Facinus, quos inquinat, aequat: The Mutinies of Lucan’s Bellum civile

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Facinus, quos inquinat, aequat: The Mutinies of Lucan’s Bellum civile

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Introduction

For a people with fierce nostalgia for republican governance, Roman authors were astonishingly negative about the common people who once gathered together to serve as their legislature. Fergus Millar argues that it was the *populus Romanus*, the common crowd, who were the true center of Republican government, as the only ones with true legislative power,¹ and yet Cicero, perhaps the most famous defender of Republican Rome, has nothing positive to say about Roman crowds or the power they wield. In his oration against Clodius after his return from exile, Cicero questions the very *Romanitas* of the urban voters that exercised what he saw as a frightening amount of power in the struggles leading up to the end of the Republic: *an tu populum Romanum esse illum putas qui constat ex iis qui mercede conducuntur, qui impelluntur ut vim adferant magistratibus, ut obsideant senatum, optent cotidie caedem, incendia, rapinas? quem tu tamen populum nisi tabernis clausis frequentare non poteras.*² By the time that Seneca is writing in the early Empire, some one hundred years later, opinions of crowds have not improved. Seneca speaks of the urban crowd with disgust, comparing a gathering in the Forum to a group of creatures, worse than beasts, who bite both each other and the hands that feed them.³

Military crowds were just as crucial to Roman life as the urban crowds of voting citizens, if further removed from the Forum itself, and their decision making skills, though masked by military discipline, were just as crucial. Every Roman army was at its heart a crowd made up of

¹ See Millar, 1-8, for an overview of his thesis that the *populus Romanus* was the center of Republican Roman government.
² Cic. *Dom.* 89. “Do you think the Roman populace is made up of those who are hired for a price, who are impelled to bring force against the magistrates, to besiege the Senate, to choose slaughter, fire, plunder every day? The people whom however you could not assemble as a crowd unless the taverns were closed.” All translations are my own. This is, of course, a piece of rhetoric, but Cicero would not have used it if it had no ring of truth to his audience.
³ Sen. *De Ira* ii.8.3. *Ferrarum iste conventus est, nisi quod illae inter se placidae sunt morsuque similius abstinent, hi mutua laceratione satiantur. Hoc omnino ab animalibus mutis differunt, quod illa mansuescunt alentibus, horum rabies ipsos a quibus est nutrita depascitur.*
individual men, a fact often overlooked when discussing the monolith of Roman military might. Motivating men to go to war is difficult, but achievable, when the state talks of patriotism or personal gain; when we turn to the case of civil war, however, the picture becomes much more complicated. In the second and first centuries BCE, the Romans were wrecked by decades of civil war, a period often depicted as a confluence of powerful generals fighting amongst themselves for supremacy. During these wars, however, the generals were not the only ones on the battlefield giving up their lives; how, then, did generals convince thousands of individuals to go to war for the sake of their own careers?⁴ Although many ancient authors only give it a cursory glance, this paper seeks to look at the relationship between crowds and leaders and how the Romans confront the question of soldiers in civil war.

To do that, I have turned to Lucan’s Imperial epic, Bellum civile. Marcus Annaeus Lucanus was a young aristocrat in the court of Nero who chose to write a historical epic about the war between Julius Caesar and Pompey from 49-45 BCE. Lucan, unlike past authors of epic, seems to take special notice of the common soldiers in his poem and tracks the various reactions the troops give to the generals who rise to prominence in this civil war. Some of the most conspicuous moments when the common soldier comes to the fore in Lucan’s Bellum civile are when the soldiers throw a wrench in the plans of one of the generals, working together to do something of their own volition – namely, when their discontent leads to the possibility of desertion or mutiny. Throughout his epic Lucan questions why a common soldier would participate in civil war, and thus why civil war exists at all, and so he puts a lot of stock in exploring the relationship between a general and his soldiers in civil war. One of the easiest ways to do that is to look at what happens when the relationship falls apart and, in a typically Lucanian

⁴ See de Blois, “Army and General in the Late Republic,” for a historical analysis of this question.
fashion, to imagine how history could have changed had the soldiers only remained steadfast and put down their swords.

The disdain many Roman authors both inside and outside the realm of historiography show for the fickle mob seems to have roots in a fear of what groups of people, no matter how common, are capable of achieving with or without the controlling hands of the elite. Greek and Roman historians alike – such as Thucydides, Livy, and Tacitus – tend to depict the crowd as a single dangerous and negatively charged entity; epic poets seem to be generally too preoccupied with the stories of heroes and gods to acknowledge the existence of common soldiers at any great length, and, when a common soldier does speak up, as Thersites does in the second book of the *Iliad*, their depiction is hardly a positive one. Lucan recognizes the power of the common people, soldiers included, both as substitutes for epic heroes and for their capabilities when they band together. They have the power to change the tide of events if they stand together, but any crowd is also made up of individuals whom Lucan wishes would think for themselves and recognize the immorality of their behavior – an act that could undermine the commander for each individual but would make them lose their collective power. Lucan recognizes this sad irony, that the crowd cannot think for itself without falling apart but that historically it has misused its power when acting collectively, and makes it part of the tragedy of his work. Unlike many Classical historical texts, in Lucan’s poem it is not the mob that is the enemy but the one man, and thus the poet can lament the fact that the common soldiers fail to use their power rather than fear the fact that they could.

Practically speaking, mutinies and desertions are bound to occur in wartime. In the case of civil war, the role that mutinies play can only be amplified, as morality and loyalty fall into ambiguity. Civil conflict based upon a religious divide or geography within a county gives the
citizen-turned-soldier a relatively clear-cut choice, a prior loyalty to obey. In the case of the civil wars at the end of the Republic, however, such as Lucan’s subject, the war between Caesar and Pompey, when sides were dictated by the uppermost level of politics and the careers of two charismatic men, the unfailing loyalty of a soldier-citizen was even more difficult to attain. Thus, particularly in the initial months of the war when fortunes are yet to be bound firmly to one side or the other, potential mutinies played a significant role in the unfolding of the conflict and in the minds of the generals themselves.

It is not surprising, then, that mutinies and their source, the mental state of the common soldiers, make a noticeable appearance in Caesar’s Commentarii de bello civili, his third person autobiographical account of his war with Pompey in 49–48 BCE. In this confluence of history and autobiography, Caesar’s trustworthiness as a messenger of historical truth may be suspect, but the significance of the details he includes is not. Caesar carefully records each time that a group of soldiers deserts from the army of a Pompeian general to his own, which seems to occur most often when the Pompeian tries to run in fear of Caesar.\(^5\) Caesar often begins his sections or new sequences of action with phrases like *cognita militum voluntate*, implying that he needs the willingness of his soldiers to go on and that that willingness cannot be taken for granted.\(^6\) He even tells stories of the preemptive measures generals undertake to try to prevent mutiny and cement goodwill, some more successfully than others. Domitius, for example, a Pompeian general, is trapped in Corfinium by Caesar’s army and, fearing desertion or mutiny, does three things to try to fortify his position: he sends messengers to Pompey asking for aid, constructs additional defenses, and promises shares of his own personal property to his troops in return for

\(^5\) See the stories of Thermus (1.12), Varus (1.13), Lentulus Spinther (1.15), and Domitius (1.20).
\(^6\) See, for example, the opening of 1.8.
their service.\textsuperscript{7} This succeeds for a time, but as soon as the soldiers learn that Domitius has given up hope and plans to flee, they open the gates and offer their commander up to Caesar.\textsuperscript{8}

Caesar himself undertakes a similar but ultimately more viable scheme when he learns of the strength of the Pompeian army in Spain and the fact that Pompey and his personal forces would soon join them. After asking the bravest of the Gallic chieftains for aid, Caesar then borrowed money from his centurions and distributed it to the common soldiers. By this act, he says, he both bound the loyalty of the centurions to him with the security of debt and made the common soldiers happy with his generous gift.\textsuperscript{9} This seems to have worked for him, as his troops remain loyal throughout the consequent near-desertion of the Pompeian troops in Spain at the battle of Ilerda. The only time Caesar records anyone ever deserting from his army is when two upper-level Gallic chieftains become frustrated with his rules for their conduct, two books later, hardly the most damning of mutinies (3.59).

Along with the stories of the major mutinies or attempted mutinies from Petreius and Afranius at Ilerda and from Curio at Utica, Caesar almost constantly makes mention, often with as little as a three word phrase, of the mindset of the troops and what the generals do or fail to do to make them happy and prevent mutiny. Although he almost always treats the troops as conglomerate forces, two large entities of soldiers and centurions, Caesar cares very much about their collective opinion.\textsuperscript{10} For Caesar, at the very least, morale is a significant factor in the

\textsuperscript{7} “militibus in contione agros ex suis possessionibus pollicetur, quaterna in singulos iugera, et pro rata parte centurionibus evocatisque” (1.17). This promise may be a variation on promising plunder after the sacking of a city, but the emphasis on \textit{suis possessionibus} hints at patronage and Domitius’ personal desperation.

\textsuperscript{8} 1.20.

\textsuperscript{9} “Simul a tribunis militum centurionibusque mutuas pecunias sumpsit; has exercitui distribuit. Quo facto duas res consecutus est, quod pignore animos centurionum devinxit et largitione militum voluntates redemit” (1.39).

\textsuperscript{10} See de Blois, 174 for a description of the role of centurions in Caesar’s army. In his writings Caesar makes a noticeable distinction between the centurions, who are often named, interact directly with their general, and are famously fanatical in their loyalties, and the common ranks of soldiers, who are often separated from their general by a centurion buffer. Caesar himself notes an instance (\textit{B. Gall.} 1.40-41) where he was able to use his centurions to influence the mood of the rankers the night before a major battle in Gaul.
success of his civil war, something that never leaves his mind as a general and something he wants his reader to take note of as well. Considering his careful catalog of every Pompeian general who lost his army and his extensive treatment of the one time someone does desert from his side, his skill at maintaining loyalty and preventing mutiny even seems to be something of which he is quite proud. Assuming that Caesar never outright lies, whatever his spin on the story of his military success may be, we have proof from his writings that the threat of mutiny was very real during the civil war and the loyalty of the common soldier was a serious factor for a general to consider.

When we turn from Caesar to Lucan, however, we cannot casually assume that the issues of the common soldier and the potential for mutiny will be treated in the same way. Lucan could have easily chosen to ignore this fact of civil war and paint whatever picture of loyalty he wanted with his prerogative as an epic poet rather than a historian. Lucan is happy to amend, ignore, and augment history for the sake of his story and his bleak portrait of the world in any number of places throughout his epic, from obvious fantasies like the catalogue of snakes to mere historical inaccuracies like the presence of Cicero at the battle of Pharsalus. Although he clearly used Caesar’s text as a source for his poem,\textsuperscript{11} it is equally clear that Lucan was not slavishly loyal to Caesar’s version of events or to any ideal of historical truth. Since we cannot assume that Lucan would mimic Caesar’s depiction of mutinies and the common soldier, we must consider how Lucan chooses to depict mutinies on his own terms and why he returns to them so often.

\textsuperscript{11} See Lintott, “Lucan and the History of the Civil War” for an overview of the relationship between Lucan and Caesar.
Chapter One
Shades of Thersites: Caesar, Pompey, and Initial Discontent

After Lucan’s Bellum civile opens with the proem, the invocation of Nero, and his exposition of the causes of the civil war, the narrative turns to Caesar as he prepares to cross the Rubicon and begin the civil war in earnest. This choice affirms the epic trope of beginning in medias res even as it fights against it. Although there had already been political maneuvering and tension between the two men, the crossing of the Rubicon has been framed ever since as the pivotal moment, the true beginning of hostilities from which Caesar could never turn back: alea iacta est and the scene it invokes are famous for a reason. Thus in some sense Lucan is beginning his action with the beginning of this civil war, sounding much more like a historian than an epic poet. At the same time, however, the conflict between Caesar and Pompey, as Lucan has just finished explaining in his exposition in lines 67-182, had been a long time coming and could not be said to have started out of the blue the moment Caesar crossed the Rubicon. At the time of Lucan’s opening Caesar and his troops have been fighting together – albeit against the Gauls rather than other Romans – for exactly ten years, in true Homeric fashion. Furthermore, in the world Lucan creates, civil war is an unending, unstoppable force, as is the movement of Fortune that topples greatness;¹² for the Romans who lived through generations of civil unrest, watching general after general pitted against one another, such a pessimistic worldview cannot have been too foreign.¹³ The crossing of the Rubicon is an important moment and could be

¹² Bartsch, 24.
¹³ See, for example, the preface of Livy’s history, where the author laments the corruption of his time, and how Rome can no longer bear either its disease or the remedy necessary to fix it (Liv. 1 pr. 9). The steady decline of the Roman state, which Livy outlines broadly in his introduction before exploring it in greater detail in his work, feels inexorable.
argued as the beginning of *this* civil war, but in Lucan’s eyes civil war has long since started, and will continue as long as Fortune has greatness to cast down.

In Fortune’s unstoppable destructive course, Lucan tells us, Caesar is a favorite pawn, an eager, rushing force like lightning who is always pushing ahead to his next victory.\(^{14}\) In spite of this depiction of Fortune and Caesar as an unstoppable pair always in motion, however, it takes a remarkable amount of time for Caesar to get going on his destructive path. The first image we have of Caesar is one of him stopped, ready to march into Italy but faced with an apparition of Roma herself begging him as her *miles* to turn back.\(^{15}\) Caesar musters his courage, declares himself his own master and, assuming the role of *dux*, pushes on. After this moral obstacle, Caesar soon finds himself facing another delay – the river itself – and once again has to pause briefly before pushing on. This pattern of delay and *moras solvit*\(^{16}\) is one that has been observed by both Jamie Masters and Shadi Bartsch in their works on Lucan, perhaps as a sign of reluctance on Lucan’s part to begin his project and implicate himself as an agent of civil war.\(^{17}\) After Caesar faces and dissolves the resistance of the town of Arminium, he has to confront one final obstacle: his troops themselves and their unwillingness to march on Rome. Caesar gives a lengthy speech to try to convince his soldiers of the righteousness of the move, but he is met with discontent and the possibility of mutiny. It isn’t until Laelius, a loyal centurion, gives a speech in response to Caesar’s address that the soldiers fully commit themselves to Caesar’s cause.

This is not the first or last time an epic – or, as we shall see, a history – has opened with or quickly turned to a potentially mutinous situation. The first example, as one might expect, comes from Homer in his *Iliad*. Although the anger of Achilles causes discontent in the camp of

\(^{14}\) Masters, 15.
\(^{15}\) 1.185-205. See Bernstein, 261 for a discussion of the apparition of Roma as a rhetorical device and her similarities with Hector’s apparition to Aeneas in *Aen.* 2.
\(^{16}\) 1.205
\(^{17}\) See Masters, 1-5; Barsch, 13-15. John Henderson also comments on how Lucan’s subject pollutes its author (and reader) in his article “Lucan/ The Word At War,” 122.
the Greeks and private desertion from Agamemnon’s authority early in Book 1, it isn’t until Book 2 that we see a full-fledged mutiny on the beach of Troy. In this passage, which takes up the first three hundred lines of the Book 2, Agamemnon, encouraged by a dream, decides to test the commitment of his soldiers by proposing to abandon the siege and seeing if they comply or insist on staying and fighting. The test fails, and the soldiers eagerly prepare the ships for the voyage home. It takes the smooth voice of Odysseus to convince the commanders to wrangle their men back into order. Once they are back in the assembly, however, the first common soldier to make an appearance or give a speech, Thersites, openly abuses Agamemnon’s authority and lists all the reasons why they should in fact return to Greece. Once again Odysseus comes to Agamemnon’s rescue, verbally then physically rebuking Thersites before convincing the assembly as a whole that they should continue to fight.

