The Rise of Julius Malema

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The Rise of Julius Malema

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# Table of Contents

Introduction

Chapter 1: “A Vacuum of Leadership”

Chapter 2: “Service Non-Delivery”

Chapter 3: “South African Strife”

Chapter 4: “Malema Rising”

Conclusions

Bibliography
Introduction

“We are in a political laboratory; never blame us if we make mistakes, we are [just] learning.”

–Julius Malema¹

Before Jacob Zuma’s election in 2009, Julius Sello Malema was a virtually unknown figure in South African politics. After the general elections in April of that year, Julius Malema became a household name. As President of the African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL), Malema has become one of the most contentious and ridiculed figures in South African political history. Malema’s rise to fame has been swift; his outspoken commentary on the African National Congress (ANC) as well as his merciless prodding of previously taboo South African issues such as land reform and nationalization has brought him domestic and international attention.

Malema is certainly a surprising addition to the South African political landscape because of his arguably untested and uneducated background as well as his affiliation with an ethnic minority. The leader of the ANC’s Youth League claims to represent everyday South Africans in his rhetoric and in his proposed polices for South Africa. His swift rise to political fame raises many questions—did Malema arise out of a vacuum of leadership and service delivery in the ANC? Is Malema responsible for creating a movement, or is he simply a product of the dissatisfaction of the South African people? How did the ANC’s “running dog” turn

against the President that he helped to elect?² How are his actions and words affecting South Africa’s standing in the world? And most importantly: What can we learn about populist politics and the political atmosphere in South Africa through Malema?

As will be explored in depth in the first chapter, a vacuum of leadership within the ANC has been critical to Malema’s rise, this vacuum of leadership became visible at the ANC’s 2007 Polokwane Conference, when Jacob Zuma openly challenged Thabo Mbeki for leadership of the ANC. Zuma later succeeded Mbeki as Secretary General of the ANC, and was subsequently elected President of South Africa. Prior to this shift, the ANC was seen by most of the world as a unified party; the ANC now contains various clashing factions and members who are not afraid to speak publicly about how and by whom they think the party should be run. This shift in the comportment of the ANC has enabled Malema and his followers to speak out against policy and to create a political undercurrent that has grown in strength against Jacob Zuma and could possibly topple him.

Service delivery, or more accurately, service non-delivery, is an important segment of the social climate to consider when examining post-apartheid South Africa. My argument is that young and poor black South Africans make up the majority of the country’s population—and the ANC’s constituency—and they are not being actively integrated into South Africa’s economy quickly or efficiently because of current domestic policies. Millions are living in shacks on the outskirts of South African cities with little to no access to infrastructure such as plumbing or electricity. Other issues, such as poor education, the lack of jobs and the very large gap between the have and have-nots has created resentment and anger among the poorest in the

² Ibid. 26
country. Malema both contributes to tensions by addressing the concerns of the poor with his compelling speeches and by being outspoken in addressing these concerns via the media.

In the third chapter, I argue that the issue of a generational divide also helps to explain Malema’s rise to prominence. As head of the ANCYL, it is Malema’s job to represent the youth of South Africa. Those who did not experience Apartheid, or who were too young to actually see how it affected the country may not appreciate the ANC’s history as ‘liberators’ and ‘freedom fighters’ as much as previous generations. The youth of South Africa are dissatisfied with the way things stand, and they do not have memories of the past as a reference point for how bad some forms of governance can truly be—these youths are simply exasperated with the ANC’s current mode of running the country. Malema is responsible for expressing the views of his peers: the view that the ANC should be held accountable for the state of the country and prodded into the “right” policies for the majority of South Africans.

The vacuum of leadership within the ANC, the issues of service delivery to the poor, and the dissatisfaction and unrest amongst the youngest members of South African society are the major factors that have contributed to the political problems that President Zuma now faces; these problems are personified in Julius Malema.

After a detailed analysis of the three reasons behind South Africa’s unrest as well as a look at the ANCYL, evidence of Malema’s rise to power will be explored and analyzed further in the fourth chapter entitled “The Rise of Julius Malema.” Firstly, Malema’s modest past and the shaping of his personality will be highlighted in a short biographical section. Secondly, Malema’s role as a dedicated member and promoter of the ANC will be examined via public accounts of Malema’s actions, such as transcripts from speeches, media reports, as well as first-
hand video accounts. Thirdly, Malema’s actions of speaking out against the perceived
capitalistic tendencies of the ANC and other powerful South Africans, and his desires of
nationalization and land reform need to be addressed. After the accusations of hate speech and
stirring up the previously ignored issues of land redistribution and the nationalization of mines,
Malema was most recently accused of living beyond his ANCYL salary and inquiries have been
made to trace Malema’s method of supporting himself so luxuriously. This is ironic, since he
has previously accused many members of the ANC as well as other South African public figures
of corruption. Finally, current events surrounding Malema’s potential expulsion from the ANC
as well as his continued political potential must be analyzed.

Finally, an exploration of Malema’s perceived ‘success’ is needed in order to illustrate
whether or not Malema is a true contender for power in South African politics. The implications
of Malema’s power will be explained in depth at the end of this introduction and in the final
chapter. For my purposes, Malema’s success will be defined as the amount of positive change
or attention he has achieved for his constituency (poor South Africans) since his rise. This
approach has flaws because his presence does not necessarily create change, nor does he
currently have any power to make policy corrections in South Africa. I understand this, but the
media attention that Malema brings to the issues pressures the ANC to perform well, as does
the small backsliding the party experienced during local elections in 2010. To illustrate
Malema’s success according to my established definition, I will use primary documents from the
ANCYL, as well as public reactions from the ANC. Public opinion is also very important in

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3 “Malema Speaks Out” Sabelo Ndlangisa, News 24, February 2, 2011
measuring Malema’s growth, and I will use targeted interviews of my contacts in South Africa to achieve this. Unfortunately, this also has flaws, because those that I will be able to contact come from educated backgrounds, and that can interfere with the presentation of Malema’s perceived persona.

In my conclusion, I will explore Malema’s future. There are many that fear that Malema will gain power within the ANC, and perhaps be elected to run the country someday. His references to the nationalizations of mines and land reform would certainly make many investors in South Africa’s private sector very nervous, and could potentially damage the country’s economy. His perceived racism and accusations of hate speech would cause the economically-powerful white minority to feel unsafe if he were in a leadership position. Small indications of these effects have already begun, and the ANC has scrambled to show the world that their policies do not agree with what Malema believes.

I must argue that Malema is a young radical, and at one time, all leaders of the ANC were young radicals. If Nelson Mandela were given the Presidency of South Africa when he was the ANCYL President, his policies would have been different from what they were in 1994. Malema has already shown a leaning toward appreciating what private investment and the interests of the West could bring to the country and his own private wealth. Thus, Malema conceivably is no threat to the security of South Africa; he merely draws attention to policy issues that need to be resolved or amended.

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5 Reference Press Statements. “ANC statement on the stance of the ANC Youth League on Botswana and African Leadership Institutions”, “ANC NDC disciplinary hearing into the conduct of Comrade Julius Malema”, “ANC condemns linking of the singing of the struggle song by Malema to Terreblanche killing”
Although no one can see into the future, I would confidently say that if Malema were to gain significant power, he would not become another Robert Mugabe, but instead, he would become another Jacob Zuma.

**Literature Review: Politics of the ANC and the Entry of Julius Malema**

A broad literature on the ANC and its role in South African Politics exists. My work contributes to the literature by critiquing and analyzing the leadership dynamics within the political party. My methodological approach to the study includes examining diverse primary sources. These primary documents include records of ANC conference and through conversations with scholars in the United States and South Africa who specialize in South African politics. I supplemented these primary sources with monographs, newspaper articles, and informal interviews.

The topic and subject matter of this study is current and in-progress. Many of the writers of my sources are academics, journalists, and policy analysts. There are many examinations of Jacob Zuma’s rise to the Presidency of South Africa; the most significant sources were from Alec Russell: a South African news editor, Zwelethu Jolobe: a political science professor who mentored me with at the University of Cape Town, Andrew Feinstein: a former ANC member, and Tom Lodge: a professor specializing in South African Politics at the University of Limerick. These scholars' contributions to the body of knowledge surrounding the ANC before and during the election of Jacob Zuma as well as the analysis of the significance of those actions is very
important in understanding the subject matter. These men’s work certainly stands as an inspiration and a framework for this piece. Alec Russell takes a journalistic approach, outlining the events in the 2007 election as they happened, and also added his own opinions of Zuma which were based on past interactions with the politician. Zwelethu Jolobe works primarily as a political analyst, and his work examines the impacts and implications that the election process holds for the ANC. Andrew Feinstein has an insider’s detailed knowledge, and he analyzes small details of the ANC’s decision making behind closed doors. Tom Lodge takes an unbiased, academic approach, and offers more economic analysis into his writings on the politics of the ANC.

On the topic of service delivery, South African news correspondent R.W. Johnson’s insightful research and commentary helped to shape the qualitative information needed for this piece. Another journalist, David Goodman, and Professor Stephen Chan at SOAS also contributed to the body of knowledge surrounding the history and current events concerning South African service delivery. For my statistical data in the chapter, David McDonald and John Pape’s work Cost Recovery and the Crisis of Service Delivery in South Africa was incredibly in-depth, and provided the majority of my data as well as the inspiration for the definition of service delivery itself.

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For historical grounding and theoretical background concerning Apartheid, Leonard Thompson’s *History of South Africa* was incredibly helpful, as was Julian Kunnie’s modern insights in *Is Apartheid Really Dead?*

As for contemporary sources, BBC News, Mail & Guardian South Africa, The New York Times, and The Economist were all trustworthy and timely sources. One of the most works to this piece was Fiona Ford’s book, *An Inconvenient Youth: Julius Malema and the ‘New’ ANC*. This book is critical because the author spent a year in close confidence with Julius Malema and had many interviews with the politician. Luckily, this book was published at the end of 2011 with an important foreword by South African-Based theorist, Achille Mbembe. I also followed new technologies to further extrapolate examples of Malema’s views and speeches, such as twitter and Malema’s personal blog. This type of referencing adds an edge to the work, keeping it up to date and integrating Malema’s voice into the story.

These works are all crucial in reporting the facts about the rising dissatisfaction in South Africa as well as the characteristics of Julius Malema’s political potential in the country. This work is unique in that it brings together the facts from academic discourse and new sources in its analysis. My approach to this work was to include Malema’s voice, which I felt had not yet been properly heard in the realm of academic discourse. While researching this piece and it was my hope that one of the foremost researchers on the ANC would publish something on the rise of Malema, but this has yet to happen. Interestingly enough, the typical academic observers and commentators on South African politics have remained silent on the topic of Julius Malema. This is probably because Malema’s future is highly unpredictable; he could be a potentially powerful figure in South African politics or a short-lived political celebrity. To many
scholars, it is not yet apparent whether or not Malema will continue to be a household name, or if he will be forgotten by his followers and the press. Malema is an important figure in South African politics because of the support he holds with the people and because of his intelligence in manipulating the media.

This piece is not merely political commentary on recent events in South African politics. This piece is about a man who overcame many struggles and became a leader for those who are like him. Malema is a man who appears to want tangible change for all South Africans, something that was promised once before but has yet to surface. For now, it does not matter whether or not Malema is personally successful with his movement, what matters is that he inspires people to come together to express their frustration, to talk about what was previously taboo. Malema himself is a barometer of the attitudes of everyday South Africans, and for that he will always be of considerable importance.
Chapter One: “A Vacuum of Leadership”

In 2007, the African National Congress experienced a historical political shift involving then-President Thabo Mbeki and Deputy President Jacob Zuma. The dramatic election of Jacob Zuma and the removal of Thabo Mbeki began a crisis for the leadership of the ANC that will affect the party’s politics for years to come.

The roots of this crisis began with Mbeki’s economic policies that were perceived to favor the elites of the country by building trade with the West and by employing a market-based approach to domestic spending that did not allow for governmental development in the poorest areas of South Africa. Instead, the policy pushed for macroeconomic growth and for austerity in municipal and local spending. It did not help that Mbeki himself seemed oblivious to the expectations of the country’s poor black majority.¹ The expectations of the black South African majority were that the country’s new economic growth of over five percent (stemming from the new economic policy) would trickle down and help the poor become a functioning part of the economy.² This “trickle-down effect” did not occur in Mbeki’s administration; the growing middle classes in South Africa, as well as corporate elites, made the most of this period of rapid economic expansion. The working class and the poor saw little to no growth. The majority of South Africans, left impoverished and uneducated by the structure of the previous Apartheid governmental system, did not encounter tangible positive economic growth in their communities. Instead, they were witness to a narrowing of opportunities and a growth of

² Ibid.
poverty for the lower classes as a whole. This loss became a point of tension for poor South Africans—the group who happened to be the ANC’s largest constituency—and resentment grew against Mbeki.

