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**A New Identity for Old Europe:
How and Why the French Imagined *Françallemagne* in Recent Years**

Scott Gunther

[“A New Identity for Old Europe: How and Why the French Imagined *Françallemagne* in Recent Years” *French Politics, Culture, and Society*, Spring 2011.]

In January 2003, France and Germany celebrated the fortieth anniversary of the Elysée Treaty, the bilateral treaty of cooperation and reconciliation signed by France and West Germany in 1963. The commemoration led to calls for practical measures aimed at increasing the two countries’ economic and political cooperation. Serious efforts were also made in the symbolic realm, which focused on encouraging citizens of both countries to think about what they share, to forget what they do not, and to consider the possibility of some form of Franco-German identity grounded in a newly imagined geographic space of *Françallemagne*. Much has already been said about national identity, about how it is defined and how culture is used to bolster nation-building in the economic and political domains. Much has also been said about the Franco-German friendship and the political and economic *rapprochement* of these two countries in the postwar period. Little attention, however, has been paid to the ways in which culture has contributed to the recent emergence of the imagined community of *Françallemagne*, particularly in the years immediately following the 2003 anniversary of the Elysée Treaty.

The argument presented in this article is twofold. First, with respect to how a sense of Franco-Germanness was fostered in recent years, I argue that these most recent efforts for cultural *rapprochement* differed in important ways from previous attempts to bring France and Germany closer together. Earlier efforts focused on introducing one country to the foreign culture of the other. The most recent efforts, however, were not so much about teaching one

country about the other country's culture, but rather about blurring distinctions between the two cultures and encouraging people in both France and Germany to imagine a new kind of identity, one built primarily on an awareness of a shared culture. Evidence for this argument comes from an analysis of the contents of various media that came out of the fortieth anniversary of the Elysée Treaty, including (1) a new version of the nightly news program *Arte News* on the Franco-German television station Arte, (2) a new, light-hearted weekly program called *Karambolage*, also shown on Arte, whose goal is to decrypt "the particularities of French and Germany daily life,"¹ and (3) a new history textbook, *Histoire/Geschichte: L'Europe et le monde depuis 1945*, developed for use in both German and French high schools, in which the content of the French and German versions is identical, the only difference being the language of publication.²

Second, with respect to why *Françallemagne* was imagined with unparalleled verve beginning in 2003 and continuing for a few years after, I argue that during this time, foreign policy concerns surrounding the war in Iraq and the associated tensions between the United States and "Old Europe" were the main forces responsible for bringing France and Germany closer. However, with recent changes in political leadership in France, Germany and the United States, and with Iraq fading from public focus in recent years, anti-Americanism is abating in France and Germany, and with it, the drive for *Françallemagne*. I emphasize that the motivation for recent efforts to bring France and Germany closer differs from the motivation for other efforts to improve relations since World War II. In the decades following this war, Franco-German *rapprochement* was motivated mostly by the desire never to see France and Germany go to war with one another again. Recently, however, the ties between France and Germany were bolstered primarily by a shared opposition to the Iraq war, to the presidency of George W. Bush,

and to American unilateralism. In other words, if earlier efforts were motivated by the hope of transforming a former enemy into a friend, recent efforts were mostly about coming together in the face of a common adversary. In January 2003, when Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schröder met in Paris to commemorate the fortieth anniversary of the Elysée Treaty, the notion of a common adversary was clearly on people's minds. During this meeting, Chirac adopted Schröder's position against the war in Iraq and the two leaders issued a joint statement of their strong opposition to a U.S. invasion. This statement was the impetus for Donald Rumsfeld's coining of the term "Old Europe," which undoubtedly only served to promote a stronger sense of Franco-German solidarity.

Before turning to an analysis of how and why French people imagined *Françallemagne* in recent years, it should be mentioned that in many ways a Franco-German identity is conceptually similar to that of a European identity, because its sense of community has less to do with tangible connections than with an imagined set of mutually agreed upon values.³ In the early 1980s, the term "national character" was replaced with "national identity," which in turn was replaced by the term "cultural identity" in the mid 1990s. Fears of being associated with racist, essentialist ideas have motivated this evolution in terminology; and to some degree, the growing sense of a European cultural identity stems from the fact that it has allowed people to be freed from the nationalist assumptions that accompany discussions of national identity, especially since in explanations of what makes up a European identity there has been "a valorization of an ideal of the civic, universalist side of the equation in the attempt to bypass what [might be referred to as] 'the affective.'"⁴ Franco-Germanness lies somewhere between national identity, a *Gemeinschaft*, or ethnic community, on the one hand and an abstract European

cultural identity, a *Gesellschaft*, a sociopolitical entity grounded neither in geography nor ethnicity on the other.⁵

How Franco-Germanness was Imagined in Recent Years

Getting French people to imagine *Franco-Germanness* has involved several interconnected pedagogical strategies. First, it has been necessary to foster a shared sense of “here” (within *Françallemagne*) and “there” (outside the imagined community), or of “us” and “them.” Second, the shared culture of the two countries has not been described as something new, but as something that has always existed and is merely being uncovered or “remembered.” Remembering a shared past is an important part of imagining a community; equally important, however, is the effort to forget those events of the past that affected members of the imagined community differently. As Ernest Renan reminds us in his classic lecture at the Sorbonne from March 1882, *Qu’est-ce qu’une nation*: “... the essence of a nation is that all individuals have many things in common, and also that they have forgotten many things. No French citizen knows whether he is a Burgundian, an Alan, a Taifale, or a Visigoth, yet every French citizen has to have forgotten the massacre of Saint Bartholomew, or the massacres that took place in the Midi in the thirteenth century.”⁶ These different strategies are all employed in the various media described in the sections that follow, though each media form has tended to privilege one strategy over the others. In the case of *Arte News*, for example, the most important contribution to a sense of Franco-Germanness has been in establishing a sense of “here” and “there.” For the show *Karambolage*, it has been mostly about “remembering” what the two countries share, while the most important function of the new Franco-German textbook has been to encourage these two populations to forget diverging memories of the past.

For each of the three media forms examined below, the underlying argument is that these most recent efforts for cultural *rapprochement* differ in important ways from previous attempts to bring France and Germany closer. Since World War II, initiatives to bring France and Germany closer have consisted mostly of introducing the culture of one country to the other: beginning in the 1950s, students in one country were encouraged to learn the language and history of the other; “town twinning” matched up cities on either side of the Rhine in order to promote touristic and professional exchanges; films and music from one country were celebrated with cultural festivals in the other; “Franco-German Societies” brought performances of classic French theater to Germany.⁷ Yet in all these cases, the underlying notion that German and French cultures were different was taken as a given. Indeed, these kinds of initiatives may have served to reify a sense of essential difference between the two countries even as the two populations became more knowledgeable of and friendlier toward one another. The point of analyzing excerpts from these three media forms in the sections that follow is to see how the most recent efforts (post-2003) have not been so much to teach one country about the differences of the other country, as to blur distinctions between the two cultures and to encourage people in both France and Germany to imagine a new kind of identity, one built primarily on an awareness of a shared culture.