When we turn to the Aeneid, the next text to pick up this tradition, we find that Vergil has taken the image of the seditious crowd and safely contained it within a simile about Neptune and his control over the winds. In the Iliad passage, the rush of men towards the ships is described like a storm, κινήθη δ’ ἀγορὴ φῆ κύματα μακρὰ θαλάσσης/ πόντου Ἰκαρίω, τὰ μὲν τ’ Εὐρός τε Νότος τε/ ὀφοι’ ἐπαξέας πατρὸς Διός ἐκ νεφελάων; Vergil takes this simile and turns it on its head, choosing instead to describe the movements of a storm like the behavior of an unruly crowd. When Neptune realizes that Aeolus has sent out the winds at Juno’s command and not his own, he gives a short speech scolding the winds for their impudence and then moves to calm the sea. Vergil then launches into the first simile of his epic:

*Ac veluti magno in populo cum saepe coorta est*  
*sedictio, saevitique animis ignobile volgus,*

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18 Hom. II. 2.144-146. “The assembly was set into motion like a great swell of the Icarien sea, which the East and South winds urged on, rushing from the clouds of Father Zeus.” The simile continues for three more lines, this time comparing the soldiers to crops blown over by the wind.
The *ignoble volgus* seems to be referring to a civilian rather than military crowd, despite earlier descriptions of the winds as an army put to flight by Neptune, and commentators have associated the calming of *sedition* with a specific *exemplum* of Cato the Elder, despite Neptune’s talk of Aeolus’ kingship. Whatever Vergil is trying to show with these dualities, he is clearly interacting with Homer’s depiction of the mutinous crowd in a way that is marked, being the first simile of the epic, and is playing with the interaction of leaders and their followers without having to put the loyalty of Aeneas’ men on the line.

If we look after Lucan to fully appreciate his place in this tradition, we see that Tacitus, who incorporates a number of epic tropes into his historiographical works at moments of narrative importance, also opens both of his major works with accounts of mutinies. His *Annals*’ first major episode after Tiberius’ ascension to the Principate is the Pannonian mutiny quelled by Drusus (1.16-30), which is immediately followed by the German mutiny quelled by Germanicus (1.31-54). These two episodes together make up about half of Tacitus’ first book and contain all but three of the references to *rabies* and *furor*, two of the most common characteristics of both crowds and civil war, in the entirety of the *Annals*. The soldiers in Pannonia, who had grown lazy during the pass of power from Augustus to Tiberius and had been hoping for a civil war as a way to make extra profit, were stirred from mere discontent to seditious action by a common soldier named Percennius, who used to rouse crowds at the theater

19 Verg. *Aen*. 1.148-150. “And just as when sedition often has sprung up in great people, and the base crowd rages in its spirit, and now torches and rocks fly — rage provides arms.”
20 See Hardie, “Crowds and Leaders in Imperial Historiography” 18-19, for a more in depth discussion of the dualities presented by the statesman simile.
21 See Joseph, *Tacitus the Epic Successor*, esp. 9-10, for an overview of Tacitus’ utilization of epic techniques.
22 See Woodman, “Mutiny and Madness: Annals 1.16-39,” for a discussion of the similarities in the ways that Tacitus presents the two mutinies.
23 Joseph, 73-74 n. 128; see also Woodman 11-12 for a discussion of the madness of crowds in Cicero and in Livy’s account of the mutiny quelled by Scipio Africanus in 206 B.C.E.
and is given a short speech in Tacitus listing his complaints. Here we have a potential parallel to Thersites from the *Iliad* Book 2, a single common man with the potential to stir up his compatriots who is treated very negatively by the author. As in Homer and Vergil alike, we see both the individual common soldier and the crowd as a whole as a negative force: a base and ugly man who has to be beaten into submission, a destructive storm, the *ignobile volgus* that throws rocks in its rage, and now a lowly theater worker with an abusive tongue and a group of men who would rather profit from civil war than live in peace. Tacitus’ disdain for the *dux olim theatralium operarum, dein gregarius miles, procax lingua et miscere coetus histrionali studio doctus*,\(^{24}\) is one out of many examples of the hatred and fear most authors level at crowds and rabble-rousers, whether they be mutineers, demagogues, or theater workers.\(^{25}\)

The *Histories* opens with the short reign of Galba and briefly mentions the sedition in Germany, but spends most of its time dealing with civilian and military crowds in Rome as Galba and Otho each struggle to win over the crowd. This passage, too, deals very directly with the question of the relationship between one man and a group of common people and what to do when it fails, though it is far less focused than the previous accounts of one set of troops and their commander. Here Tacitus seems to be much more interested, as Vergil was in the statesman simile, in considering the relationship between military and civilian crowds and the potential ramifications for the principate: *omnia deinde arbitrio militum acta* (Tac. *Hist.* 1.46).\(^{26}\) Tacitus sets Galba’s death scene as a dynamic opposition between Otho’s armed forces, lost *sine more et ordine militiae*,\(^{27}\) and the crowd of petrified civilians who surround Galba in the Forum. The soldiers, bereft of the order that elevates them above an armed mob, burst into the Forum on

\(^{24}\) Tac. *Ann.* 1.16. “One a leader of a theatrical faction, then a common soldier, insolent in tongue and learned from his study of actors how to stir up a crowd.”

\(^{25}\) See Hardie (2010) 14 for the manipulative power implied by Percennius’ theatrical career.

\(^{26}\) Hardie (2010), 24-26.

\(^{27}\) Tac. *Hist.* 1.40.
horseback disiecta plebe, proculato senatu, with no thought for the sanctity of the Capitoline, the temples, or the emperors past or present – clearly out of their minds, raging like Vergil’s storm with no thought of consequences, in direct opposition to upper and lower class civilians alike. The unarmed crowd is hardly a positive force, however, despite its seeming opposition to the negative force of the army. While the army approaches they stand stunned: *non tumultus, non quies, quale magni metus et magnae irae silentium est*.28 Once the two groups meet the civilians are startled out of their inaction and flee, leaving Galba to be brutally murdered by some soldier, so lost in the crowd that even Tacitus is unsure of his name. Tacitus has set the stage for his *Histories* with a bleak mutiny scene of crowds and violence, where soldiers will abandon any semblance of order for the chance to murder their emperor and civilians will merely wait for the inevitable and flee.

This tradition of inaugural mutiny, stretched from Homer to Tacitus, could hardly have survived on the back of tradition alone. From a functional standpoint, within the scope of any epic or history about powerful generals in opposition it makes some sense to establish in a dramatically engaging way that the general must conquer his own men before he conquers his enemies. A general with absolute control over his troops can become a dangerous autocrat, as we see illustrated so vividly in Lucan, but a general with too little control can be just as dangerously ineffectual. The successful quelling of a mutiny could cement a general’s leadership qualities for the reader, as it does with Germanicus in the opening of the *Annals*, and establish the control of a leader before his success with his troops is taken for granted for the rest of the work. This image of a single man, charismatic and strong-willed, standing up to a crowd and bending their will to his own is certainly one that seems to have had resonance with a Classical audience. This image proves popular in historical profiles of great generals, as Livy lingers on Scipio Africanus’

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28 Tac. *Hist*. 1.40. “Not an uproar, nor a quiet, it was such a silence of great fear and great anger.”
quelling of a mutiny in Spain in the middle of Book 28, Quintus Curtius dramatizes Alexander’s control over mutinous troops on two separate occasions, and Tacitus, as previously mentioned, glorifies Germanicus’ success with the troops in Germany.\textsuperscript{29} The power of the orator to turn the emotions of a crowd, which Cicero admits is necessary,\textsuperscript{30} can be celebrated when the crowd is moved from violence to obedience, and can even feed into a general’s heroism.\textsuperscript{31}

Not all of these opening mutinies, however, cement the general in question as a positive figure capable of controlling his men. The success of Agamemnon’s mutinous situation in the \textit{Iliad} is foggy at best, as his speech convinces his soldiers of its literal meaning and has the opposite of the desired effect. The episode arguably paints Odysseus as the successful rhetorician and hero, since he is the one who reassembles the troops and convinces them to stay, but this hardly serves to establish the authority of the general figure, who needs to be rescued by his crafty subordinate. Despite the fact that the mutiny is technically quelled, this episode shows the lack of morale among the Greek troops and paints Agamemnon’s leadership as tenuous rather than strong. In the opening of the \textit{Histories}, the unrest against Galba isn’t even successfully stopped, as he is brutally murdered and his enemy briefly put in his place. This then sets the tone for the rest of the period that is Tacitus’ subject, where the opinion of the crowd is fickle, power fleeting, and the overall mood bleak. These opening mutinies could be seen, then, as a test that predicts the success of the general in question and the tone of his story as a whole; Agamemnon has dubious success, but not without great loss, while Galba’s reign is only the beginning of a dark period for Rome. Germanicus may never find success as \textit{princeps}, but he certainly enjoys

\textsuperscript{29} See Fantham (1985), 123, for a more in depth exploration of this imagery.

\textsuperscript{30} Cic. \textit{De Or.} 2.337: “\textit{maximaque pars orationis admovenda est ad animorum motus non numquam aut cohortatione aut commemoracione aliqua aut in spem aut in metum aut ad cupiditatem aut ad cupiditatem revocandos.}” “The greatest part of a speech sometimes must be turned to moving emotions either by urging or by some reminder, encouraging them to hope or fear or desire or glory, and also often calling them back from rashness, anger, hope, injury, hatred, or cruelty.”

popularity with the people until his death and remains a hero – a reputation which lingers even to this day.

When we turn to Lucan in light of this tradition and consider his opening mutiny, we find that not only is the success of the general in question dubiously won, but Lucan refuses to lay the issue of troop morale to rest. Mutinies, both against Caesar and against his various adversaries, resurface with surprising regularity and are quelled with varying levels of success as the poem progresses. While Lucan may be drawing on this tradition and the image of the orator facing down the crowd, he is certainly not doing so to establish the supremacy of a general and move on, and whatever tone he sets for the troops and for his poem with one mutiny is quickly altered by the arrival of the next bout of unrest. In addition, in this first mutiny, as with Agamemnon’s failed testing of the troops, it is not Caesar who cements his army’s loyalty but his assistant, the fictional centurion Laelius. The unrest, in fact, is brought on by Caesar’s speech as it was with Agamemnon’s, and it takes the speech of a subordinate to resolve the situation. To better understand Lucan’s use of the opening mutiny, we must look more closely at the passage itself and the speeches that Lucan provides.

In Lucan’s version of events, after Caesar has taken Arminium he is plagued with self-doubt, unsure if he should march on Rome. He is swiftly spurred back into action, however, by the fated arrival of Curio and other Caesarian sympathizers, fugitives from Rome. Curio gives a speech to Caesar that encourages him to advance with his army to Rome, and in less than ten lines Caesar is assembling his troops and announcing his intentions to fight against the will of the Senate. This episode combines two different historical encounters between Caesar and Curio, as Roche notes: one later recorded in Appian’s *Belli Civili* (2.5.5), where Curio advises Caesar in Ravenna to march on Rome in December of 50, and another mentioned by Cassius Dio (41.4.1)
where Caesar calls Curio to Arminium to tell his soldiers of the movements against them in Rome in January of 49, which Caesar then follows with a speech of his own. By conflating the two incidents, Lucan is able to develop the character of Curio and recognize that the politics of the Senate were a motivating factor in Caesar’s march in addition to the general’s pure immorality. He is still, however, able to make Caesar the first to try to convince the troops to participate in civil war and reinforce his monstrous characterization of the general. Lucan’s invented scene also creates yet another parallel to the potential mutiny scene in the Iliad, where Agamemnon’s decision to test his troops with his speech was prompted by the arrival and advice of a trusted political ally, in that instance a false specter of Nestor in a dream. Curio, an infamous turncoat who had been vocally opposed to the triumvirs in the 50s but began speaking well of Caesar shortly after achieving office, is hardly a suitable substitute for Nestor in terms of wisdom or eminence, but he proves to be equally persuasive.

Making Caesar’s speech to the troops and his final decision to march upon Rome coincide with Curio’s arrival in Arminium, however, postpones the decisive moment until Caesar has already crossed the Rubicon. This allows Lucan to add yet more layers of delay before Caesar’s fated march on the city, as Caesar faces the obstacles of his own self-doubt and then of his soldiers’ morale even after the river is crossed. Lucan is eager to point out the heavy hand of Fortuna and the hopelessness of resisting Caesar at every chance he gets, and as the consumers of a historical epic his readers are awaiting Caesar’s march with anticipatory dread. Lucan plays on this tension between the reader’s reluctant knowledge of Caesar’s ultimate success and the hope that this series of delays provides. He offers the reader chance after chance for Caesar to

32 Roche, n. 266-95.
33 See Roche, n. 269 for a discussion of the ancient rumor that Caesar bribed Curio to switch sides and the modern skepticism surrounding it.
34 For example, while Caesar is hesitating and Curio is yet to arrive, Lucan writes, “justos Fortuna laborat/ Esse ducis motus et causas invenit armis,” or “Fate labored to make the movements of the leader just, and found causes for arms” (1.264-265).
turn back and change history, even after the Rubicon has been crossed and conflict seems unavoidable.

Within this confluence of historical events we find Caesar’s first speech to his troops and his first attempt to convince them to stand with him in face of civil war. The corresponding speech in Caesar’s own work (BC 1.7.1) occurs in Ravenna before the crossing of the Rubicon, and the oration is reported in indirect speech as a rather dry list of the wrongs done to Caesar by anonymous enemies and the injuries to the office of the tribune. Caesar does not blame Pompey, with whom he is still in strained correspondence, for their falling out, but rather the enemies that have used envy to lead his old friend astray. The vast majority of the reported speech is taken up with a discussion of the weakening of the tribunician veto, with a note that not even Sulla took that power away. Although Caesar ends with an exhortation that they defend the honor of the general who led them on so many successful campaigns in the past, the politics that occupy most of the summary seems to be less than inspirational. In response, however, the Thirteenth Legion cries out *se se paratos esse imperatoris sui tribunorumque plebis iniurias defendere*, acknowledging with their positive response to such a technical speech that they are fighting not only for Caesar, but for a serious legal issue.