After six years as president of the country and of the ANC, Mbeki faced a rebellion within the party led by Jacob Zuma, his former deputy president.³ Heroic Zuma emerged in contrast to the commonly vilified version of Mbeki; Zuma is a Zulu who grew up in poverty, and constituents saw him as a warm, patriotic figure that would remember his roots when formulating and installing economic and domestic policies. Mbeki was educated abroad and lived a middle-class lifestyle throughout the brutal South African Apartheid, when many others were risking their lives for freedom and equality. Zuma emerged as the people’s candidate; he was a popular contender for the leadership of the country’s most powerful party. Because of Zuma’s popularity with the general populace and the obvious discontent with Mbeki’s policies, members of the ANC became increasingly split between the two candidates. Members began to take sides; they were on Zuma’s side or they were with Mbeki. This was a novelty for the ANC. There had not been conflict over party leadership since 1949, when Nelson Mandela and the ANC’s Youth League openly criticized the ANC’s because of a difference in ideology.⁴ This split of members over party member Zuma and party president Mbeki was the first of its kind; blatant campaigning and partisanship had never been seen in the ANC before Zuma laid claim to the party’s presidency.⁵ The battle between Jacob Zuma and Thabo Mbeki was a historic

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⁴ Ibid.
moment because it opened the doors for partisanship within the ANC, and built the mechanisms for challenging leadership within the party.

At the ANC’s 52nd National Conference in Polokwane, Limpopo in December 2007, Jacob Zuma was proclaimed the victor of the power struggle within the ANC and became the party’s president. The inner struggle had come to a head and the voting members ended the conflict with Zuma holding a majority of their votes. Mbeki and his followers were defeated and rather than falling away out of the spotlight, the group decided to form another political party called Congress of the People, or COPE. The founding of another party served to illustrate the large rift in the ANC in leadership for the public and the media to observe. Many members left the ANC to join COPE and to support Mbeki. COPE began to attract moderate South African voters from racial minorities who did not always lean as far to the left as the ANC traditionally had. COPE was seen as a threat to the ANC’s hegemony in the country because it recruited many of the ANC’s members and valuable donors.

Fortunately for the ANC, COPE did not become a permanent fixture in the South African political arena. COPE did not last long as a separate political party mainly because of irreconcilable differences within the leadership and because its platform was too similar to the ANC’s already established policies. The ANC did not lose many of its voters among the poor majority, nor did its two-thirds majority decrease significantly as a result of the split. The emergence of COPE is not the important lesson to take away from this section—it is the message that many in the ANC took away from the Polokwane Conference. The message was that partisan behavior was accepted in Polokwane by the ANC and was illustrated with great

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6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
fanfare in the formation of COPE. Previously, the ANC had not been accepting of this sort of behavior; any sort of rift between members was quickly quieted and only discussed amongst party elites. The move to allow the inter-party politics of the ANC’s elite leadership to be seen and heard by its members and the general public has created a major problem for the current leadership of the ANC and its allied parties, and it will continue to do so into the near future.

**Tri-Partite Politics after Polokwane**

The ANC has been traditionally allied with two groups: the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SACP). The groups were allies in the days of Apartheid and continued their relationship together very amicably during the reconstruction period after 1994 because they represented powerful interests within South Africa. COSATU represented the interests of labor unions; labor unions had been pivotal in hastening the end of Apartheid via strikes and as outlets to speak out against discrimination. The SACP was traditionally home to South African intellectuals and radicals who kept the post-Apartheid government in touch with its radical leftist roots. Both of the groups were given equal say in the proceedings of the governing party through their elected leaders, who also held positions in the upper levels of the ANC.⁸

Both COSATU and the SACP were important contributors to the outcomes of Jacob Zuma’s election within the ANC, because both of these groups campaigned for Zuma within their memberships at the grassroots level. These groups believed that Zuma would follow a more “labor-friendly” and leftist agenda because of his personal history in contrast to Mbeki’s

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and that is why they chose to back him as a candidate.\(^9\) Essentially, neither the SACP nor COSATU felt that Mbeki’s politics and policies suited their individual purposes, so they chose to join the Zuma faction and use their powers to see him elected as Secretary General of the ANC.

With COSATU and the SACP backing him, Zuma created the left-populist alliance, which also included youth groups, NGOs and various religious organizations.\(^{10}\) With these pro-poor groups behind his candidacy, Zuma was seen as a pro-poor candidate. That carefully-crafted image certainly helped Zuma to win the votes of rank and file ANC members. If it were not for these influential groups Zuma would have had a much more difficult campaign and he would not have had the heavy expectations placed on his shoulders that he now has to contend with.

Unfortunately, Jacob Zuma did not turn out to be the President that his allies on the left had hoped he would be. One condition of Zuma gaining the Presidency was that there would be no major shifts of economic policy—this was decided by leadership within ANC.\(^{11}\) For COSATU and the SACP, a change in economic policy had been what was desired, and although the groups had assisted in changing the ruling party’s leadership, they could have no impact on the country’s economic direction. This rift between what the allies thought should happen and what the ANC mandated in its policies would eventually cause trouble within the alliance. The expectations that these groups had for Zuma’s administration in contrast to Zuma’s realities were unsettling and caused many disagreements within the alliance. The conflicts that the


alliance would eventually face with Zuma stem from the unfulfilled promises that Zuma made to those who helped him win his place as leader of the ANC and President of South Africa.

The conflicts between Zuma’s administration, COSATU, and the SACP have been highly publicized unlike prior conflicts within the alliance before the Mbeki-Zuma power struggle. There is much literature on whether or not there will be a major split in the tri-partite alliance, and if COSATU will go on to start its own political party like COPE. The majority of experts wager that there will not be a split; the ANC is too powerful with its current two-thirds majority, and the SACP and COSATU know that. President Zuma knows that as well, which is why he does not seem pressured to appease these organizations that helped him before he was in power. Instead of splitting, these groups are forced to work from inside the alliance to create the change they desire. This is another reason that the pillars of leadership within the ANC have become so shaky; the forces that once unified the ANC and made it powerful are fighting against one another for distinct and separate policies. COSATU and the SACP were once members of a strong alliance of liberators and policymakers, but now they become a group that only holds the power to change the leadership of the ANC to someone who is more supportive of their voice. This desire of a different leader combined with the established precedent for partisanship within the party’s politics can only work negatively against Zuma and his supporters.

**Zuma as President**

Zuma became President of The Republic of South Africa officially in 2009 after the ANC won the national elections with a two-thirds majority. As was previously mentioned, President Zuma’s administration felt no strong compulsion to change the economic policies that the
country followed. In reality, Zuma made big promises during his campaign to many politicians and businessmen in and out of the ANC, and these massive debts needed to be paid before he could focus on South Africa’s impoverished majority. Jacob Zuma is a charismatic politician who knows how to use popularity to his benefit, but he still needs support from those who control the country’s economy. Unfortunately, even if Zuma does have the best intentions for South Africa, he has to serve the interests of capitalism and the wealthy first, and the needs of poor black people second. This prioritization creates a vacuum of leadership for the poor majority that has become very dangerous, and could be filled by an equally charismatic and popular political entrepreneur, one that does not have the volatile past or the political debts that Jacob Zuma has to answer to.

Zuma’s has had a troubled political past; he was accused of rape and corruption long before he challenged Mbeki for the leadership of the ANC and assumed the South African Presidency. In November 2001, Schabir Shaik, a friend of Zuma’s, was arrested for corruption. Shaik was involved in a private French company’s arms deal with the South African government; the arms supplier had given gifts of luxury vehicles and cash to people with certain levels of political clout that could make sure the company’s bid was accepted over the bids of other businesses. Schabir Shaik became the most important figure in the trial, because it was alleged that he used his “personal relationship with Jacob Zuma to benefit himself and his companies.” It was found that the creators of the deal would have paid Zuma R500,000 to

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13 Andrew Feinstein. *After the Party: Corruption, the ANC and South Africa’s Uncertain Future.* (London: Verso, 2009) 194-197
14 About $64,000
facilitate the deal’s success with the ruling party and Zuma was also asked to protect the arms dealers from any investigation into their business transactions.  

Schabir Shaik was tried by South African courts and sentenced to fifteen years in jail for charges of corruption and fraud. The relationship between Shaik and Jacob Zuma was described as “inappropriate” by the court judge and Zuma was then indicted on corruption charges. Because of the nature of the charges, Zuma was then fired from his position of Deputy President by then-President Mbeki, and his trial was set for July 2006. This moment was significant because it illustrated to the public for the first time that there was conflict and questionable political practices within the ANC. It became acceptable for the media to cover these issues in the interest of the public. Zuma’s corruption case eventually collapsed; the judges ruled that there was not enough evidence against the politician to pursue the case further. Unfortunately, for Jacob Zuma, the case had left a stain on his integrity as a politician and his legal troubles had only begun.

Another event that Zuma was embroiled in during 2006 has probably become the most famous South African court case post-Apartheid. In 2006, Zuma was accused of raping an HIV-positive family friend without protection. The timing was terrible—the stain of Zuma’s corruption trial was still fresh upon his reputation and Zuma was also heading the National AIDS Council at the time. Zuma became a media sensation almost overnight; he was ridiculed by almost every major news publication for his convoluted reactions to questioning in the

15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
courtroom. A brief summary of the trial and Zuma’s testimonies can be found in the next paragraph.

Zuma pled not guilty to raping the 31 year old daughter of a family friend in his home on November 2\textsuperscript{nd}, 2005. During the trial, Zuma’s lawyers requested that the accuser be questioned on her sexual past: the judge permitted this action. When asked why she did not tell Zuma to stop, the accuser said that she was paralyzed with fear and could not act properly, which is considered a typical reaction to sexual assault. Zuma’s lawyers continued to probe into the complainant’s sexual past, trying to find evidence of previous sexually illicit behavior. When Zuma was called upon to testify he began (in his native language of isiZulu) by describing his struggles against South African Apartheid and his traditional Zulu upbringing. Zuma then goes on to describe his version of the infamous evening’s events. He said that the intercourse was consensual and that he knew the accuser wanted to have sex with him because she wore only a \textit{kanga} (wrap) and allowed Zuma to massage her. Zuma also stated that he knew that the accuser was HIV-positive but he did not have a condom at hand. Zuma then went on to say that after the encounter, he showered in order to minimize his chances of contracting the virus. Zuma then went on to state that since the accuser spent the night and accepted the cab fare that he offered her to return to her home she did not act as if she had been raped. As a final note, he explains that it is not acceptable in Zulu culture to leave a woman aroused without having sexual intercourse with her. Zuma states that it is part of his culture, and that he is a Zulu traditionalist.\textsuperscript{19}


This paragraph comes as a condensed version of the timeline above.
Zuma’s rape trial seemed as if it would end his political career, especially because of the contrast that his Zulu ideals presented to the Western media sources that were rabidly following and commenting on the case. Instead, Zuma’s Zulu supporters turned out in the thousands to support him against what they called a “honey trap” created by his political opponents. Zuma’s trial was seen as a conspiracy to assassinate the leader’s character by his opponents. Zuma’s lawyers eventually found enough evidence against the accuser through her sexual history to get Zuma released from all charges. When Zuma was acquitted, he addressed the mostly Zulu crowd that waited outside the courthouse to congratulate him in his mother tongue of isiZulu. During the speech, Zuma excited the crowd with a rendition of the anti-Apartheid song “Lethu Mshini Wami,” (Bring me my Machine Gun) which signified his strong ties to the struggle for freedom. It was obvious at this time that Zuma’s popularity was indomitable. Many believed that the rape trial and his testimonies’ portrayal in the media would end Zuma’s viability as a political candidate, but they were wrong. Zuma was elected ANC Secretary General in December 2007 by a significant majority.

Even with his overwhelming popularity with the majority of South Africans, Jacob Zuma’s presidency so far has not proven to hold the drastic change that many South Africans so desperately desired during Mbeki’s administration. The ANC’s inner leadership struggles, conflict in the tri-partite alliance and corruption have shadowed Zuma’s administration. It is difficult for South Africans to identify policies that Zuma has created during his term—many can only comment on the various scandals attached to his name.

