decrochage.’ (at risk of unhinging)
3. Social intervention for “invisible” populations
4. Social cohesion between neighborhood inhabitants

These typologies follow the themes of the former CUCS contract, and represent the most important “social dysfunction” of most of the priority neighborhoods.

This procedure, or one very similar to it, was followed by all of the QPs in the agglomeration. This represents twenty QP neighborhoods, with 124,000 inhabitants. (With all of the propositions of extension of this geography by the various cities, the number of inhabitants will rise to about 167,000.) Even this centralized dictating of qualifying neighborhoods is quite
symbolic of the entrenched hierarchy that the national government holds over the local
government. This diagnostic was then presented in six different workshops with the members of
the agglomeration, divided into six themes: Education, Health, Delinquency Prevention,
Employment, the Social/Urban link, and Citizenship/Social Link. In parallel, there were two
workshops dedicated solely to the question of Urban Development, and the reform of the ANRU
Program. Each theme was covered over the course of two workshops. The first was a
presentation of a diagnostic of the territory on the communalities, the threats, the weaknesses, the
strengths, and the opportunities that exist on the larger territory. The goal of this first workshop
was to determine the key issues of neighborhoods, and begin the brainstorming process to find
preliminary possible responses that the Politique de la Ville could offer in the context of the new
reform. The second meeting, which invited the same city representatives as the first meeting, was
intended to clarify how to respond to the key questions in an inter-communal way, and turned
out primarily to be a conversation on best practices by the different cities. In practice, in the
meetings, there were often substantial conversations on the methods utilized without the question
of evaluation of the city’s own practices. The actors at the different meetings began in consensus
on the needs of the communities, but ended up in tension regarding the responsibilities and
abilities of the different actors.

We can already note several worries about the procedure that stem from the lack of
full participation of all the actors, and principally the neighborhood inhabitants. Those invited
and in attendance at the meetings were: chiefs of Politique de la Ville for each city, and for
certain workshop themes, those responsible for social services (for example, the Director of
Health for the Health workshop.) For each workshop, there was also a national representative for
the State services. An example of this was the representative of Education Nationale at the
Education workshop. However, there was an almost complete absence of neighborhood inhabitants, of neighborhood councils, and of representatives from the non-profit world. Their expertise and opinions on the needs of the communities, an indispensible voice that is itself recognized in the text of the law, were therefore never taken into consideration in the foundational activity of the workshops. Yet this step is the most important, since it determines the major orientations that the new contract will take. There is no genuine consultation for the basis and substance of the reform.

The offered explanation for this problem is not without merit. With a law that fell in March, and a strict deadline on the signatures for the contract in January (under penalty) it would be almost impossible to assemble a Citizens’ Council that is functioning, representative, and able to begin the process of consultation. Committing to this procedure would risk accumulating significant delays, which would risk a flux in subsidy deployment for the organizations. Furthermore, it is conceivable that this year is simply a year of transition, and therefore there is a triage in place; this procedure cannot be put into place immediately. So perhaps we can assume that this inhabitant absence is more a question of functioning than a question of political will.

Perhaps- but probably not. For it has often been noted that an enlarged participation of inhabitants worries elected officials. The first reason for this is that often, consultation with inhabitants can be long, and can deviate quickly from the intended topics and objectives. To be blunt, elected officials do not want inhabitants to request services and renewals that they will not then be able to promise and deliver on. The second reason, often evoked in whispers, is that the Citizen Council is likely, and rightly, to question the role of the elected officials. Why would there be a need for an elected ‘Politique de la Ville’ elected official to
represent the community members when the inhabitants can be their own actors and representatives? This would render these elected officials obsolete. One last reason is that the establishment of this Council risks being complicated, long, and subject to delay. Elected officials don’t want to carry the weight of this transition for fear that it’ll reflect badly on their mandate, and be politically unfavorable.

Another worry is the absence of the elected officials in this brainstorming procedure. Practically speaking, this absence is understandable. Twelve consecutive workshops can be difficult to fit into busy schedules. At the same time, though, this absence lends itself to confusion about the political will of different cities, often with elected officials from different political parties, each with their own agenda to carry. The representatives present at these workshops cannot accept propositions of significant evolution or changes without consulting with their elected officials. This leads to confusion, and increases the back and forth and delays that accumulate during this process, leading to circular conversations around good practices, without any concrete promises on evolutions that can be seen, or significant directions cities are willing to take. The conversations are entirely speculative. Beyond the practical considerations, there is also one of democracy to be asked about the absence of these leaders. This procedure would be delayed by creating the Citizens Council, but the delay would be alleviated by the simple inclusion of elected officials- and are they not supposed to be the officials that represent the interests of the population, and the population itself, of their communities?

We can conclude on two larger questions that these absences pose: Is the government truly representing the people that it ought serve? Are the governments (national, communal, local) ready, mentally and administratively, to truly and genuinely take into consideration the public opinion?
ii. The Creation of Citizen Councils

The participation that inhabitants are supposed to engage in for the co-construction of the reformed law is not vague, it is inscribed into the law, and explained in the accompanying ‘guide de fonctionnement’ (Manual.) All of the City Governments that are concerned by matters of Politique de la Ville will need to put into place a Citizens Council for each neighborhood categorized as Priority. This is intended to be the primary response to the initial criticism of the mechanism: its lack of interaction with the populations in these neighborhoods. It allows for the creation of a space of ‘constructive engagement’ to answer the demands of “Pas Sans Nous,” that criticizes the exclusion of citizens from mechanisms of Politique de la Ville. In the preamble to the reference guide for the Citizens’ Council, written by the Minister of the Rights of Women, of the City, of Youth, and of Sports (yes, these are all grouped together) it clearly indicated that this construction of councils is part of the “objectives that inscribe themselves within the report [Pas Sans Nous.]”