Although Caesar only gives us the summary of his speech in indirect speech, we expect the speech of Lucan’s Caesar to have at least a similar backbone to its historical antecedent, despite its transplant from one side of the Rubicon to the other. The two speeches, however, are barely even recognizable as related. Lucan opens Caesar’s speech with *bellorum o socii*, a phrase that, while likely looking back to Caesar’s famous historical use of *commilitiones*, introduces a central line of reasoning absent from Caesar’s own report of the incident. Lucan’s Caesar

\[35\text{1.7.8. “That they were ready to defend against the injuries to their general and to the tribunes of the plebs.”}\]

\[36\text{See Roche, 299 n.}\]
bookends his speech with appeals to his soldiers’ personal investment in the issue, the wrongs done to them personally, and the reasons why he and his soldiers are on the same level. He invokes their past service with him and implies that Rome is readying for war against them as much as against him and treating them like foreign enemies – Hannibal, to be specific – rather than heroes who have just spent ten years spilling their blood for their country. From his assertion that wrongs against Caesar are also wrongs against his soldiers, Caesar moves on to the main body of his speech, namely increasingly colorful invective against Pompey and the lawlessness he has established in Rome. Caesar the historian had blamed others for Pompey’s misguidance and the state of Rome, with a subtle jab at Pompey for crossing a border that even Sulla left inviolate, the tribunician veto. Lucan’s Caesar, on the other hand, assaults Pompey for 30 lines as a lifelong tyrant, though without mention of the tribunician veto in specific, and compares him to Sulla in terms more sensational than legal for a significant portion of the attack. This picture of Pompey is so abhorrent that it is hard to believe that the speaker of the speech could have ever considered himself a friend or ally of its subject, a fact the historical Caesar clings to with remorse while Lucan’s character ignores it. After this lengthy middle section Lucan’s Caesar returns to the fate of his beloved soldiers, bemoaning, *mihi si merces erepta laborum est,/ his saltem longi non cum duce praemia belli/ reddantur; miles sub quolibet iste triumphet.* He then moves on to describe how they will be forced to live if they lose the war, landless and worse than criminals, before finally exhorting them *[detrahere] dominos urbi servire paratae.*

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37 See 1.324-335 especially for the discussion of Pompey’s connection to Sulla and the colorful imagery that Lucan conjures.
38 1.340-342. “If the reward of labors is stolen away from me, let the prizes of long war be returned to them at least without their leader; let the soldier triumph beneath whomever.”
39 1.351.
When we compare the two speeches, the tactics Lucan gives to his Caesar become clear in contrast. His soldiers should fight with him, not out of particular love for him or legal particulars, but because they are being personally threatened by Pompey’s tyrannical leanings and have to stop them to get what they deserve and to save Rome herself. These admittedly grandiose arguments seem like they should have been convincing, hinging upon both self-interest and noble loyalty to Rome, with a clear depraved enemy to depose. Lucan’s readers are expecting this speech to succeed, whether they recognize the scene from Caesar’s commentaries or merely know their national history, especially since Caesar has pushed past so many obstacles already. Lucan even sets the speech up as that of an epic hero addressing his comrades or followers about their future successful endeavors with vocabulary and theme.\footnote{See Roche, 299 n. See also Masters, 4 for a discussion of the parallels between Caesar and Aeneas.}

He alludes directly to Aeneas’ speech to his troops in \textit{Aen.} 1.198, which opens with a similar \textit{O socii} and continues on to address the same theme of past troubles that have been overcome.\footnote{The entire opening reads, \textit{O socii (neque enim ignari sumus ante malorum)/ o passi graviora, dabit deus his quoque finem.} “Oh companions (for we are not ignorant of past troubles), oh you who have suffered heavier things, the god will grant an end to these things also.”}

Once again, however, Lucan turns the tables on his readers and dashes their expectations. Caesar’s speech is met not with enthusiastic promises, but with muttering and uncertainty. \textit{At dubium non claro murmure volgus/ secum incerta fremit}, Lucan writes, and cites \textit{pietas} and the penates as the reason for their hesitation.\footnote{1.352-353. “But the doubtful crowd, with an indistinct murmur, muttered uncertainties with itself.”} Apparently, though Caesar attempted to persuade them that Pompey was a danger to Rome, the soldiers were either unconvinced or simply too pious to march on Rome, despite a potentially legitimate reason. Lucan has framed Caesar as an epic hero with allusions to the opening of the \textit{Aeneid}, and Aeneas’ speech of an epic hero offering encouragement to his comrades is even part of a larger tradition of such speeches that begins with Odysseus (\textit{Od.} 12.208-12). By placing Caesar in this tradition, only to cast him...
down, Lucan both plays with the expectations of his readers and makes bitter commentary on the
tropes of the epic genre.

The suspense is short-lived, however, as Lucan foreshadows the content and outcome of
Laelius’ speech before we even hear the centurion’s name: *sed diro ferri revocantur amore/
ductorisque metu.*43 Laelius then enters the scene and delivers a speech that is ostensibly
directed, like Curio’s, not at the assembled troops but at Caesar himself. Although these two
speeches make a pair, it is not Caesar who needs convincing that marching to Rome is the right
path; it is the assembled army that needs to hear Laelius’ words, and it is their response that
allows Caesar to push on towards his inexorable fate.

Laelius’ speech is the antithesis of Caesar’s in content and rhetorical tack. The centurion
makes no attempt at logical reasoning and spends very little time slandering Caesar’s enemies,
mentioning the Senate once and Pompey not at all. Most noticeably, where Caesar makes an
effort to place himself on the level of his soldiers, Laelius pushes in the opposite direction and
forcibly elevates Caesar beyond the status of general to replace Rome herself as the ultimate
object of his soldiers’ loyalty. The very first lines of each speech clearly define this opposition
with their addressees: while Caesar began his speech with *bellorum o socii,* Laelius addresses his
leader as *Romani maxime rector nominis.*44 This title, as Roche points out, already links Caesar
to Jupiter in Laelius’ eyes, and the near-worship continues as Laelius’ conviction gets more and
more fervent.45 In his opening phrase, Laelius brings up the moral language of *ius* as a frame for
the entire speech, setting himself up within the bounds of the same moral system that was

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43 1.355-356. “But they were called back by their terrible love of the sword and the fear of their leader.”
44 1.359-360, “Greatest guide of the Roman name.”

45 See Roche 359-60 n. for examples of similar appellations in Vergil and Seneca. Also see Sarah Nix, “Caesar as
Jupiter in Lucan's ‘Bellum Civile’” for a further exploration of this theme in Lucan.
troubling the common soldiers with pietas seven lines earlier. After a protestation that Caesar must not trust his troops if he has not marched on Rome already, an effective jab at the guilt of the listening soldiers who are wavering in their loyalty, Laelius confronts the all-important question head on: usque adeo miserum est, civili vincere bello?

Laelius provides his own answer with no hesitation. Duc, he says, lead us on wherever you may wish. He then combines his elevation of Caesar with his introduction of a moral code to make the two one and the same, explaining, nec civis meus est, in quem tua classica, Caesar, audiero. Despite his mention of civil war as a positive, as Matthew Roller rightly argues in his article “Ethical Contradiction and the Fractured Community in Lucan's ‘Bellum Civile,’” Laelius is introducing for the first time an alienating picture of civil war, in which the enemies of his commander are effectively foreigners, and Caesar’s will replaces the soldier’s moral compass. This is further demonstrated by Laelius’ promises as the speech continues, as he pledges to perform increasingly perverse and amoral acts if Caesar wishes them done. He presents the appalling images of fratricide, patricide, and the slaughter of his pregnant wife and child in visceral detail as acts he would be willing to commit for Caesar before turning to the burning of temples and, finally, the destruction of Rome herself. While Caesar had tried to frame the coming campaign as a quest to save Rome from a tyrant, ending his speech with the image of dragging despots out of a city ready to serve, the final image of Laelius’ speech is that of Rome’s destruction, willingly if not cheerfully enacted by the soldiers once loyal to her. With this,

46 At 1.359-60, the speech opens under the qualification “Si licet... et ius est, veras expromere voces,” “if it is permitted and just, to display true voices.”
47 1.366, “Is it so terrible, to conquer in civil war?”
48 1.373-374, “Nor is he my countryman, Caesar, against whom I will hear your trumpets.”
49 See especially pages 329-330 in Roller for his discussion of Laelius and his speech.
50 1.376-386. See Roche 271-274 for a further exploration of the way in which Lucan constructs these images, their intertextual flavors, and where they come back later in Lucan’s own epic and prove Laelius to be a grim prophet.
Laelius has constructed an entirely new moral order with Caesar at its head and no culpability for
the soldiers who enact it, and Rome’s power has been eclipsed.

This is the argument that sways Caesar’s soldiers and finally sets them decisively on the
path to civil war; *his cunctae simul adsensere cohortes,/ elatasque alte, quaecumque ad bella
vocaret,/ promisere manus.*\(^{51}\) Despite Caesar’s best efforts, they could not be exhorted to civil
war within the bounds of their old moral system, no matter how colorfully Caesar painted
Pompey’s picture. In addition, the soldiers could not be cajoled into serving through talk of
equality with their general. Even though it was ostensibly aimed at Caesar and not the other
soldiers, one man’s promise of devotion, this seemingly crazed promise convinces the other
soldiers to fight and adopt a similar attitude.

This new system as proposed by Laelius is clearly not one the reader should agree with
on a moral level. Even if Laelius had not ended his speech with images of pregnant wives
slaughtered by their husbands, burning temples, and the crumbling walls of Rome – images
clearly meant to incite the reader’s horror – Lucan leaves clues throughout the speech that point
to Laelius’ depravity with the bitter irony that Lucan so loves. For example, when Laelius
attempts to convince his fellow soldiers with the entreaty *usque adeo miserum est civili vincere
bello,* Lucan is making an intertextual allusion to Book 12 of the *Aeneid,* as Roche points out,
where Turnus asks his sister *usque adeone mori miserum est?*\(^{52}\) In this passage, Aeneas has just
attacked Latinus’ city, which had been left undefended, and Turnus is deliberating whether he
should go and try to protect the city, which would likely claim his life. With this question,

\(^{51}\) 1.386-388, “All the cohorts at once assented to these things, and promised their hands, which they raised on high,
to whatever wars he called for.” This response, as well as the preceding speech, may be a parody of the military oath
that soldiers swore to their commanders; see Campbell, 19-22 for the importance of the military oath to the
functioning of Republican and Imperial armies.

\(^{52}\) *Aen.* 12.646, “Is it so terrible to die?” See Roche, 366 n. Also cf. Horace *Odes* III.2.13 where, in a discussion of
wars against foreign enemies, the author asserts, *dulce et decorum est pro patria mori,* “it is sweet and suitable to die
for one’s country.”
Turnus decides that defending the city is more important than his own life and sets off to face his noble and tragic end – the precise opposite of Laelius, who essentially damns Rome and her sanctity during his speech. The fact that Laelius comes to the opposite conclusion of Turnus, putting individual well-being over the state of the city, coupled with the fact that the potentially noble mori has been replaced by civili vincere bello, signals the reader that Laelius’ code is not to be admired. Nevertheless, Lucan claims, this is the kind of intrinsically flawed argument needed to enact civil war.

The advent of this new moral code is something that Lucan takes care to emphasize. He has created an entirely fictitious episode within a conflation of two historical events, then spends one hundred lines recording Caesar’s speech, Laelius’ speech, and the reactions of the assembled soldiers to each oration. Had he merely wanted to show the depravity of Caesar and the way that he led his troops, Lucan could have given Laelius’ speech to Caesar and made his monstrous anti-hero all the more sinister for coming up with a twisted moral scheme centered around his own godlike status. If he wanted to play on the theme of the opening mutiny and give the troops both discontent and a voice with which to raise it, adding a Thersites figure to the mix, he could have articulated the complaints of the troops through a similar lowly mouthpiece. He could have even included Laelius’ speech but labeled it as the voice of the collective body of men, as he does in lines 1.248-256 when the townspeople of Arminium protest the advance of Caesar. Instead, Lucan gives the speech that in many ways sets the tone of Caesar’s behavior for the rest of the epic to a named character of his own creation.

Laelius has the dubious distinction of being one of Lucan’s only entirely fictional named characters, and despite his brief appearance, he is vividly characterized as an amoral fanatic who in a sense launches Caesar’s campaign against Pompey. Apart from the content of his speech,
Laelius gets a brief introduction as *summi tunc munera pili/* Laelius, *emeritique gerens insignia doni,/ servati civis referentem praemia quercum.* Laelius is a centurion, a soldier lower in class who has risen through the ranks of the army by his own merits, and the *primus pilus* at that, showing that he has risen as far as he could possibly go to a position that essentially makes him the highest of the common soldiers. In addition, he has won the *corona civica* for saving a Roman life, a significant military honor. Given these details, the reader would expect the speech he gives to be as honorable as his military career, an expectation sorely dashed.

In addition, however, Laelius stands as the voice of the common soldier, the only one the reader has heard yet in the course of the epic. In the writings of the historical Caesar, the *primus pilus* would act as a liaison between the general and the common soldiers, and as the centurion set above the rest, Laelius can be expected to straddle the worlds of the officers and the rankers. In some ways, Laelius, as a centurion, can be seen as a chorus leader for the common soldiers, still one of them but a leader and a crystallization of their common fears and desires. Despite this slightly elevated role, it is still notable that Lucan not only gives a common soldier of his own creation a name and a voice, but allows him to correct one of Caesar’s failures. The character may not be an admirable one morally speaking, but he is far from a base creature who hinders the goals of his betters. His military record paints him as the perfect soldier and, with the *corona civica*, the perfect Roman soldier. The fact that a soldier celebrated for his preservation of Roman life would go on to make the speech that he does about his willingness to slaughter Romans in civil war fits once again into Lucan’s bitter sense of irony, as Roche notes, but Roller points out that his award can also show that Laelius has earned the trust and approval of his peers.

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53 1.356-358, “Then the officer of the greatest spear (the *primus pilus* centurion, or the highest ranking centurion of the unit) Laelius, bearing the mark of an earned gift, the oak demonstrating the reward for a Roman citizen saved…”

54 Caes. *Gal.* 1.41.3, 7.17.8. See Roche, 356-7 n.
community, having exemplified virtus and pietas in the eyes of his compatriots. Perhaps Laelius’ new moral framework is so effective in changing the common soldiers’ minds because he has already earned the authority to make such judgments based on his past heroism. Laelius, unlike Caesar, is truly one of the commilitiones, a common soldier and a leader, who can elevate his general above the troops while remaining one of them.

This scene is made all the more remarkable if we look again to Lucan’s original model, the almost-mutiny at the start of the second book of the Iliad. In the Iliad, we have a general with dangerously autocratic tendencies, Agamemnon, who gives a speech to his troops suggesting they leave Troy in the hope that they will refuse, after being prompted in a dream by a vision of Nestor to do so. In Lucan, we also have a general with dangerously autocratic tendencies, Caesar, who gives a speech to his troops suggesting they march with him in civil war in all earnestness, after being prompted by Curio to do so. Each general fails to accomplish his goal, though their failures manifest in different ways. Agamemnon convinces his troops to obey the literal words of his speech, but he had been hoping for failure rather than success, while Caesar simply fails to be convincing.

The reactions of the troops, although both far from the desired effect, are actually quite different from one another, and for once Lucan is the one who treats a potentially dramatic episode with brevity. Caesar’s troops mutter among themselves for two lines, paralyzed into inaction by their lingering morals, but are soon swayed by the words of Laelius and propel themselves into motion. Agamemnon’s troops, on the other hand, are inspired by his speech and launch into motion before he has the chance to stop them, preparing the ships for the voyage home and receiving a six line simile comparing their movements to the power of the wind. The gods have to become involved to stop the flight, and Odysseus has to address both the...
commanders and the common soldiers with tailored speeches to get them all back into an assembly. One disappointed common soldier, Thersites, rears his head and articulates his complaints to Agamemnon, and has to be put down by Odysseus, this time with violence as well as words, before the crafty general can convince the soldiers to stay and begin to clean up Agamemnon’s mess. Odysseus and Laelius, one of the greatest heroes of the Greeks and a fictional centurion, have parallel roles as they convince the troops to follow their commander with successful speeches after the commander has failed, but Lucan takes only seven lines to get from Caesar’s speech to Laelius’; Homer takes one hundred and forty two.

If we return to the initial image of Agamemnon’s troops streaming out of the assembly to ready the ships and their comparison to the wind, we can see that Lucan is creating further dialogue with Homer and the two bodies of soldiers by transplanting that imagery from the mutinous troops to the newly convinced soldiers showing their support for Caesar. Homer describes the disbandment:

\[
κινήθη \delta' \ άγορη φη κύματα μακρά θαλάσσης \\
pόντου Ἰκαρίωι, τά μέν τ’ Εὐρός τε Νότος τε \\
ώτορ’ ἐπαῖξατο πατρός Διός ἐκ νεφελάων. \\
ὥς δ’ ὅτε κινήσῃ Ζέφυρος βαθό λήμνον ἐλθών \\
λάβος ἐπαγίζων, ἐπὶ τ’ ἡμύει ἀσταχύέσσιν.\]

When Odysseus finally convinces the troops to stay and fight, they cheer and praise him, but they fail to put their enthusiasm to action and the narrative soon moves on to a speech from Nestor describing battle plans. In Lucan, the responses to the two speeches are reversed, though the effectiveness of each response is the same. Caesar’s speech is met with a brief and muted verbal response, while after Laelius has finished speaking, the troops pledge their allegiance to Caesar and action follows:

\[ I I . 2 .144-148: “The assembly moved as the great swell of the Icarian sea, which either the East wind or the South wind stirred up, rushing from the clouds of father Zeus. Just as when the West wind moved the deep field of crops, rushing furiously, bowed down upon the sheaf of wheat.”]
Both of these passages have imagery of the wind, whether it be East, South, West, or North, coming up against flat obstacles – the surface of the sea for Homer, and the faces of cliffs for Lucan – and bending down vegetation – a field of wheat for Homer, and oaks in a forest for Lucan. If the parallels in story were not enough, this deliberately crafted imitation of imagery shows that Lucan is acknowledging the Homer passage and using the consequences implied by his imitation to his advantage.