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21 Ibid. 235
Another problem seems to be arising for Zuma with the ANC Youth League, which was once one of his allies. Before Zuma was elected, leftist groups wanted to support him, to see him elected to make the changes that Mbeki did not feel were important or viable at the time. Now, Zuma is under attack because he has not yet made the policies that his constituency placed him in office to create. It seems that Zuma has not yet realized how much power this constituency holds, even though it influenced his election. He waves this constituency aside as if it were another bothersome lobby or critic. The President has instead turned to what he perceives as a bigger threat to his administration—the dramatic struggles within the ANC and the tri-partite alliance for political power, and what that could mean to his own grasp on the country.

President Zuma has recognized the factions within the ANC that dislike his administration and threaten to tear it down just as he did Mbeki’s. Zuma bemoans the current state of the ANC and the organization’s newfound ability to share its inner struggles with the media without his consent. He commented that a major challenge the ANC faces is the “disappearance of respect and discipline.” Zuma also calls on ANC members to stop “clique-ism” and “gossip.” This attitude serves as evidence that Zuma is frustrated and frightened by the internal politics of the ANC; ironically, it is the formation and publicity of these internal politics that helped him become president in the first place.

Conflict within the tri-partite alliance also poses a threat to Zuma’s hegemony in the ANC. COSATU released “The Alliance at a Crossroads—the Battle against a Predatory Elite” in

23 Ibid.
September 2010. This primary document contains evidence of COSATU’s perceptions of the alliance’s erosion as a result of the ANC’s capitalist policies. The document, more importantly, discusses the emergence of a corrupt “predatory elite” which milks South Africa’s wealth for its own purposes and keeps the black African majority in poverty. This document seems to be a thinly veiled accusation aimed toward Jacob Zuma’s administration, which had previously fallen under scrutiny for corruption. Zuma’s administration reacted by creating the controversial “secrecy bill” which gives ANC members the right to classify any information as secret and to disallow the press from publishing anything the ANC does not want to become public. This bill is an effort not only to keep state secrets from being announced in a post-Wiki Leaks era, but to prevent any further conflict within the ANC from becoming public knowledge, and most importantly-- the business doings of any ANC members that would not be considered proper by the standards COSATU or any South African constituency will also not be released to the public.

Dale McKinley, known for his participation in and analysis of South African leftist politics, believes that although COSATU and the SACP may be able to hold key positions in the alliance, they will never hold substantial power in the making of policy. The creation of the secrecy bill by the ANC has made McKinley’s theory even more apparent. Although COSATU and the SACP face a lack of voice within the alliance, they still have the power at the grassroots level to severely discipline leaders of the ANC with votes during election time. Zuma knows this as well, since the combined powers of the SACP and COSATU helped him to be elected Secretary-

General of the ANC. Zwelinzima Vavi, the highly vocal leader of COSATU, does not seem to want to step down and relinquish all power to the ANC, as they would have him do. This power struggle does not seem to have an end in the near future, and could act as an irritant to Jacob Zuma throughout his presidency unless he agrees with COSATU to make major changes in policy, or if he silences the group altogether, which could become extremely controversial.

With the watchdogs of the ANC’s politics muzzled by the secrecy bill and the lack of voice they have within the alliance, the situation in South Africa seems worrisome. Without any sort of governmental transparency, the chances of corruption at any level will rise precipitously. With the current president’s history in the field of corruption, this is a legitimate fear for South Africans.

Corruption has overshadowed Jacob Zuma beginning in 2001 with the Shaik scandal until the present day. Besides allegations from COSATU’s “predatory elite” document that calls for more investigation into the finances of South African leaders, Zuma has regularly appeared to be linked to questionable behavior where his finances are concerned. A simple Google search of “Jacob Zuma Corruption” yields many op-eds and newspaper articles tying Zuma and his followers to suspicious behavior.

For example, in 2010, Zuma’s nephew, Khulubuse Zuma, was tied to a scandal involving the company he chaired, Aurora Empowerment Systems. Aurora Systems bought Pamodzi Mine after the company declared bankruptcy in 2009. Immediately after the mines were bought,
wages stopped being paid to employees. After that, many illegal workers were reported to be on the premises, working in the mines. Finally, Aurora Systems turned off the electricity going to the communities where its workers lived. The company, Aurora Systems, was not punished by the government for the way it treated its workers, and instead the company and the government laid the blame at the feet of some of its foreign investors. Khulubuse Zuma was rumored to have made several million Rand from the liquidation deal. This incident serves as an example for South Africans who wish to talk about Zuma’s presidency and how it has treated the poor and working classes. The mine is now being sold off in sections to foreign companies, and the workers have no hopes of being treated fairly unless the ANC works with COSATU on its labor policies, which does not seem likely considering the relationship between the two groups. By allowing for the poor and working classes to be treated as cheap migrant labor, the ANC and Zuma’s administration are certainly not earning any respect from its former supporters.

For another perspective, one could use the example of the corruption hotline that Jacob Zuma himself established in South Africa in September 2009 to help his image appear tough on corruption. Zuma created the hotline in response to a vast amount of pressure he was receiving from rival political parties such as the Democratic Alliance (DA) and from anti-corruption demonstrations incited by COSATU and the ANCYL. The President even worked the phones himself when the line was established. On the first day, the center received 27,000 calls from

Accessed 10-30-2011

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a83b342c-03cc-11e0-8c3f-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1clMhTy3D Accessed 10-30-2011

31 Ibid.


http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8298574.stm
frustrated South Africans complaining about corruption and service delivery in their local municipalities. In October of the same year, the line was reportedly so “swamped with calls” that when the DA called it 42 times, it was unable to access an operator. It seems as though corruption is so deeply rooted in Zuma’s administration that local authorities cannot keep up with the demand or have simply resigned themselves to living in such a frustrating situation.

The current South African political situation seems frustrating and disappointing for many South Africans who expected a return to the type of leadership that Nelson Mandela represented for the ANC. The fact that there are so many strong factions within the ANC—and the tripartite alliance as a whole—serves as a warning sign that bigger upsets have the opportunity to occur. The media attention paid to these signs shows the world that perhaps the ANC no longer wields the absolute unquestioned power that they had in the days directly after Apartheid. These factions draw the attention of political leaders from the big issues that threaten all South Africans and back into the political arena. Because of these political machinations and their effects, there has been a vacuum of public leadership in the Zuma administration.

This vacuum of leadership is incredibly dangerous for President Zuma, because it distracts his priorities away from those who advocated for him, the poor black African majority. This majority is sick of corruption, it is sick of false promises from its leaders. This attitude leaves a position for someone to step in and lead this significant constituency with promises that he will help them to get what they want—economic freedom and equality for all South Africans, regardless of race or socioeconomic status in the foreseeable future. This equality begins with providing basic services for all South Africans, and this has yet to be done. A
mixture of frustration and disillusionment from a large segment of the populace could prove to be fatal for Jacob Zuma’s presidency or his image as a politician. The people of South Africa want to see positive change in their communities, in their homes. The current economic and political situation is not acceptable to them, and they have made their disillusionment and their impatience known in the past few years—first, with Zuma’s election, and now with protests and strikes. This brings forth the second chapter of this piece, and another issue that frustrates and angers the majority of South Africans—service delivery to the poorest black African neighborhoods—services are disappearing at a rapid rate, and the people want to know what they have done to deserve such apathy from their own government.
Chapter Two: “Service Non-Delivery”

During South African President Jacob Zuma’s tenure in office, there has been a rise in the number of demonstrations and protests relating to the issue of service delivery in underserved neighborhoods throughout the country. For the purpose of this chapter, service delivery is defined as the provision of basic municipal services such as electricity, running water, housing, toilets, and trash collection by the governing body. Recent protests over the lack of such services in poorer neighborhoods brings attention to the fact that the Zuma administration seems to have slowed down or abandoned the efforts to develop the country’s domestic economy on an equal footing. These issues, however, are not Zuma’s creation; the disparities between rich and poor have always been great in South Africa even before the racially separated system of Apartheid, which ruled the country for almost 50 years. There has been a swift decline in service delivery since the era of Mbeki and in turn the satisfaction of the poorest of South Africans (the ANC’s largest constituency) has dropped precipitously since the year 2000. This presents a considerable problem for President Zuma and his supporters in the ANC since the lowest classes (and largest constituency) have the ability to exert considerable stress on the political situation in South Africa. The service delivery problem is becoming much more of a political liability for the ANC as time moves forward.

The Apartheid era in South Africa (1946-1994) was characterized by vast political, economic and social inequalities across racial lines. During this time, each race was assigned its own unequal housing situations—black Africans and ‘coloureds’ of mixed race were forcibly moved into houseless townships on the outskirts of major cities or Bantustans in the worst
parts of the countryside where they were forced to build and live in shacks.\textsuperscript{34} This occurred as a result of the Group Areas Act of 1950, a major pillar of Apartheid legislation that compelled people of the same race to live together and with no others of a different race.\textsuperscript{35} These racially segregated communities were established without advance notice or planning and as a result, basic services were poor or nonexistent in these areas. One of the reasons for this was the absence of strong local leadership within these forcefully formed communities; whatever government that did exist was more symbolic than functional and the actual running of the segregated communities was done by the racist National Party that established Apartheid.\textsuperscript{36}

With this lack of leadership, no one brought communities together to protest living conditions, and the Apartheid leaders kept down any hint of insurrection against the established system.

During Apartheid, service delivery in black and coloured communities was substandard in comparison to that of white communities because of the extremely racist nature of the governing system in place. The community aspect of the Apartheid system was modeled after the American “Jim Crow” laws which demanded residential segregation. White people lived in the same ways that the majority of Western families lived, with modern conveniences and with regular services provided by their local government, such as trash pickup and sewer systems. Non-white communities were not bestowed with the tremendous privilege that their white counterparts were given in their segregated urban areas; the National Party delivered few services to the Bantustans and townships. Essentially, the only service delivered to non-whites under the National Party’s leadership was the building of ‘matchbox houses’ for a privileged

\textsuperscript{34} Leonard Thompson. \textit{A History of South Africa}. (Yale University Press: New Haven, 2001) 190-199
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{36} Sultan Khan and Benoit Lootveit. “Tribal Authority and Service Delivery in Durban Uni-City.” In \textit{Government, Governance and Urban Territories in Southern Africa: Proceedings of the International Symposium at the University of Zambia}. 155-180
few. These houses built by the Apartheid regime cost $2500 and were small living spaces comprised of approximately 430 square feet.\textsuperscript{37} Often, these structures were not used as single-family homes; many South Africans made their homes in such a building—at night the floor and furniture were covered with sleeping bodies. The majority of these communities did not have running water or toilets in their homes, nor were the houses equipped with electricity.\textsuperscript{38} Since the Apartheid government only built homes for a select few in areas close to cities, the rest of the non-white population was resigned to living in informal settlements in hastily erected shacks on the infertile land they were allocated. These informal homes rarely kept people properly warm, let alone provided for electricity or proper plumbing. During the South African Apartheid, only whites were allowed to experience the conveniences of living in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century: all others were forced to live on top of one another in a desolate landscape without hope of advancing past a predetermined existence because of the color of their skin.

To the right is a photograph taken by the author of an Apartheid-era “Matchbox House” which was meant to house a family of four, but only contained 430 square feet.


\textsuperscript{38} Sultan Khan and Benoit Lootjeit. “Tribal Authority and Service Delivery in Durban Uni-City.” In Government, Governance and Urban Territories in Southern Africa: Proceedings of the International Symposium at the University of Zambia. 155-180
After the fall of Apartheid’s regime and the first democratic elections in 1994, it was expected that there would be changes in the realm of service delivery for non-white communities. The emergence of a “Rainbow Nation” wherein equal treatment of all races, sexes and classes was legally enforced would also bring access to modern conveniences to all of its citizens. The Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP), which is discussed in detail later in the chapter, reflected this fixation on domestic economic development and the ability of non-whites to partake in the nation’s wealth. The plan promised to set aside significant amounts of money for the development of South Africa’s infrastructure and welfare systems, and its implementation was highly anticipated by the ANC’s voters. But, one must remember that the South African governing body had a herculean duty to perform for its people. The country’s infrastructure had only been developed to serve a small minority of white citizens properly; it was almost as if the country’s population had tripled overnight when the ANC came into power. The liberating party would be compelled to build much more framework and work out an efficient system to deliver public goods. The oppression of Apartheid had left many challenges to be dealt with after its passing, and the ANC had to fulfill the country’s giant expectations.