One additional difference between earlier efforts and current efforts to bring France and Germany closer stems from the fact that these most recent efforts are *mediatized*. This development is important for a number of reasons, all of which highlight why current efforts are more capable of blurring distinctions between the two cultures than were previous efforts. First, postwar efforts, which focused on student exchanges and tourism between the two countries, brought one population into direct contact with the other. To the extent that it would be hard to

equate a French person's experience of visiting Germany with a German's experience of visiting France, each population's experience would be necessarily different from the other's. Twenty-first century efforts, however, lead both peoples toward a more similar experience by bringing them into contact with a single, shared culture. Second, travel is commonly associated with a way to get away from one's own environment, to encounter something different, and to learn about others, whereas the experience of watching television is associated with the familiar, since it is frequently consumed in one's own cultural space and on one's own terms. Third, for French and German people not fluent in both languages, linguistic differences are brought to the forefront when visiting the other country. With the new mediatized texts, however, each population consumes the cultural information in its own language—indeed, while watching Arte, French people can have the “experience” of Germans speaking French fluently through dubbing, as linguistic difference fades into the background. And finally, the internet, along with television stations broadcast around the world by satellite, have caused people to become accustomed to the idea of media unconstrained by national borders. Increased familiarity with placeless media forms has paved the way for mediatized texts less defined by national identities and for the imagining of new communities like *Françallemagne*.

Arte News Creates a Sense of “Here” and “There”

Two terms are useful for categorizing the means by which information is delivered to viewers via television news: mediation and dissemination. Dissemination refers to seemingly unmoderated feeds from primary sources with little commentary. Stations that broadcast across national borders, such as CNN International, tend to be good examples of the dissemination news style. Mediation, on the other hand, relies on some kind of interpreter, either in the form of a

news anchor or journalist, to explain why and how the information delivered is relevant to a particular community of viewers, who are left with the sense that the information provided is not necessarily universal. In interpreting information for a specific community, the mediation news style fosters a sense of “here” vs. “there” and of “us” vs. “them.” Local news programs provide good examples of this style of news delivery.

In 1992, Arte began broadcasting in France and in Germany; and in the beginning, the evening news privileged dissemination over mediation. Jean Michel Utard, who has written on the history of Arte, explains that in the station’s early years “the channel thus seem[ed] to erase itself, or at least present[ed] itself as a transparent place, where the words pronounced [were] not its own. Consequently, the author and the viewer appear[ed] to be put into relation without any mediation, the author assuming full responsibility for the message.”⁸ It may have been simply that the channel could not mediate for a community that did not yet necessarily exist. It needed to work first on bringing that community into existence. As a former employee of Arte remarked in 1993, “Franco-German friendship ... doesn't exist. But because it seems desirable, we have to fabricate it.”⁹ It makes sense then that until Franco-Germanness became imaginable in the minds of viewers, the station’s cultural and national identities would remain somewhat vague.

Adding to Arte’s blurred identity was the fact that it was difficult to show anything truly controversial concerning France or Germany. While watching Arte in France for example, a French viewer is keenly aware that Germans are watching representations of France; the French viewer may even contemplate the fact that Germans know that French people are watching representations of Germany. Consequently, as one commentator wrote about Arte in 1993, “critical freedom has to be curbed in case it gives offence. All disputes become national disputes.”¹⁰

In late 2003, however, Arte's programming underwent significant changes, all of which were aimed at moving the channel away from its earlier style of an obscured identity. Early that year, as a part of the anniversary of the Elysée Treaty, Chirac and Schröder had released a joint statement, articulating their vision for the future of Franco-German television generally and of Arte specifically. The statement encouraged television stations in both countries to develop more Franco-German programming and called upon Arte specifically to make the channel's character more apparent by promoting European programming "while maintaining its Franco-German identity."¹¹ This kind of intervention by politicians in the audiovisual realm, which might seem surprising in a place like the United States, is hardly exceptional in the context of France. Indeed, as Tamara Chaplin points out in her recent work on French philosophers on television, "in the second half of the twentieth century the French state embraced the technology of television not simply to 'educate, inform, and entertain' the public—in the words of the national broadcasting administration—but as a tool in the service of national building."¹² In France, the idea that television can, and even should, be used to shape collective identities is not new.

In November, Arte indicated that it would be making changes to its programming along the lines of the recommendations set out in Chirac and Schröder's joint statement, which involved producing new Franco-German programming, including the show *Karambolage*, but also pushing the station's news style toward greater mediation and a more explicit articulation of the channel's Franco-German identity. Victor Rocaries, Arte's program director at the time, summarized the new programming in terms of "*legibility*, homogeneity, *proximity*" including the addition of "more anchor people to create a warmer, *more human*, connection."¹³ Jérôme Clément, the president of Arte, added that "with the new programming line, Arte is confirming

its will *to interpret* current events in a complex world, ... *to explain* the fundamental questions linked to the future of the planet, ... *to explain* the history that contributes *to our identity* and to open the mind.”¹⁴ The italicized terms in the statements above indicate, some more explicitly than others, the move toward greater mediation.

Following the programming changes in 2003, French and German newscasters began to alternate weekly on *Arte News* (the language difference was resolved through simultaneous dubbing). *Françallemagne* became increasingly imaginable as both French and Germans anchors used expressions such as “here” or “us” freely to refer to the two countries collectively, encouraging viewers to think that they were part of a single community. It is significant that on this new incarnation of *Arte News*, politicians outside of France or Germany are referred to with their names, titles, and nationality (for example, “British Prime Minister Tony Blair”), while important figures in France and Germany are referred to only by name and title without any mention of nationality (for example, “President Sarkozy”) or at times only by last names (for example, “Merkel”).¹⁵ *Arte News* blurs the differences between France and Germany when making geographical references as well, with newscasters casually referring to regions in two countries, such as Saxony, Burgundy, the Black Forest or Normandy, without specifying in which country they are located. When referring to regions in other countries, however, the newscaster will specify the country by name (for example, “Tuscany, Italy”). This rather subtle editorial policy encourages viewers to think of the interior borders of *Françallemagne* as concurrent with the borders of the two countries’ regions, rather than split down the middle by the Rhine.