If Caesar is Agamemnon and Curio is the shade of Nestor, then Laelius is Odysseus. Their speeches are utterly dissimilar – Laelius proposes a new moral code with Caesar at its head, while Odysseus reminds Agamemnon and the troops of Calchas’ prophecy that they only have to hold on one more year before victory – and yet both start off their speeches addressing the commander whose troops are reluctant to fight, but intend their words most for the ears of the unwilling soldiers, who promptly agree to take up arms for their commander once more. This is a fact that is worth exploring, as the replacement for Odysseus in this new parallel scenario was entirely in Lucan’s hands. He could have made Curio the one to convince the troops, someone with status roughly equivalent to Odysseus. He could have imported another historical character, a tactic he has had no qualms about elsewhere in the epic, either someone else with the weight of an Odysseus behind their name or a minor aristocrat known to have a position in Caesar’s army. Instead, Lucan chose to create his own character to replace one of the two

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57 1.388-391: “Such a shout went to the skies, as when the Thracian North wind has leaned upon the cliffs of Ossa, there is a sound when the oak of the pressed forest curves down, or when it returns back to the skies.”

58 Odysseus’ speech (2.284) begins Ἀτρεΐδη τοῦν δῆτε ἄνακε, while Laelius calls Caesar Romani maxime rector nominis in his opening.

59 See, for example, the presence of Cicero at the battle of Pharsalia and his crucial speech to Pompey, 7.68-85.
greatest Greek heroes, at least in literary fame, who gives his speech with Athena by his side, and to make that character a common soldier who has been elevated but is common all the same.

This is a form of generic play that Lucan toys with throughout his poem, taking traditional epic tropes and heroes and lowering them with the participation of common soldiers. The comparison would seemingly elevate the depiction of a common soldier like Laelius up to that of an Odysseus figure, as someone who not only is capable of convincing an army to go to war where Caesar failed, but also worthy of an allusion to Odysseus. At the same time, however, as the common soldiery gets this notable visibility, we see that their one role in the *Iliad*, that of the Thersites figure who airs their complaints, is eliminated by Lucan. This may not be a bad thing for the representation of the common soldiers, as Thersites is hardly a positive figure, but it does remove their ability to voice their complaints and transfers hints of Thersites, who has no other equivalent outlet, upon Laelius, so far the only common soldier to receive a voice. Thus Laelius is both elevated by association with Odysseus and damned by shades of Thersites, a persuasive speaker who is nevertheless immoral and dangerous.

At this point, Lucan has started to define the relationship between Caesar and his troops through a moment of discontent. The reader never truly doubts that Caesar will succeed or that the soldiers will kill fellow Romans in his name, but Lucan nevertheless takes the time at this early juncture to explore what convinces the common soldier to follow Caesar willingly. First he defines an unsuccessful strategy with Caesar’s speech, showing that feelings of camaraderie and disapproval of a potentially tyrannical Roman are not enough to incite civil war, and then emends the strategy to something he believes to be convincing with Laelius’ speech, namely this new moral system with Caesar at its head.

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60 See, for example, the *aristeiae* of Scaeva (6.143-246) and Vulteius (4.465-581), and the replacement of the shade of Anchises with a reanimated and unnamed common soldier (6.719-820).
Now that Caesar’s tactics have been laid out, and laid out in a way that interacts with the very beginning of the epic tradition, it is only natural for our minds to turn to the hitherto silent Pompey and look for parallel treatment. Caesar and Pompey have been introduced, after all, as the two opposing forces in this civil war in Lucan’s exposition, and even if Caesar is painted as the aggressor, Pompey’s soldiers should have to be convinced to fight just like Caesar’s forces. Ancient historians as early as Herodotus made frequent use of the speech by a general to his troops, particularly before a major battle; Polybius goes so far as to assign these speeches their own technical term, *parakleseis*. Caesar and Polybius in particular were fond of pitting paired speeches of the two generals against each other, and by the Imperial period the highly rhetorical educational system of Lucan’s day was using military exhortations as deliberative exercises. Even with the issue of motivation of the troops set aside, it would be expected for Lucan, having spent the past two hundred lines describing the start of Caesar’s journey, to look at Pompey’s initial situation and give him a reciprocal speech.

Lucan does not turn immediately to the state of Pompey’s camp, however, and the rest of Book 1 passes without a glimpse of the other general or his army. By the time the second book starts, we have heard an ethnographic catalogue of Gauls, a description of the flight of the senators from Rome, a series of gruesome portents, and three predictions of the future from a seer, an augur, and a bacchanal. The action in the second book continues to take place in Rome.

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61 See, for example, Lucan’s first explicit image of the two generals, as the Aegean and Ionian seas held apart by the narrow isthmus of Corinth, otherwise known as Crassus, in lines 1.100-104: *Qualiter undas/ qui secat et geminum gracilis mare seperat Isthmos/ nec patitur conferre fretum, si terra recedat,/ Ionium Aegaeo frangat mare.* “Just like the slender isthmus which cuts the waves and divides the twofold sea and does not allow the water to come together, if the earth should recede, the Ionian sea would break the Aegean.” The two generals are here represented by roughly equal bodies of water, *geminum mare*, which are in reality part of the same whole; Lucan does not even specify which body of water represents which general.

62 See Hansen, 161-162 for an explanation of the importance of the general’s speech in historiography.

63 See Zoido, 154-155 for a discussion of Lesbonax of Mytilene’s speeches mimicking the battle exhortation.
where a number of civilians speak their laments, Brutus and Cato debate the merits of choosing a side in civil war, and Cato remarries a former wife. Our first narrative depiction of Magnus finally comes at 2.392, but Lucan only stays with the Pompeian army for a moment before embarking upon an extensive geographical digression that brings us back to Caesar’s march rather than Pompey’s. In his description of Caesar’s march Lucan takes the time to note the names of six Pompeian generals defeated by the Caesarian onrush before settling upon the story of Domitius, which he treats at some length in lines 2.478-525. In this episode, where Domitius attempts to prevent Caesar from reaching Corfinium by rerouting a river in his path but is handed over to the enemy by his own troops when their fate looks desperate, we actually hear two short speeches from the Pompeian subordinate, one urging his troops to stop Caesar and the second urging himself to suicide after Caesar has pardoned him.

It is not until Domitius’ episode has concluded that we finally come to Pompey himself at 2.531, already in the midst of an engagement with Caesar, and hear his long-anticipated speech to his troops. This delay of Pompey’s voice for an entire book builds anticipation as we hear of his movements but never meet the man himself while the tales of each subordinate general grow in importance and length. At the same time, however, the delay somewhat diminishes Pompey’s importance and image of authority, as we get a full picture of the other elite men serving under Pompey and even hear one of them speak before he does. By contrast, the only other Caesarians introduced so far have been Curio, who gives advice to Caesar but makes no decisions on his own, and Laelius, the fanatical centurion. This gives the reader the consistent impression that Caesar is the only man with personal authority on his side of the civil war and falls in line with

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64 2.462-477. Lucan gives us the fates of Libo, Thermus, Sulla, Varus, Lentulus, and Scipio, with increasing attention paid to each.
65 The episode is mentioned by Caesar in BC 1.17-20, where Domitius is given up by his troops only after they learn that he himself has lost hope; Lucan’s Domitius is steadfast in his defiance up through his suicide offstage.
66 The first speech is at 2.483-490; the second is 2.522-525.
the content of Laelius’ speech. In addition, Caesar is the first character we meet, both on the Caesarian side and in the epic as a whole, further elevating his importance. With Pompey, however, although he is at the pinnacle of an eight part crescendo of generals, he is still one of many, and he still has to wait until the second book to speak, after Caesar has already delivered four speeches. This literary tactic of Lucan’s reflects the historical Pompey’s political problems during the civil war, as the support of the Senate put too many competing voices in the Pompeian camp and, ironically enough, proved to be a hindrance rather than a help.

When Pompey finally does give his speech to the troops asking for their support in the face of Caesar’s approaching army, he begins with an address to the *ultores scelerum melioraque signa secuti* and takes several lines to establish his army’s legitimacy according to the laws of Rome.67 He admits that they are at a disadvantage, having lost the first engagements, but maintains that those losses were what made their cause a moral one since their enemies were the ones to draw first blood. He draws on historical exempla from Rome’s recent past in an attempt to avoid classifying his actions as civil war: *Neque enim ista vocari/ proelia iusta decet, patriae sed vindicis iram.*68 As he continues, Pompey’s *ad hominem* attacks on Caesar increase in frequency and fervor, as does his inflation of his own image, and the speech ends with a twenty-line litany of Pompey’s past victories against the various enemies of Rome before finally closing with the dubiously inspirational *quod socero bellum praeter civile reliqui?*69 Pompey, like

67 2.531-533. The first three lines as a whole read, *O scelerum ultores melioraque signa secuti,/ O vere Romana manus, quibus arma senatus/ non private dedit, votis deposcete pugnam,* or “O avengers of crimes and followers of the better standards, O truly Roman band, to whom the senate gave arms that were not private, demand battle with vows.”

68 2.539-540. “For it is not right for these to be called just battles, but rather the anger of an avenging fatherland.” Roller notes that a *bellum iustum*, for which he thinks *proelia iusta* is a metrical variant, is specifically a war against a foreign *hostis* (“Ethical Contradiction,” 323).

69 2.595. “What have I left for my father-in-law except civil war?” Not only does this phrase put the blame for the civil war back on Pompey’s shoulders, even if uttered flippantly, but *socero* draws uncomfortable attention to the familial relationship of the two generals that should not be violated.
Caesar, fails to rouse a positive response from his troops, who neither shout nor demand battle, and he is forced to retreat.

After waiting hundreds of lines, the reader has finally met Pompey and heard him speak, only to see him fail. Caesar’s first speech to his troops was equally ineffectual, even sharing some of the same pitfalls, but Lucan had already given him a successful speech against a goddess during his encounter with Roma at the Rubicon and the general was soon rescued by his *primus pilus* speech. Pompey, as Fantham notes, never seems weaker in the whole epic than he does here, failing to produce a successful piece of rhetoric and obsessing over his past victories in a way that only appears insecure. Apart from the ineffectual *ad hominem* attacks, a tactic that Caesar used to little effect as well, Pompey articulates a moral system that Roller calls the communitarian view, emphasizing the *Romanitas* of both his army and his enemy and viewing the civil war as an internal conflict within one large community. This can be demonstrated by Pompey’s insistent reminders that his army is the truly Roman one, the *vere Romana manus*, made all the more striking in comparison to Caesar’s parallel speech. Although Caesar accuses Pompey of tyranny and calls upon his troops to liberate the city from the autocrat, a strategy which Pompey echoes throughout his speech, Caesar never uses the word *Romanus*, preferring to skirt around the issue that two Roman armies are fighting with one another. Laelius’ speech is all the more effective precisely because it denies the supremacy of Rome and the soldiers’ identification as Roman citizens, replacing the entire notion with loyalty to Caesar instead. Pompey, on the other hand, uses the adjective *Romanus* three times in his speech and bases his

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70 Fantham, 32 and 526-609 n.
71 See Roller, 323-324 for an exploration of the communitarian view within this speech.
72 At 2.532, Pompey addresses his troops as *O vere Romana manus*, or “O true Roman band,” at 2.564-565, he boasts, *non privata cupis, Romana quisquis in urbe/ Pompeium transcire paras*, or “you do not desire to be a mere private citizen, whoever prepares to surpass Pompey in the Roman city,” and 2.580-582 he again boasts of his *Romanitas: idem per Scythici profugum divortia ponti/ indomitum regem Romanaque fata morantem/ ad mortem*
entire argument around the principle that he is the true Roman avenging the wrongs done to the state, the one who has always protected Rome against her enemies. At 2.541-549, in his attacks against Caesar Pompey compares his enemy to insubordinate Romans from recent history rather than foreign adversaries, calling Caesar a Catiline, Lentulus, Cethegus, Marius, Cinna, Lepidus, Carbo, and Sertorius, culminating with Spartacus at 2.554. Caesar, on the other hand, calls himself a Hannibal. While Pompey and Caesar approach their status as Romans very differently in their two speeches to the troops, both try to use a combination of *ad hominem* attacks and the notion of rescuing Rome from an oppressor to convince their troops to fight, and fail doing so. Pompey ultimately fails where Caesar does not because he has no Laelius figure to redefine a moral system for him and no Odysseus to convince his troops to fight on.

The fact that Pompey lacks a Laelius or an Odysseus may initially come as a surprise to the reader, as Lucan’s parallels between Caesar and Pompey’s first speeches to their troops go beyond their content and poor reception. The episode with Pompey in Book 2 also hearkens back to the scene in the second book of the *Iliad* with Agamemnon, Odysseus, and Thersites, and not just through its connection with Caesar and Laelius in Book 1. Before Pompey begins his speech, Lucan opens the scene with *iamque secuturo iussurus classica Phoebο/ temptandasque ratus moturi militis iras/ adloquitur tacitas veneranda voce cohortes.* This, as Fantham notes, echoes Agamemnon as he prepares for his major attack but decides to test his troops with words first. The circumstances are not identical, as Pompey speaks in earnest while Agamemnon hopes for a reaction opposite of what he says, but both use verbs of testing or trying to describe their actions.

*Sulla felicior ire coegi*, or “again I, luckier than Sulla, forced the indomitable king, who had been delaying the fate of Rome, through the isthmus of the Scythian sea in flight to his death.”

73 Caesar’s comparison of Hannibal’s march to his own comes during his speech to his troops at 1.303-305.
74 2.527-530. “And now on the following day, he was about to order the trumpets and then thought the passion of the troops who were about to march should be tested, and he spoke to the cohorts, silent because of his voice which must be revered.”
75 See Fantham, 526-609 n. and *Iliad* 2.73, πορώτα δ’ ἐγὼν ἐπεισιν πειρήσωμα.
After his speech has been given and he has no choice but to retreat, Pompey’s flight to Brundisium is described like that of a defeated bull, exiled to the forest, who regains his strength against tree trunks before returning and conquering his rival.\textsuperscript{76} The passage is clearly playing off the image in \textit{Georgics} 3.225-236 of a defeated bull who is also described as an exile and sharpens his horns on trees in the woods,\textsuperscript{77} but it also reaches back even further to the \textit{Iliad} once more, where Agamemnon, having finally mustered his troops and prepared for battle, is described, ήνετε βοῦς ἀγέληψι μέγ’ ἔξοχος ἔπλετο πάντων ταύρος: ο γάρ τε βόεσσι μεταπρέπει ἀγρομένησι.\textsuperscript{78} Both Pompey and Agamemnon are transformed into bulls after their speeches: Agamemnon is a successful bull who is at the head of his herd, while Pompey is a bull who had been defeated in battle and is forced to flee to prepare himself for the next one. These echoes of Agamemnon are reinforced for Pompey by the fact that Pompey, like Agamemnon, is the leader of many powerful aristocrats who had once held \textit{imperium}.\textsuperscript{79} Pompey even admits it himself in his speech: \textit{hinc consul uterque, hinc acies statura ducum est}.\textsuperscript{80} His army of princes and hints of Agamemnon do him no good, however, since Pompey is doomed to watch his test fail while none of his aristocratic friends steps up and takes Odysseus’ role as Laelius did for Caesar.