**The RDP and Service Delivery**

The RDP was designed as a set of economic goals for post-apartheid South Africa to steer itself toward in the years after liberation. It was designed primarily by COSATU and was thought to keep the ANC in touch with its leftist beginnings and with the majority of the
country’s poor populace. The plan was essentially an unbudgeted wish list created as a contrast to the depravity forced on most South Africans in the name of Apartheid. Among other things, the RDP proposed for the government to build one million homes in the five years after liberation, and also to redistribute 30 percent of the land during that time. It projected in RDP that during the ten years after liberation there would be free compulsory education for all and that over three million jobs would be created during that first decade. The plan also proposed that in ten years’ time, every home in the country would be equipped with basic services—running water and electricity. The RDP was an ambitious plan created by those who had been subjugated by the inequities of Apartheid; it promised service delivery to all South Africans who had not previously had access to such modern comforts. It promised homes to people who were living in dusty shacks, and it promised jobs to those who did not have the opportunity to work to feed their families. Many branded the RDP a socialist utopian dream that was likely to fail, but against these critiques, it is still apparent that the plan had the good of all South Africans in mind, and if properly implemented, it could have vastly improved the situation of the poor.

In the two years after 1994 that the RDP was fully implemented, it was highly advocated by the working class as a result of its creation by the labor union COSATU. In full swing, the RDP was predicted to cost the new South African government 90 billion rand, which is equivalent to

40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
about 13 billion US dollars in today’s economy.\textsuperscript{43} During his administration, Nelson Mandela cut this figure by a third, citing that it was too expensive for the country’s fledgling economy to fully support.\textsuperscript{44} As a result of this monetary loss, it can be inferred that the plan would only yield two-thirds of its promised outcomes, and would begin to look unsuccessful to its enemies.

After only two years of the RDP as the primary economic framework for South Africa’s economic development, the leaders of the ANC were unsatisfied with the economy’s dangerously slow pace of domestic growth the stagnancy of the country’s international economic position and decided to scrap the plan in favor of Mbeki’s brainchild-- Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR). One of the reasons behind this decision to change was the precipitous fall in value of the Rand on world markets, and the fear of South Africa’s financial collapse if there was no major economic change.\textsuperscript{45} This plan allowed for more market-based approaches and a macro-economic outlook to satisfy and gain foreign direct investment; the plan obeyed the teachings of the Washington Consensus and eventually took service delivery from the government’s hands and repurposed it into work for private contractors.

While RDP did not have a long lifespan on the stage of South African politics, it did elevate South Africans’ expectations for the role of the ANC in the realm of service delivery. Because of RDP, the ruling party was expected to provide solutions for the lack of housing and jobs left behind by the Apartheid system. These expectations will become very important later in this chapter, because they are a big part of the current vocalized dissatisfaction with service delivery. GEAR took the place of RDP because it was estimated to be more fiscally responsible

\textsuperscript{44}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{45}Ibid.
and would quickly lead the nation to higher growth, but would it work for everyone? Would it lead all South Africans to economic equality and squash the inequalities between classes?

Eventually, it would turn out that GEAR and its market-favoring policies would have a different effect than its creators originally planned.

**GEAR and Service Delivery**

Mbeki’s ideal economic framework, GEAR, was launched in 1996, and because of the precipitously falling currency values and problems in the global economic climate, it was supported by the majority of the leadership of the ANC; the rest of the alliance was not consulted about the country’s economic policy and there were no negotiations in the tri-partite alliance once GEAR was proposed. Some have called the installation of GEAR the end of black and white South Africa—a country divided on racial lines—and instead the beginning of rich and poor South Africa; it heralded the creation of a country with massive class differences. GEAR was meant to enrich the lives of the poorest South African citizens—people who were living in informal settlements with no running water and no hope of a job—by creating wealth and capital for the country that would eventually be redistributed evenly throughout the populace via the job creation that would stem from enormous growth. GEAR began as a project with good intentions, but it involved too many with interests from the private sector, too much foreign money, and too many people that had never known poverty or struggle.

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47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
GEAR is an economic framework that embraced the Western ideal of capitalism and the perceived benefits of a free-market economy. The goals of GEAR were to allow for more foreign and domestic investment by lowering government regulation. It was also made to cut government spending drastically, and to let the issues of poverty sort themselves out in the newly empowered private market. Trevor Manuel, the chief finance minister at the time explained that instead of a traditional ‘trickle down’ method, GEAR would instead enable very fast paced economic growth and it would pull the poorer classes upward with its momentum. At the time, many developing countries and even large Western powers were embracing this neo-liberal economic framework. After the announcement that South Africa would switch to GEAR, the plummet of the Rand’s value stopped, and the country’s currency began to reclaim its value in small amounts. But, it was not easy for the ANC to install the plan. COSATU and the SACP (the ANC’s allies), angered since they had not been consulted on GEAR, worked to block privatization of national industries and used the labor force as a weapon against the ANC via nationwide strikes. This caused Mbeki to back off from pushing GEAR wholeheartedly forward; in reality the plan was only used halfway and only some national industries were privatized. This left a gap between the jurisdiction of the national government in industries such as water supply, electric companies and municipal trash pickup. As a result of this confusion, South African public service delivery suffered.

49 The entire document containing GEAR’s goals and projected effects on the South African economy can be found at http://www.info.gov.za by searching “GEAR”
51 Ibid. 121
More Obstacles and a Quick-Fix

The confusion caused by the blockage of GEAR was not the only contributor to poor service delivery in the late 1990s and early 2000s. During this time, there was also a great foreign policy issue that the Mbeki administration faced: Zimbabwe. In Zimbabwe, the doomed Mugabe regime struggled to stay in power at the cost of the Zimbabwean people, and masses of farmers and farmworkers were fleeing the country as quasi-refugees in fear of ZANU-PF’s power. ⁵³ Many members of this group of migrants chose to flee into South Africa across the border—an estimated 1 million Zimbabweans have illegally immigrated to South Africa in the 21st century. ⁵⁴ These immigrants were mostly uneducated and unskilled workers that began competing for jobs and housing alongside their South African counterparts during a global economic recession. Predictably, this pushed the already strained South African economy almost to a breaking point. More and more people were living in informal housing, and making use of the limited resources that the South African government provided for the very poor. This angered many poor South Africans who felt that they should receive these resources before any foreigners. South Africans were already having a difficult time finding jobs and feeding their families; they did not welcome Zimbabweans competing with them for opportunities or resources. Recent South African attacks and killings of Zimbabwean immigrants confirm the attitude of the masses toward these unwelcome inhabitants. Immigrants have been deported back to Zimbabwe in the thousands from South Africa, illustrating that the country simply does

⁵³ Ibid. 230
not have the infrastructure or economic ability to support any more people in poverty: South Africa has reached its limit.\textsuperscript{55}

In order to promote the economy and improve employment opportunities for the poorest of Black South Africans so that they could properly support themselves, President Mbeki proposed his now infamous Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) framework a few years after GEAR. BEE was a program launched to address the inequalities proliferated by Apartheid by giving disadvantaged non-white (mostly black African) groups economic opportunities such as skill development, preference in business, and capital.\textsuperscript{56} This movement was created to achieve two things: to encourage a black bourgeoisie and to raise black small business owners from poverty into the middle class. The majority of the first participants in BEE came directly from the leadership of the ANC.\textsuperscript{57} The system eventually became a shadow of its intended purpose because it helped South Africans who were not extremely poor before it helped those who had been extremely affected by Apartheid and the global economic recession. BEE worked instead as a quick-fix for Mbeki’s administration in regards to unemployment and failing corporations. When powerful black-owned businesses failed due to bad investments or poorly made decisions, BEE was there to bail them out.\textsuperscript{58} Huge South African corporations began to add black employees to their operating boards or appoint black CEOs because of the preferential treatment the government gave to companies who met such qualifications.\textsuperscript{59} In

\begin{footnotes}
\item [56] Rob Davies. “Draft: Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment Bill.” February 9, 2009
\item [58] Ibid. 394
\item [59] Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
some situations, the black employees legitimately deserved these positions and had been previously looked over because of the remaining pressures of Apartheid, but in other situations, these black business leaders were mere puppets; they were told to sit in a position and perform as actors because of the benefits the company would receive. For many members of the black middle class, BEE meant more money and a chance to climb the social ladder after years of waiting, but for the poorest black South Africans, BEE was a failed dream.

BEE did not take care of small South African businesses as many had hoped—if it had, perhaps employment would have increased and poverty would not have been so widespread during Mbeki’s administration. Money that was meant to be spent on education for business owners was instead appropriated to financing and credit schemes, because that was what BEE administrators thought that small business owners needed.60 Small businesses should have been given education and lessons in spending money properly for expansion before they were given loans. This illustrates how out of touch the leadership of the ANC was in regards to small business; they had much more experience dealing with large corporations. Small businesses given government contracts because of BEE were sometimes not paid for years, and small businesses could not afford to wait like big businesses could. For example, the local contractor used to renovate the inside of President Mbeki’s house in Pretoria had to let employees go and eventually filed bankruptcy because the government was too slow in paying him for his work.61 These slow payment policies favored large corporations and not small businesses; even if the South African government were to give small black owned businesses major contracts, with this arrangement the contract was more a curse than a blessing. Black business owners who

60 Ibid. 402
61 Ibid.
complained were widely ignored, the ANC claimed that it had done all it could for these people. Sadly, there was a higher rate of successful small business building amongst whites and coloreds during the BEE’s heyday than business growth for black Africans.

It seems from this section that GEAR started out with good intentions, and as it failed, more and more poor decisions were made in order to fix failures quickly. Instead of redistributing wealth, GEAR helped to concentrate riches in the upper classes of South African society. These policies have most likely resulted in South Africa having such massive gaps between socioeconomic classes and a reputation for income disparity. Modern South Africa now has these issues to struggle with as a result of the decision to be more capitalist and to please the international community, and as these issues escalate, South Africans are becoming angrier and the ANC is struggling to preserve its image.

**Service Delivery in the Present**

In the years since Jacobs Zuma’s election to the Presidency, there has been more attention brought to the issue of service delivery in poorer areas. This attention has been captured by township-wide protests because of service shut-offs, total loss of services or never having had access to such public goods. These protests are meant to put pressure on Zuma to keep his campaign promise to fight poverty.

In 2009, the Municipal IQ (a non-partisan program that monitors municipal services) reported that the number of protests relating to service delivery had nearly doubled in
comparison to years prior. The majority of these protests are peaceful reminders to help the poor, but a significant amount have turned into riots. For example, a protest demanding access to sewer systems in a township near Johannesburg resulted in two police cars being turned over and burned; the police officers eventually fired upon the crowd with rubber bullets to end the demonstrations.

The reason that service delivery is so variable in the present is because of the uneven situation that local governance is in regarding water and electricity delivery. The ANC has called for audits into municipal services in order to pressure city councils to improve, but it seems that these audits have been ineffective so far. The problems that municipal governments face is that services are no longer nationalized operations; the majority are privatized as a result of GEAR’s neo-liberal ambitions. Presently, municipal governments are required to pay electric and water firms lump sums and to raise those sums by collecting utility fees from the community that uses the services. This is how utilities are delivered in some parts of the West, but in these instances, the community can afford to pay its bills. In South Africa, the official unemployment rate is close to thirty percent, which means that often there is no extra money in each individual family to pay electricity and water bills. The municipal government is then left with the fee from the water or electricity company with little or no resources to pay it. This leaves municipal governments in a financially difficult position where they have to cut off community services completely, and this situation angers community residents.

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63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
Recently, a new system designed to take some of the pressure off municipal
governments has been released. This new idea is a system of pre-paid plans, meaning that
consumers can pay for their electric or water usages in advance. This method was created by
the private sector, and the credits for electricity or water are easily accessible; they can be
bought in grocery stores or pharmacies. By buying credits, consumers cut themselves off when
they cannot afford the services, not the municipality.\(^{66}\) Areas with high instances of non-
payment have been targeted for these pre-paid utilities because of the constant cutoffs they
faced under municipal supervision. Unfortunately, the pre-payment method works much better
on paper than it does in practice. The fees for the pre-paid meters are higher, and companies
legitimize this by claiming that the pre-paid meters are in high-risk neighborhoods that have
been known to default.\(^{67}\) But, it is interesting that they would choose to cite this as a reason
since the services are pre-paid and therefore the company has nothing to lose if the customer
cannot afford to pay—the meters simply shut down. Now, communities that had previously
embraced the pre-paid system feel misled; they are paying more now for water and electricity
than if they were on the prior system.\(^{68}\) They are being punished for being poor; they are
paying higher prices than those who are better off. This is a legitimate reason for their anger,
and it is understandable that these communities protest this treatment.