Right from the preamble, it is clear that this measure is a long-term objective, and there is an understanding that it will not be possible to put into place quickly. The document foresees a “time of exchange and evaluation” in the spring of 2015, after the signature of the new contract. The timing of this is curious. It suggests that there is therefore no political intention/inclination to include inhabitants in the re-writing of the contract, an essential step in the reform. Contrary to the Minister’s preamble, therefore, this is not responding to the demands of “Pas Sans Nous,” it excludes the inhabitants in the substantive discussion on the law, the intended objectives that the Politique de la Ville ought set, in favor of a future participation,

53 Ministère des droits des femmes, de la Ville, de la Jeunesse, et des Sports, Conseils Citoyens, 3.
probably more superficial on the form to be taken by new Calls to Project for Politique de la Ville. It is not an exaggeration to say that this does not follow the reform intentions set out in the report by Bacque and Mechmache.

The reference guide offers in and of itself an interesting analysis of the political vision that ought to play out in these Councils. It does not begin to explain them by outlining its primary missions, but rather, by delineating its principles. The principles are listed in the following order: “liberty, equality, fraternity” (the classic French Republican triad, the importance of which is self-evident, the order of which is enshrined) and then “laïcité (secular values), neutrality.” These are the principles of the French Republic, and the emphasis on this constitutional vocabulary demonstrates a certain kind of push towards an objective of civic education of their Councils.54 A second set of principles follows: “flexibility, independence, plurality, parity, proximity, citizenship, and co-construction.” It seems strange that the principle of co-construction is listed last, given that it is the one taken directly from the law. The guide further emphasizes that that the Councils ought be “partners in their own right” (partenaires a part entières,) “tightly associated with the process of elaboration (brainstorming,)”55 This intent ought be the mission and the potential value of these Councils, and yet it comes off as a small detail in the reference guide. It is not a coincidence that the guide reminds that Council members ought be good and fair citizens first, before they are able to contribute to the construction of projects within the frame of Politique de la Ville.

This attempt at Citizen inclusion and participative democracy is not new or unique. There already exist, in the majority of communities, ‘Conseils de Quartiers’ (Neighborhood

54 This is a very French thing to do; the emphasis placed on the values de la République during the mandatory course on civic education completed in elementary school is significant. There is an owned up to intent to teach French citizens that they are citizens first and foremost, with other identity factors coming in secondary.
Councils) that deliberate on questions of functioning, superficial as they may be, in the priority neighborhoods. For the most past, these Councils fall under the Department of Participative Democracy in City Governments, and are directly dependent on City Hall organizing and funding. They meet in government meetings, and often have strong relationships with employees from the City Government. As they exist now, the Councils often consistently regroup the same five to ten inhabitants, and are not considered a ‘fair’ representation of the neighborhoods by any means. Council members are volunteers, and are not elected. This dysfunction has not gone unnoticed, and serves as the basis for the transition to a new kind of Council. It is foreseen in the reform that the Citizen Councils will replace the Neighborhood Councils in the coming years, with certain significant adjustments. This procedure of mutual decision making is to be able to respect both the law and the fiscal budget is in the course of discussion, and will not likely be put into place until the end of 2016. However, it offers a first insight into the willingness and political will to put this new actor in place, crucial for a full and genuine reform.

It is equally important to note that political will is the name of the game during this procedure. It is volatile, dependent on the elected officials, and gets the final say. Political will is what will (over the course of this reform) make the difference between a reform that follows the word of the law, and one that genuinely makes attempts at reforming the process of Politique de la Ville. Particularly with regards to the construction of the new Citizen Councils, political will is crucial; it determines the shape they take, and the speed with which they will be put into place. The example consistently referred to in this thesis is that of Pantin, a socialist city (it has a representative that is socialist), historically communist, with an elected official of “Local Democracy” and a City Government very favorable to the development and promotion of Citizen Councils and active measures of Participative Democracy. Individually, each one of the factors
plays a role in the shape of Citizen Councils at Pantin. Yet, even with this strong historical, communal, and political will, the Council in Pantin is still in its exploratory phase, and will not likely be put into place until one, even two or three, good years. The Contract was signed in May 2015, though was not finalized and published until January 1st, 2016. Additionally, the contract has only been signed for a period of 5 years, and in 2020, will have to be once again re-written and configured. The State of Emergency declared after the terrorist attacks, that continues to be in place today, has also derailed the timeline, and have shifted the will away from considerations of neighborhoods improvement that are not anchored in security concern, where the funding is currently being funneled.

If the full intent of the law is taken into consideration in the creation of these Councils, it is undeniable that they will play an important role. A first distinction of this new actor will be that it will be independent of the Mairie. It will have an associative status (501c3 French equivalent), but will receive a yearly subsidy from the City Government for its functioning. Its independence will therefore be similar to that of other subsidized organizations that depend on the City Government to ensure function, but control their own governing. These Councils will be essential for the drafting of the Call to Projects that serve as the basis for the actions of Politique de la Ville, and will have an important voice in the negotiations and the developments of the contract with the State- which is often amended and updated frequently. Given this important role- it is worthwhile to question whether or not there will be a true development in the composition of this new actor. Will it truly be representative of the neighborhood? Does it need to be if there is to be true reform?

The simple answer to both of these questions is no. It is very improbable that the populations that are the most precarious will be either recruited, or incentivized, to join these
Day, Pauline, Peace and Justice Studies

Councils. We know this primarily due to two facts. The first is the abstention rate for elections that reaches almost 75% in the Priority Neighborhoods. The second is that the instances of Participative Democracy that currently exists in the neighborhoods (Neighborhood Council, Youth Council, etc.) are already in difficulty, and have difficulty with recruiting and retention. (Certain Neighborhood Councils always group the same actors/inhabitants, which are also the same actors that are leaders involved in the associative world. This overlap is particularly problematic when it comes to questions of delineating functioning to different associations.)