The portraits of Pompey and Caesar as painted by these two episodes, both in the words spoken and actions described, show Lucan’s pleasure in toying with the historical images of the two generals. The opening of Caesar’s speech with \textit{bellorum o socii}, Roche notes, is an

\textsuperscript{76} 2.601-607.
\textsuperscript{77} In Lucan, the bull is described as an \textit{exul} (603), and in the \textit{Georgics}, he \textit{exulat} (225); in Lucan, the bull \textit{in adversis explorat cornua trunci} (603), and in the \textit{Georgics}, \textit{irasci in cornua discit/ arboris obnixus trunco} (232-233).
\textsuperscript{78} 2.480-481. “Just as a bull stands out before all from the herd, for he is distinguished among the assembled oxen.”
\textsuperscript{79} Fantham (1985), 566 mentions the connection between Agamemnon and Pompey as leaders of armies of princes.
\textsuperscript{80} 2.565-566. “Here is each consul, here the battle line of leaders will stand.”
acknowledgment of Caesar’s famous use of the word *commilitiones* with his troops. Suetonius claims that Caesar’s use of the word was successful and flattered his troops into submission, and yet this rhetorical tack of commonality and equality throughout the army is the one that Lucan quickly proves to be ineffectual. In fact, the strategy that Lucan suggests is the most effective, the elevation of the commander as far above the troops as possible as suggested by Laelius, is the polar opposite of the strategy the historical tradition ascribes to Caesar. It is almost as if Lucan acknowledges the strategy the historical Caesar is said to have used, lets his character Caesar behave in some ways like the historical Caesar, and then changes his behavior through Laelius into something Lucan prefers.

These two opening interactions with the troops give the impression that Caesar, despite his rocky start, is on a better footing with his men going forward, while Pompey lacks their support. Pompey may now have the passionless advocacy of Cato and the slightly more enthusiastic support of Brutus after their debate earlier in Book 2, but he fails to connect with the common soldier on a motivational level. These images of Caesar the demagogue and Pompey the inspirationally lackluster leader are ones easily found in the historical tradition. Yavetz notes that Pompey’s attempts at popularity with the urban masses were never very successful, as Cassius Dio attests in his *Historiae Romanae*. In fact, Pompey was even depicted in contemporary rhetoric as the enslaver of the people, as Lucan’s Caesar does when he accuses him of tyranny at the end of his speech to the troops in Book 1.

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81 Roche n. 299. See also Campbell, 33 for a discussion of Caesar’s *commilitiones* usage.
82 Yavetz, 49.
83 Dio 41.6.1, φοβηθεὶς οὖν διὰ ταύθ᾽ ὁ Πομπήιος ἴτα, γὰρ εὖ ἠπιστάτο ὅτι πολὺ τοῦ Καίσαρος, ἀν γε ἐπὶ τῷ δῆμῳ γενώντα, “then Pompey was afraid about these things, for he knew well that he would be much inferior to Caesar, if it were put to the people.”
84 Yavetz, 53.
Caesar’s appeal to the common people and Pompey’s lack thereof were also reflected in the composition of their armies, another fact that Lucan utilizes. Pompey’s plethora of aristocratic support has already been noted, with both consuls and Cato firmly at his side. Cicero wrote privately late in 50 BCE that Caesar’s supporters were all debtors, plebs, criminals, and the tribunes, and that no nobiles would join him in his camp. Cicero was wrong in the end, of course, as Caesar eventually gained support from Romans of all types, but Caesar nevertheless retained the favor of the lower classes and encouraged the heterogeneous composition of his constituency. While Lucan never explicitly discusses the class makeup of the two armies, he nevertheless gives us a sense through the types of characters who have spoken by the time that the speeches to the troops are given. After the list of all the Pompeian aristocratic generals who have fallen and the two short speeches from Domitius, the reader gets the firm sense that Pompey has a large support base of nobiles. The two Caesarians who speak, Curio and Laelius, are on opposite sides of the social spectrum, but as a tribune of the plebs and a centurion, both represent the lower classes in some sense and neither belong to the nobiles’ class.

In this first speech of Pompey’s, Lucan is able to acknowledge the epic tradition once more, draw comparisons between his two adversaries, and in doing so interact with the historical depictions of the two generals. If we turn back to focus on the general in question, however, we find that Lucan is making a point with his characterization of Pompey. This, as has been noted, is the first real time the audience interacts with Pompey as a character, and Lucan’s choice to make this first interaction be a dismal failure is a marked one. Lucan’s characterization of Caesar as a ruthless and bloodthirsty tool of fate leaves little room for sympathy, and like Brutus we are

85 Cic. Att. 7.3.5.
86 Yavetz, 44-45.
87 See Fucecchi, “Partisans in Civil War” for a fuller exploration of the types of supporters Pompey and Caesar each have in Lucan and their social classes and attitudes.
forced to concede to Cato, the moral voice of reason, and root for Pompey despite our uncomfortable prescience about the end of the story. When our first picture of Pompey is one of failure, however, it becomes that much harder to throw our support behind a losing horse in the reinforced knowledge that ultimately his fortunes will not change.

Lucan gives Pompey the seeds of a potential solution to this dilemma out of his own mouth as he tries to console his soldiers about their recent losses. *Di melius*, he begins, *belli tulimus quod damna priores:/ coeperit inde nefas, iam iam me praeside Roma/ supplicium poenamque petat. Neque enim ista vocari/ proelia iusta decet, patriae sed vindicis iram.* Pompey suggests that it is better for them to have suffered losses first, so that they can avenge wrongs done to their country rather than initiate conflict that can be seen as *nefas*. In Book 1, Laelius asks Caesar if it is really so terrible to conquer in civil war: *usque adeo miserum est civili vincere bello?* The allusion to Turnus’ speech noted previously makes the obvious answer a resounding yes in the minds of the audience, and we are clearly supposed to see Laelius’ moral system as flawed despite its easy instrumentation. In light of this, it is easy to extend Pompey’s assertion about the *nefas* of civil war and conclude that yes, it is so terrible to conquer in civil war, and, in fact, it is far superior morally to lose in civil war than to win. Pompey may not have a fanatical centurion ready to create a new moral system that excuses his actions, but his desperate grip on the old moral system makes him a nobler man even as his army fails him. His immediate failure as an orator and as a general makes Pompey a frustrating man to admire, but his conservative moral stubbornness redeems him as it damns him, a tragedy that resonates with readers. These two opening interactions between our major players and their troops, in accordance with their relation to the epic tradition, have served to define the characters of Caesar

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88 2.537-540. “It is better, gods, that we have borne the injuries of war first: let the impiety begin elsewhere, and now under my defense let Rome seek the punishment of suppliants. For it is not right for these to be called just battles, but rather the anger of an avenging fatherland.”
and Pompey as leaders against the foil of Agamemnon. When it comes to the common soldier, however, our lack of Thersites puts Lucan so far in a murky position. We have no contemptible common soldier to scorn, but neither does the common soldier yet have a voice.
Chapter Two

Caesar *Invictus*: The Mutiny at Placentia

So far, Lucan has explored the epic trope of an opening potential mutiny with Caesar, then expanded on it by creating a roughly parallel scene for Pompey. While he has spent more time on mutinies and speeches to the troops than any of his epic predecessors by expanding the initial mutiny into two scenes instead of one, his preoccupation can still be explained in typical epic terms and fits naturally into Lucan’s scheme of escalating epic tropes.\(^8^9\) When we reach Book 5, however, we find another mutinous situation, this time much closer to disaster for Caesar. The general and his army are returning to Italy (5.237), recently victorious in their campaign in Spain, when the troops decide that they have had enough and anonymously give Caesar a list of complaints, including long tours of service, their discomfort with civil war, old age, and lack of gratitude for their service. Caesar, however, is unafraid and replies with angry scorn, claiming that he has no need of their help and that it is the general who is important for victory, not the men beneath him. He addresses them as *quirites* and demands that the ringleaders be executed, which settles the issue.

This event in Lucan, like the speech of Curio at Arminium, seems to be combining the two mutinies mentioned by Suetonius and later historians as examples of the few short-lived mutinies that Caesar suffered during the civil wars.\(^9^0\) The first was said to have happened at Placentia in the end of 49, when Caesar ordered the ninth legion to march to Brundisium and, from there, to more service in the East. The ninth had been in service for over a decade and

\(^8^9\) Compare, for example, the structure of Lucan’s proem. Vergil’s introduction is 33 lines long, while Lucan’s is 66; Vergil is singing about *arma virumque*, two direct objects in comparison to the one in both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, while Lucan has eight phrases as direct objects.

\(^9^0\) These mutinies are attested in Suetonius *Iul*. 69-70, Appian 2. 47. 194 and 2. 93. 388-96, and Cassius Dio 41. 27-35 and 42. 52-55.
refused to obey, presumably out of exhaustion; Caesar visited the mutinous camp and discharged them in disgrace, only allowing the immediately repentant soldiers back into service once he had punished the ringleaders.\textsuperscript{91} The other mutiny Lucan draws upon is the better known one near Rome in 47, where the legions, who were about to be sent to Africa, refused to go and threatened to attack the city instead. Caesar famously called the rebellious legions \textit{quirites}, or citizens, and threatened to disband them; the soldiers, immediately cowed, insisted upon going to Africa with him, even though many were docked a third of their pay in punishment. Caesar the author unsurprisingly mentions neither event, but they are well enough attested as separate occurrences by later historians that Lucan appears to be once more tampering with history. Potential motivations are not hard to guess, since Lucan likely wanted to include the famous \textit{quirites} address but was not planning on reaching that point in history in the scope of his epic. The fact remains, however, that Lucan made a point of combining two occurrences, neither of which appears in Caesar’s commentary, using the setting of one and the details of another.

Book 5, believed by some to be the start of the second of three sections in Lucan’s proposed twelve book plan,\textsuperscript{92} opens with the two generals equal in standing:

\begin{quote}
\textit{sic alterna duces bellorum volnera passos}
\textit{in Macetum terras miscens adversa secundis}
\textit{servavit fortuna pares.}\textsuperscript{93}
\end{quote}

The action switches back and forth between the two generals as the book progresses and each leader faces his own challenges.\textsuperscript{94} The opening of the mutiny at 5.237 is the first we have seen of

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{91} See Fantham (1985), 119-120 for a concise summary of the historical evidence for both this mutiny and the following one near Rome.
\textsuperscript{92} See Ahl, 316-26 for an overview of the arguments over the reconstructed length of the epic, particularly concerning the death of Cato as the end point.
\textsuperscript{93} 5.1-3. “Thus Fortune preserved the leaders equally, having suffered wounds of war in turn in the lands of the Macedonians, mingling obstacles with successes.”
\textsuperscript{94} The book begins with a makeshift senate meeting in Magnus’ camp (7-68), continues following the Pompeians as Arrius consults at Delphi (68-236), then switches over to Caesar and the mutiny (237-373), Caesar and his quelled troops at Brundisium (374-460), the meeting of the two forces (461-475), Caesar’s struggle with Antony (476-508),
\end{footnotesize}
Caesar’s troops since Curio’s disastrous defeat in Libya at the end of Book 4. Caesar himself has been absent since he accepted Afranius’ surrender at Ilerda over six hundred lines earlier and, despite the subsequent losses of his generals, he himself was last seen as munificent and in control. Lucan takes a moment after the battle has been won to mourn the plight of Caesar’s soldiers, who have to continue fighting despite the inevitability of Caesar’s success: *ut numquam fortuna labet successibus anceps,/ vincendum totiens; terras fundendus in omnes/ est cruor et Caesar per tot sua fata sequendus.*

This image of a common soldier, predestined for terrible deeds and bullied into bloodshed by the force of the gerundive with no agency or visible presence in the sentence, is what Lucan challenges in the Book 5 mutiny.

When the mutiny begins in Book 5 and we finally turn to Caesar, Lucan immediately lets us know that the troops are no longer fighting without a say in the matter and that their general has a serious obstacle to overcome. Caesar, indomitable and fearless, has found something to fear, but within his own camp rather than on the battlefield, and Lucan admits that he is almost (*paene*) defeated by his own troops.

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\textit{haud magis expertus discrimine Caesar in ullo est, quam non e stabili tremulo sed culmine cuncta despiceret staretque super titubantia fultus.}\]

Despite Caesar’s eventual success at winning the loyalty of his troops in Book 1 and the narrator’s insistence that the troops are powerless in Book 4, the collective common soldiers are the ones who come the closest to stopping him, not Pompey or the senators at his back. In his brief sea journey and the subsequent mustering of his troops (509-721), before returning to Pompey and his decision to leave his wife on Lesbos (722-815).

95 4.390-392. “Even if Fortune never wavered, unpredictable in her successes, so often they have to conquer; their blood must be spilled in every land, and they must follow Caesar through so much of his fate.”

96 5.240-242, *nulla nam marte subactus/ intra castrorum timuit tentoria ductor/ perdere successus scelerum:* “The leader feared, never subdued in battle, that he might lose the successes of his crimes among the tents of his camp.”

97 5.249-251. “Caesar was never taught more in any other crisis how he looked down from a height that was trembling, not stable, and how he stood supported above everything that was faltering.”
exposition Lucan acknowledges that *non esse ducis strictos sed militis enses*,98 but goes on to qualify that soldiers are usually bound by a net of mutual fear and keep whatever doubts they may have to themselves.99 The sheer size of the *turba*, however, dispelled their fears and allowed them to speak out and wield their collective power. The entire introductory passage is fraught with words of fear, as Caesar *timuit… perdere successus scelerum*,100 the troops no longer produced a *pavidum… murmum*,101 their reason for silence is explained as *quisque pavet. quibus ipse timori est*,102 and the size of the crowd *metus exsolverat*.103 When the speeches begin, however, Caesar alone suffers from fear and the troops, *audax*, protest confidently.

After a lengthy exposition, Lucan introduces the mutineers’ speech with two words, *effudere minas*.104 *Effundo*, whose primary meaning “to pour out,” is most often associated with liquids and was frequently used poetically by Vergil and other Augustan writers to dispense solids such as arrows and riders from horses’ backs.105 It also, however, had a range of other meanings that invoked images of multitudes and crowds. Historians used the verb in a middle sense to describe the movements of bodies of people,106 and as a participle with crowds of soldiers usually meant “scattered” or “dispersed.”107 The verb clearly refers to an act of speaking here, as it does in Cicero and elsewhere,108 but this choice of diction corroborates the plural verb’s insistence that a large, potentially unruly group of people are the ones making demands.

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98 5.254, “That swords, once drawn, belong not to the general, but to the soldier.”
99 5.256-259, *nam quae dubias constringere mentes/ causa solet, dum quisque pavet, quibus ipse timori est,/ seque putat solum regnorum iniusta gravari,/ haud retinet*: “for the cause which was accustomed to bind their doubtful minds no longer held them, that each was frightened by those to whom he himself was frightening, and he thought himself the only one burdened by the injustices of his leaders.”
100 6.241-242.
101 5.255.
102 5.257.
103 5.259.
104 5.261, “They poured out threats.”
105 See *Aeneid* 9.509 and 10.574.
107 See *Aeneid* 6.305 and Liv. 30.5.8.
108 See Cic. *de Or.* 1.34.
The choice of _minas_ rather than _verba_ or some more neutral noun continues to articulate Lucan’s idea that fear is the predominant currency of the soldiers’ interpersonal relationships, both among each other and with their commander; the fact that the mutineers feel they can make threats in the first place also emphasizes the power that they have seized. To utilize this empowerment, however, the soldiers are forced to trade their individual identity. Unlike Laelius in Book 1 or even Thersites in the _Iliad_, the speaker of the coming speech is not named because, as Lucan just told us, the soldiers only get their power of complaint from their strength in numbers. To wield their collective power and voice their private thoughts, the mutineers have given themselves over to anonymity.