There are other aspects of the privatized service delivery system that annoys the poor—
the system treats people differently based on their neighborhood. Since the industry is
privatized, there is no leeway with South Africans unable to pay their bills—in some

\(^{66}\) Ibid. 53
\(^{67}\) Ibid. 154
\(^{68}\) Ibid.
neighborhoods consumers are cut off if they are even a week late in payment. But, in other, more affluent neighborhoods, people who have not paid in months still receive electricity and water. Poor communities often have to face higher electricity and water prices than their affluent counterparts, and if they were to receive the affluent neighborhoods’ prices, they might be more likely to pay. To many, this seems like discrimination for being poor and a beneficial system for those who are wealthy. So instead of racial Apartheid, poor South Africans are compelled to deal with a cyclical classist system that is nearly impossible to break.

**Moving Forward?**

Sociologist James Davies suggested in his article “Toward a Theory of Revolution” that individual expectations and reality usually coincide, but when they do not coincide, when reality does not live up to an individual’s expectations (usually because of a major event such as war or an economic downturn) the likelihood of revolution rises. Past a certain point, when reality is out of the acceptable gap between reality and expectation, there is almost guaranteed revolt. This action arises because the gap between expectations and reality help to solve a collective action problem, meaning that prior to this convergence, people cannot be expected to come together to take action. With the collective action problem solved, there is opportunity to come together and fight for the groups’ expected outcomes. This theory is commonly called the Davies J-Curve, and it is used in this chapter to explain the precipitous rise in protests and riots in South Africa.

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69 Ibid. 55
The rise of the ANC gave South Africans many great expectations. The promises made by the liberating party, such as economic equality and “a better life for all” helped the nation build up its hopes. These hopes were reflected in the RDP and its ambitious plans for South Africa’s future development. The platform of the ANC has been to improve the lives of those most devastated by Apartheid, and those most affected by Apartheid have always been the party’s biggest voting bloc. These people who have kept the party in power—with a two-thirds majority—expect that party to pay them back. These expectations come in the form of jobs, infrastructure and public services.

In reality, GEAR has reduced government spending by massive amounts, and there is little to no money allocated to domestic development. Trevor Manuel, former South African finance minister, explained the austerity measures put into place by GEAR and its effect on expectations most eloquently when he said,

“…We need to disabuse people of the notion that we will have a mighty powerful developmental state capable of planning and creating all manner of employment. It may have been on the horizon in 1994, but it could not be delivered now. The next period is likely to see a lot more competitiveness in the global economy. As consumer demand falls off there will be a huge battle between firms and countries to secure access to markets.”

Manuel, a neo-liberalist, has the legacy of GEAR to protect, and calls for a South African austerity measures in the face of a global economic crisis. Manuel represents reality in this situation, while the hopes that the country held in 1994 of a powerful developmental state with...
full control over development has become the expectations of the people. These realities and expectations are moving apart at a rapid pace as markets become more and more competitive, and as the South African government tightens its belt against losses.

Understanding the gaps between reality and expectations is the first step in understanding the protests and problems behind service delivery in South Africa. In the current economic climate, it does not seem that the ANC will be changing its economic framework anytime soon. And, if GEAR remains the prevalent mechanism for controlling state funds in South Africa, development for the poorest citizens will be slow or stopped for the next decade or so. This does not mean that the angry protests will stop. On the contrary, it does not seem that South Africans’ expectations have changed with the realities of the present. South Africans will continue to demonstrate their frustration with the ruling party, and this situation could get more serious as time goes on and people begin to get more organized.

South Africans are already seeing this happen in the youngest generations. The country has a legacy pertaining to youth activism—many members of the ANC started their careers in the political party in their early teens—and that legacy continues today. Perhaps the youth will hold the keys in furthering the issue of service non-delivery in South Africa, and the youth, with their energy and idealism, could potentially be the group that brings the change that South Africans have waited for since 1994.
Chapter Three: “South African Strife”

In the past few years, there has been a precipitous rise in protests and revolts concerning living conditions and income disparities in South Africa. The majority of these movements have been led by members of the Left in South Africa, such as the labor unions and African National Congress’ Youth League (ANCYL). Although these organizations are tied to the ANC via a system of alliances, their leaders choose to criticize the ruling party publicly using their grassroots base as political leverage. These protests, besides illustrating the breakdown of the ANC’s alliances, also serve to highlight the fact that South Africans are becoming angry enough to come together in objection to policy measures or a lack of thereof which they feel harm their ability to thrive economically.

These protests are the results of South Africans’ disappointment regarding the governing of the country. As was stated in the second chapter, these expectations are appropriately represented by the political revolution theory demonstrated by the Davies J-Curve, and the current global economic recession has impacted the realities surrounding those expectations. When the gap between expectation and reality becomes too large, it is easier to overcome personal psychological barriers against organizing together and publically demonstrating widespread discontent. Since the peoples’ expectations have not been met by their leaders, nor does it seem likely that they will in the near future, the gap separating expectations and realities will widen and South Africans will feel comfortable coming together more often to reveal their displeasure with current domestic economic policies. Additionally,

the majority of these protestors is under age 40, and is a member of the poor or working classes. This comes as no surprise as South Africa has a young population (approximately 40 percent are below 35 years of age), and joblessness tends to affect that group the most.\footnote{“The Youth of South Africa—Selected Findings from Census ’96.” \textit{Statistics South Africa}. http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=70309 Accessed 3-14-2012} This population is also the most likely to organize around shared discontent.

There is a long and significant history of youth movements and youth involvement in South African politics. In the most important historical moments during the fight against Apartheid, young people felt compelled to demonstrate their anger. These events, such as the Soweto Uprisings and violent resistance in black townships, were orchestrated by the passionate drive of young South Africans who desired a life free from racist control. Nelson Mandela himself was a member of the ANC’s Youth League, the branch of the ANC dedicated to bringing the passionate ideals of the youth under the wing of more experienced and pragmatic political leadership. The founding members of the group wrote the ANCYL constitution with its aims and objectives to “support and reinforce the African National Congress in the attainment of the goals of the National Democratic Revolution.”\footnote{ANCYL Document. “ANCYL Constitution.” Available at http://www.ancyl.org.za. Accessed 1-31-2012} In essence, the ANCYL was created to compel the ANC forward toward liberation and equality with the ideology and energy of its youngest members as its engine. During Mandela’s tenure in the organization, he used the ANCYL as a platform to critique the ANC’s polices and to push for radical change. Mandela and his friends gained a wide base that championed their more radical beliefs; in this way the ANCYL gained considerable sway over the conscience of the ANC. The pressure exerted by Mandela and his followers was so intense that in 1949, the ANC adopted the “Programme of
“Programme of Action,” authored and promoted by the highest ranking members of the ANCYL. This implementation was a turning point for the political party; it transformed the ANC from a passive, black bourgeois intellectual group into a fully formed liberation movement. Because of the actions of the ANCYL’s leadership during the 1940s and 1950s, the ANC went from being a tired and powerless political group to a leader of resistance in the struggle against Apartheid.

Mandela’s “Programme of Action” was considered to be extreme for the times, but it helped shape the modern ANC as well as the ANCYL. The plan called for the rejection of segregation and of white leadership altogether and reflected the African Nationalist Movement’s primary beliefs such as black Africans standing on their own in the name of liberation, and of creating a pan-African nation-state. The plan highlights the militant radical ideas that Mandela’s generation held at the time and it used those views to reinvigorate the ANC. Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, and Oliver Tambo made it obvious that the ANC’s character needed to be changed in 1949 in order to effectively fight Apartheid. These men’s plan put the ANC on the path to liberating South Africa and ending Apartheid in their lifetimes. Their work toward political equality and strengthening the base of the ANC remains evident even today, as demonstrated by the ANC’s two thirds majority in South Africa. Their energy still remains in the ANCYL, and like their predecessors the current generation believes that the ANC needs to change. The modern ANCYL has some radical ideas on how to create that change.

Now, the ANC has 20 years of national leadership behind it and about half of black South African households remain dangerously below the poverty line, while only 2% of white

households are in that same grouping.\textsuperscript{78} Although this is a positive change in comparison to the
days of Apartheid when nearly all black South Africans lived in poverty, it is not significant
enough to keep the populace from becoming agitated. The amount of change in the past 20
years is insignificant enough to rile the more leftist members of the ANCYL. Realistically, the
expectations that black South Africans hold do not meet with the realities that the ANC has to
offer, but the ANCYL does not take this into account. All South Africans have seen evidence of
the amazing economic growth that the country has achieved in the past 20 years, and they
want to be a part of it. In the past two or three years since the global economic downturn, the
underlying tensions between the poor and the ANC have become much more noticeable. This
Sandton vs. Soweto, or rich vs. poor mindset reflects tensions felt around the world and is
encouraged by global protests ranging from the Arab Spring to the Occupy Wall Street
Movement. Will poor South Africans get so frustrated with the ANC’s service delivery and
political performance that they will no longer revere the ANC as the liberating party? Have
black South Africans become disillusioned with the party that was supposed to represent their
interests but instead catered to corporations and the Washington Consensus? Will the ANCYL
use these tensions to exert pressure on the ANC like Mandela did half a century ago?

\textit{Evidence of Unrest}

The rumblings of unrest began in 2006 with a COSATU-led protest against the massive
job losses that South Africans faced when textile factories began to move to countries with
lower labor standards (mostly in East Asia) as well as the closing of the vital Johannesburg

mines. The loss of over 100,000 jobs affected mostly unskilled, uneducated workers; those jobs are often the hardest to bring back after they are gone as a result of globalization and South Africa’s relatively high labor standards. The COSATU-led strike lasted more than two months and the police were called in several times when the demonstrations became violent. This strike helped to draw the ANC’s attention to workers’ issues. Although this strike ended with a compromise between COSATU and the ANC, it would precede many more violent demonstrations as the economy grew worse.

During the power struggle between then-president Thabo Mbeki and his political challenger Jacob Zuma, it was evident that the majority of the country desired a tangible change in their living standards. Change became the center of the shifting political climate. Demonstrations supporting Zuma’s poor-favoring platform were rampant in the days leading to the election. South Africans gathered in their townships to protest high crime and slow rates of development for the poorest segments within the economy. In response, the populist Zuma promised to address these issues if he won the election.

When Zuma beat Mbeki at the polls, the country held its breath in anticipation to see if the new President would keep his promise and transform the framework of South Africa’s domestic economy. Unfortunately, Zuma’s hands were tied by the promise to the ANC that Zuma’s administration would not change the already established economic policies. Neo-liberalism would remain the South African economy’s prevailing economic operating system.

When it became obvious that Zuma would not be favoring the left in his policies, the strikes and protests began again in earnest, beginning with the working class and their political allies.

COSATU made it especially difficult for Zuma to keep control of the South African economy. On June 5, 2009, COSATU leader Zwelinzima Vavi warned Zuma and his cabinet that “Workers are sick and tired, they simply have had enough.”  

A month later, over 70,000 FIFA World Cup construction workers began a strike over working conditions and pay, demanding a 13% wage increase before they would go back to building the vital soccer stadiums and other national infrastructure needed for the tournament. These workers were publicly supported by COSATU, and since the strike interfered with World Cup arrangements, the protest and its causes became global news. This strike was significant because it brought the battles between the South African working class and the South African ruling class to light, and since then the protests have gained momentum.

In early 2011, a record number of workers from a myriad of industries declared a strike at the same time. Once again, they were organized by COSATU. This time around, the workers demanded that their pay be increased by 10%; in the negotiating process, worker representatives pointed out that executives in their industries made almost 400 times what the average laborer took home per month—contributing to the enormous income gap that South Africa has become infamous for. This strike was not simply a complaint about working conditions—it represented a class issue. In the end, workers only received a 6.8 percent wage

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82 Ibid.
increase, which came tied to a warning from the South African government.\textsuperscript{84} This time, Zuma’s administration struck back against both the unruly workers and COSATU, by publically chiding COSATU for leading worker insurrections when the country faced a 25 percent unemployment rate and a global economic recession.\textsuperscript{85} Zuma’s administration felt that the standards that South African workers desired were much too high to compete in a globalized market. The official comments from Zuma’s ministers reprimanding COSATU made the labor union lose face on a global scale and caused workers to become even angrier at the ruling party.\textsuperscript{86} The comments illustrated exactly where Zuma and his cabinet stood on the job and labor issue, and that position was sure to only be of benefit to South Africa’s richest: the leaders and owners of national firms and international corporations.