A comparison of *Arte News* with a second European news source, the channel Euronews, provides an interesting contrast to Arte’s move toward greater mediation. Euronews is an


extreme example of disseminated, non-mitigated news. A video feed of the day’s news is broadcast in each country where Euronews is available, with an off-camera voice providing narration for the images in the country’s own language; indeed, viewers never see a human face recounting the events. At the end of each thirty-minute broadcast, Euronews shows a segment called “No Comment,” where a short news-feed from the day is broadcast with no narration whatsoever.

In addition to these differences in style, Arte and Euronews also differ in content. Though both channels’ news programs devote approximately two-thirds of their time to Europe (Table 1), Arte focuses much more than Euronews on France and Germany, often portrayed as the core of Europe. Indeed, *Arte News* devotes only 39.6 percent of its European news coverage to non-French, non-German news, compared to 81.3 percent for Euronews (Figure 1).¹⁶ This practice is a further sign of Arte’s recent move toward greater mediation as it reinforces for its viewers an implicit sense of “here” and “there.”

Table 1. Six weeks of international news stories on Euronews and on Arte (18 September - 27 October 2006)

	Arte	Euronews
Stories related to Europe	63.5%	68.5%
Stories related to the rest of the World	36.5%	31.5%

Figure 1. Six weeks of the EU on Euronews and on Arte (18 September - 27 October 2006)



Karambolage Remembers What's Whared

Karambolage is a weekly, twelve-minute television program that also came out of the programming changes at Arte in 2003. It began airing in January 2004 and has served to promote a stronger sense of Franco-German identity, primarily by communicating what the two countries share. This lighthearted show—a sort of contemporary *Tour de la Françallemagne par deux enfants*—provides insight into everyday customs in the two countries and has been unexpectedly successful, with 550,000 viewers now tuning into the program each week.¹⁷ The overall coverage of the two countries on *Karambolage* is balanced. In the first 120 episodes there were 112 segments concerned with primarily French subjects, 111 with primarily German ones, and 160 segments where the topic was part-French, part-German. The program relies on essentially

three strategies to bring out traits that France and Germany share. These strategies are discussed below along with examples collected from the program's first 120 episodes.

The first type of strategy used to get *Karambolage*'s French and German viewers to think about what they share involves the analysis of cultural products or practices that are only slightly different in the two countries. Here, the differences tend to be extremely subtle and are often trivialized, such that the differences seem similar to those that might exist among different regions within a single country. Examples of this strategy include segments on: (1) the chocolate-hazelnut spread, Nutella, in which the viewer learns that there are differences between German and French Nutella, but that the differences are minimal: "the color is basically the same, the German Nutella is just a bit darker ... The German Nutella is dull, while the French Nutella is shiny. [With the German Nutella, one] must use a certain pressure to stick a knife in; on the French side, it goes in just like it would in melted butter";¹⁸ (2) cigarette rolling papers, which are a bit thicker in Germany than in France, with the narrator concluding that "it is always in the smallest of things that difference resides";¹⁹ (3) the "Döner Kebab," a Turko-German dish, whose French counterpart has one small difference; it is served with French fries: "a German could feel very much at home, when he happily discovers the flag of a Döner stand in Marseille or in Toulouse! Well not quite. Look closely. When he asks for a Döner ... our German friend is going to witness a terrible sacrilege that will leave him baffled: the person making his delicious Döner will load it up with a mountain of, yes, French fries";²⁰ (4) cutting bread in the two countries, in which the viewer learns that Germans tend to use an electric bread cutter in their homes while the French use knives or have it sliced at the bakery; though the overriding message is that bread is important in both countries;²¹ (4) the expression "tête-à-tête," which is used in both countries to refer to a meeting between two people, though in Germany, it has more of a

sexual or romantic connotation than it does France;²² (5) April Fool's Day, which is associated with a specific animal in each country; with fish in France and with donkeys and cows in Germany;²³ (6) the use of plastic bags from grocery stores as garbage bags, which is common in both countries, though French people tend to hang them from any hook that might be available, while Germans often have a special device that holds them neatly in place;²⁴ and (7) formal and informal second-person pronouns, which exist in both the French and German languages, though the contexts in which one must use formal or informal pronouns are slightly different in the two countries.²⁵

The second strategy reinforces the idea of a shared cultural heritage by highlighting the existence of hybrid objects or expressions whose origins are part French, part German. Examples of the hybrid strategy include: (1) the word *kaput*, which looks like it comes from German, but the word is originally from the French verb "*capoter*" (used to describe a ship that tips over); now with its Germanized spelling, the word is used in both languages to refer to something broken, such that both cultures have played a role in the word's evolution;²⁶ and (2) the German word *Mutterseelenallein*, which was originally a blend of German and French ('*moi tout seul allein*') used by the French-speaking Huguenot population of sixteenth-century Berlin; here, the narrator explains that "most likely, [the Huguenots] felt very alone, far from the homeland, because the expression '*moi tout seul*' (in English, "me all alone") spread quickly. But in order to be understood, the residents of Berlin added the German word for alone, '*allein*,' to the end of '*moi tout seul*,' resulting in '*moi tout seul allein*.' And those who did not speak French quickly changed these strange words to make them into something more familiar to their ears. That is how '*moi tout seul allein*' became '*mutterseelenallein*.' An expression so extraordinarily touching, that no single language would have been able to create it all alone."²⁷ Clearly,

representations of these kinds of hybrid objects or expressions serve to blur the distinction between what is French and what is German.

The third strategy on *Karambolage* that encourages viewers to imagine a shared culture involves examining something from one country that might be unfamiliar to people in the other country. In this case, viewers are reassured when they discover that their ignorance of the object is shared by natives of the country where the object is found. These segments show that natives are surprisingly unfamiliar with the object in question or are confused on how to use it, because the object is on its way to becoming extinct or because the rules governing the use of the object are excessively complicated. Examples of this strategy include (1) the French bidet, which according to the narrator is becoming increasingly rare, such that “over the last twenty years, sales of bidets have fallen sharply... My advice: if you still have one, keep it. It will soon be a museum piece”;²⁸ (2) the *Taschenhalter*, a clip that attaches to a café table and can be used to hold a purse; though it is a German object, few Germans know of its existence: “so what use could this utensil have? [pause] I see that you are failing miserably. I think that the French are not the only ones failing here, since not all Germans are familiar with this very precious German tool”;²⁹ (3) the French greeting kiss, or *bise*, where the narrator reassures German viewers by explaining that even the French are often uncertain about how many kisses one should give and in what circumstances it is inappropriate;³⁰ and (4) French horse butchers, which are becoming rarer as fewer French people eat horse meat: “So come on, eat some horse! We love these horse butchers too much, with their signs, their wonderful retro look. Go ahead, make a little effort, they are in the process of closing one after another. Let’s save them!”³¹ and (5) the French concierge, which is described as becoming less and less common to the point of becoming “an endangered species.”³² For objects like these that are becoming increasingly rare, the

significance of the difference is trivialized, to the extent that the object seems almost as strange, irrelevant, or confusing to natives as it does to foreigners.