For a rowdy group of fearless soldiers, the mutineers begin their threats with a surprisingly polite request: _liceat discedere, Caesar,/ a rabie scelerum._\(^9\) Already we see the soldiers rebelling against Laelius’ moral order, which effectively eliminated the problem of _scelus_ by claiming that everything Caesar ordered was _ius_. Although they had previously agreed that it was not so bad to conquer in civil war, the soldiers now seem to have had a change of heart. These protests against civil war as a general evil continue as the mutineers protest with a marked one line _sententia: tot mihi pro bellis bellum civile dedisti._\(^10\) The soldiers come back to this type of argument as they weave through their speech, complaining of committing _nefas_\(^11\) and insisting that Caesar is forcing them to perform deeds although he was well aware of their moral qualms.\(^12\) The mutineers even go so far as to use this language to justify their current behavior, which defies the very heart of the system they were following under Laelius: _nec fas_

\(^9\) 5.261-262, “Let it be permitted, Caesar, for us to depart from the madness of crimes.”
\(^10\) 5.269, “You gave me civil war as a reward for so many wars.”
\(^11\) 5.272, _imus in omne nefas manibus ferroque nocentes_: “Committing the deepest _nefas_ in every way with hands and with swords.”
\(^12\) 5.284-285, _quid velut ignaros ad quae portenta paremur spe trahis_: “Why do you drag us with hope as if we are unaware for which omens we are being prepared.”
The mutineers continually use this strict moral language as their defense in the midst of their other arguments, as if to make up for their disregard for it in the past.

These other arguments range from nods to the various threads of the historiographical tradition to other responses to Laelius to emotionally charged death scenes. The first historiographical justification for their mutiny as put forward by Suetonius, namely that the soldiers were tired from years of fighting, is acknowledged early on in Lucan’s speech in a list of previous Caesarian deaths, and then gets a fuller treatment at 5.274-284. The mutineers urge Caesar to observe all the physical evidence of their old age before asking him to release them so they can die in peace. They then launch into a stirring depiction of lonely death on the battlefield as they bemoan their last breath with their helmets still on, the lack of a wife to mourn them, and the necessity of a shared funeral pyre, proving that, despite their collective lower class status, the mutineers are competent rhetoricians who can protest a lack of individuality in death.

The other justification from historiography, this time from Livy, is that the soldiers secretly wanted to sack Rome and felt that their greed was unsatisfied, which unsurprisingly finds its way into Lucan’s speech as well. Cepimus expulso patriae cum tecta senatu, they complain, quos hominum vel quos licuit spoliare deorum. This complaint, though a testament to their alleged greed, also reveals another point of contention that links back to the renewal of their belief in a moral code outside of Caesar’s wishes. The soldiers, though apparently once willing to burn Rome to the ground, seem to have rediscovered their allegiance to Rome, again in defiance of Laelius’ speech in Book 1. The seizure of the city appears to have been a deed that

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113 5.288-289, “Neither righteousness nor the chains of our oath forbid us to dare this.”
114 5.264-269.
115 See Fantham (1985), 120 for a discussion of the reconstructed treatment of the episode in Livy.
116 5.270-271, “When we seized the roofs of our homeland, after the Senate had been expelled, who of men and of the gods were we permitted to despoil?”
required considerable compensation, perhaps because they realized that it was not covered by a usual soldier’s duties. When they ask *quid satis est, si Roma parum est*, the mutineers again imply that the sacking of Rome was a deed that could not be surpassed, and by extension a wrong that perhaps should not have been committed.\(^{117}\)

Following their list of complaints, the soldiers try to justify their behavior, and their previously oblique references to questions of moral codes become explicit. After the mutineers insist that neither *fas* nor their military oath has the right to prevent the mutiny, they go on to explain, *Rheni mihi Caesar in undis/ dux erat, hic socius; facinus, quos inquinat, aequat.*\(^{118}\) Apart from the word play, this phrase is also a direct confrontation of the moral strategy of Caesar and Laelius. Caesar is effective precisely because he is a *dux* set above the rest, and his proposal that the entire army be *socii* with him from the opening of his speech in Book 1 was an utter failure.\(^{119}\) The mutineers may be consciously mocking Caesar, although historically speaking the troops Caesar spoke to at Arminium were not the troops that mutinied at Placentia, but whether intentional or not, this reminder of Caesar’s failed moral system has virtually the same effect on the reader, who cannot help but notice that Caesar’s troops are using his own words against him.

As the mutineers’ speech nears its end, the soldiers at last unknowingly deal with Lucan’s assertion from Book 4 that Fortuna and Caesar are ultimately in control of their lives. Their final complaint is that *quidquid gerimus, fortuna vocatur,* claiming that they have not received the credit they deserve for Caesar’s accomplishments.\(^{120}\) This conscious claim of agency is followed by an even more decisive insistence on the common soldier’s importance: *Nos fatum sciat esse*

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\(^{117}\) 5.2274, “What is enough, if Rome is too little?”

\(^{118}\) 5.289-290, “Caesar was my commander at the Rhine, here he is my equal associate; crime makes equals whomever it stains.”

\(^{119}\) See Hardie, 7 for a discussion of the opposition of *dux* and *miles* in Lucan, following in the footsteps of Ovid and Livy.

\(^{120}\) 5.292, “Whatever we accomplish, it is said to be Fortune.”
licet omne deorum/obsequium spes, irato milite, Caesar,/pax erit. After turning the assumption that the soldiers’ fates are led by Caesar on its head, the mutineers deride Caesar’s alleged connection to the gods before invoking a new element in the equation: peace. The soldiers have previously asked for the opportunity to retire and implied that they were uncomfortable with Caesar’s methods, but this is the first (and last) time they have mentioned a complete cessation of hostilities. Pax, and pax deorum in particular, is conventionally a goal to be strived for, but the soldiers know Caesar well enough to recognize that peace is something their general only dreams about in nightmares. Contrary to the wishes of Caesar, this pax is ultimately what Lucan and his Roman audience hope for, and Lucan tells us before the episode even begins that the soldiers almost achieve it; we know in our heart of hearts that Caesar is in fact destined by the course of history to succeed, but we believe, as the soldiers do in this moment, that the common soldiers of Caesar’s army together have enough power to stop the war. Lucan does not allow the mutiny to stop the war, as he admits once the speech is done, but he ends the section with the decisive line, finem civili faciat discordia bello.

Any other general would be terrified in the face of the tumultus before him, Lucan acknowledges, but not Caesar. Despite the defiant conclusion of the mutineers’ speech, Caesar trusts the power of his fate and rejoices in the opportunity to face the danger of mutiny. The only thing Caesar fears is the possibility that his soldiers will regain sound minds, and he is happy, the narrator acknowledges, to ignore his soldiers’ request and force them to perform deeds they would otherwise be unwilling to undertake. When Caesar finally speaks, he is non metuens,

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121 5.293-295, “Let him know that we are his fate. Although you hope for every obedience, Caesar, there will be peace of the gods with the anger of the soldier.”
122 For the special significance of pax deorum, see, for example, Livy 3.5.14, where in response to terrible omens in the sky, omnia delubra pacem deum exposcentium virorum mulierumque turba implebantur, “All the temples were filled with crowds of men and women praying for the peace of the gods.”
123 5.299, “Let discord bring an end to civil war.”
124 5.309-316.
like the mutineers before him, and, regardless of whatever Lucan has told us about Caesar’s fears in the past, he is now driven by anger.  

Lucan’s entire description of the mutiny is filled with anger, an emotion that is both stereotypical and problematic for both sides of the mutiny. The historical Caesar was famous for his *clementia* towards his enemies, which was so great that it arguably caused his death, and Sallust even has his Caesar condemn public officials who display *iracundia* during the Catilinarian debate. Lucan chooses to discard this historical impression in favor of a ruler who rages at his subjects, as Caesar begins his speech to his troops *ira dicante*. The mutineers ended their speech, as we have seen, threatening the consequences of their own anger: *irato milite, Caesar,/ pax erit.* Caesar picks up on this promise of anger in the first line of his speech in response: *qui modo in absentem voltu dextraque furebas,/ miles.* Conventional Republican wisdom puts Caesar the angry Roman officer in the wrong, but the anger of the troops is more difficult to decipher without simply writing it off as the product of the *rabies* that comes with a crowd, a stereotype Caesar takes advantage of going forward. Even if the mutineers display a stereotypical show of anger, which is tempered by their promise of peace, Caesar’s even more unseemly display plays on Imperial Roman fears of an emperor’s unbridled anger. Although it is difficult to side with a raving crowd, the fact that Caesar responds to their anger with anger of his own puts him even more deeply in the wrong as soon as his speech begins.

125 5.318.
126 See Harris, 243 for a discussion of Caesar’s *clementia* and its relationship to *iracundia*. See also Dio 38 11.3-5 for the later historian’s view on Caesar’s lack of anger even while meting out harsh punishments.
128 5.318.
129 5.294-295.
130 5.319-320, “You, soldier, who was recently raging against an absent man with your face and with your hand.”
131 Angry heroes were, however, slightly more acceptable in the genre of epic. Consider the anger of Achilles – arguably the central theme of the *Iliad* – or the more problematic anger of Aeneas at the end of the *Aeneid*, which is explored in Harris, 246-247.
132 *De ira* ii.34.1, “It is dangerously volatile to contend with an equal, mad to contend with a superior, and vile to contend with an inferior.”
133 See Harris, 253-254 on the Imperial Roman fear of the tyrannical anger of the Julio-Claudians.
Although the mutineers waited until the end of their speech before bringing up the issues of *dux*, *socius*, and *miles* as their tour de force, Caesar wastes no time before asserting his dictatorial dominance over the troops. After the line accusing them of rage, Caesar opens his second line with a shaming address to the singular *miles*, reinforcing Laelius’ moral schema. The powerful crowd of mutineers has already been cowed into a singular soldier, stripped of their power in a single word, and Caesar is quick to assert himself as a *dux invictus* four lines later. He almost immediately gives two blunt one line commands in the imperative, one singular and one plural, scornfully ordering his former troops to *hic fuge, si belli finis placet, ense relict*, and *vadite meque meis ad bella relinquite fatis*. For all their firm demands, the mutineers spoke respectfully to Caesar, never once using an imperative; Caesar, in his confidence, never hesitates to order the men like the soldiers they were. Caesar’s favorite point, slightly less emphasized than the mutineers’ invocation of morality, is his assertion of the gods’ investment in his cause. This comes first as a direct rebuttal to the soldiers’ claim that they control his fate, as he asks, *an vos momenta putatis/ ulla dedisse mihi? numquam sic cura deorum/ se premet, ut vestrae saluti/ fata vacent.* Caesar returns to this idea and the assertion of his superiority when he insists that *procerum motus haec cuncta secuntur;/ humanum paucis vivit genus,* before claiming loftily that the gods, who are on his side, must wish for him to acquire new troops and are dismissing the old ones willingly. In these repeated reminders, Caesar is combating his troops’ assertion that they are all equal and liable to their crimes with a

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134 5.320.
135 5.321, “Flee from here, if the end of the war pleases you, once you have left behind your sword.”
136 5.325, “Go and leave me behind with my fates to war.”
137 5.339-342, “Do you think that you have given any importance to me? The concern of the gods will never oppress itself so much, that the fates will be idle enough for your safety.”
138 5.342-343, “All these things follow the movements of the leading men; the human race lives for the sake of the few.”
139 5.351-353.
reiteration of Laelius’ moral strategy, placing himself firmly on top of the moral ladder by the will of the gods.

On a larger scale, Caesar’s speech is essentially a bluff wrapped in reverse psychology. He uses both of his imperative orders to command the troops to abandon the war, the precise opposite of what Caesar truly wants, despite his boasts that he can easily find another army to finish the job. Caesar’s stirring image of old age is not of a tired soldier dying alone on a battlefield, but of a feeble ex-soldier, merely a part of the plebs Romana, watching as another army marches in Caesar’s triumph. This scornful classification as the plebs Romana may have subtly evoked Caesar’s famous quirites address for a Roman reader, still unaware that Lucan is playing with the historical record and combining this mutiny at Placentia with the later mutiny in Rome, and certainly mocks the troops’ newly rediscovered loyalty to Rome over Caesar. The speech, however, reaches its climax with a direct answer to the mutineers’ original request to discedere: discedite castris,/ tradite nostra viris ignavi signa quirites. Once again, Lucan gives Caesar an imperative ostensibly encouraging the troops to leave, replying to their demands with a surprising affirmative. By the time Caesar describes their mutiny as a rabies, an echo of the mutineers’ first request to be released a rabie scelerum, and commands the ringleaders to submit to punishment, the soldiers are utterly defeated and offer themselves for execution without protest. The soldiers, once so confident, fall for Caesar’s bluff and let go of their power of their own volition.

Unlike the soldiers of Agamemnon, Caesar’s mutineers are deeply affected by his reverse psychology, effective not so much in its logical persuasive arguments, of which there are few, but rather in its deep shaming. Laelius, too, used shame rather than logic to convince the soldiers

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140 5.328-334.
141 5.357-358, “Leave the camps, cowardly citizens, and give my standards back to men.
to follow Caesar in the first place, not even bothering to employ direct address. Our four examples of speeches to soldiers so far – Caesar’s first attempt, Laelius’ correction, Pompey’s failed attempt and Caesar’s decisive second try – suggest that typical Roman logic will never be an effective motivation for a soldier to participate in civil war: unless scelus can be redefined, no logical argument will be able to combat it.

Once Caesar is done with them, the troops give up their mutiny and become a singular frightened entity once more, as befits a group whose power came from their numbers. After Caesar’s speech finishes, tremuit saeva sub voce minantis/ volgus iners, unumque caput tam magna iuventus/ privatum factura timet, velut ensibus ipsis/ imperet invito moturus milite ferrum. The troops have become a singular volgus, and even a singular iuventus, and this time it is Caesar who is uttering the threats (minantis) in stark contrast to the group of men who, plural, effudere minas. The narrator’s aphorism that non esse ducis strictos sed militis enses is turned on its head. The soldiers are, in accordance with the epic tradition as set down by Homer and Vergil, described in the same terms as the storm soon to come in Book 5, and like the storm they are cowed by the force of Caesar’s personality and the weight of his fate. Despite their assertion that they control his fate, after a brief moment of uncertainty soldiers and readers alike are forced to accept that Caesar is truly a force that cannot be stopped.

\[142\] 5.364-367, “The helpless crowd trembled beneath the voice of the man threatening them, and such great young manhood feared a single man, although they were about to make him a private citizen, as if he could command their swords themselves, about to set the iron in motion though the soldier was unwilling.”

\[143\] See Fantham (1985), 122 for a chart of the correspondences between the mutinous soldiers and the storm.
Chapter Three
Cato’s Inheritance: The Mutiny in Libya

Our final outburst from the troops comes in the first half of Book 9 against Cato, a new military player after the death of Pompey. This mutiny appears at the beginning of the end, the start of the final third of the theoretical twelve book plan. Cato has been absent from the narrative since he threw his support behind Pompey in Book 2, but he reappears almost immediately after Pompey’s death as a literal inheritor of Pompey’s spirit. Although Cato had hated Magnus for his tyrannical leanings while alive and had only pledged his support to the Pompeian faction out of loyalty to the senate, post Thessalicas clades iam pectore toto/ Pompeianus erat. The remainder of Pompey’s post-Pharsalian army, however, is loyal to Pompey exclusively, not to a larger cause, and so when their leader’s funeral has finished, his soldiers prepare to give up their standards and flee. The Cilician king Tarcondimotus leads the way, but Cato halts his progress with a few disdainful words. The mutineer’s speech comes instead from a nameless member of the discontented crowd, who politely informs the new general that they fight for Pompey, not for Rome, before leading a rush for the ships parallel to the Iliad. It takes an impassioned speech from Cato, full of shame, admonition, and sarcastic calls for even greater crimes, to turn the ships around and convince the men to keep fighting. Cato, like Caesar in Book 5, is successful in quelling his mutiny, though it is the closest call yet.