After the 2011 strike, the relationship between COSATU and the ANC became tense. Zuma was no longer content with allowing COSATU to flex its muscles against the private sector and he began to strongly criticize any mention of strikes or worker dissatisfaction. Local governments followed the ANC’s direction and began to arrest protestors. COSATU continued its public criticism of the ANC, calling for the membership of the labor group to “fumigate” the ANC during the upcoming 2012 election.\textsuperscript{87} Secretary General of COSATU, Zwelinzima Vavi, called for the removal of unspecified ANC leaders, saying that “They are the ones who could not care less about the problems of the masses. They are only interested in government positions

\textsuperscript{85} Ibid.
and tenders." Vavi then went on to say that COSATU would not target Zuma specifically, but that the group hoped that the President would listen to their complaints. COSATU also planned a demonstration on a national scale in February 2012 in order to remind business leaders and policy makers that labor in South Africa does indeed have the power to exert political and economic pressure on the ruling classes.

The show of force by COSATU appears to be a warning to Zuma’s administration, perhaps even a threat. COSATU is obviously very disappointed with the way that their chosen candidate betrayed them, and perhaps they feel that by ridding Zuma of anti-labor influences, they could potentially regain the power they lost when South Africa adopted neo-liberal economic policies. On the other hand, COSATU could still present a threat to Jacob Zuma as President if they chose to use their grassroots strength against him. Their demonstrations could simply be a reminder to President Zuma that he needs to remember those who helped him win his place or else his position in the ANC can become forfeit. Either way, COSATU seems to be very aggressively informing the ANC that the labor group is not pleased with current policies and expects to see positive change in the direction of labor. This is not just evidence of unrest throughout South Africa’s working class, but it specifically highlights unrest at the very top of the political framework. By publically commenting on issues facing South Africa, COSATU is reminding the ANC of the political pulse it feels within its grassroots membership. The question is—will the ANC and its leadership heed this warning?

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88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
In recent years, the ANCYL has functioned as a limb of the ANC, generally agreeing with the party’s choices of policy and appointments. It is even written into the ANCYL’s constitution that “the Youth League will function as an autonomous body within the overall structure of the ANC, of which it will be integral part, with its own constitution, rules and regulations. It shall be based on the political and ideological objectives of the ANC.” Unfortunately, this part of the ANCYL’s constitution has left much room for interpretation recently.

It has become a very recent phenomenon that the ANC and the ANCYL’s political and ideological objectives have diverged. Predictably, that cleft can be traced back to the great schism of the ANC’s power, the election of Jacob Zuma. When Zuma ran against Mbeki, he had the full support of the ANCYL through the loyalties of one of its more visible members, Julius Malema. Coming out in support for Zuma also brought the ANCYL into the spotlight, as Malema publically stated that he would “kill for Zuma,” and that he did not think that Zuma’s rape charges were legitimate. Malema also verbally attacked Helen Zille, the leader of the Democratic Alliance, the ANC’s rival on the Western Cape. Malema commented that Zille was “fake” and told the press that she had had many cosmetic procedures in order to take the attention away from her political capabilities. These shocking public statements brought Julius Malema into the public eye, not only as a Zuma supporter, but as a radical who could be counted on to incite controversy. By the end of the election Malema was as widely known as the new South African President.

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In return for his outstanding and sometimes outspoken loyalty to Zuma’s cause, Malema was elected President of the ANCYL in 2008 in an extremely close race. With a new President so allied with Zuma, it seemed that the ANCYL would simply follow the ANC and its policies without question. Zuma was building a wall of supporters around himself; he did not expect for the majority of his political problems to stem from that choice.

In the first years of Zuma’s presidency, all appeared to be well between the ANC and its Youth League. Yet, the troubles started when Malema’s actions and comments began bringing negative attention to the party. First, Malema was charged for hate speech for singing old anti-Apartheid song such as “Shoot the Boer” and “Bring me my Machine Gun.” His actions were fraught with meaning for a country still coming out of the racial tensions left there by Apartheid. Many were quick to note that his legal troubles followed in the footsteps of his proclaimed role model, Jacob Zuma. During his trial, Malema stated that his songs were meant as an ideological return to the passion of fighting Apartheid, not an actual allusion to violence. Regardless, Malema was found guilty of hate speech, but the ANC did nothing to punish the leader of its Youth League. Instead, the ANC questioned the verdict and Malema kept his supporters, growing in power and confidence with South Africa’s most powerful political party behind him.

But in the past year, the ANC has become less fond of its junior branch, especially its President. With growing financial pressure stemming from the global economic downturn, and with the strikes and complaints from COSATU, Zuma’s administration was not expecting any

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95 Ibid.
new enemies. Malema, used to being supported by the ANC, felt freer to say what he felt about many political issues, even if those comments reflected negatively on the ANC. Entire books have been created to record the often politically incorrect statements that drop from Malema’s mouth, such as *The World According to Julius Malema* and *Come Again? Quotes from the Famous, the Infamous and the Ordinary*. Over the next few months, Malema stepped closer and closer to seeing what the invisible line of the ANC’s anger actually was for him.

The biggest issue that faces the modern ANC is the promises left unfulfilled by South Africa’s constitution. Malema has made fulfilling these promises his main goal, and it is those unresolved issues that have driven a wedge between the ANC and the ANCYL. The academic writer Achille Mbembe writes very clearly about the divergence between the idealistic notions that the ANC of 1994 embraced and the realism that permeates the party today in his foreword for Fiona Forde’s book on Malema. Mbembe reiterates that South African youth have an especially difficult time becoming a functioning part of the South African economy, and that they are angry with the privatization of wealth when the South African Constitution promises a redistribution of the country’s riches. Malema, as the representative for the youth of South Africa, works to bring this anger to light. As time goes on, this anger of the youth has become more and more obvious, and instead of merely brushing Malema aside as an extremist, many are beginning to pay attention to the young politician. Malema continues to gain support from Zuma’s main constituency, and many anticipate (or fear) that in the 2012 ANC election, Julius Malema will have a much larger and more visible role than he has in the past.

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96 Achille Mbembe in the foreword for Fiona Forde’s *An Inconvenient Youth: Julius Malema and the ‘New’ ANC.* (Johannesburg: Picador Africa, 2011) ix
Presenting the People’s Demands

Now that Malema’s political fortune is on the rise, he feels comfortable presenting the ANC and the world with a list of his ideas and demands for the governance of the South African economy. These ideas are considered leftist and extreme, harkening back to the main purpose of the Mandela-era ANCYL. The hopes that Malema and his allies have for the future of South Africa are as follows.

1. “Economic Freedom in Our Lifetime”: This is both the main political platform and campaign slogan for Malema’s position as ANCYL President—the catchphrase is on every part of the ANCYL’s website, next to a picture of Malema’s face. The phrase is interpreted as the declaration that those who were punished harshly by the Apartheid system (essentially all non-whites) ought to make use of the charters for nationalization of South African natural resources and land redistribution inserted into the country’s own Constitution. This slogan, “Economic Freedom in Our Lifetime” is essentially a cry for the nationalization of all South African mines, and a land redistribution policy.  

2. “Social Transformation”: South Africa is not yet a post-racial society and it does not seem that the country will have perfect race relations in the next decade. The ANCYL calls for social reparations to be paid to those who were the most punished by Apartheid. These reparations include stronger drug and alcohol restrictions to prevent abuse, correcting human settlement patterns, developing rural South Africa, and more steps toward gender equality.

3. “Youth Development”: Predictably, the ANCYL pushes very hard for the inclusion of younger South Africans to be involved in the economy. South Africa is a young

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http://www.vusigumedethinkers.com/content/YOUR%20SUBMISSIONS%202011/JUNE%202011/ECONOMIC_FREE_DOM_IN_OUR_LIFETIME[1].pdf Accessed 2/12/2012

country: 65.8 percent is of working age (between 15 and 64). In this age group, the official unemployment rate is 48.2 percent. The ANCYL proposes a framework that will enable the younger part (under 35) of this prevalent age group to have access to education and skills training, economic training, social skill training, and lobbying advocacy. This plan, known as the National Youth Policy, would target what they consider “youth at risk” which includes women, the disabled (including HIV/AIDS patients), the rural poor, and the unemployed. This serves as a challenge to the current policies on youth, and the ANCYL calls for a greater activism role for its members to install this new plan.

These policies from the ANCYL reflect the organization’s political stance, which leans to the left side of the political spectrum. Some of the policies, such as more opportunities for the young and poor, are predictable solutions and are for the good of all South Africans. Other points, such as calling for the nationalization of the mines, frighten many South Africans. It is on these more contentious points that Malema and Zuma disagree. These points have driven the wedge between the ANC and its youth branch, and these are the points that Malema continues to reiterate even after repeated warnings from the ANC.

**Malema & the End of the ANC’s Support**

Julius Malema’s continued stance on the nationalization of the mines and land reform has become a huge annoyance to the ANC in the past year. Although Malema had not been reprimanded for his hate speech trial, he continued to say things that reflected poorly upon the

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100 Ibid.
ANC. Finally, when Malema made inappropriate statements on the governance of Botswana, insulted President Jacob Zuma by comparing him to Thabo Mbeki, and by making some questionable financial deals, he was found guilty by the ANC disciplinary committee of provoking divisions within the party and bringing the organization into disrepute.102 As punishment, Malema was suspended from participation in all ANC activities for a maximum of five years. Malema tried to file an appeal against this decision, but it was immediately denied. It seems that Malema finally went too far in his critique of the ANC. He has embarrassed the party diplomatically by his negative remarks on Botswana and his professed admiration for Zimbabwe’s governance under Robert Mugabe. His issues with President Zuma seem to have finally come to a head, and so far, it seems that President Zuma has emerged the victor.

Chapter Four: “Malema Rising”

Julius Sello Malema personifies the three issues that face the ANC today-- a vacuum of leadership, service non-delivery, and a restless youth. Malema has used his position as the leader of the ANCYL to gain media attention as well as a considerable grassroots base of dedicated followers. For every fan of Malema, there are many who dislike him and his policies; his name invites scorn and mockery from many segments of the citizenry—especially elites. Malema brings out interesting reactions in South Africans—they either love him or they hate him, but either way, there is a demand for constant updates about him.

Today, Malema is credited with instigating trouble for the ANC by making some unflattering and negative comments as well as by inciting the South African masses to insist upon the redistribution of wealth alluded to by the 1994 Freedom Charter. Such behavior by a public figure disturbs many and the question on everyone’s minds is—Is Julius Malema a legitimate political figure? Should South Africans be warily respectful of the 31 year old quasi-celebrity or should he be classified as a pretender to the ANC’s hard-won inheritance? This question arose not in 2008, when Malema first came into the spotlight as an outspoken Zuma supporter, but instead in June 2011, when Malema was re-elected President of the ANCYL in an uncontested race. In this election, the entire country witnessed Malema’s popular draw and the almost fanatical dedication of his base. After noticing Malema’s considerable star appeal, South Africans began to monitor his career, hypothesizing that someday he would become a significant presence in the ANC.
Malema did become a major figure in the politics of the ANC, but not in the way that his followers predicted. Instead of continuing as a dedicated Zuma supporter, Malema has begun to make a name for himself by manipulating the political divisions within the ANC and fanning the flames of dissatisfaction within the young and poor. This behavior has most recently earned Julius Malema expulsion from the ANC—the party that has played a major role in creating and accelerating his political career. Recent events such as the expulsion and subsequent denouncement by onetime allies of Malema have thrown a shadow on the fiery young man’s political future, but the immense popularity of his personality and his politics still merit close watching.

Julius Malema’s life story certainly reflects the experiences of the majority of South Africans—it is partially his modest upbringing that endears the youth leader to his admirers. Malema was born March 3, 1981 to a single mother, Florah Malema, in Sheshego, part of the Limpopo province in northeast South Africa (Limpopo is one of the poorest provinces in South Africa). Florah Malema lived in a township home with her mother, son and several siblings while working as a maid in wealthier household. Florah had three children in her lifetime, two girls and a boy, but Julius was her only child who lived past the age of three.  

Julius Malema proclaims that he has never met his father; he was raised only by his mother’s side of the family. Julius had a difficult childhood, his mother worked long hours and he spent most of the time living with his grandmother in what would be considered extreme poverty. Oftentimes, Julius felt compelled to knock on neighbor’s doors just to find something to eat. At night, Malema slept on the floor because there was not enough sleeping space in the house for all of

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104 Ibid. 35
the Malemas. In school, Malema received a substandard elementary education; the Apartheid system formally ended when he was 13, so many of his most formative years were spent in an oppressive and racist atmosphere. Malema was not particularly enamored of academics—his circumstances made him more likely to desire day-to-day survival than to look ahead to an uncertain future. Recent publications of Malema’s matriculation results, in which his highest grade earned was in woodshop, reflect this attitude.\footnote{“Julius Malema’s Matriculation Results.” Politics Web South Africa. October 24, 2008. http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page71627?oid=107612&sn=Detail Accessed 3/28/2012} After school, young Malema would collect cans for money to supplement his family’s income. Many members of the ANCYL leader’s former neighborhood are quick to remember that Malema never resorted to stealing, unlike many other boys in his situation.