Finally, in addition to the segments presenting French and German cultural objects outlined above, at the end of every episode of *Karambolage* is a guessing game, or “*devinette*.” Viewers are shown a short video of an ordinary place that is located either in France or Germany and are encouraged to find a clue, such as a uniform, a sign or other object that is only found in one of the two countries, which would indicate in which country the scene was filmed. The clues are subtle. Indeed, French television critics have commented that finding the answer is “not as easy as one might think”³³ and that the puzzle can be “fairly aggravating, since it is often unsolvable.”³⁴ For viewers who are unable to figure out in which country the scene was filmed, the consequence of course is that they are left with the impression that France and Germany are more similar than they might have otherwise thought.

Histoire/Geschichte Forgets What's Different

Like the recent programming changes on Arte, the history of the Franco-German history textbook also stems from the ceremonies of January 2003 when the Franco-German Youth Parliament met in conjunction with the convention for the anniversary of the Elysée Treaty and made a proposal for the project, which immediately received the support of Chirac and Schroeder as well as the *Conseil des ministres franco-allemand*. The proposal called for the creation of a series of history textbooks for use in both German and French high schools, where the content of the French and German versions would be identical, the only difference being the language. The first of these textbooks, *Histoire/Geschichte*, a 336-page work that treats the history of Europe and the World since 1945, appeared in time for the 2006-2007 academic year

and sold approximately 30,000 copies in both France (published by Nathan) and Germany (published by Klett) that first year.³⁵ Two more Franco-German history textbooks covering earlier periods are expected, raising the obvious question of how other ghosts from the past, including the causes of World War II and the effects of the Napoleonic wars, will be handled by the joint team of historians. The second book, scheduled to appear in time for the 2009-2010 academic year, covers the particularly controversial period of the mid-eighteenth century up to 1945; and the third book, which will appear several years later, covers the prior period.

This textbook project was not the first time that historians from the two countries came together to discuss their respective visions of the past. As early as 1949, historians from both France and Germany began meeting every year or two in Speyer, Germany, with the goal of identifying and removing nationalistic bias from the two countries' history books.³⁶ More recently, in 1995, a book of shared Franco-German *lieux de mémoire* was released, coinciding with the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War. The original idea for the project came from the *Haut-Conseil culturel franco-allemand*, which met in the fall of 1988 in Frankfurt. The members of the Haut-Conseil had been fascinated by Pierre Nora's notion of *lieux de mémoire*, and so they called for the creation of a book of binational *lieux de mémoire*, which ended up including entries on Charlemagne, the Rhine, and even on symbols that seem deeply national, such as Versailles. The book also included an entry on Verdun, a site that had already been transformed by the famous 1984 scene of Kohl and Mitterrand holding hands and honoring soldiers fallen during the First World War. It states:

From that point on, the French memory of Verdun no longer refers only to the courage of the *poilus*, to their patriotism, to their victory: it becomes also a shared memory, a bi-national memory, referring to a mutual

massacre, perceived as a lesson of peace for the future. Never again—such a massacre is now impossible, thanks to the Franco-German friendship. From this, a negative memory of the relations between France and Germany (the blood of Verdun) is transformed into a positive shared memorial heritage, needed to mark the solidarity of the [Franco-German] couple in the construction of Europe.³⁷

The editors explain in the conclusion that the goal of the book was “to show that well before the antagonism from the war of 1870, affinities between the two countries were numerous and cultural and commercial exchanges were constant; even during the period of antagonism, many French and German people resisted the propaganda of the time and maintained their free will.”³⁸ This new book represents a strong break from the ways in which history has traditionally been recounted in the two countries’ textbooks. Even with respect to historical events or people that could easily be considered a part of both countries’ histories, French and German textbooks have told different stories. For example, though both countries have included Charlemagne in their respective histories, “in French textbooks, Charlemagne had reconstructed the Roman empire; in German textbooks, he had founded the German *Reich*...”³⁹ Thus, with each country emphasizing its unique connection to the Holy Roman Empire, Charlemagne can be presented in both France and Germany as a national, rather than a shared, bi-national *lieu de mémoire*.

What immediately stands out in the new Franco-German history textbook is that the memory of World War II is recounted in a surprisingly similar way for both countries, such that coming to terms with the memory of Vichy France is equated with coming to terms with the memory of Nazi Germany. A number of reviews of the textbook have pointed out that “it is

regrettable that the SS, authors of the crimes of *Oradour-sur-Glane*, are associated with ‘the Vichy syndrome.’”⁴⁰ The idea of connecting the two countries’ memories of the war is of course a strong break with the ways in which the memory of the war has traditionally been treated, with German textbooks normally focusing on accepting guilt and responsibility for the war, and French books emphasizing the French resistance and glossing over the role of collaborators. In Jeannie Bauvois-Cauchepin’s study of the treatment of World War II in French history textbooks, she explains that:

[French] textbooks have constructed a mythology of the Maquis, always rural, associated most often with a mountainous landscape, with acts of sabotage, with harassment of the enemy; all the textbooks asked children, to locate sites of resistance in their local area ... The Vichy regime was not ignored, but cited succinctly: ‘In Vichy, Pétain took the title of head of the French state. The government had to succumb to the orders of the occupier.’ ... The French had been ‘deceived.’ They ‘resigned themselves to defeat. But others rejected servitude.’⁴¹

In strong departure from earlier history textbooks, the effort to emphasize similarities and forget differences continues throughout the new Franco-German textbook. Indeed, for each historical period, differences between the two countries are relegated to a short section at end of the chapter, leaving the reader with the impression that similarities dominate their pasts. While it would be easy to imagine that the most controversial part of producing a Franco-German history textbook would involve the treatment of World War II, this was not the case. In fact, the most contentious issues for French and German editorial teams were the sections on United States’ foreign policy and on the history of the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc, with the French

insisting on a more critical view of the United States and a more sympathetic treatment of Soviet Communism.⁴² With regard to the United States, “whereas [the German historians] tended to see America as a protector and supporter of Western Europe, the French often saw it as the new ‘imperialistic power.’”⁴³ The final product remains somewhat anti-American and fairly tolerant of Soviet Communism; and Guillaume Le Quintrec, one of the French historians who worked on the project, recently said in an interview that it was “largely right” to describe the work as anti-American.⁴⁴ This is not unusual given that a recent study suggested that in general, French textbooks are anti-American to the point that French high school students might be led to wonder “could it be that all evils in the world are caused either indirectly or directly by the actions of the United States?”⁴⁵ As for the history of Communist regimes, “Stalinist and Chinese crimes are minimized. To qualify Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn as a simple dissident without evoking the contents of *The Gulag Archipelago* is an understatement. And the section on Mao gives no information, with or without statistics, on the Great Leap Forward or on the Cultural Revolution.”⁴⁶