If we extend our scope of inquiry beyond the mutiny itself, we see that Cato has essentially been in dialogue with Pompey’s troops since his eulogy at Pompey’s funeral at line

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144 9.17-18, et scelerum vindex [manes Pompei] in sancto pectore Bruti/ sedit et invicti posuit se mente Catonis, “And the spirit of Pompey, the avenger of crimes, settled in the sacred breast of Brutus and placed itself in the unconquered mind of Cato.” Note that even though Cato is seemingly influenced by the spirit of Pompey, he is still invictus.

145 9.23-24, “After the slaughter in Thessaly, now he was entirely Pompeian in his heart.”
188 and continues to interact with them, with a few notable digressions, up until the end of their march across the Syrtes at line 937. Cato gives a funeral oration, the troops stir with mutiny, Cato gives a brief rebuke, the mutineer gives his speech, and Cato replies with a lengthy speech of his own, a one hundred line exchange where Lucan gives Cato three separate addresses to the troops. There is a lengthy geographical digression describing the harshness of the region they are about to face, but as soon as the narrative returns to Cato at 371 he gives yet another speech to the troops, this time to encourage them to march across the barren sands. After they respond positively, Lucan launches into another lengthy description of the harsh climate and the suffering of the troops within it, but Cato’s voice is back soon enough, rebuking a soldier who tries to offer him a drink of water. Following the discovery of a temple and a brief debate between Labienus and Cato over the benefits of knowing the future, still technically a conversation between Cato and a subordinate, Lucan gives us a detailed description of Cato’s interaction with the troops as they all suffer together at 587, punctuated by yet another brief speech from Cato to his troops about the safety of the drinking water.

In spite of all of Cato’s speeches to the soldiers, we have to wait until line 848 for the soldiers to finally speak again, and despite the narrator’s earlier assurance of their newfound willingness to cross the desert,\(^{146}\) they do not have particularly positive things to say. This is, of course, after the infamous snake passage, and Lucan’s readers have just been subjected to a catalogue of soldier names, snake species, and gory deaths. The soldiers, plural yet speaking as one, beg the gods \textit{saepe} to return them to the horror of Pharsalia, as they are intruding upon a serpentine realm harsher than civil war. \textit{Cogit tantos tolerare labores/ summa ducis virtus}, Lucan

\(^{146}\) 9.406-408: \textit{Sic ille paventes/ incendit virtute animos et amore laborum/ inreducemque viam deserto limite carpit, “Thus he kindled their fearful spirits with virtue and a love of labors, and, having left the boundary behind, seized the path from which there would be no return.”}
notes, and yet their toleration is grudging at best. After Caesar quells his mutiny in Book 5, his troops never complain again and, apart from their assent before Pharsalia, have very little further presence in the epic. Cato, however, is continually talking with the troops that slowly become his. After the march finishes, Cato disappears from the rest of the extant poem, and while some speculate that he would have come back to make one more stand before his suicide at the end of Book 12, his actions in Book 9 are almost entirely defined by his interaction with the common soldiers. The mutiny against him in lines 215-294 cannot be taken as a standalone event, therefore, but as a pivotal moment in Cato’s development as a leader of Pompey’s men.

Cato, the perfect exemplum of a Republican hero, has no interest in partisanship or one man rule. Although he advises Brutus to join Pompey’s side rather than stay aloof from the fighting in Book 2, he strongly objects to the admission of the mutineer that the army fights for Pompey instead of for Rome. Despite his often expressed distaste for autocrats at the heads of armies, Cato steps forward and becomes one himself as soon as he delivers Pompey’s funeral oration. After his death, Pompey undergoes metempsychosis, perhaps echoing the stories of Caesar’s apotheosis after his own murder, but the vindex scelerum is soon put in its place by Cato’s eulogy. The first two words of Cato’s speech, civis obit, make it clear that Pompey was merely a man, and while civis may be a higher compliment than dux coming from the mouth of Cato, it still places Pompey on the same level as every other Roman citizen. The rest of the speech is hardly a ringing endorsement; Cato carefully balances Pompey’s strengths and weaknesses in both content and structure, with such lines as iuvit sumpta ducem, iuvit dimissa

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147 9.881-882: “The outstanding virtue of their leader compelled them to tolerate such great labors.”
148 See, for example, the opening of book nine, where Lucan notes, [Cato], ubi pendebant casus dubiumque manebat, quem dominum mundi facerent civilia bella, oderat et Magnum, quamvis comes isset in arma/ auspiciis raptus patriae ductuque senatus, or “While the fates were hanging in the balance doubt remained, whom civil war would make the master of the world, Cato hated Pompey also, although he went with him as a comrade in arms, seized by the auspices of the country and the generalship of the Senate” (9.19-22).
149 See Seo, 217, for a further exploration of Pompey’s metempsychosis in Cato’s eulogy.
potestas. Cato ends his litany of mixed praise with the benefits of Pompey’s condition in such a time and at the very last turns the speech towards himself. The et mihi at the beginning of his first sentence (212) emphasizes this, and Cato goes on to note that non deprecor hosti/ servari, dum me servet cervice recisa. Not only does this turn of rhetoric encourage the soldiers to imagine Cato in Pompey’s place, but it serves as one of the many reminders of Cato’s upcoming suicide that haunt the text for the readers and draws yet more attention to Cato as the new figure to watch. Lucan maintains once the speech is done that Cato brought greater honor to Pompey in his eulogy than the deceased general could have ever hoped to receive while praised at the Rostra, but after the considerable emphasis on Pompey’s faults, it is hard for readers not to turn to Cato as a better solution for the Republican cause.

Cato is now the next leader to take up the Republican cause, the recipient of Pompey’s inheritance. The implications of that remark, obvious as it may be, are worth exploring. We have already seen that Pompey could not stand up to Caesar in any significant way, despite their seemingly equal and opposite status. Caesar’s side has not won every battle, but when the two generals were face to face, Caesar always triumphed. We have also already seen how Caesar completely overwhelmed Pompey in his control over the troops; although it took him a failed speech before he found success, Caesar is able to assert complete supremacy over his troops in Book 5, while Pompey has no such luck in his parallel speech in Book 2 and is continually bullied by his technical subordinates. Cato is put forward, both by the narrator and by his own speech, as the new and improved leader of Pompey’s faction, but with that responsibility comes the assumption that he will be the single man in charge of an army, Caesar’s new equal and opposite. This authority and semi-heroic status gives Cato the very power he so despised in

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150 9.200, “Power taken up was pleasing to the leader, and power sent away was pleasing as well.”
151 9.213-214. “I would not beg to be preserved for my enemy, Caesar, while he preserved me with my head cut off.”
152 See, for example, Pompey and Cicero before Pharsalia, where Cicero essentially forces him into action.
Pompey and makes the denouncer of autocrats similar to Caesar on some level. Cato insults the dux, the rector, and the rex and is held up in the minds of the readers as the Republican ideal, and yet he has to step into the shoes of a Pompey or a Caesar when it falls to him to convince the troops to stay and fight. In fact, when the mutinous soldier begins his speech and addresses it to Cato, he *compellat regentem*, while Cato had rebuked Pompey for being a *rector senatus* a mere thirty lines earlier. When Cato begins his speech in reply, Lucan speaks of the *voces ducis*. As soon as Cato takes it upon himself to confront the troops and engage in this dialogue, he steps into Pompey’s shoes, and while historians call Pompey’s side the Republicans, Lucan never refers to them as anything other than the Pompeians.

The troops seem to concur with Lucan’s assessment, since the soldiers decide to abandon camp a mere sentence after Cato’s speech is done despite Cato’s subtle assumption of the Pompeian mantle. *Fremit interea discordia volgi*, Lucan begins, *castrorum bellique piget post funera Magni*. This language of the volgus and the murmurs it makes when discontented are common in Lucan and indirectly echo the crowd of Caesarian soldiers upset by Caesar’s unsuccessful speech in Book 1: *non claro murmure volgus/ secum incerta fremit*. Their reasoning, that the soldiers were tired of camps and war after Pompey’s funeral, seems straightforward enough, but the phrase *post funera Magni* could be interpreted in two ways. The first is corroborated by the later speech of the mutineer, and takes *funera Magni* metaphorically to mean Pompey’s death. The soldiers were only fighting for Pompey, and now that he is gone they have no reason to endure camp life or warfare. The second takes a more literal interpretation

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153 9.226. *Rego*, the verb meaning “to rule,” was an extremely loaded word in the minds of Romans, and carried heavy connotations of tyranny.
154 9.194.
155 9.255.
156 9.217-128. “Meanwhile discord of the crowd murmured, and camps and wars were wearisome after the funeral of Pompey.”
157 1.352-353, “The crowd muttered uncertainties to itself in an unclear murmur.” The crowd Vergil describes in his simile of the winds is a *volgus* as well.
of *funera Magni*, and assumes that Lucan is talking about the funeral rites themselves. Cato’s speech has just concluded the funeral three lines before, and while there is no causal relationship implied by *interea*, it seems at least possible that it was Cato’s speech on top of the death of their beloved commander that contributed to the discontent. If we can accept a hint of this reading, then we again have a connection to the mutiny in Book 1, one that further associates Cato with the hated Caesar: both leaders give speeches about Pompey which are met with discontented rumblings from the crowd, and another lengthy speech is required before the soldiers express their approval.

After a brief exchange with Tarcondimotus, Cato looks at *omnes/ in coetu motuque viros*, and *quorum unus aperta/ menta fugae tali compellat voce regentem*.158 Although Lucan uses a potential crowd word in *coetu*, this is overall an extremely humanizing portrayal of a crowd that was just recently a singular *volgus*. Cato sees *omnes viros*, who are collected together and in motion, but clearly made up of individuals. Unlike the mutiny in Book 5, in this scene we have an unnamed soldier singled out as the voice of the army’s complaints, which the wording *quorum unus* makes unmistakable. Laelius was a relatively common soldier with a voice and an individual speech, a character who shares further similarities with this unnamed mutineer, but this is the first time we see the spokesperson of a mutinous crowd as a physical person, even if he is unnamed. He even goes so far as to physically lead the movement onto the ships as an independent agent once he finishes speaking, reaching all the way back to the flight to the ships in the *Iliad* for parallels.

This mutineer speaks out and justifies their desertion by invoking the civil war strategy of Laelius, claiming that now that Pompey has died, the soldiers have nothing to fight for. The

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158 0.223-224, “All the men in a gathering and in motion, one of whom, with a mind open to flight, addressed the ruler with such a speech.”
mutineer’s speech opens plainly with his central argument: *Nos, Cato, -- da veniam – Pompei duxit in arma,/ non belli civilis amor, partesque favore/fecimus.*\(^{159}\) This is, of course, the heart of Laelius’ argument as well, who tells his commander that he would gladly obey any order so long as Caesar is giving it. One of the Book 9 mutineer’s more pithy lines comes near the end of his speech at 9.248, where he insists that *Pompeio scelus est bellum civile perempto,/ quo fuerat vivente fides.*\(^{160}\) This again encapsulates the precise point of much of Laelius’ content, as the centurion spends much of his time describing terrible acts of civil war he will perpetrate, no longer objectionable because they are undertaken out of a sense of *fides.*\(^{161}\) Laelius’ argument is underpinned by the assumption that Caesar is a man who should be elevated above all other men, which Caesar himself takes up more explicitly in his speech against the mutineers in Book 5. Cato, as we have seen, fights against this image of the near-holy autocrat in his funeral oration for Pompey, insisting that Pompey is simply a dead citizen who is now gone, but the mutineer seems to preserve some of this Laelian worship of his commander despite his death. In lines 240-242, he insists that the greatest honor will be furnished for the *sacris umbris,* reinforcing the prior image of Pompey as a venerable shade whose wishes should be heeded, and goes on to assert that he will have *nullum ducem* but Pompey, even if he is forced to obey another master. This elevation of the *dux* is very much in line with the speeches of both Laelius and Caesar and continues to extend this technique of crowd management through most of Lucan’s epic.

Although our nameless speaker echoes Laelius and by extension Book 5’s Caesar in his overarching message, he also bears significant resemblance to the Book 5 mutineers in the specific forms of his complaints, if not always in content. Both speeches begin surprisingly

\(^{159}\) 9.227-229, “Pompey led us, Cato, – grant us pardon – into arms, not a love of civil war: we made factions with his favor.”

\(^{160}\) “Civil war is a crime now that Pompey has been killed, which was faith while he was alive.”

\(^{161}\) See particularly 1.373-374: *Nec civis meus est, in quem tua classica, Caesar,/ audiero,* “Nor is he my fellow citizen, against whom I hear your trumpets sound, Caesar.”
politely for mutineers’ speeches: the Book 5 mutineers ask Caesar *liceat discedere*,\(^{162}\) while the Book 9 mutineer asks Cato to *da veniam*.\(^{163}\) Both mutineers talk about peace as a precious quality in direct opposition to their commander: the Book 5 mutineers end their speech with a threat that the soldiers will bring peace against Caesar’s will, while the Book 9 mutineer opens with a description of Pompey as the man *quem paci praetulit orbis*.\(^{164}\) They also, unsurprisingly, share a desire to go home and see their loved ones and spend a considerable time begging for deaths of old age.\(^{165}\) Although these are not particularly revolutionary similarities, considering the nature of the mutineers’ situations, the fact remains that despite their polar opposite ideological viewpoints – one group of soldiers is rebelling against the cause of following one man, while the other is mourning its loss – the mutineers ultimately have the same goals and echo one another in their speeches. This gives the Book 9 mutineer the peculiar position of representing both Caesar and his mutineers from the scene in Book 5, which leads us naturally to our next question: what about Cato? If the mutineer has verbal echoes of both an autocrat and a revolutionary, where does that leave the one man they are rebelling against?

When Cato begins his second speech to the troops, he uses what seems to be the obvious tactic for a moral Republican man and points out the mutineers’ misguided sense of loyalty: *ergo pari voto gessisti bella, iuventus,/ tu quoque pro dominis, et Pompeiana fuisti,/ non Romana manus?*\(^{166}\) This *iuventus* plays off of the conflation of singular and plural that characterized the single speaker for the crowd thirty lines earlier; a singular noun, *iuventus* could either refer to a specific singular youth, or to a group of young men forced into a single unit, as it does when Lucan describes Caesar’s cowed troops as a single entity in Book 5. Thus for the first half of

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\(^{162}\) 5.261.
\(^{163}\) 9.227.
\(^{164}\) 9.229, “whom the world preferred to peace.”
\(^{165}\) See 5.281-282 and 5.274-277; in comparison see 9.230-231 and 9.234-236.
\(^{166}\) 9.256-257, “Therefore have you waged war with an equal vow, young men, did you also fight for your master, and were you a Pompeian band, not a Roman one?”
Cato’s speech the readers are uncertain whether Cato is responding to the mutineer who spoke up directly or to the group of soldiers as a whole. Cato’s diction is notable beyond its ambiguity of addressee, however. As was just noted, Caesar’s troops are a _iuventus_ after Caesar quells the mutiny in Book 5, which is iterated twice in the nine line denouement after Caesar finishes his speech.\(^{167}\) In fact, this word _iuventus_ is used almost exclusively to refer to Caesar’s army from the end of Caesar’s speech until Cato takes it up at 9.256.\(^{168}\) This choice reinforces Lucan’s point that the Pompeian soldiers are just like Caesar’s soldiers in the end, but Cato continues to use the word even after the troops have allegedly promised themselves to the Republican cause. This, we shall see, is not the last time that Lucan equates Cato’s mutinous troops with Caesarians.