This portrait of childhood is unfortunately very common in South Africa; these are the conditions that many modern children still struggle with—even after the end of Apartheid. The unemployment rate hovers around 23 percent, which keeps average South African families like Julius Malema’s without a steady income to provide financial stability.\footnote{“Unemployment.” Statistics South Africa. 4th Quarter, 2011. http://www.statssa.gov.za/keyindicators/keyindicators.asp Accessed 4/2/2012} These modest roots give Malema a prominent place in the hearts and minds of many South Africans. Historically, the majority of South African leaders did not have such modest upbringings—this was one of the reasons that Zuma was so popular in the campaign against Mbeki. Even Mandela came from a respectably middle class background with a calm and loving home life. One must remember that a great number of South Africans live on grants as small as $50 a month and are very familiar with life in poverty. To them, Malema embodies that struggle, and he has overcome that life using his wits and his ambition. Malema symbolizes a new type of leader,
one who knows what it is really like to live in poverty. These people are proud of Malema-- he is a symbol of success amidst overwhelming odds.

Julius Malema became involved with the ANC very early in his life, during the effort to fight Apartheid. At the age of nine, Malema joined the “Young Pioneers,” a youth segment of the ANC. Soon after, Malema began training in the use of firearms and participated in other militant activities such as assembling Molotov cocktails for use against Apartheid forces. Malema’s career within the ANC moved quite quickly after the eradication of Apartheid in 1994—first, he was voted the regional president of the ANCYL. In 2001, Malema was made national head of the Congress of South African Students (COSA). During this time, Malema also attended school irregularly and dabbled in local business deals to supplement his small salary. Malema often comments that from an early age, the ANC defined his life, it was all he had—he was drawn only toward politics. The examples that Malema gives as well as the depth of his involvement with the ANC certainly demonstrate that Malema felt a strong connection to the ANC from an early age.

Malema illustrated his passion for politics during Jacob Zuma’s rise to power. Prior to 2008, Julius Malema was an obscure youth leader from Limpopo; after the highly publicized election, Malema became a South African household name. During Jacob Zuma’s campaign Malema stated that he would “kill for Zuma,” and embarrassed himself and the Zuma camp when he sang the hateful Apartheid song, “Kill the Boer” at a rally. Eventually, Malema was tried and acquitted for singing the song, and in the meantime he gained a few influential friends.

108 Ibid.
such as Winnie Mandela and Jacob Zuma. Malema felt free to make anti-white comments and to call for the redistribution of wealth during this time. Malema’s allies in the ANC did not necessarily agree with him but they also did not move to stop him. It seemed that while Julius Malema’s controversial actions upset many—he could do no wrong as far as the ANC was concerned. During occasions of hate speech, racial slurs, politically insensitive comments and outright attacks at political opponents from Malema, the leadership of the ANC simply ignored his behavior. This behavior worried many moderate South Africans about the ANC’s motives in supporting Malema. They wondered: Does the ANC secretly agree with Malema’s rants? Even when Malema’s newfound wealth and the legitimacy of its origins came into question, the ANC said nothing. Instead, he was shielded by the ANC’s proposed secrecy policies. Somehow, corruption charges against Malema were dropped, just like his hate speech charges. To outsiders, it seemed that the ANC silently approved of this behavior, but it was a matter of time until Malema’s unbridled attitude would take him beyond the ANC’s tolerance.

In the past two years, Malema has abused the ANC’s tolerance too many times. The political party has finally begun to take action against its youth leader, but not for the reasons that everyone expected. Malema is not in trouble because of hate speech or for attacking journalists and rival politicians—Malema is in trouble because he attacked his old ally, Jacob Zuma. During a speech to the ANC’s National Executive Committee in February 2012, the youth leader clearly outlined his political intentions to the ANC’s ruling body—intentions that the ANC would disagree with. During his speech, Malema reiterated his policy of “Economic Freedom in Our Lifetime,” a play on Nelson Mandela’s famous philosophy of “Freedom in Our Lifetime.” In

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his address, Malema calmly discussed the historical importance of the ANCYL within the ANC and his hope that this importance would only grow with time. Malema took his discourse a step further, however, when he began to discuss the need for defending ideals within the Freedom Charter by nationalizing mines, banks, and other important industries. Malema demanded that research on the possibility of nationalization in South Africa be discussed openly within the ANC. The ANC on the other hand, has said publically that the nationalization of the will never become an issue.

The uneasiness between the ANCYL President and the elites in the ANC escalated when Malema began to openly criticize Jacob Zuma’s political policies by blaming current problems such as the lack of housing and unemployment on “this generation” of politicians. In another public setting, Malema compared Zuma’s governing style to that of Thabo Mbeki, the president that the nation had so famously tired of in 2006. In yet another widely publicized speech to students at the University of Witwatersrand, Malema said,

“...It is under President Zuma that we have seen the youth of the ANC being traumatized, being expelled from their own home. It is under President Zuma we have seen a critical voice being suppressed... We have seen under President Zuma, democracy being replaced with dictatorship. We have seen an intolerance...people, who become impatient with the youth.”

Through these utterances, Malema has turned Zuma into an enemy of the poor youth, a point which is potentially dangerous in a youth-dominated country during an election year. Although it is obvious by the demonstrations and the attitudes of the masses that they desire more

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112 Ibid.
change than what Zuma has given them, Malema did not count on the power that Zuma holds as Secretary General of the ANC. These actions and the power that Zuma holds would later come back to haunt Malema.

After publically criticizing Zuma, Malema also flaunted his support for Robert Mugabe’s regime in Zimbabwe during a trip to that country in 2010. The discussion he attended was on “indigenization”-- the nationalization of white Zimbabweans’ farmlands and the redistribution of those lands into black African ownership. Malema wore a t-shirt with Mugabe’s portrait on it for the entire trip, and was heard vocally praising the Zimbabwean leader. The ANC was put in a difficult situation because of Malema’s visit, as South Africa had been attempting to broker a fragile peace between the Zimbabwean dictator and the ZANU-PF, Mugabe’s political opposition within the country. Malema’s attempt at changing the direction of the ANC’s foreign policy did not endear him to the leadership of the party. For his Zimbabwe incident, Malema was fined and accused of “bringing the ANC and the government into disrepute.” This was the first incident wherein Malema’s actions were punished specifically by the leadership of the ANC. It later became obvious that Malema did not take these punishments seriously because he continued to comment unfavorably on the ANC’s foreign policy in Libya, Swaziland, Cote d’Ivoire, and the widespread dangers of “re-enforcing British and American imperialism,” by maintaining close relations to the West.


116 Ibid.

In another attempt to drive the ANC in his favored direction after the Zimbabwe conflict, Malema publically called for a change of political leadership in neighboring Botswana and commented that Ian Khama, the country’s president, was a “puppet” of the United States and of Western ideals.\textsuperscript{118} He added that Botswana’s governing style in relation to the West was a threat to Africa as a whole.\textsuperscript{119} This comment especially angered the ANC, partially because of the anti-Western sentiment and because Botswana is a major ally of South Africa’s. A few days later, Malema apologized for his remarks, probably as a result of the ANC’s prompting. Malema expressed hope that the ANC would forgive him for youthful mistakes stemming from his political fervor.

Malema’s comments on Botswana turned out to be the final straw for the leadership of the ANC. Because of his comments on Botswana and his thinly veiled criticisms and accusations in regard to President Jacob Zuma’s leadership, Malema was brought to trial and accused of “sowing divisions” within the party and again of bringing the party into disrepute.\textsuperscript{120} This time, Malema was not simply given a fine. In August 2011, Malema was tried by the ANC in Johannesburg for his crimes against the party; during the trial massive crowds gathered outside and became violent and vocally supportive of the youth league leader. The court moved to dismiss Malema from the ANC for five years.\textsuperscript{121} Malema promptly apologized for his behavior and the embarrassment it brought to the ANC, and then filed for an appeal.

Malema hoped that the appeal would mean that he was no longer dismissed from the ANC, but he lost his gamble. Instead, the court ruled that Malema be expelled from the ANC

\textsuperscript{118} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{119} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid.
altogether, because he had "reneg(ed) on his membership oath and (was) not prepared to respect the ANC’s constitution." Later, on April 4th, 2012, the ANC National Disciplinary Committee (NDC) announced that Malema would not be expelled from the ANC, only temporarily suspended, on the prescribed conditions that Malema,

"1. ...will not exercise any duty in his capacity as an ANC member, President of the ANC Youth League and/or Member of the Provincial Executive Committee of the ANC Limpopo Province; 2. He will not attend any meeting of the ANC or any of its structures, including the Leagues, except for the purpose of the NDCA hearing and the pending disciplinary proceedings to be instituted against him. 3. He will not address any meeting of the ANC or any of its structures, including the Leagues, whether as an invited guest, in his capacity as President of the ANC Youth League and/or as a member of the ANC; 4. He will not make any public statement on any matter pertaining to the ANC."

For Malema, a man who clearly enjoys public appearances as well as wielding the considerable power that his position as President of the ANCYL gives him, this is a harsh punishment. For a man who has spent nearly his entire life involved with the ANC, to be suspended from the party’s meetings, structures, and any public discussion of the party is a harsh punishment indeed.

Malema has already illustrated to the world that he does not plan to heed the conditions put forth by the NDC. On April 6, 2012, Good Friday, Malema was invited to speak at two churches in the Eastern Cape. At the Last Hope Church in Butterworth, South Africa, Malema was quoted as saying, “I will never be silenced. There is nobody who has a right to silence me. The right to speak was given to me from the day I was born.” This comes as no surprise to those who understand Malema’s personality; his ego could simply not handle being

\[122\]
\[123\]
\[124\]

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\[122\] Ibid.
\[123\] "Comrade Julius Malema’s Immediate Suspension Pending Disciplinary Proceedings." *Public Announcement of the ANC National Disciplinary Committee.* April 2, 2012
silenced because he feels that what he has to say is important. What does come as a surprise was Malema’s testimony in the church in which he explained that he was undergoing “personal hardship” and asked churchgoers and the bishop to pray for him, because “those that used to be our friends have turned against us. They have not only turned against us but plan our death. You have an obligation, bishop, that what they plan for does not succeed.” In a recent announcement on his all too famous twitter account, Malema posted “Suspension, expulsion, now I get threats of treason should I attack country president in my personal capacity.[sic]” Perhaps Malema does indeed feel certain reservations about his sensitive position within the ANC--or he is attempting to win the sympathy of his fans with this humble and vulnerable attitude. So far, there has been no evidence to suggest that Malema’s life is actually threatened by any of his former allies. As another rebuke to his enemies via social media, Malema tweeted, “Let easter remind you of what happens to those you think are dead & buried. [sic]”

Malema is fighting back against his punishment, which he feels is silencing his voice. Certain factions within the ANC have good reason to silence Malema, as he has already openly criticized the Secretary General during an election year. It was previously understood that Zuma’s reelection would be easy, but with Malema around it may not be so simple. Zuma has much to lose if Malema remains a credible figure within the party. Although many reporters have asked Malema what his plan of action is should he be expelled from the ANC as well as his position as ANCYL President, Malema does not seem to have concrete answers yet. Instead,

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125 Ibid.
126 Julius Sello Malema, Twitter post, April 5, 2012, 4:47 am, http://twitter.com/Julius_S_Malema
Malema hopes that the youth-driven movement that he has begun will gain momentum, and that his hopes for “Economic Freedom in Our Lifetime” will be realized with or without him.

Malema’s Future

After his successful reelection as president of the ANCYL, Julius Malema was branded as the “ANC’s future” or as the “South African President in Waiting.” In 2011, Malema was named as one of the top ten most powerful men in Africa by Forbes magazine. Malema was considered unstoppable by his supporters, and he made his detractors very nervous, especially on the topics of land reform and the nationalization of South African mines. But this was before Malema began to challenge Zuma, the man he helped gain power.