Further insight into the possible points of contention can be gleaned by comparing the contents of five popular French textbooks with the contents of the Franco-German version.⁴⁷ All five French books devote more space to a topic called “À la recherche d’un nouvel ordre mondial” than the Franco-German one does. This topic is part of the curriculum that the French Ministry of Education requires in the last year of high school. In recent years it has tended to focus on topics such as American unilateralism, the “war on terror,” anti-Americanism in the world, and tensions in the Middle East. The French textbooks allot considerably more space to these topics than the Franco-German book does (4.2 percent for the Franco-German book, 11.2 percent on average for the French textbooks).⁴⁸ French books also all devote less space to

Communism and life in the Eastern Bloc than the Franco-German book does (9.1 percent for the Franco-German book, 5.9 percent on average for the French textbooks)—a result of the efforts on the part of German historians to draw attention to the crimes of Communist regimes.⁴⁹ In order to build the case that each country has its own specific form of war guilt, the Franco-German book spends more time discussing the memory and consequences of the Second World War than the French books do. The Franco-German book also devotes much more space to issues currently facing the European Union as a whole (9.1 percent for the Franco-German book versus 5.8 percent on average for the French textbooks).⁵⁰ This is not surprising not only because European issues are relevant to both countries, but also because, like other projects devoted to fostering a sense of Franco-Germanness, this textbook is resolutely optimistic with regard to the European project and to the continued importance of the Franco-German “motor” driving the EU.

Thus various media stemming from the ceremonies for the Elysée Treaty anniversary allowed people in France and Germany to begin to think of themselves as Franco-Germans, with *Arte News* establishing a sense of “here” and “there,” *Karambolage* helping viewers to “remember” what the two countries share, and *Histoire/Geschichte* encouraging the two populations to forget diverging memories of the past. In the second part of this article, attention shifts from the question of how to the one of why French people imagined *Françallemagne* in recent years.

In fact, the two questions might be considered two sides of the same coin. As will be argued below, the question of why *Françallemagne* was imagined recently has much to do with the perception of a shared adversary in the form of the Bush administration and its war in Iraq, while previous efforts to bring France and Germany closer had more to do with turning a

previous enemy into a friend. The goal of transforming a former enemy into a friend carries an implicit message of difference, and the notion of essential otherness between the two former enemies is likely to persist for some time even as the two work together to foster a degree of tolerance for one another by learning more about one another. However, when the motivation for *rapprochement* stems for a need to unite in the face of common adversary, it becomes possible for the two communities to put aside their differences and to see how similar they are, especially in relation to the *relative* difference of the external adversary.

History provides examples to support the idea that it becomes more likely for individual communities to forget differences among themselves, to recognize what they share, and to imagine themselves as part of a single community when they are faced with a common, external enemy. As Jean-Baptiste Duroselle has pointed out, the peoples of Europe have for centuries seen the extent to which they perceive themselves as different from or similar to one another go in cycles that mirror the extent to which enemies are thought to be internal or external to the continent.⁵¹ Charles Martel's victory in Poitiers against the Arab invaders, the Turkish conquest of Constantinople, and the European "discovery" of tribes in the Americas were all moments when the peoples of the European continent were able to see a bit more clearly the similarity of their cultures. However, when the enemy was to be found within the continent, for example during the Thirty Years' War, the Napoleonic wars, or the Franco-Prussian War, people were likely to think in terms of more local identities.

Why Franco-Germanness was Imagined in Recent Years

The notion that collective identity can be shaped through education is nothing new to France, a country that already had an important experience with nation-building in the schools of the Third

Republic. The strategies employed today to foster a sense of Franco-Germanness have parallels in the ways in which books like Ernest Lavisse's 1901 history textbook—establishing a canon of national heroes and teaching children to love the motherland—and Bruno's *Tour de la France par deux enfants* (1877)—exposing the diversity of France's regions while highlighting unifying moral and patriotic values—were used to build French national identity. Interestingly, whereas the textbooks of the Third Republic identified Germany as the “national enemy,” such that French identity became increasingly defined in negative terms as “not German,”⁵² Franco-Germanness is today being defined largely as not American.

Increased interest in Franco-Germanness in recent years can be traced to several important events that took place in January 2003: (1) the commemoration of the fortieth anniversary of the Elysée Treaty, in which France and Germany celebrated forty years of official friendship with an unprecedented meeting of members of both national parliaments; (2) Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schröder announced their desire to develop symbolic and practical measures to foster commonalities in the areas of economics, diplomacy, culture, leisure, and sports – there was even talk of letting French and German people claim common citizenship and of the two countries forming a single diplomatic service; (3) Chirac ended up adopting Schröder's position on the war in Iraq and issued a clear position against an invasion; and (4) Donald Rumsfeld's now famous 22 January 2003 remarks about the distinction between Old and New Europe in which he explained to Washington's foreign press corps, “But you look at vast numbers of other countries in Europe, they're not with France and Germany ... they're with the US ... You're thinking of Europe as Germany and France. I don't, I think that's old Europe.”⁵³

Collectively, these actions served to reinforce Franco-German ties. In the years immediately following these events, the sense of shared identity increased. The discussion of

The number of professional and school exchanges increased, and industrial cooperation between France and Germany reached an all-time high in January 2004. There was also a boom in the number of bi-national marriages, which could partially explain why there were 30 percent more babies born of Franco-German couples in 2004 than in 2003. At the same time, the Franco-German television station Arte saw its viewership grow by an impressive 13 percent between January 2003 and January 2004.⁵⁴ In the realm of education, the two countries signed an agreement aimed at increasing the study of each other's languages in schools in October 2004. In order to provide joint information from the two countries' ministries of foreign affairs jointly, a single website portal was created in 2003.⁵⁵ Finally, beginning in 2003, a new word, "Françallemagne," began to appear in the French press.⁵⁶ It is thus no surprise then that in January 2004, the *Secrétaires généraux pour la coopération franco-allemande* proclaimed that "Franco-German cooperation has never been so dense."⁵⁷