Explaining this phenomenon would require an entire separate thesis, because it is integrally linked with the deprivation of civic rights, and the perception of deprivation that inhabitants, particularly in priority neighborhoods, feel. This is often linked to high dropout rates, the unemployment rate, an increased violence in neighborhoods, and linked to a government that seems not to, or does not, answer neighborhood and inhabitants needs. Inhabitants therefore feel not only unrepresented and separate from their local governments, but as if they were in combat with their governments. (This is not a phenomenon felt uniquely in France, but one that holds particular weight given the hypocrisy it presents to the ‘French’ values.) The sad irony of this explanation is that the answer to this disconnect is the creation of the Citizen Councils, but this disconnect is precisely what puts the possible functioning of this new mechanism at risk.

The success of these Councils rests primarily on their acceptance by the neighborhood inhabitants, and their perception as legitimate actors. It is only with this legitimacy that the recruitment of council members will increase, and that the participation of the
inhabitants will fully take form and be representative. A large step must be taken away from what Jazouli and Rey call “façade consultations,” that give the councils a “placebo role.”

The independence of these Councils is therefore crucial. In order to be accepted by the inhabitants, they must be seen as a new and independent actor, which works in parallel with the institutional actors, but is not itself a part of the institution. It is here that this principle of co-construction must be respected.

However, before the development of this legitimacy, city governments are looking for an answer to the problem of recruitment. In an attempted answer, it is written into the law that a percentage (not yet determined) of the Council members will be solicited as volunteers through a random drawing by the Mairie. This attempts to account for and target the populations that may not have information about the Councils, or who would not instinctively think to join the Councils, but who may, after invitation, be motivated to do so. In principle, this idea is interesting. It allows the Mairie to encourage and incite participation, and has the potential to attract new actors and voices into the debate on Politique de la Ville. In practice, however, it would be very difficult to use only this mechanism to attract a sufficient number of volunteers for a two-year mandate on the Council. Turnover would likely be high, and the response rates on this kind of solicitation have proven to be very low. However, this is an untested method, and it remains to be seen how it will be put into action.

Another question discussed in the reference guide is the structure that the Council will take. The Council will be composed of two “colleges”: one for inhabitants, and one for associations and local actors/figures. This will allow for two types of local actors to have a voice.

56 Jazouli and Rey, *Pour une histoire*, 198.
in the consultation efforts. This will also attempt to give a voice to smaller associations that are in difficulty, but have no link/relationship with the traditional institutions.

To aid in establishing legitimacy, the guide recognizes the importance of the support publicly given to the Council by public powers (the local government, and the elected officials.) The Council will be recognized by the Préfet after consultation with the Mairie, and will be recognized as a signatory actor for contracts with the City and State, although when, and in what context is left to be seen. They were absolutely not included in the first contract that was signed in May 2015 in Est Ensemble in the case of Pantin. Not only were they not signatory, they were not consulted for the drafting of the contract itself.

Yet even with the creation of these Councils, there remain many different voices that are missing in this debate, and are integral to its success. The first is the voice of the immigrant population. The Council is entirely composed of citizens, and it was not by accident that they are called Citizen Councils rather than the Inhabitant Councils, or, as before, Neighborhood Councils. The arrangement therefore excludes an essential part of the population from the conversation. The immigrant populations are also often the most precarious and the poorest, the most disenfranchised, for whom Politique de la Ville actions are intended: one more reason to include them within its development. In Pantin, the neighborhoods most affected with this exclusion are Les Quatres Chemins, and Sept-Arpants Stalingrad, where the foreign population is between 24% and 46%. This represents a significant chunk of the entire population of the concerned neighborhoods.

Pantin is also often a space of temporary home, with all the problems this kind of housing solicits in the private sector, for populations that are in transition, often new immigrants. There is therefore a significant turn over in population, with people remaining in the
neighborhoods between three and five years, without any plans at permanent housing. In Pantin, close to 26% of the population settled there within in the past five years, and this number doubles in the Priority Neighborhoods that are inter-communal such as Villette- Les Quatre Chemins. This poses a significant obstacle when it comes to developing a social linkage and encouraging democratic participation long-term.

Another population segment without recourse to the debate on Politique de la Ville is the ‘invisible population,’ illegal immigrants or ‘populations du voyage’ (Romany primarily), an ever-increasing population in Priority Neighborhoods. Some crucial questions which are integral to the re-thinking of Politique de la Ville, such as the question of tenuous housing, are closely linked to these populations, the most vulnerable and preyed upon; but the answers to these questions that will be thought out will not include important contributions from these populations themselves. This is not to say that including this voice in the conversation would not be difficult, practically speaking, simply that it is a notable absence.

One last population that is affected, but without representation: the ‘youth’ population. There is currently one instance of Participative Democracy for Youth: the Council of Youth, but this is more linked to the program for Civic Education of City Hall, and not their opinions/ideas on the big problems of the Priority Neighborhoods. As it currently exists, it is also completely detached from the Department of Politique de la Ville. The significant questions linked to this specific population were discussed in every single workshop, due to questions of high dropout rates and of delinquency, the two categories the most subsidized under the contract of the former CUCS. However, this population was never consulted for either the diagnostic portion of the reform (the portion that would have likely been the easiest to include youth participation in) or the brainstorming on the mechanisms of response.
These absent populations represent just a few of the difficulties that the Council has ahead of itself in terms of having it be a representative body. These are consequently inherent limitations to what it can do.
iii. A new mechanism of consultation and Co-Construction

The primary role of the Council is to co-construct the new Contrat de Ville and to participate in future contractual steps and adjustments. For the drafting of the new City Contract (Contrat de Ville) it’s already game over. Within the frame of the reform for Est Ensemble and Pantin, the Councils do not yet exist, and so a consultation on the “analysis, identification of mobilizable resources, potential programming of actions,” as required by the law, is no longer possible. Even if the Councils were miraculously put into place within the year of 2015, or 2016, it is quite likely that the substance of the Singular Contract would not be changed for very practical reasons. Within the reform law, and in the framing of the Councils, is necessity for participation of these Councils in the piloting of the new contracts is made clear. On this point, for practical reasons or no, there can be no debate, in spirit or by the word: the law was not respected.