After he scolds the troops for preferring Pompey over Rome, slavery over personal freedom, Cato uses no scintillating turn of rhetoric to convince the troops to fight for Rome. In fact, his advice will sound strangely familiar: _ite, o degeneres_, he says, _Ptolemaei munus et arma spernite_.\(^{169}\) Three lines later, Cato commands them again, ordering _vadite securi_.\(^{170}\) These three imperatives strongly recall Caesar’s speech in Book 5, when he tells his troops to _hic fuge, si belli finis placet, ense relicto_,\(^{171}\) and _vadite meque meis ad bella relinquite fatis_.\(^{172}\) Not only does Cato use the same imperative, _vadite_, in his second phrase, but each imperative that Cato uses in this new stage of his argument falls at the beginning of a line, making his repeated demands for the soldiers’ departure impossible to miss. Although Cato takes a little more time to get to it, the explicit thrust of his speech is the same as Caesar’s: each commander is ordering his mutinous troops to simply leave. Neither of them, of course, would actually benefit if the troops

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\(^{167}\) See 5.365 and 5.373.

\(^{168}\) The one exception occurs at 8.122, when the people of Mytilene offer up their townspeople as troops (_iuventus_) for Pompey after he has lost his army at Pharsalia.

\(^{169}\) 9.268-269, “Leave, o degenerate men, spurn both the gift of Ptolemy and your arms.” The gift of Ptolemy refers to the death of Pompey, which has freed them from obedience to an autocrat.

\(^{170}\) 9.272, “Depart safely.”

\(^{171}\) 5.321, “Flee from here, if the end of the war pleases you, once you have left behind your sword.”

\(^{172}\) 5.325, “Go and leave me behind with my fates to war.”
obeyed them, but they each utilize the shame of their commands to manipulate the soldiers with reverse psychology. Cato even goes so far as to tell the troops to seize Cornelia and Pompey’s sons and to cut off his own head and bring it to Caesar. Cato’s speech ends with yet more imperatives, the ships return to shore, and *iusti patientia Martis* established once more.\(^{173}\)

Cato may have been treating the Pompeian soldiers like Caesarians, given their insistence on the Laelian view of civil war, and reverse-psychological commands may simply be the best way to control a mutinous crowd. Given the myths surrounding Cato, however, the painfully strict idealist should not be one to take the easy but ideologically problematic route. As a popular feature of Stoic *memorabilia* and rhetorical exercises by the Neronian period, Cato’s characterization in Lucan could not have escaped his sizable reputation outside of the poem, even – or especially – if Lucan never gave him some of his most famous qualities. As Seo puts it, “Cato’s *persona* had already been schematized by the Roman habit of creating *exempla* to serve a variety of cultural functions. The degree to which Cato fulfills or contradicts the expectations of his mytho-historical *persona* can illuminate how we read Lucan’s enigmatic protagonist.”\(^{174}\) Sallust famously wrote that Cato, in comparison to Caesar, did not contend with the partisan in being part of a faction, a quality Cato sets aside as soon as we meet him in Book 2 and fully rejects when he stoops to Caesar’s level.\(^{175}\) If we are expecting Cato to never be a proponent of one-man rule, an uncompromising idealist until the end, then his use of Caesarian tactics in dealing with the mutiny and taking command of a partisan army has to make us stop and reconsider his characterization.

Although the readers may have doubts about the Stoic purity of Lucan’s Cato, the soldiers in Lucan’s epic repeatedly mimic Cato and try to follow him as an *exemplum*. Even

\(^{173}\) 9.293.
\(^{174}\) Seo, 200.
\(^{175}\) Sallust, *Cat*. 54.6.
before the march through the Syrtes, Cato is continually imitated and foreshadowed in the suicidal scenes of various soldiers throughout the civil war.\textsuperscript{176} Cato himself continually reminds the readers of his upcoming suicide, arguably his most defining moment as an exemplum. In his funeral oration for Pompey, already the commemoration of pseudo-Catonian suicide, the only pure one line sententia clearly refers to the exemplarity of his own death: \textit{scire mori sors prima viris, sed proxima cogi}.\textsuperscript{177} The only problem is that the two “suicides” apart from Pompey’s that use Utica as a subject of mimesis are the aristeiae of Scaeva and Vulteius, the two crazed Caesarian centurions who gladly offer themselves to death for the sake of Caesar.\textsuperscript{178} Cato is once again being connected with fervent proponents of autocracy, and as he assumes the mantle of Pompey and inspires his troops to take up arms again and march across the desert in what is potentially group suicide, we have to wonder at the morality of his exemplum.

Seneca tells us in \textit{De Constantia} that Cato is a more certain exemplar of wise men (\textit{viri sapientis}) than Odysseus or Hercules.\textsuperscript{179} This moral supremacy should be seated in his Stoicism, in his dispassionate advocacy of Republicanism and what is best for the state. Seo proves convincingly, however, that if Lucan’s Cato is a Stoic, he is a poor one, noting his “anger, immoderation, and ultimately, disharmony with the plan of a malignant universe.”\textsuperscript{180} Cato’s speech to the mutineers is hardly a reasoned piece of Stoic rhetoric; the mere fact that it shares characteristics with a speech of Caesar’s shows how anti-Stoic the oration is. We can even anticipate the lack of Stoicism before the speech begins, when the narrator describes Cato’s act of speaking as \textit{erupere ducis sacro de pectore voces}.\textsuperscript{181} Not only does this line refer to Cato as a

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item\textsuperscript{176} See Seo, 200 on the imitation of Cato’s myth through suicide.
\item\textsuperscript{177} 9.211, “The best lot for man is to know when to die, but the next best is to be forced to die.”
\item\textsuperscript{178} See Seo, 201 for the specifics of the centurions’ imitation.
\item\textsuperscript{179} Sen. Const. 2.1, \textit{Catonem autem certius exemplar sapientis viri nobis deos immortalis dedisse quam Ulixen et Herculem proribus saeculis.}
\item\textsuperscript{180} Seo, 199.
\item\textsuperscript{181} 9.255, “Words burst out from the sacred breast of the leader.”
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dux already, but there are words bursting out of him, outside of his control, and they come from his *pectus*, not his *mens*. When the ghost of Pompey found its successors after its metempsychosis, it settled in the *pectus* of Brutus, but could only *invicti posuit se mente Catonis*.  

Now, however, that Cato has accepted control of the troops and stepped into Pompey’s place, he seems to be losing control of himself.

Cato, now a strange amalgamation of Caesar, Pompey, and pseudo-Stoicism, has to face his troops like any other general and convince them to follow him. Although his funeral oration seems to have been met with limited success, he manages to quell the mutiny with his Caesarian shame tactics, only to be faced with the task of convincing the troops to march yet again once they reach the terrors of the Syrtes. This speech succeeds again, and for a time the men prevail, spurred on by *virtus* and *amor laborum*, but the march has to be peppered with several more small speeches from Cato. Eventually, though there is no mutiny, after they are confronted with the snakes the men begin to complain again and ask the gods for reprieve. Although they initially welcomed Cato’s suicide mission like a Vulteius or a Scaeva, Cato’s men face their *agon* and crumble beneath the pressure, despite Cato’s *exemplum*. Pompey, who had too many scruples about freedom to match Caesar’s dictatorial dominance, could barely control his troops. His army becomes Cato’s inheritance, and there is brief hope that Cato will take his place over the troops and truly confront Caesar. In becoming Caesar’s equal, however, Cato becomes a sort of semi-tyrant, a passionate Stoic, whose half measures cannot succeed. Caesar journeys from unsuccessful speaker to firm autocrat as the books progress, and he never has trouble with his troops again once he puts them down. Cato journeys from Stoic to autocratic proponent of personal and governmental freedom and is reconvincing his troops for the whole time that we see

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182 9.17-18, “Placed itself on the unconquerable mind of Cato.”
183 9.407.
184 See Johnson, 54-56 for an exploration of the catalogue of snakes as an *agon* for the common soldiers.
him as a commander in the poem. Through his interaction with his troops, we can see that Cato performs a corrupted mimesis of his own, but his scruples hold him back. No one can out-Caesar Caesar.
Conclusion

Over the course of the *Bellum civile* we have watched Lucan outline a moral trajectory for Caesar, Pompey and Cato through their interaction with the troops. Lucan is able to create a rough framework for his exploration of the commander-soldier dynamic with his web of both inter- and intra-textual references, but although this has illuminated the characters of the generals and their relationships to one another, the moments of mutiny seem to have taught us more about the commanders who quell them than the soldiers who perpetrate them. Lucan may be more sensitive to the crowd than a Seneca or a Cicero, as he acknowledges the human individuality that creates a *volgus*, but his sympathy does not entirely redeem the crowds he portrays.

Despite Lucan’s vain hopes to the contrary, the fact remains that throughout his epic, with the possible exception of Pompey’s retreat in Book 2, the common soldiers always stay with their commanders. The one man always wins. This may be every Roman orator’s dream, but for Lucan it shows the ultimate failure of the Roman citizen soldier, who could not find his way to a moral path through civil war. Such a path may not exist, as Cato’s decline from Stoicism suggests, but one cannot help but wonder if Cato made the wrong choice in Book 2 when he decided against abstention from the war. Lucan gives a tantalizing glimpse of the right path for the common soldier in Book 4 when the Caesarian and Pompeian armies, who are camped near one another at Ilerda in Spain, set down their arms and come together to mingle, swap stories, and bemoan the horrors of civil war, not as partisans, but as Romans.\(^{185}\) Lucan’s narrator tells the troops how close they are to ending the conflict, begging them to simply disobey their

\(^{185}\) 4.169-211. Lucan notes at 4.179 *Nec Romanus erat, qui non agnoverat hostem*, “Whoever was not already acquainted with the enemy was no Roman.”
commander, but the Pompeian general soon bears down upon them and breaks the fraternization with words and the threat of his army of slaves. The soldiers return to their acceptance of crime, and our glimpse of hope is lost. Lucan’s account of this event differs greatly from both Caesar’s version, in which the Pompeian troops mutiny to the Caesarian side but their general wrangles them back with violence and oaths, and Cassius Dio’s later version, in which Pompey’s troops surrender on the condition that they can go free, but are once again prevented by their commanding officer. Lucan is clearly making a point with his mutual mingling: all the soldiers, no matter their side, are Romans, and if that could override whatever loyalty they have to their generals, there would be no civil war. As an Imperial writer looking back on the start of the civil wars that will destroy the Republic, Lucan is painfully aware of the importance of the army to one man rule and the power that they grant, making his lament all the more bitter.

Republican aristocrats like Cicero had to reconcile the centrality of the masses to their celebrated form of governance with the fact that these crowds can, in the eyes of history, choose spectacularly wrong. Ultimately, of course, Cicero met his end, and the Republic died with him. By the Imperial period, it seems anxiety should have shifted from the danger of the crowd to the danger of the autocrat, and aristocratic authors could have felt pity for the crowd, robbed of its say in its own fate. We see this attitude in Lucan with Caesar’s characterization as the ultimate autocratic nightmare who can only be stopped by his troops and more subtly with Cato’s corruption and the suffering it causes his troops. At the same time Lucan is uncomfortably aware that the events he so deplores are still sanctioned by crowds of Roman citizens. Caesar was

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186 4.186-188: Classica det bello, saevos tu neglege cantus;/ signa ferat, cessa: iam iam civilis Erinys/ concidet, “Should he give the signal for war, ignore the fierce cries; should he bear the standards, cease; then, then the civil strife will fall.”
187 4.205-236.
188 Caes. BC 1.74-76; Dio 41.22.4-23.1.
189 For the importance of the army to Imperial rule and the problems it posed for the emperor, see Campbell, 17-18.
190 See Millar, 35 for a discussion of the duality of the Roman Republican crowd as both dangerous rabble and a governing body.
beloved by the people, as was his successor Augustus, and if the *populus Romanus* was the true heart of the Republican government, they gave up their own power willingly. The citizens of the Roman Empire are no different from the citizens of the Roman Republic, emperors are enabled by armies of men just as Caesar and Pompey were – a fact Lucan’s readers will be reminded of in 69 – and all the power that Nero wields is not so different from Caesar’s. Lucan’s mutineers never succeed, not just because of the weight of the history of the civil war, but also because Lucan knows that crowds of citizens will submit to the tyrannical rule of many Julio-Claudians to come.

If Lucan was intent on exploring the nature of crowds, leaders and the power dynamic between them, with a mind to commenting on the present by using the past, why did he chose to do so with mutinies? The problematic move from Republic to Principate to Empire could be seen from the hindsight of the Neronian court as a crisis of *Romanitas* as the *populus Romanus* is stripped of its power, and civil war, as we have seen, is the ultimate crisis of *Romanitas*. Crowds of Roman citizens, once the center of the Republic, have become raving beasts by the time of Seneca: *ferarum iste conventus est*, he says of the urban crowd, *horum rabies ipsos a quibus est nutrita depascitur*.191 This *rabies* is not unique to crowds. In his *Historiae* Tacitus notes that *rabies* is one of the driving forces behind all civil wars, playing on many of Lucan’s themes: *non discessere ab armis in Pharsalia ac Philippis civium legiones, nedum Othonis ac Vitellii exercitus sponte posituri bellum fuerint: eadem illos deum ira, eadem hominum rabies, eaedem scelerum causae in discordiam egere*.192 Within the scope of Lucan’s poem, the mutineers in Book 5 corroborate the identification of civil war as *rabies* when they open their speech asking

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191 Sen. *De Ira* ii.8.3: “It is a meeting of beasts… whose raving madness consumes those who give sustenance.”
192 Tac. *Hist.* 2.38: “The legions of citizens did not part from their arms at Pharsalia or Philippi, nor were the armies of Otho or Vitellius going to set war down willingly: The same anger of the gods, the same raving madness of men, the same causes of crime drove them to conflict.”
to be released *a rabie scelerum*, but Caesar introduces a third identification for *rabies* in his response. At the very end of his speech, when he demands punishment for the ringleaders of the mutiny, Caesar refers to them as *quibus haec rabies auctoribus arsit*. Crowds, civil wars, and mutinies all possess *rabies* as they rage against what is right with potentially incendiary results.

In a sense, a mutiny is a microcosm of civil war, one part of a larger whole fighting against another, and so it makes perfect sense for Lucan to use moments of mutiny to explore his central crises of civil war in a more containable way. At the very start of the epic, when Caesar begins his journey across the Rubicon and faces down the apparition of Roma, the goddess does not initially address him as a commander but rather puts her questions to *viri*, addressing the army as a group of men under her command. Caesar calls himself *tuus miles* in his reply, reinforcing the image of Caesar as soldier and Roma as leader, but brushes past her with no regard for her requests and is soon being called *ductor*. Caesar perpetrates a one-man mutiny of his own, casting off his identification as Roma’s *miles* and setting out to attack his old mistress for his own purposes. The whole civil war is a mutiny against the highest authority, Roma herself, and each mutiny is a small civil war of its own. By the end of Lucan’s epic, the crowd – the symbol of the Republic – has tried to assert its power against the leaders of both sides of the conflict. The mutineers against both Caesar and Cato, despite their narrative differences, have become unified in their complaints and desires, but are both forced into submission by their respective autocrats – symbols of what Rome’s government will become – using the same tactics against their similarly fallible natures. Caesar’s great mutiny against Roma

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193 5.262.
194 5.359, “the ones by whose sponsorship this raving madness blazed.”
195 1.191.
196 1.202, 228.
is the only one that succeeds. Although the rise of Augustus is years away, by the time the
Bellum civile closes, Imperial rule has already won.
Bibliography