Prior to 2003, there was little reason to expect France and Germany to come out of the commemoration of the fortieth anniversary of the Treaty the way they did.⁵⁸ Through the 1990s, and especially following Schröder's election in 1998, Franco-German ties were actually weakening.⁵⁹ Sources of tension included Germany's desire to see its contribution to the European Union's Common Agricultural Policy reduced (this program benefited French farmers, since France got approximately 20 percent of the CAP money—more than any other country). Both countries also squabbled over the EU's voting structure: Germany wanted more majority-based decisions and France feared that Germany could use its support in Eastern Europe to outvote French positions. Finally, France's permanent seat in the UN Security Council was beginning to cause tensions between France and Germany, with Germany requesting its own seat or else the possibility of a single seat for the whole EU—either option could mean the

elimination of the French seat. By the early 2000s, French officials began to worry and some began to call the partnership “broken.”⁶⁰ In 2001, Ulrike Guerot, a scholar of Franco-German relations, affirmed that “the binational engine is in trouble ... there is no longer any clear and common Franco-German idea;”⁶¹ and in the summer of 2002, the German newspaper *Die Zeit* went so far as to imagine a requiem for the Franco-German axis.⁶² However, by the fall of 2002, it became clear that the situation was about to change. The “red-green” coalition in the German government was already causing some concerns about US-German relations, and both French and German leaders expressed frustration with Bush’s disregard for the strategies proposed by his European partners for the “war on terror.” Finally, and most importantly, there was the American decision to go to war with Iraq.

The fact that this recent Franco-German rapprochement had so much to do with American foreign policy should come as no surprise. Indeed, since at least the early 1990s, there has been a powerful negative correlation between the strength of the Franco-German friendship and the health of European-American relations. During President Clinton’s time in office, for example, American-European relations improved, while the Franco-German friendship waned. Beginning in the 2000s, however, deteriorating relations between the Bush administration and French and German leaders in general, along with the war in Iraq in particular, reversed the trend. A survey conducted in 2004 provides recent evidence of this reversal. The data from this survey showed that an increase in the percentage of French people who had positive feelings for Germany between 2002 and 2004 was accompanied by a decrease in the percentage who had positive feelings for the United States, while over the same time period, French people’s opinions of other countries such as Russia and Israel (the statistics for these two countries are provided merely as controls) remained relatively stable (Table 2).⁶³

Table 2. French attitudes toward other countries in 2002 and 2004

% of French respondents with positive feelings for...	Germany	USA	Russia	Israel
2002	62%	60%	47%	43%
2004	70%	51%	49%	42%
Change 2002-2004	+12.9%	-15%	+4.3%	-2.3%

In sum then, while the fortieth anniversary of the Elysée Treaty ultimately solidified the ties between France and Germany, the changes that took place immediately following the meeting of the two countries cannot be attributed to this event alone. Indeed, past commemorations of the Treaty were of limited importance and the commemoration of 2003 would most likely not have mattered had it not been for its timing with the expression of solidarity by French and German leaders in their opposition to the war in Iraq and with US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s coining of the term “Old Europe.” The construction of *Françallemagne* as a community defined primarily as not American that ensued, is undoubtedly the most important factor in this sudden reinforcement of the ties between the two countries.

The period from 2003 to 2005 may represent the apogee of Franco-Germanness. In the years since, and in particular since 2005, there are clear signs that the power of this construct is once again waning. Even at its peak, it was clear that Franco-Germanness remained of less import than national identities; indeed, the specific reasons why each country has been interested in pursuing a Franco-German friendship in the first place can potentially be explained along national lines, with Germans trying to move beyond the guilt of World War II, and with the French being motivated by more Gaullist strategies. With respect to Gaullism, it has often been in France’s interest to play a strong role in supranational structures, such as the European Union, and France’s interest in *Françallemagne* has been based on the recognition that “Germany-plus-

France in the European Union was a force greater than either country alone, certainly than France alone.”⁶⁴ This feature of French foreign policy is of course nothing new. As John Farquharson and Stephen Holt pointed out in their 1975 book, *Europe from Below*, France has “what can fairly be called a missionary complex in respect of their way of life. Examples of this attitude are not hard to find. De Gaulle in his memoirs referred to France as having been ‘from time immemorial’ a ‘champion of humanity,’ disseminating freedom of thought, a process described as ‘God’s work.’”⁶⁵

Germany, however, has had a very different approach to disseminating its culture, since “the events of the Third Reich led to considerable circumspection after the war.”⁶⁶ This has meant that “for some time the Germans presented a low profile to the world in respect of their way of life,” and that there has been a “greater emphasis on contemporary life in the Federal Republic, as opposed to the German cultural heritage in general [and that] the German government has now moved to a rather different concept of cultural policy as such, with the emphasis on collaboration with other states.”⁶⁷ Consequently, though the articulations of Franco-Germanness in the media forms presented here have been similar in both countries, differences in the ways in which national identity is conceived have meant that the notion of *Françallemagne* has resonated differently on either side of the Rhine: the French have tended to look at it as a broader space for propagating French universalist ideals, while in Germany, the motivation might be understood in more ethnic terms, as a way to be less “German” and to distance oneself from the memory of World War II.

In the end, there are several reasons to expect the importance of the Franco-German friendship to wane in the coming years. Already, the term “Franco-German” is appearing with less and less frequency in both countries’ newspapers, and the idealistic projects set out in 2003,


such as the effort to create a single citizenship for both countries, have lost steam. Also, the two countries' current leaders, Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy, are less interested in pursuing the Franco-German friendship than their predecessors were. Moreover, there is the long-term trend of post-reunification Germany becoming less interested in the Franco-German friendship as it both moves beyond its war guilt and develops relationships with other countries, notably to the East. After decades of being weaker than France, Germany emerged as the more powerful political partner in the 1990s and Germans have begun to realize that there are times when it is in Germany's interest to act independently. As Julius Friend explains in his book *Unequal Partners*:

As long as Germany was burdened by the immediate memory of World War II, and even after it recovered full sovereignty in 1955, France was the leading partner. By 1968 German economic superiority was manifest, but France could consider with more or less good reason until unification that it had political trumps that Germany did not possess. Unification made it plain to most of the French that these trumps—membership in the Four-Power Council for Germany, a UN Security Council seat, even atomic armaments—had lost much of their value in the relation with Germany.⁶⁸

Finally, the anti-Americanism that fueled the recent surge in Franco-Germanness in the two countries may be fading, particularly in Germany. Anti-Americanism seems to be somewhat more endemic to France than Germany, which could suggest that Franco-Germanness will continue to be imagined in France for a longer period of time than in Germany. A comparison of the number of times the term “Franco-German” appeared in French and German newspapers


each year between 2001 and 2008 with the number of times the terms “United States,” and “Iraq” appeared those same years is telling. The correlation⁶⁹ between the frequency with which the term “Franco-German” appeared and the frequency with which the word “Iraq” appeared each year was exceptionally strong in both countries, with positive correlations of 0.91 for French newspapers and of 0.83 for German newspapers (Figures 2 and 3, and Table 3).