It is also stipulated that the Councils will need to be involved and consulted on “all of the [categories] of the contract.” This includes both the urban and the social categories. One significant intent of the reform is to encourage the actors of Politique de la Ville to work together. It is intended that the Councils will be a new actors for the NPNRU, and will have a significant/voting voice on the jury for new projects. The elaboration of this procedure still needs to be thought out and put into place, but the political will of this inclusion (at least at the national level) is quite clear.

Finally, there is a big hope to develop and stimulate citizen initiatives, with the creation of a fond citoyen (citizen funding pool) at the heart of the Council. The Councils will

have mechanisms proper to them in order to “elaborate and drive”\textsuperscript{59} projects that will within the context of the Call to Projects of the Politique de la Ville. These projects can be carried out by the Council itself as an actor, or by individuals from the neighborhood.

iv. “Parlons Quartiers”

Est Ensemble stands out by a step taken by the Agglomeration, which demonstrates significant political will to include inhabitant voices as quickly as possible in the process, and in the brainstorming about the contract drafting. The step is called “Parlons Quartiers” (Let’s talk Neighborhoods.) This program was presented to the elected officials (bureau communautaire) in October 2014, and in November, began working in several cities in the Agglomeration. The objective is to initiate citizen participation in the whole of the politics of the Agglomeration, but in particular in the services offered for Politique de la Ville. This step was not required by the law, and therefore demonstrates a genuine political will to include inhabitants within the analysis and early consultation process. “Parlons Quartiers” was developed in coordination with local actors, in order to mobilize the highest number of inhabitants on the questions that are most important for them. This step was done in two parts, first a collection of citizen priorities, and second, open restitution. The first part was done in person by giving quick questionnaires to citizens on their priorities- independent of any program. This is intended to jumpstart the conversation, telling inhabitants to elaborate and draw attention to questions/issues that are most important to them, as well as the primary needs they feel the neighborhood has. This questionnaire was handed out to inhabitants in public spaces in the neighborhoods themselves (grocery stores, parks, etc) and was also available online.
**Figure 18 and 19**

Above is the first questionnaire that was issued as a part of the Parlons Quartiers initiative for Est Ensemble. This is the questionnaire that was handed out to residents at local areas of high density, such as supermarkets, and was also, if possible, accompanied by a short, oral, questionnaire with a functionary.

Figure four shows the questionnaire that is offered online. The questionnaire asks inhabitants to choose, between several offered priorities, the ones that are the most important for them, and additionally allows for a space in which inhabitants can add additional questions, ideas, or priorities. The objective of these “rendez-vous” are to “collect and illustrate the collective voice” of inhabitants with qualitative data. This is an example of good practice of an “aller vers” (go towards) towards individual inhabitants, rather than resting on the quite slow schedule of the Citizen Councils. This method was also fairly well funded, and made accessible as much as possible: online, visually and auditory, and in person.

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61 “Communauté d’Agglomération Est Ensemble : Parlons Quartiers”
The second step of this program is a meeting between all of the important Politique de la Ville actors, and the neighborhood inhabitants, on the diagnostic of this process. “Parlons Quartiers” was designed and organized by the Cities, and piloted by the Agglomeration, and demonstrates an important initiative for including those new actors, the ‘inhabitants,’ who are at the heart of the reform.
Conclusion:

« Mais la France affirme aussi ses exigences. Quelles sont-elles pour aujourd'hui ou pour demain ? Réformer, réunir, réussir. Voilà l'ordre de mobilisation que nous pouvons délivrer. »
- François Hollande (Président de la République), 2013

[« But France affirms its demands. What are they for today or for tomorrow? To reform, to reunite, and Succeed. This is the order of mobilization that we can deliver. »]
- Francois Hollande (President of France), 2013

I conclude that there are two parallel worlds in the reform of the Politique de la Ville: the world of the intention of the law, and the lived experience of the development at the level of the drafting of the resolution/contract. There is a significant gap between the two. We can therefore note two primary developments occurring in the actors of the Politique de la Ville.

The first evolution is one of a “global vision” for the future contract of the Politique de la Ville, with an equal consultation between the inhabitants of the Priority Neighborhoods, the State, and the Agglomeration. This would target projects of renovation that are more important, carried by actors in partnership with the private sector and universities. This vision is intended to ease the responsibility of the State, and create a context of social responsibility held and organized by the inhabitants themselves.

However, in practice, this intention seems a far-flung and far-off eventuality rather than a plan of action, and we can notice that there is significant difficulty in the realization of a reform that demands such a quick turnaround, complete an overhaul of this massive law. There is therefore a second, more realistic evolution occurring slowly in the different cities. The primary evolution hoped for in the call to reform of Politique de la Ville, the greater inclusion of citizen participation, is manifesting itself in a superficial way, with a development of the future Citizen Councils that is showing itself to be slow and complicated, with a political will that is in inconsistent at best, unsupportive at worst.
Furthermore, the process of elaboration of the reform, which ought serve as the backbone for the actions that will be carried out in the context of the new contract, is meeting good practice standards, but does not give any promises of significant change. It is also without any resident inclusion in the brainstorming process. Even with a margin of comprehension about the unrealistic timeline expectations that the reform sets, this intent of the law has already been ignored. In line with the calls to reform, Jazouli and Rey conclude:

« Une politique de la ville renouvelée et re-justifitée doit reprendre sa place auprès des acteur les plus proches du terrain, en particulier, les habitant, pour reformuler avec eux les modalités de son actions, a partir de leur besoins et non a partie des dispositifs clefs en main, résultant d’après compromis entre institution nationales et locales.»