Throughout this piece, the meteoric rise of Jacob Zuma through the restlessness of the youth and the growing sentiment against Thabo Mbeki in the ANC has been described in detail. The most important lesson to take away from the 2007 example is the fact that Jacob Zuma himself encouraged this rift in the ANC; Zuma encouraged South Africans to stand up against a leader that they no longer felt was necessary and to dispose of him through democratic methods. In doing so, Jacob Zuma has created a problem for himself, and Julius Malema has stepped in to exploit this. Since Zuma has paved the way of sowing divisions within the ANC in order to democratically replace a disappointing leader; he has made it much easier for any leader of the ANC to be supplanted by another. It is now apparent that Malema plans to rally against Jacob Zuma in the 2012 ANC general election. Malema understands that the majority of the South African population is dissatisfied with the direction in which the country is moving; he

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129 Ibid.
is the ANCYL President, it is his job to understand the mindset of the youth (which coincidentally makes up the majority of the country.) Malema has reacted to this in a way that some could call selfish—he has harnessed this dissatisfaction to make himself more famous, more politically powerful. On the other hand, Malema’s motivations could truly be in favor of the people he has spent his life with, the people his career has depended on—the poor black majority. Either way, Julius Malema has considerable grassroots support with the youth in South Africa, even if he is not currently accepted by the ANC. On the next page, statistical data from the US Census Bureau made into population pyramids is used to show how much of the population Malema can count on for support if he continues to ally himself with the youth. As was said previously, South Africa has a massive population of young people, and this group is also the most effected by unemployment. The charts do a better job of explaining Malema’s chances to stay in the spotlight now, ten, and twenty years from now.
South Africa 2012: This chart emphasizes the fact that most South Africans are currently between 15 and 34 years of age. This large grouping of young people is where Malema’s popularity comes from.

South Africa 2022- Ten years from now, the majority of the population is still young, maintaining the ability for a youth leader to stay in power.

South Africa 2032- Even twenty years from now, the majority of the population would remain under 39 years of age.
Jacob Zuma knows that Malema has the potential and the desire to topple him. This is one of the reasons that Malema presently finds himself so heavily persecuted by the elites of the ANC. The entirety of the ANC will come together during December 2012 in Manguang to hold their election conference. At the conference the next Secretary General of the ANC will be decided and if the ANC wins the general elections the following year—which seems highly likely considering the party holds a two thirds majority in most national elections—the winner of the elections in Manguang will be the next President of South Africa. Since Jacob Zuma has only served one term in office, he is still eligible for another term. Zuma wants this term, but Malema does not want him to succeed.

Malema weakened his political career by making it known that he does not support his former ally for another term as President. Jacob Zuma on the other hand, hurt his own political career by allowing Julius Malema’s actions to go unpunished for so long and then punishing him after he had won the hearts of many South Africans. If Malema had simply been pushed out of the spotlight after the first accusations of hate speech, Zuma would not face this dilemma. Instead, the problems began when Malema compared Zuma’s policies and governing style to that of Thabo Mbeki, his deposed predecessor. These type of verbal attacks continued until Malema was presented with the knowledge that he was to be tried by the ANC for his comments on Botswana as well as his comments on Zuma. This did not restrain Malema, instead in a recent speech in the Northern Cape, Malema alluded to Zuma, saying that some leaders become drunk on power and that they became too confident thinking that they going

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Malema went on to encourage the crowd of 3000 ANC members to think about nationalizing the mines, which had been outlined in the country’s 1994 Freedom Charter. The youth leader chastised unnamed elites in the party for being too close with mine owners and for being too close with big business. Finally, Malema went on to say that Mandela, the party’s biggest hero, never would have expelled a youth league member for reminding the party of its responsibility to its people; Mandela knew that young people needed to be guided with a wise and steady hand. This speech turned members of the ANC’s attention back to the teachings laid down in the more leftist portions of the Freedom Charter. This example is what organizations like COSATU and the ANCYL wanted Jacob Zuma to fulfill when they helped him to win the position as Secretary General of the ANC. This is the resounding theme in the battles for the heart and soul of the ANC. But, last time a leader won the highest seat in the ANC that seemed willing to make these changes in the interest of the poor and jobless, he was instantly turned against this rhetoric. Even if Malema succeeds against the odds stacked against him, will this happen again?

Malema’s future, like all politicians’ futures in a democratic society, is highly unpredictable. His current alienation from the ANC could be temporary; his fan base seems loyal to his personality and his passions. On the other hand, Malema continues to cross the lines and defy the punishments that the ANC sets for him. To his benefit, Malema also still holds strong ties with influential ANC members, such as provincial premier Cassel Mathale, and South African Deputy President Kgalema Motlanthe. Both of these men, Malema’s closest allies,

132 Ibid.
133 Ibid.
belong to his Pedi ethnic group, a minority amongst African ethnicities in diverse South Africa.

Motlanthe and Mathale have also emerged as opponents to the potential of a second term for Zuma, and if Zuma is not reelected, they could become even more powerful in the next administration. By becoming more powerful themselves, these men could also help to advance Malema’s political career. Malema means to support Motlanthe in a bid against Zuma in 2012 along with the ANCYL. The continued support of these men combined with continued enthusiasm for Malema’s leadership from the ANCYL show the public that the fight is not over for Malema’s potential political career. But, if Zuma emerges as the victor of this particular battle, it seems highly unlikely that he will ever invite Malema back into his inner circle. Ironically, the success of Malema’s political career depends on the failure of the same man who helped him to succeed in the beginning.

**What Does Julius Malema Signify?**

This piece serves to illustrate the various elements of dissatisfaction in modern South Africa. Julius Malema is the lens with which to highlight these elements. Those elements are the issues within the ANC’s top leadership, problems with service delivery, and the restlessness of the youth. These elements would be problematic on their own, but when combined they create circumstances for a populist figure such as Julius Malema to emerge.

Who is Julius Malema? He is a man who is unafraid to be politically incorrect. He is an incredibly polarizing figure in South African politics because he feels free to address painful issues in South Africa’s recent history, such as racism and inequality. South Africa is known as a miracle because of its unwillingness to face the unresolved tensions of the past between its
citizenry, but Malema’s aim is to attack this delicate peace. Malema scares people, especially South Africans with something to lose. This discord he has encouraged discourages foreign investment and causes another wave of racial strife. For those South Africans simply trying to survive, Malema speaks the truth; he puts words to all of their unspoken frustrations and questions for the first time the system that keeps them down. Many of his critics say that Malema is not genuine, if he is ever actually given real power he will live comfortably and become complacent like many of his “revolutionary” predecessors; the temptation would prove too difficult to overcome. This type of outcome depends on how truly connected Malema is to his followers--no one can answer question that but Malema himself.

What does Malema represent in politics? Many of his detractors brand him as a populist, a demagogue, a political entrepreneur, and most of all a liability. Others brand him as a hero, the voice of his generation. Who is correct? Has Malema begun a movement in South Africa with his persuasive personality and his fearless dialogue? Or, have the issues that South Africa now faces--dangerous issues--created him? Is Malema the true leader of a youthful revolution, or is he merely a product of his generation? South African academic Achille Mbembe felt the need to define Malema’s place by observing that “Malema embodies both the passions and contradictions of post-struggle politics and the dark and troubling undercurrents of a long South African tradition of lumpen radicalism.” In this way, Malema has become both a catalyst for social revolution and the product of it.

135 Foreward by Achille Mbembe in An Inconvenient Youth: Julius Malema and the ’New’ ANC. (Johannesburg: Picador Africa, 2011) vi
The murmurings of social revolution stirring in South Africa are too vast and widespread to be a result of the efforts of a single man. Malema is not the single explanation for widespread frustration. On the other hand, without Malema South Africa’s political landscape would not be the same. Malema has become a symbol for people to rally behind; he is a breath of fresh air in comparison to the long-established institutions and dignified leaders that the ANC presents as the modern face of its party.
“You can arrest me, but you can’t arrest my ideas.” –Julius Malema

Julius Malema’s political future at this point is hanging by a thread. If Jacob Zuma is to win a second term as Secretary General of the ANC, and predictably, as President of South Africa then Julius Malema will be expelled from the party and forgotten. This can be inferred from the intense tension between the two men. Malema and Zuma have both insulted one another publicly, and the ANC leadership conference of 2012 will allow for these tensions to come to a head. Only one man will come out of that conference with his political career intact, and it is impossible to predict which it will be.

So, if Zuma is to win this fight, Malema will be forced to separate from the party he has worked for all his life. If Malema were to go off on his own to begin a movement or a party, he will probably not cause much trouble for the ANC. Yes, that sort of action from Malema would be newsworthy, and there is no doubt that he would have a substantive base, but the ANC still holds a two thirds majority in South Africa, and that type of power cannot be ignored. Malema would do well to remember the lessons of COPE—the ANC is simply too powerful, and unless he was able to lure the entirety of the South African Youth over to his side, he would be unable to make an impact against the political Goliath that is the ANC. Malema would fade into the background as a youth organizer who sometimes causes trouble, but without the ANC’s protection, Malema would also be much less likely to do something that could land him in court---or in jail.
On the other hand, what if Malema emerged as the victor at the end of 2012? That would change everything. Malema would certainly not be nominated to be Secretary General at this time, but one of his older allies within the party would be. Malema could perhaps regain his position as ANCYL President, or he could find another position within the ANC if it suited him. If Zuma were not to win a second term as President, many doors would remain open to Julius Malema in South African politics.

This does not necessarily mean that Malema’s views would be embraced. Malema would not be welcomed into a policymaking position because of his volatile background and his desire to nationalize the country’s mines. He would remain a political celebrity for some time, until he could prove his loyalty to the ANC’s bottom line. If Malema were to remain a populist, a political entrepreneur, then his career would be limited to that role—he would be given no real power.

Malema does not seem to want that type of role. Yes, he loves fame, but there are many different types of fame in the world of politics. Right now, Malema is practically infamous; he is a running joke for commentators and the media. If Malema were to embrace the ANC’s preferred methods, perhaps he could gain more respect, and become a famous leader rather than remain a ridiculed public figure.

Malema is only 32 years old. Perhaps, as he ages he will become complacent. He already demonstrates a love of wealth; he only wears Breitling watches, a brand that runs upwards of $5000 per watch. He has also been spotted in various imported luxury vehicles and owns several homes in South Africa. It is difficult to uphold this type of lifestyle on the salary of a

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revolutionary. In order to suit his own tastes, Malema may turn to the most expedient way to please himself and those closest to him; he could easily forget those who he speaks for now.

There is much fear within the foreign investment community in regard to Malema’s potential as a South African political leader. These investors should not fear Malema—by the time that he is given real power by the elites of the ANC, he will have learned that his disturbing rhetoric of nationalization and redistribution are not effective in a globalized, neo-liberal society. These ideals belong to a young man; in 20 years Malema will have gained the wisdom and restraint that are the hallmarks of all good leaders.

The one glimmer of hope in Malema’s future is if he actually does gain power, and if he actually does gain the power to create policy, hopefully he will remember his base. Malema’s past seems very important to him; hopefully it is more important to him than it was to Zuma. If Malema were to gain real power, maybe he would finally use that power to actively fight poverty in South Africa. This type of healing does not need to come in the form of a redistributive economic framework, but in the creation of jobs for the young and restless population. This type of healing could come in the form of equal education for all, in the form of economic stability caused by wise political choices. Malema can still be used as an instrument for change, but this change can happen peacefully.

Throughout this piece, I have highlighted the most controversial events in both President Zuma and Malema’s political careers. In doing so, I hoped to point out the similarities between the two figures. They are both incredibly charismatic figures who remain popular with the majority of South Africans. Zuma and Malema were both raised in abject poverty and became a part of the ANC in their most formative years. Both men have also encountered
significant obstacles on their way to power in the form of lawsuits and allegations. These legal struggles came as a result of each man’s behavior behind closed doors—neither man can seem to act with caution and moderation, as befits a politician. Now, a battle exists between these two very similar figures to unseat one another from positions of importance within the ANC. It is interesting that it has come to this—a mentor fighting his protégé for power. In the long term, it will be fascinating to see how deeply the similarities run between Zuma and Malema—especially if Malema succeeds in displacing Zuma from the Presidency.

Malema is still incredibly young to be mired in the world of politics. Over the past two or three years, he has matured considerably. He is no longer the man at the rally singing “Kill the Boer” and shouting obscenities at reporters that ask him the hard questions. Instead, he has begun to restrain himself more, to make wise choices that reflect well upon his personality and his intelligence. He appears after the disciplinary hearings with the ANC to be more reserved. He is still unafraid of a fight, but he picks his battles much more wisely, and he has learned to win them with a whisper instead of a shout. Malema is not an educated man, but he is an intelligent one, and those who do not recognize that are in for a surprise. After working directly with the masses and the media for two years, he has learned to speak to people’s hearts. In the future, Malema could be a formidable force in the South African political landscape, not only as a popular figure, but as a true leader of the people.
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