Figure 2. Frequency of “Iraq” and “Franco-German” in French newspapers*



*Total number of times the terms “Franco-allemand(e)” and “Irak” appeared each year from 2001 to 2008 in three French newspapers: *La Croix*, *Le Figaro* and *Libération*. The numbers on the left side show the number of times “Irak” appeared in an article or a headline and the numbers on the right are for the number of times the term “Franco-allemand(e)” appeared in an article or a headline.

Figure 3. Frequency of “Iraq” and “Franco-German” in German newspapers*



*Total number of times the terms “Deutsch-Französisch(e)” and “Irak” appeared each year from 2001 to 2008 in three German newspapers: *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, the *Hamburger Abendblatt*, and the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*. The numbers on the left side show the number of times “Irak” appeared in the text of an article or in a headline and the numbers on the right are for the number of times the term “Deutsch-Französisch(e)” appeared in the text of an article or in a headline.

Table 3. Correlations between the frequency with which the term “Franco-German” appears in each country’s newspapers and the frequency with which other terms appear from 2001 through 2008

Correlation between the frequency of “Franco-German” and the frequency of:	French Newspapers	German Newspapers
“Iraq”	0.91	0.83
“United States”	0.66	0.47

However, the correlations between the frequency of the appearance of the terms “Franco-German” and “the United States” (0.66 correlation in French newspapers, 0.47 in German newspapers) show that these associations are a bit weaker in both countries, though less so in France than in Germany.⁷⁰ These numbers suggest that the component of Franco-German

identity associated with opposition to the war in Iraq was strong in both countries, while the correlation value for the term “United States” seems to indicate that the component of Franco-German identity linked with being not-American was slightly stronger in France than in Germany and that the easing of tensions between the United States in France with the arrival of Sarkozy in France and the election of Obama in the United States could lead to a decrease in the French desire to pursue the Franco-German friendship. With all these factors taken into consideration—the end of the Bush presidency, the long-term trend of an increasingly independent Germany, the recent changes of leadership in France, Germany, and the United States, and the possibility that tensions between United States and Europe will decline in the coming years over the war in Iraq—there is every reason to believe that historians will soon be looking back at the 2003-2005 period as an unusual blip in a longer trend of weakening Franco-German relations that began in the 1990s; this, despite the various efforts of recent years to get people to imagine *Françallemagne*.

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Notes

¹ *Karambolage* website, www.arte.tv/fr/connaissance-decouverte/karambolage/104016.html (accessed 17 June 2008). The German word *Karmbolage* (in French, *carambolage*) means collision, especially in the context of the game of billiards.

² Guillaume Le Quintrec et al., *Histoire/Geschichte: L'Europe et le monde depuis 1945* (Paris: Nathan, 2006).

³ See Monica Sassatelli, "Imagined Europe: The Shaping of a European Cultural Identity Through EU Cultural Policy," *European Journal of Social Theory* 4 (2002): 435-51.

⁴ Vivienne Orchard, "Culture as Opposed to What? Cultural Belonging in the Context of National and European Identity," *European Journal of Social Theory* 4 (2002), 429.

⁵ Jürgen Habermas, "Citizenship and national Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe," *Praxis International* 1 (1992): 1-19.

⁶ Ernest Renan, *What Is a Nation?* (lecture at Sorbonne, 11 March 1882), in *Becoming National: A Reader*, ed. Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, trans. Martin Thom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 45.

⁷ F. Roy Willis, *France, Germany, and the New Europe 1945-1967* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), 240.

⁸ Jean-Michel Utard, "Arte Information télévisée et construction d'un point de vue transnational. Étude d'un corpus franco-allemand" (Thèse de doctorat, Université Robert Schuman Strasbourg III, 1997), Second Part, Chapter 1, 16.

⁹ Stephen Games, "Europe: Hard Arte of the Possible," *The Guardian*, 21 January 1993.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Section 21, *Déclaration commune franco-allemande à l'occasion du 40^{ème} anniversaire du Traité de l'Elysée Palais de l'Elysée*, 22 January 2003.

¹² Tamara Chaplin, *Turning on the Mind: French Philosophers on Television* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 2.

¹³ Régine Magné, "La chaîne curieuse," *Sud Ouest*, 25 November 2003.

¹⁴ Delphine de Mallevoue, “La petite chaîne des curiosités; Arte : Lancement d'une nouvelle grille,” *Le Figaro*, 2 January 2004 [emphasis added].

¹⁵ This information comes from an analysis of every episode of *Arte News* from 18 September 2006 through 27 October 2006.

¹⁶ These numbers come from an analysis of the number of stories devoted to each region on the two channels during the six-week period from 18 September 2006 to 27 October 2006. News stories where only a headline was mentioned, without any accompanying story, were counted as half of a story for the purpose of this chart.

¹⁷ Claire Doutriaux, *Dossier de presse pour la centième émission*, 27 November 2006, 2.

¹⁸ *Karambolage*, Episode 102, 17 December 2006.

¹⁹ *Karambolage*, Episode 40, 23 January 2005.

²⁰ *Karambolage*, Episode 82, 9 April 2006.

²¹ *Karambolage*, Episode 94, 1 October 2006.

²² *Karambolage*, Episode 80, 26 March 2006.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Karambolage*, Episode 38, 9 January 2005.

²⁵ *Karambolage*, Episode 11, 21 March 2004.

²⁶ *Karambolage*, Episode 29, 24 October 2004.

²⁷ *Karambolage*, Episode 82, 9 April 2006.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ *Karambolage*, Episode 98, 5 November 2006.

³⁰ *Karambolage*, Episode 118, 20 May 2007.

³¹ *Karambolage*, Episode 84, 30 April 2006.

³² *Karambolage*, Episode 65, 27 November 2005.

³³ Cécile Jaurès, “Coup de cœur; Ces étonnants voisins d'outre-Rhin; *Karambolage*; Arte, chaque dimanche, 20 heures,” *La Croix*, 10 January 2004.

³⁴ Anne-Marie Fèvre, “Cathédrales cathodiques: *Karambolage* décrypte les différences entre la France et l'Allemagne,” *Libération*, 8 October 2005.

³⁵ Christine Ducros, “Succès pour le récent manuel d'histoire franco-allemand,” *Le Figaro*, 28 October 2006.

³⁶ Willis, *France, Germany, and the New Europe*, 241.

³⁷ Corine Defrance and Ulrich Pfeil, eds., *Le Traité de l'Élysée et les relations franco-allemandes 1945-1963-2003* (Paris: CNRS Éditions, 2005), 219.

³⁸ Horst Möller and Jacques Morizet, eds., *Allemagne-France: Lieux et mémoire d'une histoire commune* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1995), 207.

³⁹ Jeannie Bauvois-Cauchepin, *Enseignement de l'histoire et mythologie nationale: Allemagne-France, du début du XX^e siècle aux années 1950* (Berne: Peter Lang, 2002), 180.