[« A renewed and re-legitimized Politique de la Ville must re-take its place among the actors that are the closest to the territory, in particular, the inhabitants, to reformulate with them the modalities of their actions, according to their needs, and not according to the mechanism already existing in hand, resulting from compromise between institutional state and local actors.” ]

There is something interesting to be noted about the fact that Jazouli and Rey come to this conclusion towards the end of 2015, after the reform of February 21st has been mandated, and this exact procedure, at least according to the word of the law, has been put into place. They only reference this new contract drafting once- in their conclusion- in which argue that the time between 2015 and 2020, the mandate of the new contract, ought be a time for reflection and debate. They do not advocate for a significant upheaval, but also clearly do not consider the efforts made by the local governments even worthy of mention- they are surface level. Even

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62 Jazouli and Rey, *Pour une histoire*, 197.
despite its flaws, Pantin was proactive about this reform procedure, while other cities were not. On average this was not a concerted, successful reform procedure. Or perhaps- there is so little transparency, intentional or no, around this procedure, that it was not commonly known to be occurring. The former hypothesis seems the most convincing given Jazouli and Rey are both prominent researchers at Sciences Po with strong ties to the non-profit community of the 93.

There is a disconnect between the national government that wrote the reform, and the local officials (elected, and representative) who are resisting it. There is, however, one important evolution that is occurring, and it is the transition of the responsibility to the Agglomeration, which has already taken hold of the reins on the drafting of the new contract.

In the final words of their book, Jazouli and Rey remind the reader:

« La politique de la ville n’est pas un simple assemblage de procédures techniques et financières ou de dispositifs aux acronymes exotiques, c’est d’abord et avant tout un acte de foi dans la République.»\(^63\) (201)

“The Politique de la Ville is not a simple assembly of technical and financial procedures, or mechanisms with exotic acronyms, it is first and foremost an exercise in faith in the Republic.”

We ought not forget that at its best, Politique de la Ville can be a productive mechanism in positive peace building, and one of the few that aims to take into consideration the demands and needs of the communities they serve. Even when it is inefficient or wasteful, it delivers concrete results for low-income communities in desperate need, ranging from small actions such as after school tutoring, to million dollar park developments. These small actions affect the day

\(^{63}\) Jazouli and Rey, *Pour une histoire*, 201.
to day life of community members, who would be left in the lurch, if PV were to pull out of communities. A financing action that may seem small and inefficient on the national level, such as 10 000 Euros for Pantin non-profit 4CheminEvolution, can make the difference between an important community actor folding under financial pressure. These ought not be forgotten when we draft recommendations for reform.

Much is yet to be determined on the final directions that the new reform for Politique de la Ville will take, and it is perhaps possible that in the future, certain hopes for the reform will be included in the contract. But this is a possibility that is vague, and becoming vaguer every day given the current political climate in France. The reform of 2014 and 2015 risks being both too slow for a real process of co-construction, and too fast for an important step of inhabitant consultation. Therefore, as we await reform development, small evolutions and changes are organized, with any substantial changes being set aside for another fiscal year. Concretely, therefore, the functioning of the actors stays status quo, with a millimeter-by-millimeter movement towards a fundamental reform. Without this foundational reform, however, we can imagine that the Politique de la Ville will continue to have the same problems it had before, and in 2020, we will find ourselves once again in a large brainstorming for reform, with additional reports calling for change, with the same budgetary and timeline imperatives.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Atelier Un</th>
<th>Atelier Deux</th>
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</table>
| **Grandes Questions :**  
- Quelle est la ligne de partage entre la ville et les habitants ? | **Questions à demander :**  
Quelle est la finalité sociale des projets?  
(Le social vient souvent derrière l’urbain)  
Qu’est-qu’on fait pour les PRU qui sont en train d’être achever la ? ex : Pantin/Courtilières |
| **Phase Amont :**  
- Inclure Conseil d’habitants pour le diagnostique et l’appel a projet  
PRU → question de temporalité devant les habitants  
- Est-ce-que tous les sujets (notamment les questions de vision stratégique) peuvent être abordes par les citoyens ?  
- Elément de pédagogie envers les habitants ? | **Réflexion Phase Amont :**  
- adosser projet urbain à un projet de quartier intégré a quelle échelle ?  
- travailler sur le méthodologie du diagnostique social ? AVANT  
- enquêtes sociales avec bailleurs → carotte financière et comment intégrer les copropriétés pour les communies qui sont majoritairement privée (apparemment cela est déjà fait avec les PRUs, mais pas très efficace)  
- questionner la place de l’habitant → confrontation prof. Vs. Habitant sur le dysfonctionnement du quartier  
- Cet instance d’arbitrage devrait être fait pas le Conseil Citoyens mais avant qu’ils soient mis en place, on fait comment ?  
Qui est garant de cette Co-construction ? Conseil Citoyens ? |
| Habitants sur le diagnostique :  
- Ateliers ouvert a tous  
- rencontre sur l’habitat → individuel ou en groupe |  
- faire ce diagnostique à quelle échelle ? Quartiers ? Ville ?  
- mais quels personnes se mobilisent pour les questionnaires (surtout quand on considère que 80% de la population ne vote pas) → s’appuyer sur les relais  
Faire ce diagnostique à quelle échelle ? Quartiers ? Ville ?  
- mais quels personnes se mobilisent pour les questionnaires (surtout quand on considère que 80% de la population ne vote pas) → s’appuyer sur les relais  
Privilégier les actions sociales dans le PRU  
- réflexion sur un centre commercial → pole social d’emploi |
| Exemple : Aménagement du Parc Diderot Bobigny : ils on fait un questionnaire, Quoi comme ville ? PADD avant l’heure | ! La Loi : oblige des Maisons de Projets avec une conservation pour chaque NPNRU  
- innovation dans les marches publiques  
- lieu concret pour avoir la concertation  
- préparer l’utilisation de la clause d’insertion → organiser la transversalité au niveau interco  
- développer les projets PAR le quartier  
- veiller qu’il y a une coordination entre les acteurs du social et de l’urbain  
- réintégrer la fonction de directeur du projet mais parfois pas garantis collaboration |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Le Calage du Programme:</th>
<th>Conception Technique du Projet:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| - repenser les projets en forme des habitants plutôt que déjà fait Pole Métiers / Arts  
- grand problème de locaux pour associations (Pantin Habitat) | - Associer les habitants au cahier des charges  
- besoin d’une pluridisciplinarité dans les projets des équipes pour repenser l’interaction  
- question de calendrier pour déterminer les projets |
| Démendeurs vs. Locaux : souvent soit un ou l’autre | |
| |
| Phase Opérationnelle: | |
| - Revues de projets : élargie, opportunités liées au double partage CAEE / V et partage des responsabilités  
- question de gestionnement  
- se laisser une marge de manières  
- besoin d’un suivi terrain  
- acteurs/habitants (habitants relais) formation → habitants comme référents sur les PRU (Ecole de Rénovation Urbaine, ex : Voisins Malins à Montreuil)  
- favoriser les projets CUCS qui ont un lien Urbain et permet une meilleure appropriation du quartier  
- accompagnement aux travaux  
- faire le lien avec le volet tranquillité | |
| L’appropriation des Réalisations: | |
| - Questions de changement de la population et de l’habitat  
- Quels types d’accompagnement sur les livraisons ? | |
| - Laissez une certaine dose d’inachèvement → pour faire comment à l’usage les habitants pour l’appropriation  
- tester les aménagements  
- relais habitants pour accueillir les nouveaux voisins et donner aux personnes relais un accompagnement par la Ville |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Comment répondre aux enjeux de santé spécifiques aux quartiers politique de la ville? (effets sanitaires de mauvaises conditions de logement et de l’environnement, toxicomanie)</th>
<th>Atelier Un</th>
<th>Atelier Deux</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| - faubourg : tuberculose/ saturnisme | -espace de concentration pour repérer les ménages en précarité énergétique  
- favoriser l’intervention dans les quartiers sur la réduction des risques toxicomanie  
- mise en place d’un expertise sante sur liens des thématiques liées aux conditions de logement → mais pas uniquement le saturnisme  
- diagnostique précoce dans les écoles  
- diagnostique sur place → aller vers conditions de logement LIEN URBAIN  
- SCHS devrait être au croissement de cette politique  
- formation infirmière soigner à domicile  
- coupler actions de prévention/promotion sante avec interventions urbaines (ex : rehab de foyer)  
- mutualiser au niveau interco des quotas de logement  
- sensibiliser personnes âgés à propose de leur santé  
- démarches de sante communautaire  
- re-sensibiliser les bailleurs → faire lien politique de l’habitat  
- prévention des actions précoces des ados → lien éducation pour la prévention enjeu insertion social  
- lien accueil des collégiens temporairement exclus  
| - vieillissements de travailleurs migrants FTM/CHRS  
- trafic → alcool/ drogue  
- troubles psychiatrique – les ressources ne sont pas suffisante (Pantin n’as pas d’EMPP)  
- vulnérabilité lies aux enjeux sociaux : dentistes, surpoids  
- de plus en plus de praticiens qui on l’âge de la retraite  
- grande précarisation habitant  
- population migrants pas Access aux soins  
- habitat dégrade  
| - espace de concentration pour repérer les ménages en précarité énergétique  
- favoriser l’intervention dans les quartiers sur la réduction des risques toxicomanie  
- mise en place d’un expertise sante sur liens des thématiques liées aux conditions de logement → mais pas uniquement le saturnisme  
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- prévention des actions précoces des ados → lien éducation pour la prévention enjeu insertion social  
- lien accueil des collégiens temporairement exclus |

| 2. Comment adapter la promotion de la santé aux problématiques des habitants des quartiers? | - souvent question budgétaire soins vs. prévention | - Co-construction avec les habitants de certaines actions  
- adapter le message (formation, langue) pour certains groups d’habitants  
- travailler sur les outils (ex : photos, diapos, tv) et mutualiser ses outils (niveau agglo ?)  
- renforcer les acteurs locaux pour les démarches de proximité LIEN accès au droit  
- formation pour les prof. Pour accueillir les habitants et adapter les informations pour une Co-construction  
- acteurs de leur propre santé → aller vers les jeunes notamment pour la question de la prévention (obésité, bucco-dentaire)  
- faut faire une cohérence avec les thématiques et l’offre de soin  
- médecine dans les milieux scolaire → utiliser les temps périscolaire  
- améliorer la connaissance des dispositifs pour les personnes accueillant du public afin d’améliorer l’information/orientation (portail d’information à mutualiser)  
- carnet de sociabilité comme Paris |
| 3. Comment améliorer l’accès et le recours effectif aux soins dans les quartiers? | 1-Territoire ou les équipements de santé sont nombreux  
- offre de soins hospitaliers satisfaisants  
- faiblesse d’offre libérale et pour la plupart pas ca  
  suis les lignes de métro (les frein principale est que le prix est trop cher pour le rez-de-chaussée)  

2. Phénomène de non-recours aux soins  
- souvent pas de couverture complémentaire  
- phénomène d’enclavement  
- population étrangère → frein de compréhension/langue  
- population de campement ROMS  

- Plusieurs actions fait dans le cadre du droits commun → actions ARS, Initiatives de la ville  
  – essayer d’avoir plus de libéraux, de maisons de médecines, et pôles de santé, et Pantin a des bourses pour plus de création libéraux  

- Actions « politique de la ville » → 260,000 précarités migrantes, PRE médecin, démarche ASV prévention  
  - un CLS à Pantin → deux en cours  

- faire un lien avec les maisons qui aide à la parentalité  
- investissement CAEE et Ville pour soutenir l’installation des praticiens sur le territoire  
- 2 projets de création d’observatoire de santé (Bobigny et Montreuil) | - maraud / permanence  
- camion de santé pour un aller vers au plus précaires  
  i (AMV= Mutuelle pour les personnes invisibles)  
- favoriser le repérage du non-recours aux soins  
- équipes mobiles de santé pour aller à domicile  
- questions de transports et d’accessibilité pour les emmener au centre de soin  
- travailler sur la mise en place de prêt pour le soin → have to put in money for the initial service  
- lien urbain= nouveau bâti rez de chaussée  
- maison de santé- vision territoriale de l’offre de soin  
- crée des MSPs complémentaires des CMS et 1 pole de santé regroupant CMS-MSP-libéraux  
- commencer ce partenariat dans les QPV  
- interface PRU- réserver des locaux a loyer réduit par les pros de santé  
- Courtilières- n’intéresse pas du tout les commerçants et les libéraux de santé  
- mutualiser l’accueil physique et le secrétariat  
- financement par l’état, la vile pour une aide a installation ? |
-La loi nécessite la création de conseils citoyens (mais quasi existe déjà comme conseils de quartiers par la volonté des politiciens de Pantin)
-conseil des étrangers – quasi symbolique (?)