⁴⁰ Henri Amouroux, “Le nouveau manuel d'histoire franco-allemand ? Un véritable dictionnaire de l'essentiel,” *Le Figaro Magazine*, 27 May 2006, 44.

⁴¹ Bauvois-Cauchepin, *Enseignement de l'histoire*, 265.

⁴² In addition to debates over content, the two teams also faced the daunting task of reconciling the differences in pedagogical methods between the two countries. The French tend to focus on teaching specific information, while German schools focus more on teaching students to think independently. And though the German team pushed for more text and fewer images, the final product ended up resembling French textbooks more than German textbooks (Arnaud Bouvier,

“Le premier manuel d'histoire franco-allemand est attendu pour 2006,” *Agence France Presse*, 20 October 2005).

⁴³ “History lessons; A Franco-German textbook,” *The Economist*, 8 July 2006.

⁴⁴ Adam Sage, “Franco-German school text ‘anti-American’,” *The Australian*, 5 May 2006.

⁴⁵ Barbara Lefebvre and Eve Bonnivard, *Élèves sous influence* (Paris: Audibert, 2005), 148.

⁴⁶ Alfred Grosser, “Le plus grave est le silence sur tout ce qui pourrait encourager les lycéens à mener une vie engagée: Le manuel franco-allemand, une déception,” *La Croix*, 26 July 2006, 23.

⁴⁷ The five textbooks are: (1) Jean-Michel Lambin et al., *Histoire, terminale S* (Paris: Hachette éducation, 2004); (2) Laurent Bourquin et al., *Histoire, Terminales ES, L, S* (Paris: Belin, 2004); (3) Jacqueline Le Pellec et al., *Histoire, terminales L, ES, S* (Paris: Bertrand-Lacoste, 2004); (4) Guillaume Le Quintrec et al., *Histoire, Terminales L-ES* (Paris: Nathan, 2004); (5) Jacques Marseille et al., *Histoire, Terminales L-ES-S* (Paris: Nathan, 2004).

⁴⁸ The breakdown by textbook edition is as follows: Belin 11.6%; Bertrand-Lacoste: 8.1%; Nathan (Le Quintrec et al.): 15.1%; Nathan (Marseille et al.): 10.1%; Hachette: 11.1%.

⁴⁹ The breakdown by textbook edition is as follows: Belin: 6.4%; Bertrand-Lacoste: 6.8%; Nathan (Le Quintrec et al.): 6.4%; Nathan (Marseille et al.): 5.8; Hachette: 4.5%.

⁵⁰ The breakdown by textbook edition is as follows: Belin: 6.4%; Bertrand-Lacoste: 6.8%; Nathan (Le Quintrec et al.): 6.4%; Nathan (Marseille et al.): 5.6%; Hachette: 3.9%.

⁵¹ Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, “L’idée de l’Europe dans l’histoire,” in *La France et l’Europe*, ed. Yves Léondar (Paris: Documentation française, 1990), 4.

⁵² Stéphanie Krapoth, *France-Allemagne: Du Duel au duo, de Napoléon à nos jours* (Paris: Privat, 2005), 17-18.

⁵³ BBC News, “Outrage at 'old Europe' remarks,” 23 January 2003,

news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2687403.stm.

⁵⁴ Pascale Hugues, “France-Allemagne: Les hauts et les bas d'un mariage de raison,” *Le Point*,

22 January 2004.

⁵⁵ <http://www.france-allemande.fr/-Accueil-.html>.

⁵⁶ See for example, “Un jour en Françallemagne,” *Libération*, 22 January 2003.

⁵⁷ Noëlle Lenoir and Hans-Martin Bury, *Communiqué des secrétaires généraux pour la coopération franco-allemande*, 22 January 2004,

www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actu/bulletin.asp?liste=20040123.html&submit.x=4&submit.y=6#Chapitre2.

⁵⁸ DeFrance, *Le Traité de l'Élysée*, 8.

⁵⁹ “The end of the affair? Germany’s relationship with France,” *German Politics* 4 (2005): 401-16.

⁶⁰ “France-Allemagne: un tandem en panne ?” *Panoramiques* 54 (2001),

www.editions.corlet.fr/panoramiques/sun/html/54.html.

⁶¹ Ulrike Guerot, “Ten Years After the Fall of the Wall: France’s New View of Germany,” in *France-German in the Twenty-First Century*, ed. Patrick McCarthy (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 36.

⁶² Joachim Fritz-Vannahme, “Requiem für eine Achse,” *Die Zeit*, 18 July 2002,

www.zeit.de/2002/30/Requiem_fuer_eine_Achse.

⁶³ German Marshall Fund, *Transatlantic Trends 2004 – Topline Data 22* (Survey conducted by EOS Gallup Europe from 6 June to 26 June 2004 with a sampling of 1006 French people), cited

in “Derrière le discours de l’amitié franco-allemande,” Claire Demesmay, *Visions franco-allemandes*, October 2004, 3.

⁶⁴ Julius W. Friend, *Unequal Partners: French-German Relations, 1989-2000* (New York: Praeger, 2001), 104.

⁶⁵ John Farquharson and Stephen Holt, *Europe from Below: An Assessment of Franco-German Popular Contacts* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1975), 2.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 3.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 8.

⁶⁸ Friend, *Unequal Partners*, 104.

⁶⁹ For readers less familiar with the use of correlation data, here is a brief explanation of this statistical tool: “The term correlation literally means co-relate and refers to the measurement of a relationship between two or more variables ... A correlational coefficient typically ranges between -1.0 and $+1.0$ and provides two important pieces of information regarding the relationship: Intensity and Direction. Intensity refers to the strength of the relationship and is expressed as a number between zero (meaning no correlation) and one (meaning a perfect correlation). These two extremes are rare as most correlations fall somewhere in between. In the social sciences, a correlation of 0.30 may be considered significant and any correlation above 0.70 is almost always significant ... Direction refers to how one variable moves in relation to the other. A positive correlation (or direct relationship) means that two variables move in the same direction, either both moving up or both moving down ... A negative correlation (or inverse relationship) means that the two variables move in opposite directions; as one goes up, the other tends to go down.” [emphasis added] Christopher Heffner, *Research Methods*, Chapter 8.6 [<http://allpsych.com/researchmethods/correlation.html>].

⁷⁰ These numbers come from an analysis of the number of articles that appear in a Lexis-Nexis search of the French newspapers *La Croix*, *Le Figaro* and *Libération* and of the German newspapers the *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, the *Hamburger Abendblatt*, and the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*. The total number of articles appearing for a search using each of the terms per year for the period 2001 through 2008 was used to calculate the correlations.