! Règlement de IDH (Initiatives d’Habitants – souvent de projets d’animation) → il y a une nécessité de cadrer juridiquement
 -enveloppe IDH 2014 : 5000 (Fête de Quartiers etc.)

CONSEILS:
CEP (Conseil d’Enfants Pantinois)
-laisse comme c’est, fonction bien → ambassadeurs pour leur classe

CJP (Conseil de Jeunes Pantinois)
-renforcer la transition CEP→CJP, crée une évolution
-travailler avec les collèges et les lycées, partenariat pour élargir et crée de la visibilité
-élection d’un ambassadeur pour une classe
-représentant des conseils d’Antenne Jeunesse pour l’intérêt général ?
-tranche d’âge énorme- 11-17ans
-fonctionnement périscolaire et installation du weekend
-une des plus grandes problématiques est le réseau social, comment faire de la pub, peut être mettre la demande d’être dans le conseil en ligne

Education Civique :
-EU, Ville, Etat, La Justice, parcours a la citoyenneté
-faut faire des moyens moins scolaires !

Assises de la Jeunesse :
-réunion débatte sur le fond
-réunions plénières avec les élus

Autres Ressources:
-Le Lab : +18
-Médiateurs, PRE, Maisons de Quartiers, clubs sportifs comme relais

Conseils de Quartiers:
-renforcer lien avec les projets porté par la ville
-aller chercher les citoyens – comme pour la consultation pour le parc Diderot
-programme qui soit valider politiquement
-faire comme l’agglo a fait mais pour les habitants dans les commissions thématiques

!! Petit débat dans la réunion : !!
-Est ce qu’on voit les conseils comme une Co-construction ou un contre pouvoir
-enveloppe d’un peu près 15,000 euros
-pas d’élus dans le conseil

Du Rapport sur lequel est basé la loi :
Stratégie d’Empowerment Française :
-se repose quand même sur le droit de vote aux élections
-locales des populations étrangères et diversification des élus (social, culturel, etc.)
-il est nécessaire qu’il y ait un non cumul des mandats
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Atelier Un</th>
<th>Atelier Deux: Proposition de Pistes d’actions</th>
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</table>
| **1. Comment conjuguer les actions locales pour une intervention globale plus efficace dans les QP?** | - besoin des interlocuteurs à la RATP ou dans les immeubles (bailleurs) pour le squatting → il faut une politique interco pour mobiliser les grands acteurs  
- nécessité d’un diagnostique plus approfondis sur le type de squat (traffic vs. apres ecole) → consulter les habitants  
- un stationnement genant  
- question de video surveillance (chasse le trafic mais ne le change pas)  
- rapport santé - délinquance |
| Example Type:  
- ZSP Quatre Chemins: plus de police moins de vols a tire de vente a la sauvette de traffic et plus de mediateurs | |
| **2. Comment s'approprier les espaces publics pour la tranquillité public?** | - traffic vs. regroupement  
- squattage est une question de gerement au quotidien → fault que les habitants s’y investissement pour remplacer le stationnement  
- developper des espaces de rencontres à proximité (ex: PDI, sejours de rupture)  
- reappropriation pour les femmes  
- importance de l’eclairage  

**LIEN URBAIN:**  
- faire attention a toujours lieé dans les projets les competences de tranquilite public |
| - problematique d’appropriation de l’espace public dans les halls et les pieds d’immeuble HLM qui pèse sur les habitants du quartier (en particulier les groupes d’ados pour la sociabilite et le traffic)  
- notamment dans les faubourgs (4Chem1)  
- appropriation illegal par les migrants, ROMS, qui n’ont pas de ressources et donc fouille poubelles (espace public) par example | |
| **3. Comment prévenir la délinquance et lutter contre la recidivé des jeunes?** | - soutien à la fonction parentale → échange culturel  
- prevention specialise, ex: mediateurs pour essayer de re-orienter les jeunes  
- lien avec emploi insertion et TIG  
- prevention primaire pour éviter  
- ex avec success étape ado à Pantin  
- maintenir la scolarité au moins jusqu’a l’age de 16ans  
- police de proximite plutot que PM PN  
- restaurer la confiance entre les jeunes et les institutions |
| - agressions devient de + en + violentes avec violence en groupe en particulier sur les espaces publics  
- identifier les jeunes qui on l’impression de suivre ce parcours lien education | |
| **4. Traffic** | - collaboration avec PN  
- cree de la visibilite par le presence policiere  
- observatoire departementale de suivi |
| - question intercommunale → plus touché vers le metro  
- plaques tournantes | |
| - un traffic + ou - structuré  
| - enfants de + en + jeune touchés (guetteurs) 
| - trouble de voisinage et delinquance annex 
| - lien santé pour les usagers ! 
| éviter le simple chassement des trafiquants | - cibler les acheteurs aussi bien que les vendeurs → lutte contre la toxicomanie lien santé 
| - faut rendre la vente moins rentable 
| - rendre la collaboration avec l’Etat plus cohérente sur cette problematique |

Pas discuté de façon élaboré dans le deuxième atelier mais presenter comme une problematique cle dans le premier:

**Violence fait aux femmes**

- besoin d’accompagnement du début à la fin  
- le taux de violence augmenter mais est ce que cela est plutôt car plus se sentent capable de porter plainte ou il y a t’il plus de violence 
- besoin d’une formation pour les policiers même s’il existe un soutien associatif
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Atelier 1</th>
<th>Atelier 2: Propositions de pistes d’action</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Comment améliorer l’Access au droit et aux droits, et adapter l’offre de services publics aux publics précarisés/fragilisés?</td>
<td>- repenser l’interaction entre les acteurs publics/ éviter le doublement</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- renforcer et adapter la présence physique (horaires, permanences, formation pour mieux orienter, traduction)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>- développer médiation interculturelle</td>
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<td>- accompagnement vers les institutions</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- renforcer le ALLER VERS physique (médiateurs? camions? cafés sociaux?)</td>
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<td>- mise en réseau de guides et d’annuaires</td>
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<td>- former agents du commissariat pour orienter et faciliter la porte de plainte</td>
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<td>- formation pour une meilleure posture des acteurs publics envers les habitants (préjugés etc.)</td>
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<td>! Commentaire du représentant du 93- LIEN URBAIN</td>
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<td>- le domiciliat est un prérequis à l’ouverture des droit→ renforcer lien avec ABS et PST</td>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>Comment créer les conditions d’une mise en “capacité d’agir” des habitants du quartier?</td>
<td>- éviter une concurrence entre associations</td>
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<td>- concurrence entre les initiatives locaux et les associations plus structurées qui ont plus de dispositifs pour répondre appel a projet et monter des dossiers</td>
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<td>- faciliter la montée des dossiers appel à projet (faire un guide/suivi internet?)</td>
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<td>- repenser la démocratie participative traditionnel → donner moyens d’auto organisation aux habitants</td>
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<td>- faciliter la montée des projets pour quartiers par des individuels</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>- favoriser subventions pour des associations qui sont montés avec les habitants</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>- doit avoir un lien plus fort avec les élus sur les territoires pas que en temps d’élections</td>
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<td>! sortir d’une logique de consommation de services</td>
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<td>3. <strong>Comment lutter contre les discriminations, les stéréotypes, le repli communautaire/identitaire et les phénomènes territoriaux de domination?</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|   | -pression de la porte du voile au Courtilières  
-religion comme nouveau lien social  
! LIEN SECURITE  
-question de l’appropriation des espaces publics  
-pressure de conformité et pas des espaces publics pour les femmes  
-fracture intergénérationnel pour l’appropriation des espaces publics?  
-discrimination comme phénomène de domination  
! LIEN URBAIN  
-enjeu de mixité | -formation pour une meilleure posture des acteurs publics envers les habitants (préjugés etc.)  
-passer par la convivialité pour apprendre sur les autres  
- il y a un besoin d’un diagnostic discrimination/ dispositif  
-réinterroger nos programmations culturels → projets sur la mémoire  
-mettre à profit des clauses d’insertion y compris pour des métiers plus qualifiés  
-faire un lien avec le city de l’immigration?  
-rôle de l’éducation et le péri sportif pour lutter contre le repli |
|   |   |   |
|   | 4. **Comment assurer le rôle d’accueil de l’immigration international et permettre une meilleure intégration des populations migrantes, notamment femmes?** |   |
|   | -Access a la culture comme véhicule de lien social | -formation nouvelles femmes de relais?  
-adapter services → maintenant la population immigrée asiatique est plus forte  
-accompagnement à la scolarité  
-créer des lieux de socialisations  
-mise en place de prêt pour les démarches d’insertions? |
**Elements de Diagnostique:**
- 40% de la population a moins de 30 ans
- famille monoparentale augmente dans les QP et les HLM
- manque d'accompagnement, particulièrement pour l'orientation
- difficultés d'insertion sur le marché du travail

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<th>Atelier Un</th>
<th>Atelier Deux: Proposition de Pistes d'actions</th>
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| **1. Comment mieux répondre aux besoins éducatifs, éviter le décrochage scolaire et favoriser la réussite éducative (notion de parcours éducatif)?** | -Petit débat sur la favorisation de la mixité sociale pour faire monter les taux de réussite
- groupes âgés 16-25 sont en rupture, taux haut d'absentéisme
- regroupement fort LIEN trafic, tranquillité → particulièrement dans les quartiers habitat social historique
- enjeu de décloisonnement sportif/culturel
- renforcer le périscolaire après la 6ème → crée un lien plus fort entre l'EN et les Centres des Quartiers | -développer l'ouverture s/ le monde culturel en travaillant avec les transports
- développer les mesures de responsabilisation par le partenariat local → réseau de tuteurs
- tutorat= exemplarité AFEV accueil des exclus, réintégration
- limiter les effectifs de la classe
- développer accompagnement éducatif primaire et périscolaire
- travailler sur le repérage des signes de décrochage scolaire
- valoriser les compétences extra scolaire
- investir massivement sur le primaire

Le P.R.E. ne sera pas touché fortement par la reforme |

| **2. Comment renforcer les liens entre éducation, formation, et emploi?** | -crée des ressources pour mieux orienter les filles vers des emplois majoritairement dominés par les hommes | -accompagnement au choix des filières
- faciliter le transfert des connaissances dans les filières
- anticiper et multiplier les rencontres possibles qui sont intéressantes pour les élèves pour découvrir les entreprises et les villes etc.
- favoriser les stages et apprentissages plus tôt LIEN URBAIN
- mettre à profit des opérations l'aménagement du territoire (ZAC, PRU)
- initiatives de deuxième chance |
| 3. Comment faire évoluer et renforcer la communauté éducative (parents/institutions/scolaire/acteurs locaux)? Comment renforcer l'accompagnement à la parentalité? | -il existe une grande difficulté des parents (en particulier monoparent et migrants) qui mettent à distance les institutions scolaires  
-accompagnement à la parentalité dès la petite enfance! | -faire entrer les parents au collège et le collège dans les quartiers (le aller vers) | -point de vigilance particulièrement fin 3ème |
Objectif du COTECHE:
- Typologie d'ensembles en matière de cohésion sociale
- Préparer le COPIL

Retour de questionnaires ingénierie

Réflexions sur l'organisation de l'ingénierie

Valider les engagements et le cadre de mise en œuvre

Processus d'élaboration du protocole de préfiguration avec l'ANRU

Processus d'élaboration de la programmation 2015 des actions (cohésion sociale)